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Benjamin Fondane (1898–1944) had many vocations, sometimes contradictory: 
he was a poet and a philosopher, a cineaste and an essayist, a disciplined 
polemicist and an unbounded absurdist. His varied activities overlap and yet 
remain distinct, greater than the sum of their parts. An existential horizon 
animated his life and work. He was a dedicated and original reader of philosophy, 
but resented its reductions and limitations. It was as a poet that he worked at the 
limits of what language could capture, playing with this boundary in a search to 
affirm existence itself. Confounded by the manifestations of modernity and swept 
up in the major historical events of his era, he brought his literary affinities and 
his Jewish heritage to bear on the revelatory aspects of catastrophe. Between the 
messianic potential of the extra-rational and the performance of human utterance 
he generated a reciprocity between poet and reader even through the inevitable 
failures of the text. In the ruins of Western culture at the end of the First World 
War he saw also the ruination of language itself. His poetic response, 
simultaneously anguished and celebratory, entailed a prophetic, apophatic 
resistance, a constant renewal which, when seen holistically with his work as a 
whole, represents what he called irresignation, a going-on without rational 
expectation of consolation. 
The thesis develops from the critical foundation of Fondane studies in 
French (and Romanian, Italian and German) and advances the overdue reception 
of Fondane’s work into English. The first part contextualizes his life, work and 
styles. The centre of the thesis is a sustained reading of his major poetic sequence 
L’Exode: Super Flumina Babylonis, informed by my work translating it (in 
collaboration with Henry King). The third part is a theoretical intervention in 
regards to Fondane’s assertion of the capacities of poetry at the boundaries of 
rational thought. A profound concern for the stakes of language and ineffability is 
the filament which weaves these parts together. 
Honouring Fondane’s own reservations about definitions, several notions 
are ventured as conceptual handholds while remaining conditional. 
Disconsolation, for example, the ongoing desire for an answer to life in the face of 
the absurdity of such a quest, and the context that engenders irresignation as 
Fondane’s response; together they are considered through a discussion of literary 
mood and tone. A certain idea of anamnesis – remembering that some things 
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cannot be adequately remembered – is crucial to the apophatic considerations of 
the thesis. Crucially, a paradoxical notion of art as a kind of subversive 
celebration, valuable precisely for its capacity to sustain contradictions, is put 
forward as a way of following the paths towards which Fondane gestures.  
These theoretical concerns are bolstered by comparisons with 
contemporary poets Laura (Riding) Jackson and Edmond Jabès. The rich and 
living poetry of L’Exode, with its plethora of voices, forms and experiments, its 
ancient myth and radical modernity, exemplifies Fondane’s work of recuperation 
and restitution, his refusal either to resign himself to the status quo or to sweep the 
slate clean. The thesis explores the ways in which this poetic witness affirms 
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Paris, mur des lamentations | réservé à plus tard 
[Paris, wailing wall | reserved for a later date] 
 
(from L’Exode, MF 179; CO 173) 
 
 
On the 14th of June 1940, the Nazi army drove into Paris. The French capital had 
marked a decisive moment in its history as the ‘capital of modernity’ in 1871, when 
the tragedy of the Commune ended with Prussian troops staging a victory parade 
down Baron Haussmann’s wide, uniform boulevards. In 1940, the farce of French 
military strategy had seen the ‘most modern army of its time’ (Bartov 1994), the 
Wehrmacht, sweep across the territory of its southern neighbour with relative ease. In 
the années folles, the city of light had literalized its Enlightenment nickname, as 
electricity set its streets artificially ablaze with shop fronts, billboards, cinema palaces 
and nightclubs. Now smoke filled the air from burning petrol reserves.  
  1940 also heralded the mass production of penicillin, the discovery of carbon-
14, the sale of the first nylons, the development of the Z2 computer, the first artificial 
hip surgery, the invention of plastic contact lenses and the Frisch–Peierls 
memorandum on the viability of the atomic bomb. Yet as the historian Hanna 
Diamond recounts in her book Fleeing Hitler, nearly a quarter of the population of 
France (around 8 million people), ‘more people […] on the move than at any time in 
previously recorded history’ (Diamond 2007, 2) took part in a chaotic flight bereft of 
modern comforts. One eyewitness commented ‘in the space of four days, France had 
jumped backwards six centuries, finding itself at the gates of a medieval famine’ 
(Diamond 2007, 2). Diamond describes how ‘railways could not cope […] Parisians 
continued their journey on foot […] as they took to the roads, they encountered 
exhausted and frightened evacuees from Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg along 
with fellow citizens from the north and east of the country […] no one had planned 
for this exodus and the result was total chaos with an enormous price to pay in terms 
of human misery and suffering’ (Diamond 2007, 1–2).  
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  Diamond narrates the proliferation of bicycles, horses and carts, and the vast 
numbers walking, most of whom had packed in haste or not at all. Their numbers 
quickly increased as petrol ran out for the privileged minority with motor transport. 
Hunger led to the pillaging of fields and townships, and German aircraft struck at 
random like lightning on the slow-moving lines of civilians. Confusion reigned, 
exacerbated by the refugees’ shock at their abandonment by the French state and 
military, and generalized suspicion due to the fear of a fifth column. The writer 
Camille Bourniquel remarked ‘only an experience in the Bible could represent this 
surge of humanity’ (Diamond 2007, 2). 
 This catastrophic event seemed to disrupt time. It represented both a peak of 
modernity in the might of the German army and a throwing-open of time, so that its 
human effects seemed not so much bracketed by a historical present as part of a flow 
of disruption and displacement which was more easily approached through religious 
and literary lenses. The Parisian avant-gardes, accelerators of the future, were 
confronted with a vanguard of modern steel. While some of the right-wing minority, 
such as Pierre Drieu La Rochelle and Céline, welcomed Hitler not so differently to 
the way Hegel welcomed Napoleon, most were cast into the same disarray as other 
civilians. A few, especially if they were Jewish or had already fled Germany (or both, 
such as Walter Benjamin), had particular prescience of the stakes involved, though in 
most cases it did not help prepare them for the German victory. Avant-gardes already 
had form in artistically responding to modernity’s violence, such as Rimbaud at the 
Commune or Picasso with Guernica.1 Such events defeated simple understanding for 
those who lived through them, and exposed the inadequacy of the means available to 
attempt to communicate their significance. 
 One such writer who nonetheless made the attempt was the idiosyncratic poet 
and philosopher Benjamin Fondane. Fondane was also a cineaste, visual artist, 
polemicist and translator who mingled extensively with the dadaists, surrealists and 
Grand Jeu group without formally attaching himself to any of them. In the early 
1930s, he had been making a name for himself in Parisian literary circles with the 
publication of poem-sequences such as Ulysse and Titanic, lyric narratives of 
 
1 See for example Rimbaud’s ‘Chant de guerre parisien’ (Rimbaud 2009, 73) and Kristin Ross’s book 
The Emergence of Social Space: Rimbaud and the Paris Commune (Ross 2008) or T.J. Clark’s Picasso 
and Truth (Clark 2013). 
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wandering and of disaster. Their mostly free, disjointed verses mixed dissatisfaction 
and alienation at modern life with the desire for new horizons, and startling, 
personalised, surreal imagery with cityscapes, images lifted from cinema and 
descriptions of nameless masses – workers and emigrants – who had thus far received 
a miserly distribution of the future. This combination of individual and mass 
experience of alienation would eventually lead him to coin the untranslatable 
expression le mal des fantômes, which became the title of a later collection and 
ultimately his chosen title for his collected French poetry.2 Around the same period, 
he had also been working on a different project without publishing it, one that 
employed his Jewish heritage much more explicitly. No significant part would be 
published until after his death, but it was finished in 1942 or 1943, when he wrote an 
afterword that, in an understated way, indicated he viewed the work as a kind of 
resistance to the triumph of fascism. In uncanny fashion, the work was called 
L’Exode, or to give its full title, L’Exode: Super flumina babylonis [Exodus: By the 
Rivers of Babylon].  
 Fondane, less complacent than some Europeans regarding the menace of 
Nazism, had already considered emigrating to the Americas in the 1930s, but had 
been hampered, like Benjamin, by his poverty (Salazar-Ferrer 2004, 187). He thus 
directly experienced the invasion and latter-day exodus. In L’Exode, his deep and 
broad use of Biblical imagery to confront modernity – analogous to the way other 
modernist writers and he himself drew on classical sources – pre-empted the events 
which seemed to literally collapse the different worlds into one another. L’Exode was 
unlike any sequence he had written before. Though it contained elements of the same 
surreal, genre-subverting lyrics of his other poems, it brought together a host of 
different characters and poetic forms into an original and quasi-dramatic texture.  
 Many of the characters of L’Exode are lifted straight from the Bible, but their 
creation is also – and sometimes simultaneously – influenced by antecedents of 
modernity such as François Villon and Nietzsche, as well as by cultural fields as 
diverse as kabbalah and the music hall. This use of characters parallels the ideas 
 
2 It is sometimes rendered as the pain, sorrow or sickness of ghosts; Vassiliki Kolocotroni ventures 
‘phantom trouble’. Mal has no direct equivalent and I also feel that no English translation captures the 
duality of this malaise or ache being both with and of ghosts, the hurting and the haunting of masses of 
people devalued in actuality and in history. 
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Fondane was concurrently developing around existential dimensions of aesthetics, in 
his burgeoning vocation as an existential philosopher. Drawing often on Shakespeare 
and Nietzsche – a focus encouraged by his philosophical guide Leon Shestov – he 
was coming to the view that the truest existential statements are brought out by a 
Wildean ‘truth of masks’.In his afterword, he wrote that ‘celui qui parle décline son 
identité tout de suite [the one who speaks immediately discloses their identity]’(MF 
208) but this character-identity serves a particular literary purpose, and allows the 
author to sidestep philosophical responsibility for the utterance, as a kind of psychic 
protection which allows the speaking of thoughts too intemperate to state directly.3 
 The interplay of different voices also creates a relational emphasis in which 
new angles are revealed and poetry’s palinodic capacity to sustain contradiction 
comes to the fore. Yet it may be that the distance Fondane was seeking also 
contributed to an early dissatisfaction with the work. We will probably never know 
for certain the ‘obscure scruples’ (MF 207) that held him back from publishing in the 
1930s. But it may be that despite his juxtaposition of varied poetic forms, the 
realization of his vision was struggling to find the shape that best suited it. His 
philosophical development was also seeking new outlets, as he sought to balance his 
anarchic ‘ransacking of the safeboxes of philosophy’ (Lescure 1998, 23, my 
translation) with his poetic activity. Certain passages of the work, such as the verses 
he puts into the mouths of Hebrew alphabet letters or the soliloquies of three 
unnamed men, attest to this struggle. 
 The invasion of 1940 energized its victims even as it threw them into a panic. 
André Morize wrote of ‘a deeply moving and pitiful mixture of bravery and panic, 
calm courage, distress, and (what a marvellous thing) good humour, the will to live 
and fear of death’ (cited in Diamond 2007, 53). These contradictory qualities are 
reflected in Fondane’s additions to his poem in the 1940s as surely as the streams of 
human lives, the horses and carts and the death and destruction. Fondane scholar 
Olivier Salazar-Ferrer argues that in L’Exode ‘the ghostly reality of the narrative 
subject in Ulysse and Titanic was saved by his cry’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2004, 178, my 
translation). The dramatic dialogue is interrupted right in the middle by the return of 
the lyric je, only a je marked by radical self-interrogation and peri-utterative, 
 
3 See also his discussion of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms (CM 234). 
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questioning expostulations. Fondane had come to place particular emphasis on 
performances at the limits of utterance, such as the cry, or wail [le cri], and the 
prayer, in his essays (CM 25; EM 39). Now these concerns irrupted into his poetic 
sequence in the form of an ‘Intermède [Interlude]’ subtitled Colère de la vision 
[Visionary anger], which ambiguously hovers between the poet’s rage at what he is 
witnessing and frustrations with his own art. 
 Fondane had previously tried to reconcile his desire to make his poetry touch 
reality with his own position at a remove from the epicentre of tangible historical 
events. Now, instead of bearing witness from the edges, a position that characterizes 
Ulysse, he was caught in the maelstrom. His Shestovian understanding of the 
absurdity of history, akin to Walter Benjamin’s, had already stripped him of any 
illusions of stability and security in the modern world. Despite his distrust of notions 
of progress, his contributions to anti-fascist debates had earlier (in 1935’s L’Ecrivain 
devant la révolution) led him to proclaim the uselessness of literature in resistance to 
war and oppression, a position he honoured when he was called up to the French 
army prior to the German victory. Now, however, he came to understand his practice 
of poetry as its own kind of resistance. His most famous poem, the 1942 Préface en 
prose to L’Exode, circulated as an act of defiance during the Occupation and stands 
as an immaterial resistance to fascism and racism to this day. 
 Anne Mounic, another Fondane scholar, argues that  
 
from the point of view of a narrative conceived as a singular subject’s 
existential perception of events shared, in one way or another, by the whole 
(whether or not they are ‘historic’), the importance of myth reveals itself, not 
as a chimera leaping from a fanciful imagination, but as the common thread 
of our effort to live and our belonging in the world. (Mounic 2017, 88, my 
translation)  
 
The importance of myth, alchemized through a dramatic dialogue, cannot be 
overstated in Fondane’s poem. Yet the lyric voice, inserted into the work as a direct 
response to his lived experience of catastrophe, brings it to a new degree of artistic 
force, in which the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.  
 The lyric passages of the Intermède and the Préface cut through the more 
esoteric aspects of the sequence as it had previously existed. Yet rather than 
straightforwardly undermining them, the tension between the vivid immediacy of the 
6 
 
lyric voice and the mythic diversity of the rest of the work raised the latter to a new 
degree of relevance. Though the author ‘était fort loin de penser qu’il prophétisait 
[hardly imagined he was prophesying]’ (MF 208) in 1934, his images of exile and 
exodus beyond the bounds of history took on new sharpness as his bruised but 
impassioned lyric voice responded to the force of the present. 
 The fourth poem of the Intermède exemplifies the immediacy and skill of 
Fondane’s blending of various elements. It speaks, in a first person plural, the 
questions and the flotsam of hopes whirling round the refugees’ minds, passed around 
to the point of becoming impersonal. This effect is heightened by the form, which is 
reminiscent of the style of a popular earworm. 
 
Qu’allons-nous faire si les fleuves 
l'un après l’autre nous quittaient? 
Mon Dieu, mon Dieu, qu’allons-
nous faire? 
 
La Meuse nous a fuis, la gueuse, 
et la Somme s’est fait enlever… 
Si tous le fleuves nous quittaient 
qu’allons-nous faire? 
 
La Marne, ô rusée, ô jolie, 
Pourquoi es-tu restée au lit? 
Ô Seine, c’est de la folie! 
           Mon Dieu! 
 
Il reste la Loire, elle attend, 
elle nous attend sûrement, 
toute nue parmi ses joncs 
         – n’est-ce pas, ô Loire? 
 
Mais si elle aussi nous quittait, 
à quoi bon le pain et le lait, 
s’il en demeure sur la terre? 
 
Si elle aussi, elle s’en allait… 
Mon Dieu, mon Dieu, qu’allons-
nous faire? 
What are we going to do if the rivers 
one after another should leave us? 
Oh God, oh God, what will we do? 
 
 
The Meuse gave us the slip, the bitch, 
and the Somme’s been carried off... 
If all of the rivers should leave us 
what will we do? 
 
Sweet Marne, so canny, so pretty, 
why did you stay in your bed? 
Oh Seine, this is insanity, 
  Oh God! 
 
There’s still the Loire, she's waiting, 
she’s waiting for us for certain, 
naked between her banks 
– isn’t that so, dear Loire? 
 
But if she were to leave us too, 
what would bread and milk be worth, 
supposing there’s any left on earth? 
 
If she, if she left too... 
Oh God, oh God, what will we do? 
 
 




Bread and milk appear as quasi-Biblical images, the essential stuff of life symbolized 
in poetry – but they are also figuring as a very prosaic, very immediate concern. 
Diamond notes that ‘crossing the Loire seemed to promise safety’. She reproduces 
the account of Léon Werth: ‘they [the Germans] pass the Somme, the Oise. Even if 
they pass the Seine nothing is lost. We will fight them on the Loire. We will have no 
shortage of rivers and strategy is the science of rivers’ (Diamond 2007, 64–65). 
 The commonplace ejaculation ‘mon Dieu!’ took on a new significance in a 
context where the complancency of everyday life had been turned upside down by an 
overwhelming event. Fondane, shaken from his artistic milieu and ‘brusquement […] 
jeté dans la campagne de France [abruptly thrown into the countryside of France]’ 
(MF 176) would have been as shaken as his fellow refugees, though perhaps less 
surprised. His prose writings of the 1930s betray an uncommon prescience of the 
imminent disasters. His poetry, fed, like the perceptions of those around him on the 
roads, by information and misinformation flowing on the radio and from mouth to 
mouth, also allowed him to make something more of this input by drawing on rich 
resources of form, image and existential reflection. In the seventh poem of the 
Intermède, the voice of the present and the voice of myth interchange and overlap 
like radio channels: 
 
Nous laissions derrière nous Paris.  
                                  Ah! si jamais 
je t’oublie, Jérusalem… À présent 
tu n’étais plus une ville, mais une   
                                  vieille hostie 
un pain de chair, de sang 
qui est resté là-bas, mais que nous  
                                     emportions 
avec nous – dans la captivité,  
                                         l’outrage 
dans l’angoisse, l’offense et le  
                                  vomissement. 
Douce rivière, ô Siloé! 
Ô Seine! et toi Paris, mur des  
                                   lamentations 
réservé à plus tard 
quand Assyrie enflée comme une  
                               vessie immense 
crèvera! 
 
We were leaving Paris behind us. Ah!  
                                                  If ever 
I forget you, Jerusalem... From that  
                                                moment 
you were a city no more, but an old  
                                   piece of the Host 
bread of flesh and blood 
that stayed put, but which we were  
                                                carrying 
with us – through captivity, insult, 
through anguish, offence and vomiting. 
Sweet river, O Siloam! 
O Seine! and you, Paris, wailing wall 
reserved for a later date 
when Assyria, swollen like a huge  
                                               bladder 
will burst! 
 
How many Jews on this earth, Lord!  
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Que de Juifs sur cette terre,  
            Seigneur! et qui sans doute 
T’ont oublié, cous raides et têtes  
                                      fortes. Oui, 
et pourtant nous criions vers Toi.  
                             Te souviens-Tu 
du bouc, jadis, que la forte main  
                                           d’Aaron 
imposait et chassait dans le désert,  
                                            chargé 
de nos impuretés? Me voici Aaron. 
Je me mets à genoux et je sanglote  
                                              et crie 
en une langue que j’ai oubliée,  
                                        mais dont 
je me souviens aux soirs émus de  
                                       Ta Colère:  
‘Adonaï Elochenu, Adonaï Echod!’ 
 
                          who have doubtless 
forgotten you, stiff-necked and  
                                 headstrong. Yes, 
and yet we were crying out to You. Do  
                                       You remember 
the goat, back then, that the strong  
                                        hand of Aaron 
fell upon and chased into the desert,  
                                                     laden 
with our uncleaness? Now I am Aaron. 
I go down on my knees and I sob and  
                                                          cry 
in a language I have forgotten, but  
                                                     which  
I remember in the impassioned  
                       evenings of Your Anger: 
‘Adonai Eloheinu, Adonai Eḥad!’ 
 
(MF 179–180; CO 172–174) 
 
The affective reality of the mythical history is reactivated by the very concrete 
present reality. The rivers of France map in association with the Siloam, river lost to 
the Jews in the first Jewish-Roman war.  
 The Siloam is where Jesus sent a blind man to recover his sight (John 9). The 
longing for knowledge tends to be juxtaposed in Fondane’s work with reminders of 
humanity’s suffering, mortal state. The Christian desire for salvation, carried in the 
poem’s image of the wafer, is given a tragic pathos in the face of the material 
conditions of its setting. The identity of the exile, rent from the physical and social 
fabrics that normally allow it to help constitute itself, is dependent on memory alone, 
clung to and carried ‘through anguish, offence and vomiting’. The fusion of the 
expression of alienation in modernity with a poetic reactivation of Jewish mythos 
create both a powerful assertion of and a resistance to the ‘metaphysics of exile’ 
(Salazar-Ferrer 2004, 178–179). The Jewish experience becomes generalised: ‘Que 
de Juifs sur cette terre, Seigneur! [How many Jews on this earth, Lord!]’  
 Significantly, the last stanza of this poem dramatizes an uncertainty of 
understanding and expression in the hour of failure and abandonment. The speaker’s 
self-characterization as Aaron is ambiguous: is the poem doing the work of the 
scapegoat, charged with a confession of humanity’s failings and weaknesses? If so, 
the poet recognizes its inability to fulfil the task of absolution. The poet speaks of the 
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limits of speaking, falling to sobbing and crying. He speaks in ‘une langue que j’ai 
oubliée’. The prayer-words of the last line are at the absolute limits of signification; 
they are an irrational, fragmented, ritualized gesture as much as linguistic signs. 
 The thread of this thesis is bound up with Fondane’s struggle with the limits of 
language, of how catastrophe exposes the inherent insufficiencies of human attempts 
at communication and reconciliation through words. He himself had previously 
abandoned poetry altogether for several years, bereft at the crumbling of the faith he 
had invested in Symbolist aesthetics. Yet he returned to it, and as his hard-won 
commitment to poetry shows, it also became the site of a vital and affirmative 
resistance, not only to ineffability but also to the elements he considered to be 
detrimental to the celebration and assertion of life in its plenitude, from 
overconfidence in idealist philosophy to the terrible destruction wrought by the Nazis. 
After the exodus and the surrender of France, he returned to Paris along with the bulk 
of its inhabitants. There, at great personal risk, he refused to obey Nazi and Vichy 
laws, living clandestinely in occupied Paris until the end of his life, working, against 









Si, par contre, une limite est, pour vous, ‘une torture et un aiguillon’, si 
vous êtes de ceux qui, pas toujours, mais ne fût-ce qu’une fois, ont crié 
que la logique ne saurait résister à un homme qui veut vivre; si vous 
étouffez en un monde qui n’a ni portes ni fenêtres, et pensez que c’est le 
rôle de la métaphysique de les faire surgir, alors, seulement, votre passion 
sera existentielle. 
 
[If, however, a limit is a ‘torture and a spur’ for you, if you are one of 
those who has cried out – not all the time but even just once – that logic 
cannot resist a man who wants to live, if you are suffocating in a world 
that has neither doors nor windows and think it is metaphysics’ job to 
conjure them up, only then will your passion be existential.] 
 
from Le Lundi Existentiel (LE 62; EM 28) 
 
Benjamin Fondane was an agonistic philosopher. On one hand he was a studious 
reader of major philosophical texts and a fierce and dedicated interlocutor with them. 
On the other, he resented the project of philosophy itself, chafing at the reductions 
and limitations inherent in any attempt to reason with the world. This tension is 
appropriate, for as a poet he valued the sustaining of contradictions very highly. Like 
the surrealist group, of which he was almost a de facto member, if – like his friend 
Antonin Artaud – an idiosyncratic one, he saw in poetry a route to going beyond 
quotidian, rationalized perceptions. However, he was deeply divided from the line of 
André Breton because he ultimately saw in surrealism the same hubristic confidence 
of masterful interpretation he condemned in idealistic philosophy. While the latter 
suppressed the irrational entirely, the former became guilty of rationalizing it in turn, 
what the Fondane scholar and publisher Michel Carassou refers to as a ‘systemization 
of the irrational’ (Carassou 1999, 15, my translation).  
 One way to understand Fondane’s position is to consider that philosophers have 
always tried to guarantee the supremacy and absolute clarity of the logos, and poets 
have always subverted this by playing on the ambiguity of words, right from the 
starting point that one word – one signifier, even one letter – can have two 
diametrically opposed meanings. The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
witnessed many projects in many domains that considered themselves modern in the 
project of attempting to to bring mundane reality into line with the perfection of 
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ideals. From grand projects such as ‘scientific’ Marxism to the a priori economics of 
the Austrian school which underpin neoliberalism, many trends in modernity, 
explicitly or implicitly, sought to make reality conform to theory. For others, Fondane 
among them, modernity exposed the ideal world as a fraud, leaving us only with 
reality as we live it and with the conflicting, contradictory medium of language as our 
only means for navigating a fundamental cultural disunity. The logos is no longer 
guaranteed by a divine or otherwise ideal super-reality, whether conceived in 
grandiose terms, such as the Supreme Being of the French revolution, or more 
covertly, as in Whig history and its latter-day mutations. However, language remains 
the nexus of communication for our existence. By using it to gesture to what it cannot 
capture, the poet can seek to affirm existence itself. 
 The tension between the processes of reason and the excess that always remains 
outside of any definition is crucial to Fondane’s work. In his key essay Faux Traité 
d’esthétique [Pseudo Treatise on Aesthetics] he wrote: 
 
On ne peut guère nier la duplicité de notre art. Mais il est très probable 
qu’elle tient principalement à la duplicité de l’artiste moderne. En tant 
qu’homme, il croit à une réalité naturelle et mécanique qu’en tant qu’artiste 
il ne peut que repousser de toutes ses forces; mais il ne parvient à croire, en 
tant qu’homme, à ce qu’artiste il tient pour vrai. Conflit déchirant et qui ne 
peut se résoudre par un compris – et fût-ce un compromis hégélien.  
 
[We cannot deny the duality of our art. But it is very probable that it 
primarily originates in the duality of the modern artist. As a man, he believes 
in a natural and mechanistic reality that as an artist he must push against 
with all his strength. Yet as a man he cannot make himself believe what, as 
an artist, he holds as true. This is a terrible conflict and one that cannot be 
resolved by a compromise – even if it were a Hegelian one.] (FT 106) 
 
The problem of life’s irrational aspects is fundamentally bound up with the problem 
of the limits of language. As a vehicle for rational thinking, language constantly trips 
against the irrational impulses that fail to ever be fully categorized by it. For Fondane, 
the liminal space of this conflict is the terrain of the poet. 
 The philosopher Ann Van Sevenant argues that Fondane is ‘undoubtedly a 
precursor of twentieth century philosophy of difference’ (Van Sevenant 2007). She 
describes his work as pressing the reader to ‘continue the many discontinuous 
meanings that haunt not only texts, but also each individual experience’ (Van 
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Sevenant 2007). The failures of language are productive failures, and the poet bets on 
the space they open, on their capacity to make something happen beyond themselves. 
The critic Patrice Beray argues that 
 
in Fondane’s work the time of invention in and through language is allied 
with the ‘address of the witness’, which achieves the convergence of a 
personal account and a factual or historical relation. But for the poem to 
exist, the narration and the linear story must ineluctably make way for the 
temporality and spatiality that the ‘present’ of writing creates in its own right 
[…] Alone, the discourse of the poem, without a ‘reason’, steps forward into 
the unknown. (Beray 2006, 238–243, my translation)  
 
A certain kind of reciprocity is hoped for by the poet, precisely in the generation of 
meaning in the anticipated encounter between text and reader.  
 As is made evident in interlinguistic translation, meaning is consistently being 
both lost and created. Each interpretation of language sends meaning transformed 
back to its origin, changing how that origin may be received in turn. My own 
engagement with Fondane has been shaped by my practice of translating his work 
from French into English. Jacques Derrida drew extensively on the practice of 
translation in his own thinking about language. In his work Monolingualism of the 
Other, he writes of the paradox that each poet creates their own idiolect that is 
nonetheless oriented towards a reader. He claims that 
 
language is for the other, coming from the other, the coming of the other 
[…] the fact that there is no necessarily determinable content in this promise 
of the other, and in the language of the other, does not make any less 
indisputable its opening up of speech by something that resembles 
messianism, soteriology, or eschatology […] what remains insurmountable 
[…] whatever the necessity or legitimacy of all emancipations, is quite 
simply the ‘there is a language’ […] there is no metalanguage (Derrida 1998, 
68–69) 
 
This interminable dwelling between messianism and human utterance is a pertinent 
parallel to Fondane’s deployment of Jewish scripture in his poetry.  
 Derrida continues: 
 
This is not to say that language is monological and tautological, but that it is 
always up to a language to summon the heterological opening that permits it 
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to speak of something else and to address itself to the other […] It can also 
be given over, without betrayal, to other inventions of idioms, to other 
poetics, without end. (Derrida 1998, 69) 
 
At a time when many of his avant-garde fellows were attempting to ground a 
definitive artistic praxis, Fondane performed this act of opening towards a poetics 
without end, a poetics that also resisted political attempts to ‘end history’, 
maintaining always the ‘heterological’ possibility of a connection with the other, in 
defiance of pre-determination of either form or content.  
 For Fondane, the poetic act has a profoundly existential dimension. Analysing 
the ‘negative’philosophy of his philosophical mentor Shestov, Luca Governatori 
argues that, ‘where the philosopher [Shestov] sought somehow to prove, in a battle 
lost in advance, the world’s ultimately non-apprehensible nature, the artist simply 
wants us to experience it’ (Governatori 2002, 14, my translation). This is the task 
Fondane sets himself as a poet. In his essay ‘Silence in Debris’, the writer China 
Miéville quotes Fondane’s opposition of living and knowing (Miéville 2019, 5).1 In 
his own apophatic approach to history, Miéville sets out the ‘presence’ of silence in 
the debris of modernity’s catastrophes, arguing with Fondane that we ignore it at our 
peril. Ι came to Miéville’s essay after having conceived the thesis title, but the 
parallel is felicitous. The ruins of modernity’s ideals also entail a kind of confusion 
and ruination of language, as the sound poems of Dada showed. The whole question 
of Fondane’s poetry became how to speak with and from these ruins. 
 L’Exode, as the poet Claude Vigée claims, is arguably Fondane’s major poetic 
work (Vigée 2007). In collaboration with Henry King, I have been working on 
translating it for several years, with extracts published in magazines and in the first 
Fondane anthology to appear in English (Cinepoems and Others), and a full edition 
forthcoming. Accordingly, it is the focal point for my critical and theoretical 
discussion of Fondane’s work as an artist, philosopher and critic. My readings of it 
form the axis around which the thesis turns. As I shall set out, these readings are not 
straightforward literary criticism (Patrice Beray has done the best and most extensive 
formal and metrical analysis of Fondane’s work to date, in his 2006 book Benjamin 
 
1 Fondane asks, subversively but honestly, ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un philosophe pour lequel la liberté ne 
commence que là où la connaissance finit? [What kind of philosopher is he who does not accept that 
freedom begins where knowledge ends?]’ (CM 30; EM 44) 
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Fondane, au temps du poème). Instead, they attempt, to some degree, to respond to 
the holistic and idiosyncratic tendencies of Fondane’s own critical work. 
 The thesis comprises three main parts. The first is mainly expository, a survey 
of Fondane’s life, work and reception history; his context in and responses to 
modernity and modernism; and a discussion of the methodological concerns around 
critically studying a contradictory field and a defiantly category-resistant author. The 
second part is where the main readings are developed. The third represents an 
argument for understanding Fondane’s work in open-ended ethical and theoretical 
ways, following his own defence of associative over syllogistic modes of thought to 
posit functions of poetry that are powerful yet provisional in definition. All three are 
overlain and interwoven with a linguistic element: the importance of the limits of 
rational discourse and the effects of ineffability are held up in sustained apposition to 
the discussion of Fondane’s work. 
 Fondane is under-known in the English-speaking world, although the situation 
is rapidly changing. In Part I, Chapter 1 balances introducing Fondane for the reader 
with the need to focus on what is essential for grounding the arguments of the thesis, 
rather than being comprehensive. A discussion of his biography highlights his 
relation to artistic and philosophical trends and some of the issues around defining his 
life and legacy. An overview of his reception follows, examining the history of his 
work after the Second World War, including the attention he has received from critics 
writing in English. A brief survey of his work, in its various domains, is included, 
again with a focus on what is most relevant for the current study. A literature review 
covers the existing field of Fondane scholarship, as well as the theoretical 
associations that have been most important for the thesis. Finally, the methodological 
difficulties of academically approaching an author whose stated desire was to 
‘dédorer la séduction [strip off the seductive glitter]’ (CM 30; EM 45) of academic 
discourse are discussed, and Fondane is placed in a loose context of idiosyncratic 
modernist writing that blurs the boundaries between criticality and creativity. 
 Chapter 2 takes a broader approach to understanding Fondane’s primary 
philosophical and artistic concerns and situating these with his contemporary 
contexts. For Fondane, the absurdity and suffering of life could be understood and 
confronted by way of catastrophic events; catastrophe, for all its terrors, also held a 
possibility of revelation and renewal. Thus this chapter looks at Fondane’s 
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understanding of modernity as catastrophe, shorn of the cultural unity that has at 
times been consolatory for humanity in the face of disaster. His critique of Humanism 
and turn to the existential metaphysical angles he saw exposed by this view of history 
are set out. These are then related back to the notion of ineffability, and its resonances 
from negative theology, which help to frame both his extra-rational take on 
philosophy and his poetics, as they did for contemporary writers such as Kafka, Celan 
and Jabès. Chapter 2 concludes by tying this awareness of ineffability with the 
challenge of responding to historical events, their resistance to full rational 
comprehension and the possible value of extra-rational responses. 
 This is a thesis that constitutes a sustained engagement with the insufficiencies 
of terminology: with the contradiction acknowledged, Chapter 3 sets out its 
keywords. The notion of ‘disconsolation’, formulated partly in contrast to the role of 
philosophy as consolation, is put forward as one way of thinking about the paradox of 
Fondane’s declaration of the essential suffering of existence and his determination to 
affirm existence’s intrinsic value. This state, which, in his worldview, could only be 
surpassed messianically, is the terrain from which the attitude he called 
‘irresignation’ can spring. In a theoretical move which is intended to be functional 
rather than conclusive, these two terms are linked to poetic notions of mood and tone, 
as a means to reading them as effects in his poetry when they cannot be considered as 
independent from his philosophical work, nor as didactically ‘carried’ by his poems. 
Several other key terms are also discussed proleptically for their development in the 
analysis, including the concept of poetic testimony, what Beray calls the ‘discours du 
témoin’ (Beray 2006, 238). 
 Instead of a purely linear unfolding, the thesis contains two chapters that 
diverge from the central focus on Fondane to enrich the argument and context 
through comparison. The first of these is chapter 4, which acts as an interlude 
between the introduction of disconsolation, irresignation and testimony and the 
deeper engagement with them in L’Exode. Chapter 4 uses a contrasting comparison 
between Fondane and his contemporary Laura (Riding) Jackson in order to expound 
and clarify his relationship to language and its insufficiencies, and the ways his 
struggle to respond to the resulting aporiae became a paradoxical but essential aspect 
of his poetic activity. The juxtaposition of this comparative chapter with those that 
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follow give another dimension for the reader’s engagement with Fondane’s poetic 
decisions. 
 Part II begins with chapter 5, which uses disconsolation to get to grips with 
L’Exode itself. Firstly, the prominent polyphonic and heteroglossic aspects of the text 
are reviewed. Secondly, the contradictory, yet mutually inclusive, enfolding of 
personal, historical and mythic temporalities in the work is connected to the ‘time of 
the poem’ (Beray 2006) and its (non) place of existential experience and affinity. 
Thirdly, the importance of characterisation and masks, key to the relationship 
between Fondane’s poetry and his philosophy, is introduced, particularly in 
connection with the notion of the tragic. 
 Chapter 6 then moves on to irresignation and L’Exode. It looks at the way the 
poem dramatizes the struggle against ineffability and makes its own existence a 
performance of irresignation, even as it questions the authority of its own 
categorizations. The exilic relationship between the ‘existent’ and reality, apparent in 
the distance created by language between the object of perception and the interpreter, 
is shown to parallel the work’s Jewish imagery. At the same time, by means of the 
poem’s avowed extra-rationality, this distance is resisted in poetry itself. The work’s 
affirmation of human life and human expression, even in the midst of irony, 
bitterness and degradation, is highlighted. These points are also related to the 
development of Fondane’s own critical stance on poetics, especially his relation to 
Rimbaud. The final part of the chapter consolidates L’Exode as part of Fondane’s 
extra-rational response to catastrophe. 
 Part III moves into a wider theoretical discussion. Chapter 7, Towards Poetic 
Testimony, returns to the problem of writing disaster. It argues that Fondane’s work, 
and L’Exode in particular, complicates distinctions between the eyewitness and the 
artist, both directly in terms of addressing specific catastrophes and more 
philosophically in terms of the fight of the existent to affirm their reality against what 
Fondane saw as the alienation that reduced individuals to ghosts, without falling into 
the trap of reifying overdetermination. The Lyotardian concept of anamnesis is useful 
here as a way of understanding the poet’s non-programmatic response to disaster. The 
elusive directions it gestures towards, without dictating, lead into a more direct 
assertion of three aspects of the subversiveness of Fondane’s poetic approach. 
Although irresignation entails affirmation of the existent and of existence, it can only 
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take place in a context of subversion.2 This context is at once linguistic, existential 
and ethical. Through eclectic readings of Fondane, poetry’s operations of 
contradiction, apposition and association are shown to be crucial. This tension 
between subversion and affirmation takes us to the greatest paradox of the chapter, an 
Achebean notion of art as a kind of subversive celebration that draws all of these 
contradictions into its atmosphere. 
 Chapter 8 completes Part III. It turns this consideration of poetic testimony 
towards intersubjective and ethical concerns. These concerns are (once again) 
somewhat paradoxical in Fondane’s work: in his philosophy he consistently attacks 
any science of ethics, yet crucial ethical aspects are to be found in between the lines, 
as is clear in most readings of his work. These aspects are necessarily resistant to 
straightforward definition, yet, building on the work of other Fondane scholars, as I 
do throughout the thesis, I argue that they become evident and active, if not 
categorically defined, in his poetry. Keeping his subversions and the ambiguity of 
subject positions in his work in play, I further examine the interpretive and 
interpellative elements of his poetry introduced in chapter 7, linking them to recent 
theoretical debates over ethics and intersubjectivity and arguing for his poetry’s 
creation of a proto-political space for relation. 
 Part III is succeeded by the second comparative chapter, this time finding 
affinity between Fondane and another contemporary, Edmond Jabès. Together, 
(Riding) Jackson and Jabès, both of whom survived the Second World War, make 
useful points of reference for Fondane, who did not. Where (Riding) Jackson 
responded to the difficulties of meaning by eventually rejecting poetry, Jabès 
responded to surviving catastrophe by dedicating himself to it, confronting the voids 
of meaning in the same medium that highlighted them. As with Fondane, Jewish 
tradition and negative theology helped give form, if not solace, to his expression. 
These formal and thematic connections bring the thesis full circle, back to its 
linguistic problematic: the impossibility of speaking and the necessity of doing so, 
and the importance of poetry as a means of going forward with this contradiction.  
 
 
2 L’existant is defined simply, in post-Sartrean existential philosophy, as a person or object existing 
concretely. I will examine the openness of Fondane’s use of the term to refer to a person in their 













Benjamin Fondane’s biographical and bibliographical contexts are extensively laid 
out in Olivier Salazar-Ferrer’s two monographs (2004, 2007). These situate the writer 
and the man in the milieu which characterized his reception and social setting in his 
own lifetime – as an homme de lettres, part of a European literary and artistic culture 
of intellectual debate, political positioning and avant-garde aesthetic affinities 
interwoven across varied media and forums, from the Nouvelle Revue Française to 
the cafés of the European capitals, with Paris the most lively or at least the most 
famous (Ory and Sirinelli 2004; Winock 1997). Salazar-Ferrer maintains a holistic 
overview of Fondane’s creative activities throughout. Drawing mainly on Salazar-
Ferrer’s work, here follows a review of aspects of his biography that relate to the 
concerns of the thesis. 
Fondane was born in Iași, Romania in 1898. Part of the city’s important Jewish 
community, he benefited from its rich Yiddish culture, not least in terms of theatre, 
music, literature and folklore. He also grew up in a period of strong anti-Semitism, 
including pogroms nearby. He wrote and published poetry from a young age, 
influenced by French symbolism. As a young man he moved to Bucharest, joining an 
avant-garde group, Insula, with which he created Romania’s first avant-garde theatre. 
In 1923, he moved to Paris, actively participating in the city’s avant-garde ferment. 
He reported on events in Paris for Romanian newspapers and journals, wrote literary 
criticism and film scripts, befriended Man Ray, Antonin Artaud, Constantin Brancusi, 
Arthur Adamov and many others (he knew Romanians such as Tristan Tzara already) 
and took part in the various ebbs and flows of movements such as Cubism, Dada, 
surrealism and Le Grand Jeu.  
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 However, he never pinned his colours to the mast of any particular group, 
which is one factor in his relative neglect in modernist posterity. In 1924, he had 
another crucial encounter, meeting the Russian philosopher Leon (or Lev) Shestov, 
who encouraged him to study philosophy more deeply and to write himself. Thus, 
Fondane contributed to the existential debates of the 1920s and 1930s, later 
overshadowed, like others such as Simone Weil and Rachel Bespaloff, by the post-
war celebrity of Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus.  
 Poetry was always central to his concerns. Fondane’s move to Paris, ironically 
in part a rebuke to what he saw as Romania’s slavish imitations of French culture, 
was also paralleled by what might be called a crisis of faith in poetry, outlined in his 
1929 essay ‘Mots Sauvages’. In that short essay, written to introduce a collection of 
his existing (Romanian) poems, he attests to an inability to write poetry lasting four 
years. This thesis pivots around that crisis, and Fondane’s return to poetry in the 
medium of the French language, the reasons for which he never stopped exploring in 
both the poems themselves and in his existential and aesthetic prose writings. As this 
thesis will explore, Fondane’s literary criticism and philosophical essays overlap with 
his poetry in their engagement with the endless problem of language as origin and 
experience of consciousness in the world. 
 Fondane was not only a literary participant in the artistic and intellectual 
ecosystem. He also worked as a disseminator: as well as reporting to Romania, he 
made trips to Argentina to introduce Dada and surrealist films to South America, 
meeting Jorge Luis Borges through his friend Victoria Ocampo. He also made his 
own film there, Tararira, now sadly lost. Of course, his move to France (he married a 
French woman, Geneviève, and eventually took French citizenship) also 
corresponded with the rise of fascism in Europe. Fondane took part in fierce debates 
over the role of writers and artists in fighting this new threat, and over the appropriate 
political response, including the role of Communism. At a time when many were 
drawn to political absolutes, Fondane — without claiming a sanctimonious neutrality 
— adopted a commitment to the ultimate autonomy of art and the elements of 
existence and culture which he saw as threatened by rationalizations of history, be 




 Fondane experienced the German invasion of 1940 and the mass flight from the 
north of France, one of history’s biggest immediate displacements. He was called up 
to fight and soon became a prisoner of war. He was released back into occupied Paris, 
soon having to live clandestinely as a subversive intellectual and identified as a Jew. 
He wrote poems for resistance journals, notably through Paul Eluard. He was 
betrayed to the Gestapo in 1944. Friends such as Emil Cioran (who credited him with 
turning him away from fascism), Stephane Lupasco and Eugene Ionesco pulled 
strings to obtain his release and passage to Argentina. However, he refused to 
abandon his sister, Line, and was sent to Auschwitz, where he was murdered. 
 Many strands of Fondane’s work and life bear upon readings of his oeuvre, 
which therefore run a constant danger of reducing it. In particular, these are his 
Jewishness; narrow conceptions of existential thought, and doubt at his autodidact 
and interdisciplinary encounters with philosophy; and his death. Add to this the 
challenge he presents to understanding the history of Dada and surrealism and the 
temptation to treat him in isolation from them and it would be easy to fall into the 
trap of treating his writing ‘as a kind of biographic key’, as Chris Kraus cautions in 
relation to Fondane’s contemporary Simone Weil (Kraus 2013, 18). 
 In the ongoing process of his reception, Fondane’s perceived national and 
cultural identities are often foregrounded. This is understandable as part of an 
impulse to situate him in a canon, but it sometimes comes at the expense of wider 
ramifications. In a jacket quote on Nathaniel Rudavsky-Brody’s translation of his 
poem Ulysse (the first to appear in English in its entirety), Brooks Haxton describes 
the work as the ‘meditative and rhapsodic travelogue of a Romanian Jew’ (Fondane 
2017). Fondane’s Jewishness is undoubtedly present in the poem. Yet his response to 
all aspects of ‘being Jewish’ is ambiguous. For him, the ‘essence’ of Judaism is a 
metaphysical or philosphical or theological or existential position, rather than an 
essential identity: 
 
beaucoup de Juifs, nés Juifs: un Bergson, un Freud, un Einstein, ne le sont 
guère ‘essentiellement’; ils le sont moins qu’un Pascal, ou un Kierkegaard, 
l’un exigeant le Dieu d’Abraham, d’Isaac et de Jacob, l’autre quittant Hegel 
avec éclat pour les ‘penseurs privés’, Job ou Abraham.  
 
[many Jews, born Jews — Bergson, Freud, or Einstein, for example — are 
not ‘essentially’ Jewish; less than Pascal, or than Kierkegaard, the first 
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insisting upon the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob, the second 
dramatically abandoning Hegel for the ‘private thinkers’ Job and Abraham.] 
(Fondane 1936) 
 
His poetry draws deeply and richly from Judaic literary and theological sources. 
Haxton’s description, though, is fairly typical, in that it risks mediating Fondane too 
narrowly through such an identity. In this thesis I aim to respect his biography 
without falling foul of that restriction. It is now possible to read the essays and poetry 
of Walter Benjamin and Paul Celan inclusive of their Jewish aspects without 
prefixing every mention of their name with ‘German Jew’; Fondane deserves the 
same. Of course, we cannot suspend the terrible suffering he went through by way of 
his Jewish identity, but it is worth remembering that anti-Semitism forced constraints 
of identity upon him (Beray 2009, 18–19). His statuses as Romanian, as French and 
as Jewish were singular starting points, neither fixed nor denied, but moved through 
on a philosophical and artistic journey towards multiplicity and plenitude. In this 
sense, Fondane is eminently modernist. Like the surrealists, he reserved the right to 
descend from Rimbaud rather than his given genealogy. 
 In his foreword to Ulysses, David Rieff laudably attempts to walk the blurred 
lines. Introducing Fondane is no easy task, as my own efforts here no doubt highlight. 
This is in part due to his shifting identities: Jewish, Romanian, French; poet, 
playwright, filmmaker, philosopher; unbeliever, avant-gardiste without a group, non-
combatant Résistant, underground man. It is also due to the variety of media and 
genres he worked across. Rieff seems to seek to prevent the reader pigeonholing him 
as a Sartrean existentialist. While this is quite correct, unfortunately he throws the 
baby out with the bathwater, writing ‘as an existentialist, he is no Camus or Sartre’ 
and ‘his philosophical work… is finally of the second rank’ (Rieff 2017, xiv). Such is 
Sartre’s preponderance in conceptions of existential thought that it is difficult to read 
‘existential’ without thinking ‘existentialism’. However for many existential thinkers 
and certainly for Fondane the ambitions birthed by the ‘-ism’ suffix are anathema. 
Sartre proclaimed that existentialism was a humanism, a move that later led Michel 
Foucault to refer to him as a ‘man of the nineteenth century’ (Foucault 1966), with a 
belief in historical progress centred on the human individual. For Fondane the 
contradictions of ‘progress’ were laid bare by the First World War and existential 
thought demands its rejection as a concept.  
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 Fondane gravitates around what might be called an ‘anti-Humanist humanism’: 
a rejection of Humanism as a historical and philosophical ideal that encounters a 
desperate concern for the human subject.1 This position, influenced by Shestov, 
maintains a deep skepticism towards the powers of human reason and knowledge and 
emphasizes the effect of forces beyond the individual’s control or even knowledge, 
be they social or metaphysical. At the same time it emphasizes a kind of radical 
freedom, though it does not presume to offer much in the way of solutions. Despite 
the pull of Sartre, in this thesis I will continue to use the term ‘existential’, not least 
because it is used by Fondane himself, e.g. in Le lundi existentiel et le dimanche de 
l’histoire [The Existential Monday and the Sunday of History]. Further, I aim to 
argue across this thesis that Fondane’s philosophical writings have more to offer 
when read in conjunction with his other work, rather than as an independent project. 
 In that sense, the use of the term ‘existential’ is not to be conflated with an 
ontological project. While to some extent in dialogue with phenomenology, 
Fondane’s work is more concerned with the lived experience of existence than 
defining its parameters and indeed he sets himself against the possibility of a rational 
explanatory framework for ‘le vécu’, much as he sets himself against a possibility of 
defining history. There is a careful line to be walked here. The consciously 
subjective, self-implicating and anti-systematic qualities of Fondane’s work are 
linked to his focus on existence, a focus which emphasizes personal lived experience, 
not least his own.  
 To be fair, Rieff’s dismissal of Fondane’s philosophy is in the service of 
emphasizing the expansive importance of poetry for Fondane, which, as Rieff cites, 
he himself opposes to philosophy as ‘a permanent threat of new acts, and with them 
the looming possibility of something stronger’ (translated by Rieff, from the essay 
‘L’Esprit et le temps: La conscience malheureuse’, Cahiers du Sud, no. 171, April 
1935). Here we are closer to the tensions in Fondane’s work which are at risk of 
being overshadowed by categories of identity or genre. Above either of these still 
looms a greater danger of overshadowing, as Rieff is keenly aware: ‘a horrific death 
at a … relatively young age is like a powerful acid dissolving the meaning of 
 




everything that had come before in a life’ (Rieff 2017, ix). Rieff’s opening sentence 
at once strenuously resists the problem of Fondane’s death governing his reception 
and lays bare the difficulty of doing so. The very effort of employing the first page to 
warn against the ‘biographer’s nightmare’, ‘rewriting’ the life so that the ‘manner of 
his… death becomes the star of the show’ to some extent undermines itself simply by 
continuing to use that death as the starting place.  
 In seeking other avenues into Fondane’s work, there are two points to be made 
concerning his death. He was a victim of the Nazi Holocaust, an event which tends to 
overload any language which addresses it: there is no question of reading his death 
against the grain, as Chris Kraus does that of Simone Weil, who died just before 
Fondane (Kraus 2017). Yet the witness he bears to his time is first and foremost the 
witness of a life and is not bounded by that event. Fondane’s responses to the horror 
bearing down on Europe and on himself can seem startlingly prophetic in retrospect 
and definitely drew upon his personal insight as an immigrant who was Jewish, or at 
least Jewish enough for the Nazis. But that clarity also comes from the unflinching 
regard he developed through his encounters with metaphysics and avant-garde 
movements. In essays like L’Homme devant l’histoire [‘Man Before History’] he 
addressed the context of the period so unsparingly that his words were not only 
challenging for his contemporaries but remain so today, refusing simplistic 
definitions of evil and implicating Western culture. His testimony is of tragedy, but of 
a wider tragedy, of human beings devalued by the very progress supposed to uplift 
them in the abstract. In poems like L’Exode, Jewishness expands to include the whole 
of humanity in suffering and the search for consolation. 
 The second point follows on from the first. Rieff is not wrong to describe 
Fondane as a ‘great poet and great soul who choked to death in a gas chamber’ (Rieff 
2017, xv). It is, however, important to state Fondane’s own emphasis on the 
ordinariness of every human life. He continually subverts the heroic. His Ulysses is 
Jewish, but he remains in a sense Everyman, as Leopold Bloom does. The very first 
lines of his poem Ulysse dismantle the image of the heroic artist: ‘J’étais un grand 
poète né pour chanter la joie/ — mais je sanglote dans ma cabine’ [‘I was a great 
poet, born to sing Joy/ — but I am sobbing in my berth’] (MF 17; Fondane 2017, 5, 
translated by Nathaniel Rudavsky-Brody). Yet he also inverts tragedy: informed by 
Shestovian philosophy, he brings the tragic into the ambit of everyday human 
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experience, as condensed in the figure of Job.2 Throughout Fondane’s work 
vulnerability is foregrounded in a way that refuses the elevation of his own suffering 
as privileged either by his status as an artist and intellectual or by the specific 
circumstances of his persecution.  
 The question of Fondane’s death is intimately tied up with his perspectives on 
history. In his philosophical writing history is constantly under question, as evident in 
titles such as L’Homme devant l’histoire and Le Lundi existentiel et le dimanche de 
l’histoire. Like Benjamin, he questions the hegemony of history as a narrative 
imposed upon the past, looking to the recuperation of the latter in its concreteness, 
while the former is always already contextualized by assumed concepts. Considering 
Benjamin’s own catastophic death, Irving Wohlfarth writes: 
 
A life, as we remember it, is sealed by its end; but, according to Benjamin, 
remembrance is also the retroactive power to ‘complete the incomplete 
[happiness] and undo the completed [suffering].’ This statement was too 
theological for his interlocutor, Horkheimer, who was too convinced that 
‘the murdered really have been murdered’ to be capable of being persuaded 
that past injustice can be undone. To this Benjamin replied that 
remembrance marks an ‘experience which forbids us from conceiving 
history in fundamentally atheological terms, however little we may attempt 
to write it in directly theological one’. (Wohlfarth 1997, 85) 
 
This theological horizon for the recuperation of the past is present in Shestov’s work 
(see Clark 2008). If Benjamin introduced it into a political context, Fondane did so in 
poetry. Verse XXII of Ulysse expresses the alienation of modernity, of knowing the 
exception is in fact the rule and awaiting the contact of the event (‘comme la crue 
houleuse d’une rivière en mars [like the furious rise of a river in March]’) to confirm 
it, ‘un digne événement de l’Histoire moderne [an event worthy of Modern History]’ 
(MF 53; Fondane 2017 97). In Le Mal des fantômes 1942–1943, the reader finds a 
ghostly injunction from those disappeared and silenced in history to value life as it is 
being lived: ‘inique Histoire! Eux – les conquérants! | Et nous – les égorgés! || on 
donnerait parfois l’éternité | pour une de ces heures de la terre [iniquitous history! 
 
2 For more on the philosophical currents around what Christopher Hamilton calls the ‘tragedy of 
modernity’, see his 2016 book A Philosophy of Tragedy, especially chapter 5, ‘Among the Ruins’, 
which mentions Shestov. This philosophical context is certainly important for reading Fondane’s work, 
as will be discussed in particular in the next two chapters, but my focus is primarily on Fondane’s 
poetic response and its linguistic stakes. 
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They – the conquerors! | And us – the slaughtered! || sometimes we would give 
eternity | for one of earth’s hours]’ (MF 96–97). 
 Fondane’s refusal of absolute objectivity and distance can lead to the broader 
and deeper resonances of his ‘existential’ thought and art being discarded or reduced 
to a sub-category of the heavy circumstances of their creation. Without in any way 
diminishing its horror and injustice, in particular I wish to resist reading his work 
through the lens of his terrible death. Fondane’s voice says much that is prophetic, 
important and challenging in regards to the Nazi Holocaust and its value as testimony 
is difficult to overstate. But it is what might be called existential testimony, an uneasy 
confrontation with the metaphysical or the possibility of the metaphysical, as much as 
it is historical testimony. I can only agree with Rieff that ‘to make the horror of his 
death the focus is to grant the Nazis their victory. Better to look at a life profoundly 





The circumstances of Fondane’s death contributed to a relatively low profile for his 
work in post-war France (see Beray 2006, 144), as did the ascendancy of Sartre and 
Camus as porte-paroles for existential thought (see for example Kuhnle 2010). His 
main champions were Emil Cioran and the English surrealist David Gascoyne, but 
publications were patchy. Some scholars have argued that the work of Jewish writers 
such as Fondane was more or less consciously elided due to the hegemonic post-war 
narrative in France that wanted to supress the uncomfortable truths around French 
complicity in the Holocaust (Mole 2008; Elsky 2020). Further analysis can be found 
in Salazar-Ferrer’s monographs and across the Cahiers Benjamin Fondane and 
Titanic, the Bulletin of the Association Benjamin Fondane. A steady restitution of his 
importance to French letters has been progressing since the 1970s, thanks to the 
efforts of the Société d’études Benjamin Fondane, the Association Benjamin 
Fondane, critics such as Patrice Beray and Louis Janover, and in particular the work 
of publisher Michel Carassou. Eminent writers, including Cioran but also poets Yves 




 This growth is characterised by republications and new publications (especially 
a recent spate from Editions Non Lieu and Editions Verdier), critical acclaim (see for 
example the selection of press quotes on the Verdier website or various programmes 
on France Culture e.g. Farine 2018, Van Reeth 2017, Omélianenko 2014, 
Noudelmann 2013), cultural events (e.g. the Romanian Cultural Institute’s 
International Benjamin Fondane Prize for Francophone literature, the unveiling of 
Place Benjamin Fondane in Paris and exhibitions including a major retrospective at 
the Mémorial de la Shoah) and scholarly commentary. There has also been a 
proliferation of translations, notably into Italian and German, as well as the 
translation of French texts into Romanian and early Romanian poems into French.  
 There has been a dearth of attention in the English-speaking world, not least 
due to a lack of translations, as John Taylor noted in 2012 (J. Taylor 2012, 383). In 
the past few years, this has finally begun to change. In 2016, New York Review 
Books published two translated selections, one of philosophical essays (Existential 
Monday, translated by Bruce Baugh and myself) and one of poetry (Cinepoems and 
Others, translated by Leonard Schwartz, Mitchell Abidor, Marianne Bailey, Marilyn 
Hacker, Henry King, Nathaniel Rudavsky-Brody and myself). Syracuse Press 
published Rudavsky-Brody’s translation of Ulysse in 2017. These three represent the 
first ever significant translations of any of Fondane’s work into English.3 In his 
review in the Times Literary Supplement of October 7 2016, Crispin Sartwell called 
the NYRB Existential Monday ‘a sufficient spur to a revival of interest in this 
neglected and fascinating figure’. 2018 saw a dedicated Fondane conference at Yale 
University, the first of its kind. 
 Prior to recent developments, twentieth-century attempts to bring Fondane to 
the attention of Anglophone readers were limited to individual efforts which 
remained niche despite their often passionate advocacy. Foremost would be those of 
David Gascoyne, who knew Fondane personally (see Gascoyne 1980). Intellectual 
affinity with the philosophical currents in which Fondane travelled has perhaps 
played to the detriment of introducing readers to the vivacity of the poetry at times. 
John Kenneth Hyde’s 1971 Benjamin Fondane: A Presentation of his Life and Works 
emphasizes his relation to Shestov and takes an approach driven by semantic field 
 
3 A Canadian named Pierre L’Abbé self-published a garbled translation of L’Exode in 2008. 
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inquiry. Romanian Arta Lucescu Boutcher’s self-translated 2003 book Rediscovering 
Benjamin Fondane was a noble effort but limited in reach. Both books were 
published before any of the primary sources were available in English translation, as 
with another work, published, like Boutcher’s, by Peter Lang, physicist Michael 
Finkenthal’s 2013 Benjamin Fondane: A Poet-Philosopher Caught Between the 
Sunday of History and the Existential Monday. Peter Lang also published William 
Kluback’s 1996 Benjamin Fondane: A Poet in Exile, a short meditation on Fondane 
in relation to exile and to Shestov. 
 All of these works attempt to introduce English readers to Fondane and 
encourage their own reading of his work; now that a selection is available, this is at 
least possible to some extent. They are surveys which aim to offer a synthesised 
understanding of Fondane’s multifarious oeuvre, which is a challenge, to say the 
least. Finkenthal’s is the most sustained in this regard, synoptically restating what he 
sees as the gist of different works, and contains some useful interpretations (such as 
the application of the term ‘metasophia’, a form of knowledge that exceeds reason) 
but it is flawed (particularly in the translations) as well as simplifying at points 
(which is unavoidable given its scope).4 Nevertheless, it is certainly the best 
introductory overview to Fondane currently available in English, breaking down 
various stages in his life in conjunction with a presentation of his work that can guide 
the reader into their own reading at any point they choose. The passages on Stéphane 
Lupasco and physics are especially valuable due to Finkenthal’s professional 
expertise. As this thesis nears submission in November 2020, Stanford University 
Press is about to publish Writing Occupation: Jewish Émigré Voices in Wartime 
France by Julia Elsky, a professor of French at Loyola University in Chicago. A 
major section of her book centres on Fondane.  
 As opposed to survey or biography, this thesis represents the first full-length 
critical study in English of any part of Fondane’s work. Written under the auspices of 
the French department, it is not an introduction to Fondane, or a counterpart to the 
 
4 Some of Finkenthal’s translations are simply awkward: ‘Shestov read for the third time my paper’ 
(Finkenthal 2013, 122, quoting Rencontres avec Leon Chestov). Others are grammatically incoherent: 
‘le Dieu existe-t-il, le Dieu d’Isaïe, qui essuiera toute larme des yeux et qui vaincra la mort” (Does 
Isaiah’s God, who dry tears and vanquish death, still exist?)’ (Finkenthal 2013, 63, quoting Ulysse), 
while some are inexplicable: the line from Ulysse ‘tu avais beau presser l’orange, l’univers’, a 
reference to Baudelaire’s ‘Au lecteur’, is rendered ‘quite a task to follow tempests and the world’ 
(Finkenthal 2013, 64).  
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wide scope of Salazar-Ferrer’s studies. Nonetheless, writing in English — dare I say 
philologically — I am conscious of contributing to Fondane’s English reception. 
Indeed, while the past three decades have seen concerted efforts to bring his work 
into a proper French reception, there too there remains much critical work to be done. 
Therefore this thesis, while offering a sustained and developed critical and theoretical 
engagement with the development of Fondane’s poetry, also negotiates an expository 
aspect, as it is written with the awareness of Fondane’s underrepresentation in 
English.  
 Internationally Fondane’s poetry has occasionally made its presence felt: for 
example, lines from L’Exode adorn the Hall of Names at the Yad Vashem Holocaust 
memorial.5 He has also been discernible in the margins of post-war philosophical 
discourse, mostly in connection with Shestov, who like Fondane has thus far been 
something of a writer’s writer (despite being championed by D.H. Lawrence in his 
own lifetime). From Albert Camus’s Myth of Sisyphus to Zygmunt Bauman’s 
Modernity and Ambivalence, this marginal presence has often seemed to exert a 
haunting force on the roots of the discourse beyond its specific instances. For 
example, Bauman, although he mentions Shestov fairly extensively in one chapter, 
also devotes an endnote of almost an entire page to Shestov and Fondane (Bauman 
1991, p. 196). Some recent French publications have sought to find a legacy for 
Shestov among various critical philosophers of the past few decades (e.g. Bernasconi 
2015, Fotiade 2016). The 2015 publication of Joseph Acquisto’s The Fall Out of 
Redemption: Writing and Thinking Beyond Salvation in Baudelaire, Cioran, 




Fondane’s ‘interdisciplinary’ activities foreshadow the interpenetration of critical 
theory and philosophy with the humanities, offering promising horizons with his 
 
5 While the appropriateness of the association is indisputable, it is unfortunate that the lack of wider 
contexts for Fondane contribute to his pigeonholing as a ‘Holocaust poet’. Though his work is very 
different than that of Paul Celan’s, it is analogous in its breadth and complexity. Holocaust poetry 
may, in fact, be a contradiction in terms, as I shall explore in chapter 3. Fondane wrote before his 
encounter with extermination, Celan after. Neither give meaning to the catastrophe, but unsettle our 
relationship to it. Jackie Metzger briefly sets out some of these contradictions in an article for Yad 
Vashem (Metzger n.d.). 
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creative work. This potential was evident to David Gascoyne, who considered for 
example ‘that [Pierre Jean] Jouve and Fondane were among the first poets to 
recognize the crucial importance of Baudelaire as the creator of modern poetry’ (cited 
in Jouve 2007, 54, note 59). The free-ranging quality of Fondane’s writing is possibly 
a contributing factor to its periods of marginalisation, although this factor did not stop 
it being acclaimed during his lifetime (see Salazar-Ferrer 2004a). Sympathetic 
contemporaries from artistic and philosophical milieus recognised it as a formal 
strength of his subversive attitudes.6 
 Fondane’s rich, varied output reflects his unbounded attempts to push at the 
interstices of rational thought. In this thesis I am treating principally of his (French) 
poetry, though with his multi-faceted work as an essayist in view. In particular, the 
essays which might be contextualized as having aesthetic concerns — ‘Mots 
Sauvages’ (1929); the book-length studies Rimbaud le voyou (1933), Faux traité 
d’esthétique (1938) and Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre (which was still being 
completed as Fondane was arrested, and was first edited and published in 1972); the 
essays and letters around his participation in avant-garde movements (collected in 
Fundoianu/Fondane et l’avant-garde); the speech he wrote (but never gave) at the 
1934 Paris anti-fascist writers’ congress (L’Ecrivain devant la révolution); his writing 
on cinema (collected in a 2007 Verdier edition which reflects Fondane’s multi-
modality, bringing together cinépoems, essays, photographs and letters); and review 
articles such as those published on Brancusi and Chagall (see Fondane 2013a) — 
form their own dialogue with his poetry. At the same time, his essays written for 
philosophical publications (such as his philosophy column in Les Cahiers du Sud) are 
also brought to bear, notably La Conscience Malheureuse (1936), L’Homme devant 
l’histoire (1939) and Le Lundi existentiel et le dimanche de l’histoire (1944). 
Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre exemplifies the interlocking nature of 
Fondane’s thought, as Joseph Acquisto highlights, by way of Mircea Martin: 
 
Mircea Martin has described the difficulty a reader initially has in placing 
Fondane’s Baudelaire book within an established genre: while the title might 
indicate a biography, there is also the exploration of literary history as well 
as its social context, both of which, along with certain biographical elements, 
 
6 Walter Benjamin, his fellow contributor at Les Cahiers du Sud, was one, as he mentioned in letters to 
editor Jean Ballard (Benjamin 1934; 1935). 
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‘are put in relation with the stages of its creation’ […] Martin goes on to ask: 
‘Do we have here studies or essays? […] Is it the critique of a professional or 
of a poet? Is it a critique of Baudelaire’s poetry or his philosophy? […] Does 
this critique come from a poet or a philosopher?’ […] Martin’s rhetorical 
questions set the stage for Fondane’s analysis, which does in fact situate 
itself at the intersection of literary criticism, philosophy and poetry. 
(Acquisto 2015, 74) 
 
It is apt to read this intersection literally: Fondane’s prose strains against rationality 
and intermeshes with the absurdist, subversive and affective elements of his poems, 
which themselves sometimes contain philsophical rhetorical questions.  
 From one angle, we could take Fondane as positioning poetry as a kind of 
Derridean supplement to philosophy: in his Faux Traité d’esthétique [Pseudo-
Treatise of Aesthetics] he writes ‘la poésie peut penser bien des choses qui ont été 
refusées à la philosophie [poetry can think many things which have been denied to 
philosophy]’(FT 16). Yet a few pages earlier he criticizes poets who ‘pensent sauver 
la poésie, en la faisant passer pour un document mental, une accoucheuse d’idéals et 
de nobles sentiments [think to save poetry by passing it off as mental documentation, 
as a midwife of ideas and noble opinions]’. For Fondane, poetry is not merely 
information, even well-polished information, and cannot be bounded by thought, yet 
it can think things which philosophy cannot. This seeming contradiction remains 
unresolved, an example of the extra-rational effects of his prose. The tension remains 
and a very un-syllogistic space for meaning is precariously opened. The effects of 
Fondane’s Shestovian subversions are greatest when the territories of his poetry, with 
its metaphysical contours, and those of his undialectical prose are jointly explored. 
 In a sense, titles such as philosopher or poet are insufficient when interpreting 
Fondane. Indeed, his work undermines the usual grounds for such activities, attacking 
the primacy of reason in philosophy and aesthetics in poetry. If Nietzsche was a 
philosopher who wrote Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Fondane was a poet who wrote a 
response to Hegel (La Conscience Malheureuse). His insistence on the rhetorical 
aspects of philosophy foreshadows, to some extent, the work of Jacques Derrida and 
the controversies around its status as philosophy. Yet he respected both terms, 
following Shestov’s instructions to be ‘purement philosophique [purely 
philosophical]’ when appropriate (Fondane 1982, 5 January 1938). If I treat him 
foremost as a poet, it is not for the beauty and creativity of his work — though these 
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elements are abundant — but because the mask of poetry is paradoxically that which 
allows him to be most truthful, and to push language into an act beyond knowledge. 
Topography is a common hermeneutic metaphor in literary criticism. In Fondane’s 
case, oceanography may be better suited, not least as his poetry abounds in water 
images. His work is full of shifting currents and abyssal encounters. The long poem 
L’Exode is no exception, and with its treatment of mythical, topical, political and 
metaphysical themes, as well as its mixture of poetic tradition and innovation, it 
exemplifies the concerns of Fondane’s oeuvre taken as a whole. It forms the primary 




This thesis has been driven by a primary encounter with Fondane’s texts, one deeper 
than usual as it is bound up with translating some of them, which is a privileged, 
though at times frustrating, experience. Given the lack of studies written in English, 
this is appropriate. Nonetheless, it is of course grounded in the compact but, by now, 
sustained body of French criticism. The extensive work of Olivier Salazar-Ferrer in 
contextualizing Fondane and analysing his work from a metaphysical standpoint is 
key. So too is the work of the Société d’études Benjamin Fondane and the 
Association Benjamin Fondane, both of which regularly publish their own journal 
with contributions from various Fondane scholars, of whom Monique Jutrin is (along 
with Salazar-Ferrer) the most prolific. These organizations have also organized 
conferences, and the proceedings of the 1999 conference on Baudelaire et 
l’expérience du gouffre are particularly important.  
 The promotion of Fondane’s work in recent years owes much to gens de lettres 
such as Patrice Beray, who as well as aiding Michel Carassou in editing Fondane’s 
manuscripts has advanced Fondane studies with essays like his 2006 book Benjamin 
Fondane, au temps du poème. Louis Janover, who with Beray wrote Retrouver 
Fondane (2010), is another example of a writer working to bring Fondane to a wider 
public. Established poets such as Henri Meschonnic, Claude Vigée, Yves Bonnefoy 
and Jacques Darras have also promoted Fondane’s work; their reviews and essays 
have also been helpful for this thesis.  
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 Articles by Nicolas Monseu, Dominique Guedj, Til Kuhnle and Gisèle Vanhese 
have been useful for contextualizing the philosophical stakes of Fondane’s work and 
their relationship to his poetry. Ann van Sevenant’s work on the Faux traité 
d’esthétique and Anne Mounic’s study Poésie et philosophie: ineffable rigueur 
(2017) have also been important in this regard. Mounic and Vanhese’s work in 
particular also fleshes out connection and comparison between Fondane and other 
poets who were his contemporaries. Margaret Teboul’s article on Fondane and 
another contemporary, Walter Benjamin, was key for thinking Fondane as writer who 
traversed genre boundaries. The 1998 special Fondane edition of the review Europe 
also offered a useful entry point for French Fondane studies. 
 In terms of scholarship in English, three essays (one forthcoming) by the poet, 
translator and scholar Alexander Dickow represent the zenith thus far. These essays, 
‘Ethical Writing and Commemoration: Benjamin Fondane’s “Preface in Prose” and 
the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas’ (2018); ‘Escaping History: Benjamin 
Fondane’s “Mal des fantômes” and Interiority’ (2017) and ‘The Rhetoric of Reason: 
Fondane’s Theory of Language’ (forthcoming in the conference proceedings of the 
2018 Yale conference), combine fresh insights into Fondane’s poetry with theoretical 
rigour and open up new directions for Fondane studies across the board. In a more 
purely philosophical direction, the work of Joseph Acquisto and Bruce Baugh has 
lain the groundwork for further development and connection with trends in English-
language theoretical fields. Michael Finkenthal’s book Benjamin Fondane, while not 
without issues (some of which were noted above), provided some original analysis as 
well as an overview. 
 Romanian scholarship has been drawn on only when written in or translated 
into French. While this was an unavoidable linguistic limitation, it is also the case 
that my focus is purely on the French works, and that most, if not all, of the relevant 
scholarship is available in French (for example in the review Euresis). The exception 
is the recent developments by Italian writers such as translator Luca Orlandini. The 
most important of these — indeed one of the most important academic Fondane 
scholars working in any language — is Giovanni Rotiroti, who as a scholar of 
Romanian also bridges the French and Romanian worlds. I have drawn directly on his 
work, particularly in terms of thinking Fondane amongst the harmonies and 
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dissonances of poetry and philosophy, alongside considerations of the Holocaust, and 
by extension with regard to Paul Celan and Edmond Jabès. 
 Contemporaries of Fondane such as Celan and Jabès have provided important 
context for thinking and rethinking his work. I have devoted two chapters to a 
comparative approach in order to broaden these horizons, one on Fondane and Laura 
(Riding) Jackson and one on Jabès, which focuses on Jabès’ own writing but also 
draws on the essays and scholarship of Rosemary Waldrop and Didier Cahen. I have 
drawn on Celan where useful for the argument, as well as on Celan scholars including 
Pierre Joris, Anne Carson, Marjorie Perloff and Gerard Richter, and on Fondane 
scholars who have studied them together, such as Gisèle Vanhese.7 
 The work of Shestov is of course important. At times Fondane has been 
considered a ‘disciple’ of Shestov (Bykova 2017, 306; Hyde 1970, 26). However, I 
consider his philosophical writings in their own right. Fondane, with his unique, 
polemical rhetorical style, took the relationship between thought and existence in 
another direction, triangulated by poetry and his practice as a poet, building on 
Shestov to affirm with a poet’s peculiar bravery that, as Bruce Baugh puts it, ‘the 
truths of the irrational, affective, imaginative and passionate self are not the timeless 
intellectual truths of the philosophers but the existential, tragic truths of the great 
poets’ (Baugh 2016a, xix). Like Shestov, other philosophers active in the 1920s-
1940s such as Heidegger and Sartre form part of the backdrop of understanding the 
debates Fondane was writing in and out of; as Baugh notes, ‘the diversity of 
existential thought in the 1930s has been largely eclipsed by the phenomenal success 
of […] humanist phenomenological existentialism’ (Baugh 2016a, xviii). 
 Other contemporaries, such as Simone Weil and Walter Benjamin, both of 
whom wrote alongside Fondane in the Cahiers du Sud, and Emil Cioran, his close 
friend, also slipped through the fence gaps between philosophy and creative (and 
spiritual) writing; their work has been drawn upon where appropriate to both situate 
Fondane in intellectual and artistic history and to provide contrast. The same applies 
to the Dadaists and surrealists, including Tzara, Artaud, Breton and Fondane’s friend 
 
7 For more on Fondane and Celan see Rotiroti 2019 and 2018; Vanhese 2015a, 2015b, 2012 2011, 
2008 and 2006, Carannante 2013 and 2012; Manea 2012; Boitani 2007; and Roditi 1992. There 
remains much scope for further combined study of Fondane and Celan, though it was beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
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and champion David Gascoyne. The histories of Pascal Ory and Jean-François 
Sirinelli (2004) and of Michel Winock (1997) have been useful in establishing the 
context of these milieus. As Baugh points out, in those highly political times Fondane 
may have been idiosyncratic, with his focus on a Nietzschean ‘becoming’ (which in 
some ways anticipates Deleuze — see Baugh 2015), but he was certainly not 
apolitical (Baugh 2016a, xvii). As well as his debates around Marxism with the 
avant-gardes (AG) and as part of anti-fascist organizing (EDR), he corresponded with 
Victor Serge. Testimony and scholarship of the Holocaust, including the work of 
Primo Levi, Giorgio Agamben, Zygmunt Bauman, John Roth, Robert Boyers, 
Timothy Snyder and William Brustein and Amy Ronnkvist has also necessarily 
provided context. 
 Fondane saw himself, in his own way, as one of Rimbaud’s horribles 
travailleurs (from his famous lettre du voyant — see Rimbaud 2009). Rimbaud, 
Baudelaire and Nietzsche are the claimed predecessors whom I have drawn upon at 
points to map out Fondane’s work, as well as, to some extent, Kierkegaard, 
Huysmans and Kafka. Kristin Ross’s book The Emergence of Social Space: Rimbaud 
and the Paris Commune (2008) was an excellent exemplar for considering how to 
consider a poet with such metaphysical and existential concerns in a holistic manner, 
not neglecting the social dimensions of their work, as well as providing fresh 
perspectives on the inception of modernity in relation to Fondane and his responses. 
 A wide variety of scholarship on modernism in general has influenced the 
directions of this thesis, too much to list exhaustively, especially as much of it has not 
been drawn upon specifically, though it has contributed to a general picture built up 
over years. Certain works have overtly formed part of the dialogue, notably articles 
by Vassiliki Kolocotroni and Emma Bell and the doctoral thesis of Fabio Vericat on 
T.S. Eliot, which provided more food for comparative thought both in terms of Eliot 
and Fondane’s shared concerns and in terms of the meeting points and disagreements 
between philosophers and poets. Regarding the latter, the Bloodaxe collection Strong 
Words: Modern Poets on Modern Poetry proved very useful for considering the 
continued relevance of Fondane’s poetic testimony today, notably the essays by U.A. 
Fanthorpe and Sarah Maguire. Twenty-first century philosophical takes on the history 
of modernity, such as Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) and John Gray’s Straw 
Dogs (2015) and Jonathan Glover’s Humanity: A Moral History of the 20th Century 
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(2001) were useful for looking at Fondane’s critiques of modernity as prescient 
(though not necessarily in harmony with these). Joyce Wexler’s book Violence 
Without God: The Rhetorical Despair of twentieth-Century Writers draws on Taylor’s 
book to bring the history of ideas and poetry into juxtaposition at the limits of 
expression; some of her conclusions are a helpful contrast to Fondane’s radical 
approach. 
 As I shall discuss in the last section of this chapter, honouring Fondane’s 
decades-long intellectual and artistic struggle against abstract categorization is a 
difficult thing to balance with the analytic duties of scholarship. Indeed it was 
difficult for Fondane himself, who strove to validate the rigour of his philosophy 
without undermining his commitment to the poetic, the affective and the irrational. In 
theoretical terms, this meant directing sources towards his argument — whether for 
the purposes of support or attack — rather than applying a framework. I have 
similarly attempted to prioritize theoretical dialogue over theoretical prescription. 
This is all the more apt as the argument draws upon the influence of negative 
theology in literary and political critical theory.  
 I have drawn fruitfully upon scholars of apophasis. Shira Wolosky’s book 
Language Mysticism: The Negative Way of Language in Eliot, Beckett and Celan 
(1995) was an important text, both theoretically and to attach Fondane to certain 
modernist concerns around language from an angle which comprehended 
performative as well as philosophical aspects. Beth Hawkins’s (now Benedix) book 
Reluctant Theologians: Franz Kafka, Paul Celan, Edmond Jabès (2003) performed a 
similar function with more of a theological focus. China Miéville’s erudite article 
‘Silence in Debris: Towards an Apophatic Marxism’ (2019) was crucial, articulating 
the relevance of such linguistic and existential concerns with social and political 
ones. The work of William Franke, the pre-eminent scholar of the unsayable, goes 
without saying. James Gordon Finlayson’s work on Adorno was also helpful in this 
regard. Adorno (and Horkheimer)’s own work was also highly relevant at points, and 
there is much scope for further comparison of Fondane and Adorno (indeed, and the 
Frankfurt School more broadly), despite their acute differences in certain regards. 
Although it does not mention Fondane, Fondane scholar Joseph Acquisto’s book 
Poetry’s Knowing Ignorance draws on similar sources to my own to survey French 
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poetry’s ‘knowledge that is first and foremost aware of poetic knowledge's own 
limits’ (Acquisto 2019, cover). However, it was published too recently for use here. 
 The work of Judith Butler (2020 and 2015) and Amia Srinivasan (2020 and 
2018) provided an important bridge between the apophatic and affective concerns of 
the thesis. Literary dimensions of Sianne Ngai (Ugly Feelings, 2005) and Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgewick’s (Touching Feeling, 2003) work was also drawn upon in order 
to link Fondane’s affective concerns with affect theory. So too was recent scientific 
research (for example Lisa Feldman Barrett, 2017), which questions some of the 
research by Sylvan Tomkins that affect theory draws upon, in order to emphasize 
Fondane’s refusal of any rationalization of the irrational. One work by Roland 
Barthes, Sade, Loyola, Fourier, was also helpful in this regard, linking together 
linguistic concerns with affective ‘traces’ in his notion of the ‘biographeme’. 
Affective concerns also relate Fondane’s work to that of Emmanuel Levinas, who has 
been brought up in the Cahiers Fondane by Nicolas Monseu (2005). Alexander 
Dickow (2018; 2018b and 2017) goes beyond Salazar-Ferrer’s statement of 
Fondane’s ‘metaphysical anarchism’ to develop the importance of the relation to the 
other in Fondane’s ‘commemorative writing’. Arguments by Simon Critchley and 
Slavoj Žižek around violence and the relationship to the other, which go back to the 
debates of the 1930s and 1940s that Fondane, Weil, Benjamin and Levinas were 
active in, provide updated context. Also with a political slant is Silvia Federici’s 
recent book Re-enchanting the world (2019), which, with its nod to Max Weber, 
provides a political parallel to Fondane’s articulation of an artistic desire for re-
enchantment. 
 Two Derrida works on the capacity to speak and unsayability provide critical 
openings in the discussion: Monolingualism of the Other (1998) and On the Name 
(1995). This is appropriate, not only given Derrida’s importance in the reception of 
Levinas, but also for the under-examined influence of Shestov in post-war philosophy 
(see Fotiade 2016). Derek Attridge’s work The Singularity of Literature (2017) was 
also hermeneutically useful, in the same vein. Similarly, Jean-François Lyotard’s 
Heidegger and the Jews (1990), The Differend: Phrases in Dispute (1988) and 
Discours, figure (1971) turned out to be vital theoretical reference points, greatly 
assisted by the interpretations of the wonderfully nominatively-determined Bill 
Readings (1991) and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. It must be said, 
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however, that outside of Fondane’s own critical writings, the most important 
theoretical tool in writing this thesis has been Chinua Achebe’s expansive, meaning-
opening notion of celebration (Achebe 1992 and 1990), forged in his own reflections 
on literature and theoretical debates around philosophy and poetry. 
 
Negotiating Methodology: Fondane and ‘Other’ Criticism 
 
Fondane’s writing, taken as a whole, demonstrates a respect for the rigours of 
philosophical method in combination with a revolt against the primacy of reason, one 
that dovetailed with his artistic creation. In some ways this is the driving tension at 
the heart of his living and writing existence: in Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre, 
he wrote ‘le rapport, le conflit entre logique et affectivité quoique inexplicables, 
existent [The relation and the conflict between logic and affectivity exist, even if they 
are inexplicable]’(BEG 368; EM 79). In Fondane’s writing, the desire to explain and 
the defence of the inexplicable are combined. As a reader, scholar and critic of 
Fondane, I feel it is essential to respect the unbounded nature of this relation and 
conflict. 
 In her article ‘The Trans-cultural Journey of Benjamin Fondane’, Monique 
Jutrin states that  
 
Benjamin Fondane is an atypical writer, one who is difficult to categorize. 
Many critics have focused exclusively on the negativity so prevalent in his 
philosophy, but this focus fails to recognize an uncompromising demand that 
oriented his thinking — a fact that helps explain his distance from literary, 
philosophical, and political systems of all kinds. (Jutrin 2012, 137) 
 
Tellingly, Jutrin does not concisely define what this demand is: the anguish of 
existence, the thirst for satisfaction in life ( in the poetic ‘preface’ to Ulysse, he 
writes, from a meta-poetic vantage point, ‘Il n’y a pas assez de réel pour ma soif! 
[There is not enough real for my thirst!]’.8 Pirandello-like, the poetic voice revolts 
 
8 The ‘preface’’s metafictive soliloquoy sets out the sensitive balance between social contingency and 
individual agency, and the author as both wielder of and wielded by language: 
 
Il y avait longtemps 
que le spectacle était commencé de l’Histoire 
on en avait déjà oublié les débuts 




against authorship, as Fondane himself, perhaps, revolts against a divine or ideal plan. 
A modernist vertigo is induced by the recognition of the artificiality and baselessness 
of cultural structures at the same time as their power over the individual. The 
Homeric context of Ulysse makes this struggle an echo of classical struggles with 
fate, as well as nodding to the textual fluidity implied by the oral tradition. As 
suggested by certain sections of Fondane’s poems, such as the Hebrew alphabet 
sequences of L’Exode, there is also a parallel with the traditions of the Midrash, 
where reflective commentary upon the narrative itself becomes an integral part of the 
text. Fondane too writes ‘in the margins’ as he writes the poem, but without rabbinic 
confidence in the ultimate destination of the textual plan. 
 
quand je suis né au monde 
au milieu de l’Intrigue 
comme un événement prévu depuis toujours 
et cependant comme une surprise 
un personnage inquiétant 
qui pouvait tout laisser en place, tout changer, 
le sens de l’action, la trame des mobiles 
qui avait sur le texte établi de toujours l’ascendant prodigieux, étrange du vivant 
le droit de bafouiller les meilleures répliques 
d’improviser un monde en marge de l’Auteur 
et tout à coup, malgré le Plan, 
s’introduire soi-même au sein du personnage 
en criant, excédé, vers le public des loges 





of History had already begun 
the beginning, the fabulous origins  
were long forgotten 
when I awoke to the world 
in the thick of the Intrigue 
like an event foretold since the begininng 
and yet a surprise 
a troubling character who could 
leave everything untouched, who could change it all 
the line of action, the weave of motives, 
who had over the long established text 
the strange prodigious force of the living 
the right to stumble over the best lines 
to improvise a world in the margins of the Author 
and suddenly, despite the Plan, 
to slip himself into the character 
shouting furiously to the public in their boxes 
‘There is not enough real for my thirst!’ 




 ‘Il n’y a pas assez de réel pour ma soif! [There is not enough real for my 
thirst!]’) loses much in attempts to put it plainly into words. What might be called 
proto-utterances, semi-speech acts at the borders of discourse, such as prayer and, 
especially, le cri (the cry, scream or wail) are crucial to Fondane’s staging of the 
conflict between knowing and living, as many scholars have noted (e.g. Dickow 
2018b; Vigée 1998; Beray 1994, vi) and his attempts to affirm the latter against the 
former’s abstractions and exclusions. What is key in Jutrin’s point is that Fondane’s 
work as a whole is anti-systematic, without ignoring its own enmeshing in systems of 
thought. This thesis attempts to honour Fondane’s approach by keeping that 
resistance to systemization active, without discarding academic rigour. 
 The political scholar John Holloway, whose anti-positivist takes on Marxism 
are reminiscent of Fondane’s contributions to 1920s anti-fascist discourse, states that 
‘there is no room for the scream in academic discourse. More than that: academic 
study provides us with a language and a way of thinking that makes it very difficult 
for us to express our scream’ (Holloway 2010, chapter 1, I). Patrice Beray speculates 
that this is one reason for the neglect of Fondane’s final work, Baudelaire et 
l’expérience du gouffre: ‘the themes of this essay can be read as inspired texts, as 
poems or philosophical fables […] does it keep too close to the cry of men [?]’(Beray 
1994, v-vi, my translation). On this cry, standing at the boundary of irrational affect 
and rational discourse, Holloway stakes a critical position: ‘We quite consciously 
start from the subject, or at least from an undefined subjectivity, aware of all the 
problems that this implies. We start there because to start anywhere else is simply an 
untruth’ (Holloway 2010, chapter 1, V). This is very much Fondane’s starting point, 
and a starting point for this thesis as it aims to follow his negotiation of the presence 
of reason’s objective elements in the way of the attempt to affirm subjectivity. 
Like his contemporary Simone Weil, Fondane argued against rationalist 
traditions by insisting on the centrality of extra-rational, affective experience to the 
barest questions of philosophy and theology. He gravitates to Christ’s cry of 
helplessness: Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani (HDH 450; EM 61).9 This cry reveals an 
implication held in Fondane and Weil’s questioning of reason’s authority: that their 
 




discourse introduces a different kind of address to the model of inquiry that turns its 
discourse towards the revealing and recording of ultimate truth. Instead, a living 
interpellation to all who share in actual existence, and its unanswerable questions, is 
opened up. 
 Fondane’s work acknowledges a thirst for transcendence countered by an 
existential commitment to the hic et nunc. For Jutrin, 
 
Fondane’s oeuvre is marked by a migration through cultures and languages 
and by a dialogue between different kinds of knowledge. It is a polymorphic 
body of work, expressed equally [my emphasis] in poetic, philosophical, and 
critical texts, as well as in the theatre and the cinema. Fondane was 
passionate about all the innovative aspects of the philosophy of his time, and 
he was not afraid to venture into anthropology, psychoanalysis, logic and 
physics. (Jutrin 2012, 137) 
 
While this last claim may be stretching it somewhat (though Fondane certainly did 
keep abreast of scientific developments, not least through his friendships with Gaston 
Bachelard and Stéphane Lupasco) Jutrin’s description encapsulates the fullness of his 
respect for knowledge, even as he subverted its authority in his creations. Zygmunt 
Bauman has emphasized Shestov’s defiance of the unacknowledged and ‘incurable 
parochiality of the very search for the absolute in general’ (Bauman 1991, 81). 
Fondane embodied the double-sidedness of this summation: on the one hand, 
critiquing the affective and situational blindness and repressions undertaken by 
universalizing philosophy, on the other, affirming the singular against the supremacy 
of the absolute. Fondane is not a nihilist or an absolute relativist, but his work is a 
ceaseless renewal of the fight against the collateral damage of abstraction. 
In this thesis I carry out a scholarly and critical engagement with Fondane’s 
work while pointing up the limits of that engagement, walking the boundaries 
between Fondane’s existential thought and an existential practice that is performative 
and gestures beyond thought, with poetry as the most important juncture between 
logos and the extra-rational (I want to write that it is a praxis, but that may be 
misconstrued – for Fondane, poetry is precisely the defiance of any theory, not the 
implementation of one, nor can it be recuperated into an a posteriori theoretical 
discovery). In his 2006 review of Le Mal des fantômes in Aujourd’hui poème, 
Jacques Darras writes: ‘Fondane is a poet but also a philosopher… Fondane, on all 
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subjects, takes a personal position, dissonant each time, not through affectation but 
personal conviction’ (my translation). His philosophical and poetic projects 
supplement each other, and it is my contention that a critical engagement with his 
work is best served by navigating the tension between rigorous thinking and creative 
freedom. 
 In order to honour Fondane’s atypical writing with criticism that comes ‘from 
sideways on’, as James Gordon Finlayson puts it, (Finlayson 2012, 32), I have drawn 
on the work of poets as well as critics, and on writers who share thematic affinities as 
well as on secondary sources. As Fondane quite deliberately refrained from aligning 
with any school, I feel it is appropriate to mimic his eclecticism in terms of drawing 
on sources. I have also sought to bring paradoxes to the surface — for instance, his 
simultaneous modernism and anti-modernity (Martin 2007); his revolt against reason 
and his philosophical commitment (see L’Homme devant l’histoire in particular); and 
my efforts to subvert his pigeonholing as a ‘Holocaust writer’ while frequently 
discussing the Holocaust. Fondane wrote that ‘existential philosophy does not amount 
to an abandonment of knowledge […] but is rather the search at long last for a 
genuine knowledge which will not turn its back on anything that is, whether it is a 
matter of “unhappiness” or of the “discontinous”’ (EM 24). Fondane followed 
Nietzsche in thinking that the real philosopher must be a poet (Nietzsche 2013, 
chapter 6, section 211), or at least, that poetry could push beyond ‘professional’ 
philosophical thought (EM 24).  
 In many ways, Fondane’s existential challenge to philosophy pre-empts 
theory’s ‘affective turn’ (Clough & Halley eds., 2007), though again it must be stated 
that his philosophy is principally negative in its practice if not its aims, subverting 
and opening rather than refining theories. In this regard it also pre-empts auto-theory, 
that ‘chimera of research and imagination’ (Zwartjes 2019). While Fondane’s essays 
do not foreground the autobiographical in the ways commonly associated with that 
hybrid genre, his work taken as a whole can be seen as sharing its holistic, testifying, 
affirmative concerns. Certainly, the work of Chris Kraus (2013) and Anne Carson 
(2002a; 2002b) on Celan and Weil respectively has been inspirational as examples of 




 This thesis could not be in imitation of Kraus or Carson even if its author were 
capable of reproducing their brilliance; its academic format restricts it. Nonetheless, it 
is written with a meta-methodological awareness kept in view. Pierre Joris argues that 
‘critics’ problems are specific to their undertaking (i.e. the need to prove that the 
methodologies they are invested in are the right ones and will result in the ‘true’ 
interpretation of the poem)… Celan claimed a necessary opacity for poetry today’ 
(Joris 2005, 5). Fondane’s poetry may not be as linguistically disruptive as Celan’s, 
but he claimed a similiar place for poetry’s essential undecidedness. Rather than 
elaborating a frame to concretely define Fondane’s poetry, this thesis seeks to place 
its theoretical apparatus in the service of his contention that ‘les poètes ont vu que le 
singulier est plus important que le général, le contingent plus vrai que l’immuable et 
l’éternel, l’inintelligible plus profond que l’intelligible [poets have seen that the 
singular is more important than the general, the contingent truer than the immutable 
and eternal, and the unintelligible more profound than the intelligible]’ (FT 78). 
 In his 2016 book The Philosophy of Tragedy Christopher Hamilton discusses 
the remnants of religion still wreathed through our attempts to confront our contexts 
of questioning, to be ignored to our detriment: ‘with the loss of Christianity [as a 
monoculture] we have lost the overarching vision of the world that for so long people 
defined themselves in terms of, or against […] on the one hand, the decay of 
Christianity seems […] a cultural disaster’ (Hamilton 2016, conclusion). On the other 
hand, he also identifies with the freedom Nietzsche found through this ‘decay’. 
Hamilton concludes his existential survey of our ‘disenchanted world […] in which 
meaning is at best elusive and often absent’ (Hamilton 2016) by relating the separate 
spheres of the material and the immaterially personal, with reference to Weil and 
Beauvoir. The ‘idiocies of how we organize our life’, that let people die of hunger in 
a time of superabundance, are ‘clearly tragic’, but ‘it is tragic too when people find 
their lives meaningless’ (Hamilton 2016). Fondane seeks to confront the former 
tragedy without mutilating the realities of the latter to have them resolved into an 
ideal project.  
 For Fondane subverting rational knowledge is a step to affirming life, if space 
is given to the affective experience of not being satisfied by knowledge. In his 
introduction to Fondane et l’avant-garde, Petre Raileanu argues that when it came to 
the questions of human suffering and ‘metaphysical despair’, ‘the 20th century started 
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systematizing everything: anxiety, neurosis, ecstasy, the unconscious, desire and even 
the irrational. A systematization of the irrational, what Fondane would call the 
‘rational exploitation of the irrational’, which was what he reproached most in 
surrealism.’ (Raileanu 1999, 15, my translation)  
 Scholars such as Amelia Jones (2004) demonstrate a recovery of a counter-
trend of which Fondane may be considered a part. Gabriel Sessions argues that 
‘disconsolation legitimates the writing of dependency and vulnerability’(Sessions 
2018):  
 
At [the] instances where the emergent discourses of twentieth-century post-
Hegelian philosophy and modernism interfere, we see most clearly how 
bodily vulnerability is set against scientific over-determinism… disconsolate 
subjects… gain defining contour and shade in the narratives of literary 
modernism. (Sessions 2018) 
 
Although Sessions proposes a Spinozan response that stands at odds with Fondane’s 
‘metaphysical anarchism’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2008, 86), his ‘counter-rational praxis’ is 
nicely aligned with Fondane’s in that both imply a possibility of ‘friendship [that] 
disconsolation’s disillusioned experience of vulnerability makes possible, when it 
exists in proximity to it’ (Sessions 2018). 
 This thesis draws on late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century nondualistic 
approaches in critical theory at the same time as looking back on Fondane’s 
subversive attempts to affirm untheorizable life. It finds something of a description 
both for an understanding of Fondane’s work and for its own guiding lights in Lisa 
Samuels’s analysis of Laura (Riding) Jackson’s ‘antisystematic mandates’ (Samuels 
2001, xiii). With examples running from Ezra Pound to Angela Carter, Samuels 
refers to ‘unconventional modernist criticism, a criticism which insists on eclectic and 
subjective processess […] an unorganized ‘tradition’ by its very nature […] a body of 
work we might call the Other criticism.’ (Samuels 2001, xiii) Though Samuels is 
writing for an anglophone context, Fondane’s books on Rimbaud and Baudelaire fit 
this paradigm well. Further, as these works stand between his philosophy and poetry 
texts at the nexus of reason and ‘absurd’ expression, they exemplify the tension at the 
heart of Fondane’s work, one made overt in this Other ‘tradition’ or anti-tradition. It 
makes sense to talk about Fondane in terms of Other criticism, both as a way of 
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understanding his approach holistically and of reflecting it, balancing scholarly rigour 
with Fondanian ‘metasophic’(Finkenthal 2013, 121) concerns.  
 As will be discussed in chapter 4, there is in fact a strong antithesis between 
(Riding) Jackson and Fondane’s poetic development, one accepting failure and 
turning to other lines of enquiry, the other absurdly responding to failure with what 
he termed irrésignation, cognized despair combined with poetic affirmation. 
Nonetheless, the earlier criticism of (Riding) Jackson analysed by Samuels (in 
contrast to some of her later work) is ‘oriented to the unknown. Poetry and human 
beings are “true” for Riding insofar as they are permanently incommensurate with, 
always on the other side of, what we might say about them’(Samuels 2001, xvi-xvii). 
Such a view is also the fulcrum of Fondane’s work, which also offers a model of 
‘generative indeterminacy’ (Samuels 2001, xvii), one directing us towards a relational 
understanding of the future through a reactivation of the past in the present, rather 
than the extraction of atemporal knowledge.  
While Fondane and Laura (Riding) Jackson could not be further opposed in 
their conception of poetry’s relationship to the real (see chapter 4), this holistic, 
subversive conception of criticism is wedded to a valuation they share, of poetry as 
an ‘asocial force’ (Samuels 2001, xix). (Riding) Jackson wrote of her desire to place 
poetry in opposition to ‘reliance upon definitions of things delivered from socially 
constructed or philosophically systematized frames of authority’ ([Riding] Jackson, 
2001, 262). Without reducing Fondane’s work, as Jutrin cautions, to a negative 
project, I consider that he sees the poet as unmaker as well as maker.10  
 ‘For Fondane,’ argues Salazar-Ferrer, ‘catastrophe is paradoxical because it 
engenders’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2017a, my translation). Through its subversions, 
Fondane’s work aims to create a participatory commitment in the ruins of 
systematized thought.11 This thesis, then, aims to emulate the spirit of this Other 
modernist tradition (or anti-tradition) that holds that ‘criticism can be […] a discourse 
of thinking rather than a record of thoughts’(Samuels 2001, xvii).12 The 
 
10 He saw Dada as accelerating what he called ‘les actes de suicide nécessaires [the necessary suicidal 
acts]’ for European civilization to make way for the new (Fondane 2007, 73). 
11 The notion of participation has been key for some Fondane scholars. See for example Jutrin 2003. 
12 Despite their respective Anglo-American English and cosmpolitan French intellectual contexts, 
Fondane and (Riding) Jackson share cultural undercurrents that go deeper than their shared Eastern 




expansiveness of Fondane’s own curiosity is reflected in its resistance to genrification 
and formal convention. Poetry, philosophy, literary and artistic criticism, film scripts 
and polemic interweave and intermesh in an anti-systematic praxis drawing on 
Shestovian thought and Dada practice. Such intermodal, consciously category-
defying expression is essential to Fondane’s ceaseless quest to push his readers 
beyond the ‘consolations of philosophy’.13 However, it presents a challenge to and 
demands care from them. The challenge is how to approach these texts, connecting to 
them without overdefining or isolating them from the broader procedure they 
collectively represent. The care is in the difficult task of attempting to avoid 
abstracting and reducing this engagement ourselves. The danger may be greatest in an 
academic context and the task is likely impossible to fulfil.  
 Unlike the surrealists, Fondane did not have confidence in the triumph of art as 
a synthesis of individual and social concerns. 14 His poetry was written (and, 
significantly, rewritten) in an active sense of ever starting again: ‘le voyageur n’a pas 
fini de voyager’ (MF 146). Like Weil (though without her religious faith), his hope is 
itself impossible and absurd, paradoxically disconsolate, a Beckettian ‘going on’ 
rather than a sighted prospect. Yet also like Weil, it does not give up on collectivity. 
Chris Kraus writes that 
 
fascism triumphed largely through its emotional appeal for unity and 
collectivity. Can we devise another form of collectivity, [Weil] wondered, 
which binds without annihilating the presence and power of the person? 
Evil, she believed, occurs more easily when the person is deindividualized. 
(Kraus 2013, 178) 
 
 
linked to Nietzsche and Whitman. Both wrote some of their keenest criticism in dialogue with Eliot 
([Riding] Jackson 2001, 92–92; BEG, chapter 30). 
13 Fondane’s turn to poetry is in part a revolt against the ‘superiority’of the ‘things of the mind’ 
exemplified in Boethius but going back to Plato. His attempts to theorize what he calls irrésignation 
may come from a passage in Shestov discussing Kierkegaard and the struggle against necessity, 
against the ‘metaphysical consolations’ of ‘theoretical philosophy’: ‘the master of the world of the 
"finite" turns out to be, not the knight of faith, but necessity, and the full realization of the human ideal 
is to be found in the knight of resignation […] it will be demanded of us that we recognize this state of 
affairs as natural and desirable, and even see in it the fulfillment of a wise design planned by some 
primordial principle.’ (Shestov 1969aa, chapter XI). Fondane’s subversive freedom reserves the right 
to revolt against such a design, whether or not it actually exists. 
14 Though he did hold out an absurd hope for a re-enchantment of modernity through a better 
mediation between the imaginary and the real, as will be discussed in chapter 8. This form of 
enchantment is not to be confused with his rejection of escapist aesthetic enchantment (see chapter 3). 
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Perhaps in order to contribute to a questioning of the universal, it is necessary to undo 
the categories forced upon the specific in order to reaffirm its agency within the 
possibilities of the multiple. 
 In Fondane’s case, the public and personal crises of modernity are given charge 
by the apocalyptic association of catastrophe with ‘the hope of a revelation and of a 
new era’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2017a, 7, my translation). Yet for Fondane this hope is 
absurd, rather than truly millenarian or eschatological. There is nothing logical or 
knowable about it. This hope and the importance of art for it are encapsulated by his 
comments on cinema in his lecture introducing avant-garde films to South America. 
The crisis he refers to is the advent of the talkies and the splits within surrealism, yet 
the existential concerns are impossible to miss, as is, with hindsight, the looming 
political catastrophe: 
 
Nous sommes quelques-uns dans ce monde à avoir accordé au cinéma, 
comme moyen d’expression, une confiance d’autant plus considérable 
qu’elle fut accordée in extremis: je ne saurais vous dire avec précision ce que 
nous attendions de lui – rien de précis en tout cas… Quelle est la nature de la 
confiance? De quoi est fait un espoir et quelle est sa véritable dimension, qui 
le dira? Sais-je, savez vous, ne fût-ce qu’un tout petit peu, ce que vous 
espérez de la vie? et de vous-même? La promesse du cinéma n’est pas 
mesurable. […] Peut-être dans la grande crise qui le menace actuellement 
attendons-nous une rupture, une catastrophe, un grand schisme qui mettra 
toutes choses au point; je me trompe peut-être; si cela peut vous faire plaisir, 
je me trompe certainement; mais qu’importe que je m’y trompe? Il n’est de 
plaisir plus grand que de se tromper dans le sens juste. 
 
[A few of us have granted cinema, as a medium of expression, a trust which 
is all the greater for being granted in extremis: I cannot precisely tell you 
what we have been expecting from it – nothing precise in any case… What 
is the nature of this trust? What is a hope made of and what is its true form? 
Who can say? Do I know, do you know, even to a very small degree, what 
you hope for from life? And from yourself? The promise of cinema cannot 
be measured. […] Perhaps from within the great crisis which currently 
threatens it we are waiting for a rupture, a catastrophe, a great schism which 
will clear everything up; I am mistaken perhaps; if it would make you happy 
I am definitely mistaken, but what does it matter if I am mistaken? There is 
no greater pleasure than to be mistaken in the right direction.] (Fondane 
2007, 67) 
 
Fondane’s work is saturated with a logical impossibility of believing that a messianic 
event will ‘clear everything up.’ Yet it is the irrational desire for such an event that 







Naufrage infini: Modernity and Catastrophe 
 
Le tremblement de terre est en route. 
[The earthquake is on its way.] 
 
from Titanic (MF 110) 
 
Fondane scholars have traced the ways in which his life and work are intimately 
marked by catastrophe (Acquisto 2015, 70; Jutrin 1998, 74; Salazar Ferrer 2017a; 
2017b, and 2014). In this thesis, I will think of catastrophe as it affected and was 
interpreted by him in three forms: the material, the philosophical and the 
representational. These tend to flow into each other but also offer useful perspectives 
when examined separately. This chapter will look at each in turn in order to 
contextualize the readings of Fondane’s poetic response to catastrophe as a whole. 
The etymology of catastrophe resides in Greek tragic drama, as the turning 
point, the moment when chaos fruits and the centre of the narrative is revealed.1 
Therefore it carries a promise of revelation, for example in the apocalypse of the 
Book of Revelation. Catastrophe is totalizing, not only bearing calamity in its present 
but also subverting the future, implying that whether or not there is any degree of 
recovery, repair or restitution, life will no longer be what it was. Yet it also depends 
on a tension: that between the subjective personal experience of the protagonist and 
the wider causes and effects of the disaster. In other words, catastrophe is at once 
world-shattering and intensely intimate. Fondane saw modernity as in no small part 
shaped by catastrophe in its simplest and most brutal sense: the actual physical 
violence that rocked and defined his world, from the First World war to the genocide 
which claimed his life. For Fondane, in parallel with his Dada contemporaries and 
their refusal of sanity in a world seemingly gone mad (see Bell 2010), the 
mechanized slaughter of the early twentieth century was not just terrible in itself. It 
 
1 ‘A turning upside down. The termination of a drama is always a “turning upside down” of the 
beginning of the plot. (Greek, kata-strepho)’ (Brewer’s Dictionary of Phrase and Fable) 
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also exposed the fundamental absurdity of a world without God, where the 
reassurances of Humanist projects had been disgraced by historical events. 
The second form, then, is the catastrophe of meaning which is a starting point 
for existential philosophy. For Fondane, angoisse is inseparable from crisis, with 
what Sartre might call an authentic confrontation with crisis. As with many aspects of 
thinking about Fondane, this raises a need to critically consider the status of 
modernity and its relationship to pre-modernity in his work. On one hand, the lived 
Kierkegaardian anguish which informs much of his writing is as old as St John of the 
Cross, as old as the Bible. On another, the mobilization of existential philosophy in 
the twentieth century – from the prominence of Sartre, Camus, Beauvoir and 
Heidegger to the marginalized contributions and disputations of Fondane, Shestov or 
Simone Weil – attests to a particularly modern context of unhappiness and the absurd, 
following in the wake of Dostoevsky and Nietzsche. In Fondane’s thought, angoisse 
is a point of intersection for individual consciousness and a catastophic notion of 
existence. 
 Together, these two forms of catastrophe initiate the third, which spurred a 
great deal of Fondane’s critical thinking and occupied much of his artistic practice. 
The desire to find and express a conditional, immanent, intrinsic value to life beyond 
the demolished certitudes of theology and other imperatives to transcendence, 
combined with the overpowering task of reckoning with wanton violence, defined the 
catastrophe of representation which is the crucial context that spurred his modernism. 
I will begin by briefly surveying his direct relation to the violence – at once ageless, 
as part of an endless chain of human cruelty, and novel in its modern scale, scope and 
cultural context – of the historical period he lived through, before focusing on aspects 
of the crisis-informed existential thought which colours all of his work. Lastly in this 








History and Violence: The Context of Material Disaster 
 
Verrons-nous de nos yeux l’esprit des vieilles chutes 
sera-ce de nos mains que nous empêcherons 
les déperditions lamentables? 
 
[Will we see with our own eyes the spirits of old        
                                                              downfalls, 
will it be our hands that prevent  
grievous losses?] 
 
from L’Exode (MF 200) 
 
Modernity and modernism are typically thought through crisis (see Kolocotroni 2015, 
344–345; Burwick and Douglass, eds., 2010; Black 2009; A. Wilde 1979, 23) and 
Benjamin Fondane’s life was marked by catastrophe from the start. Born in 1898, he 
grew up in Iași, a prominent seat of Jewish culture in Europe, where he would have 
been aware of the calamitous reach of anti-Semitism from a young age. He was born 
in a period when many Romanian Jews were emigrating due to discriminatory laws 
(see Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002). The infamous Kishinev pogrom, just over the 
border from Iași in the Pale of Settlement, occurred when he was five years old. He 
came of age, moreover, as the First World War swept into Romania, and its formative 
cultural impact is as hard to overstate as the physical devastation which its armies 
wrought. Although Romania relaxed its anti-Semitic laws in 1923 under pressure 
from the Allied powers, anti-Semitism remained rife and tens of thousands of Jews 
were left stateless (Brustein and Ronkvist 2002, 213). This atmosphere was possibly a 
factor in Fondane’s emigration to Paris (Salazar-Ferrer 2004, 32–37). Here he was 
under no illusions as to the direction of European and world politics, being alert to the 
rise of the Nazis and Vichy and seeing them as modern phenomena rather than a 
‘return’ to barbarism (EDR; HDH).2 
  After being taken as a prisoner of war following the invasion, Fondane was 
released to Paris on the grounds of ill-health as the occupation was consolidated. He 
soon had to go into hiding as a Jew and an intellectual (Salazar-Ferrer 2004, 189). 
 
2 This interpretation will be discussed further in chapter 7, ‘The Artist and the Eyewitness’. 
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Eventually betrayed to the authorities, his literary connections could have secured 
him a release but his refusal to abandon his sister took him through Drancy and 
eventually to Auschwitz. As we will see, he stands out for his capacity to think and 
artistically respond to such cataclysmic circumstances from their very depths, 
maintaining a perspicacity that at times comes across as uncanny, even prophetic. 
 Fondane interpreted and responded to catastrophe while actually living it. His 
responses were conditioned by his situation. He could not help being acutely aware of 
the threat towards Jews, despite being non-practicing and naturalized French; he must 
have had direct news of the pogrom in his home town, Iași, in 1941. In other senses, 
however, it was the other way around: his apprehension of catastrophe owed much to 
his particular artistic and philosophical development, from his early fascination with 
the antisocial tendencies of Baudelaire to his encounter with and participation in 
avant-garde movements and friendship with Shestov. The urge to pigeonhole his 
oeuvre as only the temporal product of disaster must be resisted. Fondane’s work 
clearly faces catastrophe in all its intersections, and with courage, but it does so in 
order also to think and gesture through and beyond it. 
 Fondane’s perspective on modernity as catastrophe is tempered by a certain 
contradictory position of looking both forwards and back, and by French, Romanian 
and Jewish contexts. Whereas the World War, despite its colonial prototypes (Judd & 
Surridge 2013, 61 and 195) was almost universally felt as utterly modern, Fondane 
looked on late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century anti-Semitism bifocally. With 
one eye, it was evident that its violence was caught up with projects of modern state-
building and its projections and manifestations were part of a new, secularizing, 
mechanized age (‘outbreaks of violence […] now enter into history set up as 
principles, whitewashed as science’ [HDH 447; EM 57]). With the other, he could 
not but incorporate it into the vision of a historical panorama (which extended to the 
metaphysical and mythical). One of the great, generous gifts of his poetry is the 
compassionate reworking of the age-old story of Jewish persecution as a testament 
against all human cruelty, and systematised violence in particular, without in any way 
denying the particularities of Jewish experience. 
Fondane strove to engage with the historical period he was living through 
across his writing. The encounter of the twenty-first-century reader with Fondane’s 
work is coloured by our perspective on twentieth-century history. Yet rather than 
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allowing us to claim a distance which would bracket it as simply the remainder of a 
tragic, curtailed life, his life’s work consistently emphasizes the specificity of every 
‘existent’ and their unique and contingent situation in history. He strives to balance 
an openness towards the possibilities of the future with a clear-sightedness in regards 
to the present. ‘Nous sommes d’accord sur ce que nous voulons pas [we are agreed on 
what we do not want]’, he wrote, addressing his fellow writers, in 1935:  
 
l’asservissement, les brimades, les censures, la perspective des camps de 
concentration; mais nous ne sommes pas plus avancés en ce qui concerne les 
moyens à employer pour éviter l’avènement de ces désastres [… les] 
problèmes angoissants de l’écrivain ont été escamotés.  
 
[subjugation, bullying, censorship and the prospect of concentration camps, 
but we are none the wiser as to the methods to use to avoid the arrival of 
these disasters […] the writer’s unnerving problems have been evaded.] 
(EDR 60) 
 
He emphasizes the common threads between social, individual and philosophical 
problems without projecting a simplistic unity.       
 Fondane’s work is often contextualized through the ‘entry point’ of his death. 
His murder in Auschwitz incontrovertibly casts a shadow, and its pathos is amplified 
by its terribly prescient foreshadowing in both his philosophy and his poetry. 
Nonetheless, this entry point poses a dilemma for the critical or scholarly reader. It is 
evidently crucial to set out the historical circumstances of his writing and their 
resonances in his texts. Yet to give too much emphasis to Fondane’s status as a 
‘Holocaust poet’ is to flatten and circumscribe other aspects, and indeed the 
complexity of those resonances themselves as they connect and refract with other 
contexts. Fondane fought constantly for the rights of the singular, and yet his work 
also resists the elevation of any singular to an essential or primary status – even the 
horror of his own end. 
 Violence shaped Fondane’s life and thought before the Nazi party had even 
come into being. He was among the avant-gardes who registered the force of the First 
World War upon culture, responding to its effects as an ethical and epistemological 
break. His artistic work and critical writing directly participate in and critique the 
projects of the Futurists and Dadaists, as will be discussed in the upcoming section on 
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ineffability and indeed throughout this thesis. Influenced by Shestov, too, he saw the 
war as the shipwreck of the Enlightenment, leaving ‘le vieux monde écroulé [the old 
world in ruins]’.3 Although Shestov’s concerns were ultimately turned towards a 
religious horizon, Fondane’s own philosophical essays share his anti-systematizing 
tendencies and prioritizing of the ‘existent’ over abstractions, bringing them to bear 
on historical and aesthetic questions.  
 Although he was not a Marxist,4 Fondane’s critical work shares affinities with 
the Frankfurt School, and indeed with post-war philosophers such as Michel 
Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida in its critiques of rationality and 
systematization (Fotiade 2009). As for Marx, the question of the ‘poverty of 
philosophy’ (cited in EM 17) is always present for Fondane, though with a different 
focus: philosophy’s inability to provide a true metanarrative of history and of its 
failure to overcome the Kierkegaardian separation of the ‘writing self’ and the ‘living 
self’.5 In Existential Monday he sets out the need to address this latter problem as a 
cornerstone of his negative philosophy: ‘to live in one category and think in another: 
this is the critique aimed at speculative philosophy by which one recognizes the 
distinctive mark of existential thought!’ (EM 17). Following Kierkegaard and 
Shestov, the starting point for much of this critique is Hegel. Shestov and Fondane 
read Hegel as sacrificing the individual experience of existence to the progress of 
history, to the authority of Hegel’s ‘hussars with sabres drawn’ (EM 9). He was all 
too aware of the ‘seriousness of history’6 invoked by Hegel, which forced destruction 
and suffering to break into the contemplative life. However, he strenuously resisted 
 
3 In Olivier Salazar-Ferrer’s view, for Fondane Dadaism ‘reacted to the First World War by smashing 
Western idealism with absurdity, insult and derision […it] functioned as a violent agent of social and 
epistemological discontinuity, unveiling what Fondane would call “the catastrophic”‘ (Salazar-Ferrer 
2004a, 40–41, my translation). 
4 As is clear in his writings which touch on politics, such as L’Ecrivain devant la révolution [‘The 
Writer Before The Revolution’], Fondane saw the benefits of socialism as self-evident and was not an 
anti-Marxist in a simplistic sense. His critique of Marxism was philosophical in its attack on teleology 
and pragmatic in its warning against the effects of dogmatism. There is scope to align some of his 
positions with anarchist thought, as his correspondence with Victor Serge supports (Serge 2019). 
5 Fondane takes this reference to different selves from a 1927 Gallimard book of excerpts (Fragments 
du journal, translated by Knud Ferlov and Jean J. Gateau). I have been unable to trace the relevant 
entry in English translation in Kierkegaard’s voluminous journals. 
6 Fondane uses the term intertextually, referring from Elements of the Philosophy of Right, which he 
quotes in Existential Monday (EM 9). Bruce Baugh gives Nisbet’s translation as a reference, but it is 
very different from the English version as published in the NYRB volume: presumably he has 
translated directly from the French. Where Nisbet has ‘solemn recurrences of history’ (Hegel 2003, 
363), Fondane’s Morceaux Choisis has ‘le sérieux de l’histoire’ (EM 25).  
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the idea that this destruction could ever be recuperated into any narrative of necessity, 
and argued that in any case such a recuperation could only ever be an insult to those 
who had suffered in the name of its transcendent victory. His understanding of 
modernity as an epistemological catastrophe connects directly to the experience of 
the existent who loses the reassurance provided by metanarrative, and risks being 
crushed by those who attempt to manifest their own. 
 Fondane’s attempt to reckon with the widespread and unchecked violence of 
his time was informed by, and in turn informed, his ‘negative’, ‘tragic’ philosophy. 
This project primarily operated in antagonism, to resist the reductions and omissions 
considered inherent in ‘positive’ philosophy and to assert the experience of the 
‘existent’ against philosophical narratives which would attempt to dismiss or justify 
actual suffering: 
 
La pensée existentielle […] doit […] rompre l’enchantement […] elle se situe dans 
le bref interstice qui sépare la logique du rêve de la liberté de l'état de veille; elle 
est la pensée de l'effort à fournir, le moment du malaise, du désespoir, de la 
tragédie, de la lutte; elle n'est pas encore le possible, elle est la lutte pour le 
possible.  
 
[Existential thought […] must […] break the enchantment […] it is situated in the 
small interstice that separates the logic of the dream of freedom from the state of 
wakefulness; it is the thought of the effort that must be given, the moment of 
unease, of despair, of tragedy, of struggle; it is not the possible either, it is the 
struggle for the possible.] (Fondane 1938, 37) 
 
By definition, this negative, subversive philosophy could not operate by way of 
positive argument. It is this context which opens up a space for art, and in particular 
poetry, to carry such subversions into the territory of positive affirmation.  
 Poetry, then, became a means to go beyond interpreting catastrophe, to respond 
to it. For Fondane it had two important functions: to testify to the experience of the 
singular and to resist the closure of possibility implicit in philosophical claims of 
interpretative authority. With these functions in mind, the thesis readings will centre 
mainly on his long ‘dramatic’ poem (or poem sequence) L’Exode [Exodus], his most 
direct engagement with the violent upheavals that marked his life and bore upon his 
considerations of the role of disaster in human history, but will also be situated in the 
broader context of Fondane’s work.  
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 It is productive to think of L’Exode as participating in Maurice Blanchot’s 
‘writing of disaster’ (Blanchot 1995). Yet through all his attempts to speak the 
unspeakable, Fondane keeps in view the affinities of human suffering across history. 
This compassionate act of balancing and holding together the rights of the singular 
with a solidarity of suffering is seen in L’Exode’s Préface en prose [Prose preface], 
which blurs formal boundaries, being a poem and as such participating in the 
sequence, destabilizing its own status as an hors-texte, both part of and extra to the 
whole. It can be thought of as a tone-poem overture to the ‘opera’, the oeuvre, tying 
all that is to follow into a relation of feeling. It encapsulates catastrophe’s evasion of 
positive definition and the creative strategies required to affirm a sensibility of 
compassion through the midst of it.  
 The tension between the knowledge and experience of catastrophe and the 
attempt to express it is key to Fondane’s poetics. It is also worth mentioning his 
political responses. Fondane’s readings of politics are often to the effect that the 
perfect is the enemy of the good, or to put it in a more Jewish idiom, if you want to 
make God laugh, tell him your plans. Fondane’s warning of unintended consequences 
in political theory and action is mainly articulated negatively, with an emphasis on 
the dimensions of private and social life that are excluded by their operations. Art 
becomes of primary importance in part because as practice it can fill in gaps in 
political thought, at the limits of the effable. To use a Derridean framing, Fondane’s 
political thinking resists the fallible determinacy of the futur and insists on the 
modalities of unknowability of the à-venir.7 Catastrophic upheavals offer an opening 
to the indeterminacy of the future. He demanded a place – the place of poetry – be 
left open for the non-place of ‘le Non-Savoir [Un-Knowing]’ (EDR 95). 
Like Walter Benjamin, his fellow contributor at Les Cahiers du Sud, Fondane’s 
thought seems better able than that of many of his contemporaries to think beyond the 
circumstances of his time (whether or not we agree with him). In her comparison of 
their approaches to time and history, Margaret Teboul writes: ‘Benjamin and Fondane 
strive to push the violence of history that exceeds the Idea into philosophy’ and ‘their 
deconstruction of historical time aims to integrate the ‘state of exception’, the 
catastrophe’ (Teboul 2011, my translation). Twenty-first-century reappraisals of 
 
7 With thanks to Fraser Goodall. 
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political teleology, as exemplified by Miéville (2019), have the potential to reactivate 
its relevance.8 
 Among the most controversial of Fondane’s philosophical positions was the 
argument that Hitler was a ‘twisted’ product of Humanism rather than a ‘barbaric’ 
aberration from it (HDH 448; EM 59). This remains a very difficult position to 
countenance even today. Yet we must do so, remembering the etymology of 
‘barbarism’ as nonsensical babbling outwith the logical signifying of language. 
However distasteful, the Nazis used comprehensible speech representative of a 
definite ideology, beyond bloodlust.9 Timothy Snyder emphasizes the importance of 
this work of understanding in his 2015 book Black Earth: The Holocaust as History 
and Warning. Fondane’s response to catastrophe in its material form is a resistance to 
its incorporation in any iteration of the Hegelian Spirit of History, however noble or 
horrible, and any project which claims to justify any death or suffering as service to a 
higher purpose. As the twentieth century showed only too clearly, the potential for 
the letter of ideology to overrule the spirit is great. Poetry, for Fondane, could play a 
key role in resisting the transformation of good intentions into oppression and in 
keeping open the doors of possibility. 
 
Existential Despair as Crisis 
 
Nous sommes à la fois, en tant que citoyens du malheur social, des êtres 
politiques, et en tant que citoyens du malheur humain, des êtres 
métaphysiques. 
 
[We are both political beings, as citizens of social unhappiness, and 
metaphysical beings, as citizens of human unhappiness.] 
 
from ‘Préface pour l’aujourd’hui [Preface for the Present Moment]’  
(CM 20; EM 34) 
 
Une philosophie pas valable pour tous, cela veut dire seulement, peut-être: – 
non valable pour tout homme pendant que plongé aux conditions ordinaires 
de la vie où, pour chaque question, il y a une réponse toute prête. Mais la 
peste, le tremblement de terre, peuvent surgir soudain, avec leurs problèmes, 
 
8 Miéville’s essay will be discussed further later in this chapter. 
9 See Žižek 2009b, 67: ‘Nazism disclosed reality in a way which allowed its subjects to acquire a 
global ‘cognitive mapping’, which included a space for their meaningful engagement.’ 
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dans l’homme le moins préparé, dans la vie la plus banale. Tout un chacun 
peut devenir une ‘exception’. 
 
[A philosophy that is not valid for everyone means only, perhaps: not valid 
for every man as long as he is immersed in the ordinary conditions of life, 
where there is a ready-made answer for every question. But a plague, an 
earthquake, can suddenly rise up with its problems in the least prepared man, 
in the most banal life. Each and every one can become an ‘exception’.] 
 
from Le Lundi existentiel [Existential Monday] (LE 66–67; EM 31) 
 
The epistemological break of the First World War led Fondane to connect broad 
catastrophic experience with the intensely personal forms of anxiety and despair 
found in existential philosophy. The war literalized the shock waves of the 
‘transvaluation of all values’ predicted by Nietzsche, horribly clarifying the 
ramifications of his messages of the death of God and the need to reckon with the 
immanence of ethics. For Shestov and Fondane, belief in an Idealist or deterministic 
conception of history could only ever lead to the devaluing of specific human 
experience and of the importance of the ineradicable presence of the unknown. If 
their existential thought can be said to be a philosophy, it is a philosophy of crisis, 
resisting synthesis, and aiming to incessantly trouble the experience of living rather 
than absorb absurdity into a new Humanism. 
 Unlike Sartre, Fondane is concerned with how to live with anguish rather than 
how to overcome it, and with the revelatory potential which he and Shestov see as 
inherent in the experience of doubt and despair. His thought marks a refusal of 
existentialism, preferring to emphasize existential thought as a wider phenomenon 
and resisting any attempt at systemization.10 Material catastrophe such as war has 
immaterial as well as material effects, capable of collapsing worldviews and 
psychological and metaphysical buffers in the subjects who experience it, and 
spreading new and unforeseen affective modes. For Fondane it has the potential to 
shake any individual’s confidence in history’s meaning. 
 
10 ‘Existential philosophy is concerned with the thought of the existent during, involved in a Real as 
yet without form or structure.’ (EM 17) 
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 On the one hand, the ‘exception’ is an ahistorical category, as anguish and the 
‘dark night of the soul’ is testified to across the written record.11 On the other, it has a 
specific modern resonance for Fondane: the modern subject lives in a dis-unified 
culture, one in which no authority can convincingly claim to hold the key to 
transcendence and in which they are abstracted by the industrial organization of 
society and by secular attempts to rationalize history (see C. Taylor 2007). Fondane’s 
writing thus manifests a temporal dislocation, or a tension between the specific 
existential context of modernity and the pre-modern context of worldviews – 
cosmologies, affective/philosophical relations to reality – which cradle thought in a 
state where metaphysical consolation is at least conceivable (beyond naivety or self-
deception), if not guaranteed. At the same time, there remains a simultaneous 
attraction in pre-modern avowals of despair as testaments of experiential similarities 
which break through the isolation of existential crisis. Thus Fondane is less 
concerned with absolute truths about the ‘human condition’ as with a dual emphasis 
on the situatedness of experiences of despair and a kind of solidarity of suffering. He 
engages with what we might call affinities of anguish which open related possibilities 
and aporiae while retaining their specificity.  
 Fondane notably adds a contemporaneity in extending Shestov’s approach to 
the uncertainty which resists all claims to truth and authority. He brings such 
subversions to bear on contemporary society and politics as well as examining 
philosophy and aesthetics. In a sense, he sees the mechanized massacres of the early 
20th Century as extreme aspects of the alienation and dehumanization omnipresent in 
modern life.12 He brings this perspective on the interconnectedness of individual 
angst and alienation and social contexts directly to political and philosophical 
debates, for example in the speech he wrote for the 1935 Anti-Fascist Writers’ 
 
11 ‘Do you believe that misfortune is of these times only? […or is it] Dostoevsky who is right, and 
Shakespeare, or indeed their common Master, the Bible, which said, in its way, that life is a tale told 
by an idiot by its reminder, its insistence, that the same sun here below throws its light on the just and 
the unjust...’ (HDH 444; EM 52) 
12 This analysis is particularly acute in an article he wrote for the Romanian avant-garde journal 
Integral in 1927, in which he argues that Futurist exaltation of speed and materialism over the 
contradictions of human existence is the most honest artistic ally of modern doctrines of progress. 
Without approbation, he states that Futurism ‘écarte toute vie contemplative, ne conçoit que le 
mouvement; mais rien ne convient certainement mieux à son temps [brushes side all contemplative 
life, conceives only movement; but nothing suits its age better]’  (AG 52). Martin Heidegger argued 
that the ‘inner truth and greatness’ of the Nazis’ vision ‘consisted in modern man’s encounter with 
global technology’ (cited in Staal 2008). 
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Congress (L’Ecrivain devant la révolution). Against a Soviet Realist conception of 
culture as a utilitarian ‘instrument of our liberation from the domination of paradox, 
mystery, the indeterminate and the inconceivable’ (EDR 92), he argues for the role of 
art in revealing needs which exceed modernity’s rational programmes, ‘although that 
necessity cannot always be comprehended. This vast world shaped by man in 
darkness leads us to the Socratic, paradoxical discovery of the knowledge of our own 
ignorance’ (EDR 96). In the essays collected in Fondane/Fundoianu et les avant-
gardes, meanwhile, he defends the importance of the internal world against the 
primacy of social theory, arguing for an interplay between the two, walking like 
Chaplin’s pilgrim, ‘un pas dans un pays, un pas dans l’autre [one foot in one country, 
one in another] (AG 52). Most forcefully, he argues in les Cahiers du Sud that  
 
quatre siècles d’humanisme et d’apothéose de la science n’ont abouti qu’au 
retour des pires horreurs que l’on croyait à jamais révolues […] Je ne dirai 
pas qu’un humanisme prévoyant, fondé sur la misère de l’homme, nous eût 
évité les guerres, les révolutions, les cataclysmes – qui n’ont manqué à 
aucune époque de l’histoire. Mais il nous eût évité certainement les guerres à 
l’échelle de la nation, les révolutions à l’échelle du monde, et la barbarie 
machiniste, et la guerre des gaz et des microbes – et le racisme.  
 
[four centuries of Humanism and apotheosis of science have only led to a 
return of the worst of the horrors which we believed were gone forever […]I 
will not say that a far-sighted Humanism, founded on the misery of man, 
would have spared us wars, revolutions and cataclysms, which have never 
been lacking in any period of history. But it would have certainly saved us 
wars on a national scale, revolutions on a world scale, and machinist 
barbarism, and the warfare of gas and germs – and racism.]  
(HDH 447; EM 57)13 
 
For Fondane, alienation is a symptom of modernity’s catastrophic failings, and 
poetry offers a site of engagement and resistance. The ghosts of Le Mal des fantômes 
are the mass of ordinary people whose atomised lives are given no collective purpose 
and who are reduced by political philosophies of all stripes to mere cogs in the 
machine of history. Fondane’s poetry, often using images of water to emphasize the 
 
13 Fondane’s sense of modern history as catastrophic is echoed in the long view of Edward Said, 
despite Said’s self-identification as a humanist: ‘We allow justly that the Holocaust has permanently 
altered the consciousness of our time: why do we not accord the same epistemological mutation in 
what imperialism has done?’ (Said 2003, xvii). 
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groundless nature of such an existence, is in many ways a confrontation with such 
abstraction and the subalternity it enforces. 
 As Walter Benjamin showed (2003a, 389), modernity can be conceived of as 
the generalization of the exception. Whereas individual crises had always exposed an 
existential uncertainty, modernity entails a universal crisis, manifested in its most 
‘ordinary’ state as anomie and disaffection. We can also view the relationship from 
the opposite angle, if we consider worldwide destruction as dependent upon that 
‘ordinary’ disaffection and abstraction, with resonances of Hannah Arendt’s banality 
of evil. We may think today of the abstracting logic of capitalism, which, despite the 
claims of its theorists to the authority of reason, is unable to respond to the ecological 
crisis, its priorities in clear conflict even with the dire warnings of scientists. If 
Fondane’s poetry speaks to us in the early twenty-first century, it is partly because it 
again affords a paradoxical space of speaking beyond his time while insisting on its 
singularity. Fondane refuses overarching solutions to catastrophe. Instead, his 
insistence on the singular and the situated in response to alienation leads him to what 
might be termed an anti-Humanist humanism.14 The intrinsic value of life and of 
experience, in all their uncertainty, became a starting point for political and 
philosophical thought, against any conception which starts with an image of society, 
or even a cosmology, and then makes actual, existing people conform to it. This 
problem is exemplified in that emblem of modernity, the factory. Whereas Marx saw 
the factory as a deterministic driver of class consciousness, Fondane, like Simone 
Weil, saw it as a dehumanizing institution which in practice deformed and subdued 
consciousness and autonomy.15  
 The consciousness of catastrophe defined as the exception is not a political 
theorization, and certainly not a defeatist abandonment of politics. Fondane’s 
meditations on catastrophe are resonant with Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of 
History, and the possibility of a better society remains very much alive in his thought. 
However, his focus is more on the value of existence as actually lived and on how to 
live in the midst of collapse. As such, his work may act as warning and corrective to 
 
14 This is articulated extensively in L’Homme devant l’histoire, but also L’Ecrivain devant la 
révolution, where he states ‘l’artiste est humain; il est impropre de l’appeler humaniste [the artist is 
human; it is incorrect to call him humanist]’ (EDR 81). 
15 ‘Serviteurs de la machine! – cet état est indigne de nous [Servants of the machine! – this state is 
beneath us]’(AG 88) 
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political projects. It is not against politics, but it does resist teleological 
systematizations of the political. This is in part why poetics are so important to 
Fondane in both criticism and practice:  
 
l’art nous apparaît comme un phénomène d’imagination affective [… il est] 
presque impossible d’isoler les structures de cette imagination, de les réduire 
à des unités simples et fut-ce [sic] à une activité singulière, déterminée. 
 
[Art appears to us to be a phenomenon of affective imagination… it is more 
or less impossible to isolate the structures of this imagination, to reduce 
them to simply units, even as part of a singular, defined activity.] (FT 51)  
 
Poetry can perform a resistance to the delineations of systemic thought and in doing 
so reignite suppressed and devalued aspects of human consciousness. Thus Charlie 
Chaplin, whom he called ‘le plus grand poète moderne’ (AG 56), was his reference 
for a critique of and a resistance to the factory.16 In Modern Times, the chaos sown by 
‘Charlot’ causes a breakdown of the machine-system, and a blooming of the 
creativity and vitality that may be circumscribed even by egalitarian political 
projects.17 
Fondane’s participation in modernism is conditioned by an existential perspective. 
As the subsequent chapter and the readings of Exodus in chapters 5 and 6 will 
explore, the commingling of material catastrophe and personal anguish can be 
understood through the idea of disconsolation. For Olivier Salazar-Ferrer in his 
reading of Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre, 
 
The abyss appears when the values of truth, beauty and goodness collapse, 
along with the reassurances of Stoic or Christian wisdom and the morality of 
the progressives of the 19th century. For Fondane this collapse occurs under 
the force of traumatic events that are unable to be integrated into logics of 
consolation or justification, indeed exposes them as brutally insufficient. 
(Salazar-ferrer 2003a, 51, my translation)  
 
 
16 See EC; Benjamin 2003a, 251 and Buck-Morss 2002. 
17 I use the term vital in a simple or naive sense. While Fondane engaged extensively with the work of 
both Nietzsche and Bergson (see for example ‘Bergson, Freud et les dieux’ and ‘Edmund Husserl et 
l’oeuf de Colombe du réel’ in CM and Fondane 1982, as well as Jutrin 2012, Fotiade, ed. 2006 and 
Regier 2005, 76) his conceptions of life resolutely resisted theorization.  
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The gouffre or abyss is an important image for Fondane, not least as a conception of 
the lack inherent in many philosophical and political worldviews and attempts at their 
application. It also opens on to the undeniable metaphysical and spiritual dimensions. 
Fondane is not a religious thinker as such, nor a mystic. He is not an anti-rational 
thinker, but an extra-rational one. If God informs his work, it is arguably as a space 
of absence and possibility.  
 The Biblical Exodus is a narrative of God’s absence and of the possibility of an 
antagonistic relation to God and an abandonment by God. It was an especially 
productive source myth for Fondane’s poetry, especially in the overlap between 
metaphysical and worldly exile, and especially because Fondane came to see 
modernity itself as an exilic condition.18 However, while lament and a search for 
conciliation have important metaphysical resonance in modernism – think of T. S. 
Eliot’s Four Quartets, another modernist river journey – revolt is also a key response 
in Fondane’s work. He also stages Job’s ‘howl in terror’ (EM 53), the breakdown of 
any foundation and bulwark to existence in the consciousness of the ‘exception’, that 
is to say the cry for comfort of the absolutely desperate, and, simultaneously, a revolt 
against their conditions. Whether it be the Hegelian World-Spirit or the plan of the 
Christian God, Fondane’s compassion for the suffering of the now rejects 
justifications. He stands against any attempt to integrate catastrophe into a greater 
plan. 
 For Fondane, the ‘unhappiness’ of consciousness, the dissatisfaction and 
anguish of consciousness in a world where suffering is meaningless and, further, 
where no meaning could compensate for that experience of catastrophe, acts as a 
thorn in the side of abstract thought. Yet a focus on the singularity of suffering and its 
affinities with other sufferings across different times, places and cultural frameworks 
speaks of a deep compassion. It is only through a valuing of one’s own experience, 
extended outwards to a valuing of others, that such an impulse could come to be: ‘it is 
possible that philosophy does not have to know a truth which is once and for all but 
can know a truth capable of changing […] loving, crying, praying, indeed revolting or 
 
18 Edward Said’s key text Reflections on Exile amplifies many of Fondane’s themes in this regard. 
Fondane exemplifies Said’s statement that ‘exile cannot be made to serve notions of humanism’ (Said 
2001, 174), as well as the paradox of using his alienation from place of origin and language as a 
starting-point for communicating across the abyss. 
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resigning oneself are acts that shape it to some extent’ (LE 55; EM 25). Existential 
thought, then, is a crisis for rational thought. The rupture in thought caused by 
anguish and despair allows a gesture towards the existence occluded by thought’s 
operations, if only by the delineation of its absence: ‘Let the disaster happen! Will it 
still remain positive philosophy’s prerogative to measure reality’s extent by its own 
powers alone?’ (LE 63; EM 29).  
 Fondane’s existential engagement with philosophy insists upon on the primacy 
of the existent. Not only anguish but also joy and love of life are located in the 
philosophical absence of the gouffre. Philosophies which are constructed outside of it 
play an active role in shaping actual lives and societies. Against Marx, Fondane 
argues that philosophers have consistently contributed to great shifts in society, ‘aussi 
profonds que délibérés [as willed as they are profound]’ (EDR 97), often to the 
detriment of those caught up in the implementation of their ideals. Fondane’s 
emphasis on the existent resists the totality of catastrophe. His poetic response makes 
a gesture to the unsayable, to the value of life that always slips through philosophy’s 
fingers.  
  Fondane’s take on the conscience malheureuse, the unhappy consciousness of 
the existent, combines a desire for consolation in the face of the suffering of existence 
with a refusal to negate or repress its own suffering. However, conscience can be 
translated as either ‘consciousness’ or ‘conscience’, depending on context. When 
discussing the role of the poet in opening a view to the abyss, Fondane brings in the 
idea of la conscience honteuse du poète, the poet’s ‘shameful conscience’, which 
Salazar-Ferrer glosses as ‘the guilt of a subjective activity in a polarised culture that 
gets its validation from the triumphant objectivity of the sciences’ (Salazar-Ferrer 
2013, 86, my translation). It is born of a conflict between rational and irrational 
elements within the self: the poet finds themselves seeking in their art an amoral, 
‘frivolous’ contact with that which is beyond the bounds of ethical systems and use 
values, leading to feelings of shame in the face of super-egoic criteria of usefulness 
and morality. As a thinking subject like any other (Fondane clearly states that he does 
not exclude himself from rational thought: ‘tout comme vous, mon cher lecteur, je 
m’accroche désespérément à l’intelligibilité de l’histoire [just like you, dear reader, I 
cling hopelessly to the intelligibility of History]’ HDH 450; EM61). As a thinking 
being, the poet cannot but aspire to the justifications promised by philosophical 
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systems and seek to align themselves with their precepts. Yet this same desire for 
conciliation finds rational explanations and metaphysical comforts lacking. Poetry, 
sometimes despite the poet themselves, as Fondane argues in Rimbaud le voyou, 
becomes a space to explore what is not present in rational analyses of existence or of 
history – indeed what tends to be dismissed altogether – and perhaps cannot be 
present. 
 At the very same time as reckoning with the anguish of catastrophic existence, 
the desire to go beyond systematic thought also contains the urge to affirm the 
affective joy which philosophy, in its turn towards the transcendent or the universal, 
cannot capture, as well as the very expression of the existential yearning inherent in 
the subject’s relationship with this lacuna. Thus the existential abyss as indicated in 
Fondane’s work represents a utopos – the non-lieu mentioned in his poetry – outwith 
rational thought, in which repressed affect, the singular value of the existent, the 
boundlessness of the catastrophe and the yearning for an impossible resolution all 
operate. This leads us to a context of ineffability refracted through the modernist 




Men cannot unify in their human language all that they live through 
and feel in such a way that it can be expressed by a single word or 
single concept. 
 
Leon Shestov (Shestov 1975) 
 
Qui osera relever la tête afin que les mots se soulèvent? L’homme est 
un animal que la poésie pétrit dans l’argile, ou qu’elle fait sauter à 
coups de dynamite. 
 
[Who will dare stick out their neck in order to whip up the words? Man 
is an animal whom poetry hardens into clay, or else blows up with 
blasts of dynamite.] 
 
‘Mots Sauvages’ (Fondane 1996a, 23) 
 
The third aspect of catastrophe as it bears down on and informs Fondane’s thought 
and art is a catastrophe of representation. Wanton material violence and an existential 
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crisis of meaning provided fertile ground for Fondane’s participation in modernism.19 
The coin of catastrophe can be thought of as having two sides, the horror of violence 
being one and the groundlessness of meaning the other. The currency is ineffability. 
Ineffability itself can be thought of as twofold, with a distinction between the 
unspeakable and the unsayable. This is the definition used by China Miéville in his 
article ‘Silence in debris: Towards an Apophatic Marxism’ (2019). Although on close 
examination they are (appropriately) not neat categories, in Miéville’s essay the 
unspeakable and the unsayable become a useful shorthand for, respectively, the 
ineffability of horror and the ineffability of what stands in opposition to horror, of joy 
and fulfilment and their conditions. Complete fulfilment is the territory of the 
utopian20 and the divine, Shestov’s religious horizon, and is at best aspirational. But 
the unsayable is also the value of the existent that evades philosophical capture, just 
as the unspeakable is not only the unseizable meaning of horror but also suffering’s 
dismissal and demeaning by philosophy (despite the frequent good intentions of 
many who conceive of systems which carry out such dismissals or reductions). 
 Fondane arrived at a poetics open to contexts of ineffability through a highly 
personal trajectory. As an aspiring writer in Romania, he idolised French poetry, 
particularly Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Verlaine and Mallarmé. During this Symbolist 
period, represented in the Romanian collection Privelisti (Landscapes), Fondane held 
to a l’art pour l’art belief in the poem ‘ressenti comme un univers autonome 
[experienced as an autonomous universe]’ (Fondane 1996, 20), wherein poetry 
offered a pure escape from the complications of existence. His confrontations with 
material and metaphysical catastrophe, through the catalysts of Dada and Shestov, 
shattered this faith. He came to see the ‘escape’ into beauty not only as sterile, but as 
a betrayal of existence.  
 
19 Modernism was of course often driven by new theories of history, such as the Futurists’ sweeping 
veneration of the new. Fondane was concerned with thinking and living with the insufficiencies of 
historical theories rather than overcoming them. His commitment to uncertainty has some parallels 
with the tension between politics and representation discussed in David Weir’s 1997 book Anarchy & 
Culture: The Aesthetic Politics of Modernism. 
20 As already mentioned and as I will return to throughout the thesis, the notion of a ‘non-place’ has 
many aspects in Fondane’s work. In his engagement with political utopias, his critique aligns with 
Miéville’s, which calls for a ‘proud humility’ (2019, 4) in socialist politics and a recognition that the 
achievement of a better society in communism will never eradicate individual suffering, and thus 




 Fondane’s concern for what poetry tends to leave out is part of the larger 
picture of modernism’s post-Somme grappling with art as ideological apparatus, 
shaping thought and constraining ideas, so that genres such as realism ‘came to seem 
immoral’ (Bell 2010, 2). Language itself, the most fundamental social bond, seemed 
to have failed, to the point that straightforward attempts to employ it could be seen as 
betrayals of reality. Dada was the performance of a failure which the rest of the world 
seemed intent on ignoring, standing ‘in opposition to society, as did heretics in the 
Middle Ages’ (Hugo Ball, quoted in Bell 2010), burlesquing the proclamations of 
authority and, in its trauma, Emma Bell argues, ‘signifying little’, in positive terms, 
‘beyond a reluctance to signify’ (Bell 2010). Fondane’s direct engagement with ‘le 
débat continental sur le renouvellement de l’art et de la façon de penser l’art [the 
continental debate on the renewing of art and ways of thinking about art]’ (AG 17) 
eventually led to complete paralysis: from 1924 to 1928 he did not write a line of 
poetry.21 
 Dada pointed towards an aporia of expression, the defeat of meaning in a 
senseless world, where any remaining values could only be betrayed by language, its 
forms necessarily complicit with the destructive machinery of modernity. Fondane’s 
unfinished essay Signification de Dada begins ‘Nous avons été trahis par les mots 
auxquels nous avons le plus souvent ouvert notre cœur. Que cela nous serve 
d’exemple! [We have been betrayed by the very words to which we opened our 
hearts. Let that be an example to us!]’ (AG 76). Shestov’s critiques of positivist 
thinking reinforced the sense that there was always a remainder to any statement: ‘It 
is a great art, a difficult art, to be able to keep oneself from the exclusivism toward 
which we are unconsciously drawn by our language and even by our thought, which 
is educated by language’ (Shestov 1975). It was only at the end of his four-year 
abnegation, however, that Fondane’s own critical apprehension of the effects and 
import of this catastrophe took shape. He found the means to move beyond it, not by 
victoriously overcoming it, but through a refusal to accept defeat, a permanent 
resistance to overwhelming despair, creating what he felt to be new ways of affirming 
the human voice despite, and beyond, the broken promises of aesthetic expression. 
 
21 Olivier Salazar-Ferrer has pointed out that we only have Fondane’s own word to go on for this. 
Whatever the truth of Fondane’s activities during this period, the spirit of the crisis was very real. 
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Dada was an important starting point, and parts of this paradoxical stance had been 
learned through Shestov, but Fondane’s performance of this resistance was his own.  
 ‘Mots Sauvages’ [‘Wild Words’] is an essay Fondane wrote in 1929 in which 
he takes stock of the rupture, disavowing his previous belief that poetry could 
‘apporter une réponse là où la métaphysique et la morale avaient depuis longtemps 
tiré les volets [provide an answer where metaphysics and morality had long ago shut 
up shop]’ (1996, p. 21).22 Yet it also marks a refusal to relax into Pessoan decadence, 
‘renunciation as a way of life’, ‘the aesthetic contemplation of life’ as a ‘justification 
for having a soul’ (Pessoa 2002, 12). ‘Mots Sauvages’ instead opens onto a new, 
hesitant, intrinsically self-doubting use of language. The impossibility of speaking 




The more of which we can speak, the more of which we cannot […] 
Lack must be part of how we see the world, how we act in it, how we 
speak and change it. ‘What kind of philosopher’, we might demand, 
with Benjamin Fondane, ‘is he who does not accept that freedom 




Apophasis may not be sufficient, but it is necessary.  
 
(Miéville 2019, 5 & 13) 
 
Although the term apophasis has a long history as the name for the project to 
consider the impossibility of knowing God with merely mundane resources, with 
certain qualifications it has viability as a critical term for considering various 
problems of meaning in modernism and modernity.24 The theological tradition does 
 
22 Sartre carries out a similar autopsy of the dead end of Symbolist poetry in his Mallarmé, though his 
championing of a dialectical materialist prose is the antithesis of Fondane’s response. 
23 Though beyond the scope of this thesis, it would be possible to draw many parallels between 
Fondane’s linguistic problematic and translation theory, not least because of his moving between 
languages and his own practice as a translator. 
24 I am not concerned here with the rhetorical sense of declaring that one will not speak of a subject, 
and thereby speaking of it. 
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provide a foundation for this struggle with meaning, ‘a point of reference within 
philosophical explorations of language’ (Vericat 2002, 172), but, for writers from 
Walter Benjamin to T.S. Eliot to Paul Celan to Fondane, this is not so much by way 
of the transcendence of metaphysics as by its absence. 25 I want to associate Fondane 
with an apophatic tendency in modern poetry which draws on the via negativa but is 
primarily concerned with language and with interpretations of history, where ‘the 
territories of language and silence shift from metaphysics to more specifically 
historical questions’ (Wolosky 1995, 4). Fondane’s essay Faux traité d’esthétique 
sets out the commensurability of metaphysical absence and the poetic expression of 
existence, together with a defence of the extra-rational space where the affective life 
of the existent takes place.26 Fondane’s poetics seeks to acknowledge and assert 
ineffability at the same time as resisting it. In Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre, 
Fondane considers Baudelaire as veiling the unbearability of the abyss. For Fondane, 
the apophatic challenge will be how to use art not to veil the void but to acknowledge 
or even confront it. 
I propose that we may think of apophasis as having three valences when 
considering Fondane’s work, three threads that can be productively examined 
separately but which also weave together. The first of these is the apophasis of 
absence: the ineffability of the hole left by God’s disappearance, which in particular 
tears catastrophe from frames of meaning and lays bare its unspeakability. The 
second is the apophasis of existence, or the desire to gesture towards the unsayability 
of existence, to the lived remainder left behind by speculative philosophy or modern 
teleologies of politics. The third might be termed linguistic apophasis, what Shira 
Wolosky calls the ‘negative way of language’ (Wolosky 1995). This is the dominant 
‘colour’ in this textile metaphor, enfolding the other two. The failures of language to 
overcome ineffability in regards to absence and disaster can be considered to expose 
a fundamental aspect of language itself.  
 
25 Anne Carson argues that ‘a negative theology may begin as just a way of thinking about the surface 
on which you are working, whether it is a zinc plate or a slab of stone or the facts of human language’ 
(Carson 2002a, 114). 
26 See Wexler 2017, Finlayson 2012, Hawkins 2003, Carson 2002a and 2002b and Wolosky 1995. A 
key difference between modernist poetics and negative theology is the tendency for the former not to 
assume an object out of reach. Sabine Müller makes this comment on Rilke: ‘there is no veil to be 
lifted from any concealed essence. Veiledness is understood as an integral and irreducible aspect of the 
mystery of being’ (Müller 2017, 298).  
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 In negotiating his path through ineffability, Fondane learns from Dada and 
Shestov and pre-empts the theoretical engagements with the limits of language by 
‘postmodern’ philosophers such as Jean-François Lyotard or Jacques Derrida.27 His 
linguistic engagement, however, was not so much theoretical as poetic, an exploration 
of and resistance to these limits which nonetheless remained committed to the 
subjective and the singular. The combination of avant-garde subversions with 
Shestovian existential and metaphysical uncertainty invites parallels with Samuel 
Beckett, as the search for meaning becomes a going-on, a failing better. 
 This going-on– this refusal to resign oneself to the limits of knowledge and 
instead, with ‘proud humility’ (Miéville 2019, 4), endlessly negotiate how to live 
with them – informs the double sense of the title of this thesis. The ruins are both the 
actual wasteland of Europe in the World Wars and the remains of what Fondane 
called the ‘le vieux monde écroulé’ (AG 77), the shipwreck of Humanist and 
Enlightenment values. To address the felt presence of silence in the midst of this 
debris and the context of uttering from what is left over, I will now briefly expand on 
the notions of unspeakability and unsayability in relation to Fondane, on the writing 




Not until the revolts issuing from the depths, and then the dissidents 
and their clandestine writings, do perspectives open up — do ruined 
words become audible rising from the ruins, traversing the silence. 
 
(Blanchot 1995, 83) 
 
Maurice Blanchot’s text The Writing of Disaster (Blanchot 1980) is one of the most 
striking critical interventions in regards to the unspeakability of violence, and he has 
 
27 In his ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, Derrida hints at the existential import of linguistic questions 
even as he emphasizes the provisionality of terminology: ‘The word [deconstruction], at least on its 
own, has never appeared satisfactory to me (but what word is), and must always be girded by an entire 
discourse. It is difficult to effect it afterward because, in the work of deconstruction, I have had to, as I 
have to here, multiply the cautionary indicators and put aside all the traditional philosophical concepts, 
while reaffirming the necessity of returning to them, at least under erasure. Hence, this has been called, 
precipitately, a type of negative theology (this was neither true nor false but I shall not enter into the 
debate here).’ (Derrida 1985) 
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certain affinities with Fondane (see Bikard 2005). Blanchot’s text was 
groundbreaking in the performance of its apophatic qualities, proclaiming the 
impossibility of adequately representing the Nazi Holocaust by refusing to proclaim, 
acknowledging the limits of its medium through a fragmentary subversion of them. 
The very form of the text is a warning for attempts to speak the disaster. Despite 
many attempts to speak it, with all their complications, the Holocaust remains an 
unavoidable reference for the limits of representation, notably by way of Adorno’s 
oft-cited and usually decontextualized statement on poetry after Auschwitz.28 The 
shadow of the Shoah does indeed lean backwards across Fondane’s poetry and at 
points he speaks towards it, almost uncannily. 
 However, it is important to keep in mind that all of the questions around 
representation which were so horribly amplified by Nazism were already raised by 
the First World War, as I have already touched upon in relation to Dada. ‘What made 
writing about twentieth-century violence so difficult,’ writes Joyce Wexler, ‘was that 
it occurred in a secular age’ (Wexler 2017, 2). The First World War was not simply 
an overwhelming event. It exposed the epistemological break, the lie that Western 
culture could be considered justified.29 Adorno’s critique of poetry is essentially the 
same as that of Dada and of Fondane: to create objects of aesthetic pleasure, 
uncritically reproducing pre-twentieth-century forms, is to deny this new perspective 
on reality, to participate in reproducing its cruelty by masking it.30 As Rhys Tranter 
points out, ‘for Blanchot, historical testimony is by its very nature flawed, troubled 
 
28 ‘The more total society becomes, the greater the reification of the mind and the more paradoxical its 
effort to escape reification on its own. Even the most extreme consciousness of doom threatens to 
degenerate into idle chatter […] To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even 
the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today […] Critical intelligence cannot 
be equal to this challenge as long as it confines itself to self-satisfied contemplation.’ (Adorno 1981, 
34) 
29 This thought of Henry James is particularly succinct as evidence of break and as foreshadowing of 
avant-garde responses: ‘The subject-matter of one’s effort … has become itself utterly treacherous and 
false — its relation to reality utterly given away and smashed. Reality is a world that was to be capable 
of this — and how represent that horrific capability, historically latent, historically ahead of it? How 
on the other hand not represent it either — without putting into play mere fiddlesticks?’ (Lubbock 
1970, 398). 
30 Glossing Adorno’s much-misused statement, Brian Oard writes: ‘To persist, after Auschwitz, in the 
production of monuments of the very culture that produced Auschwitz […] is to participate by 
denial in the perpetuation of that barbaric culture and to participate in the process (reification) that 
renders fundamental criticism of that culture literally unthinkable’ (Oard 2011). We may think too of 
Benjamin’s famous statement that ‘there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a 
document of barbarism’ (Benjamin 2003aa, 392). Fondane addresses this problematic directly in 
L’Ecrivain devant la révolution, using the palace of Versailles as an example (EDR 66). 
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and incomplete’ (Tranter 2009).31 For Fondane, the First World War had already 
raised Adorno’s problematic, and the limits of historical representation sent him 
towards a different way of making poetry, a way that made its insufficiencies part of 
its strength. Ironically, this new mode laid the ground for his response to the 
Second.32 
 The collapse of language precipitated by catastrophe is a theme I will return to 
throughout the thesis. Blanchot and Adorno’s critiques of utterance,33 however, also 
raise the question of where do words begin again? Despite their reservations around 
cataphasis, they speak and write, however hedged, fragmentary, and challenging their 
words may be. ‘L’homme a besoin de désapprendre le langage [man needs to unlearn 
language]’, wrote Fondane in 1927 (AG 55), attempting to take stock of French 
poetry in the wake of the war. Against the resumed urge to create masterpieces, he 
affirmed the need to learn à balbutier, to stammer (AG 55). Poetry had to be 
‘humiliated’ (AG 54) so that it could open on to this new context of uncertainty. 
Writing amid the ferment of the avant-garde he concludes, without the confidence of 
a Marinetti but with a certain kind of liberatory hope, ‘jamais autant de lassos 
n’auront été jetés aux crinières de l’inconnu [never will so many lassos have been 
thrown at the manes of the unknown]’ (AG 57).  
 In the wake of the wars, Adorno emphasized the question raised by a character 
in Sartre’s Les Morts sans sépulture of ‘whether or why one should live in a world in 
which one is beaten until one’s bones are smashed. Since it concerns the possibility 
of any affirmation of life, this question cannot be evaded’ (Adorno 2001, 110). 
Fondane’s work on the unhappy consciousness aligns with Adorno’s point that ‘any 
thought which is not measured by this standard […] cannot be called a thought at all’ 
(Adorno 2001, 110). Yet despite his own participation in the interpretive work of 
 
31 Compare Fabio Vericat’s comment on T.S Eliot’s contemporary analysis of the problem: ‘The most 
important temporal myth is perhaps not that there is an ideal and final origin, but that 
there is such a thing as an intelligible present’ (Vericat 2002, 258). 
32 The abyss of silence around the quantative and epistemological novelty of modern mechanized 
slaughter is apparent everywhere in narratives around the First World War. For instance, this testimony 
from 19-year-old burial officer Norman Collins after the Battle of the Somme: ‘as an officer, the best 
way of comforting the living would be to give them a stroke on the head or a pat on the back or some 
gesture like that: without words, comfort them without words’ (Collins 2018). It would also surely be 
fruitful to compare Fondane’s poetry with that of Isaac Rosenberg. 
33 ‘It is in the nature of philosophy’, Adorno later wrote to clarify his position, ‘that nothing 
is meant quite literally’ (Adorno 2001, 110). 
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thought as evinced in his essays, ultimately his most lasting response to the 
ineffability of catastrophe was in the search for affirmation, a search which pushed 
language beyond the bounds of the conceptual. The responsibility of poetry in this 
context is thus no longer only aesthetic (if it ever truly was) but towards a crisis that 
conflates ethics and representation (a problematic most acutely developed by 
Fondane in his Faux Traité d’esthétique). He seeks to affirm certain indefinite values 
or aspects of life in the face of the irrational void of meaninglessness, while at the 
same time fighting against positive systems of thought in order to defend ‘the 
liberatory, enriching unsayable’ (Miéville 2019, 24). Unsaying, according to 
Catherine Keller, whom Miéville draws on, ‘performs its negations for the sake of the 
most positive relations possible’ (Keller 2014, 3). 
 Fondane’s apophatic search for affirmation corresponds with the same literary 
‘projects’ Beth Hawkins gleans from his contemporaries Franz Kafka, Paul Celan and 
Edmond Jabès: ‘a radical subversion of the Enlightenment Humanism that allows for 
faith in humanity as a necessary corollary to faith in the unlimited power of reason. 
Here, human capacity is tempered by incapacity and the evidence, at every turn, of 
the inhuman’ (Hawkins 2003, xxv). Like Jabès, Fondane implores us, ‘in the throes 
of the crisis, to preserve the question’ (Hawkins 2003, xxiii). That is to say, in their 
stance of challenging all systemization, Fondane’s philosophical and poetic 
approaches are fundamentally subversive, seeking to provoke the reader’s subjective 
engagement rather than offer theoretical grounding. As a Fondane scholar, the task is 
to critically open his work without overly defining it; as John K. Roth says of the role 
of the critic of the literature of catastrophe in his book Holocaust Politics, ‘it is not 
for me to settle what should remain unsettling’ (Roth 2001, 258). 
 Writing on Paul Celan, Pierre Joris says of the Holocaust that ‘all poetry, after 
that date, will have to be, at some level, a poetry of witnessing’ (Joris 2005, 6). A 
variegated notion of testimony will be crucial to my framing of Fondane’s own poetic 
response and will be elaborated in the third part of the thesis. Suffice it to say for now 
that Fondane’s own consciousness of what Blanchot calls the writing of disaster 
meant an end to what he called the ‘perfect poem’. Fondane uses this term to refer to 
the aesthetic ideal of the language of poetry transcending the mundane, an ideal to 
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which he once ascribed.34 It appears in the most famous of his poems, his response to 
the calamity he knew himself to be living through, the ‘preface’ to L’Exode: his poem 
is only a ‘cry’, he writes, ‘qu’on ne peut pas mettre dans un poème | parfait, avais-je 
donc le temps de le finir? [It is no more | than a cry, which cannot be put into a 
perfect | poem – had I even the time to finish it?]’ (MF 153). On one hand, he cannot 
escape the desire to transcend the world through beauty: the reference to time is both 
a poignant acknowledgement that his own time is running out and that there is not 
time in the world to make a poem perfect. On the other is the implication that 
aesthetic perfection denies and obfuscates the value of anguish. Fondane’s poetic 
oeuvre is a paradox, a virtuosic appeal to attend to its imperfections. In the next 
section, I will extend the ways in which poetry had to be the means for his apophatic 
response to the crisis of representation.  
Beyond Philosophy 
 
Qu’il [le désastre] se produise! Appartient-il encore à cette 
philosophie de mesurer à son seule pouvoir l’étendue du réel? 
 
[Let the disaster happen! Will it still remain positive philosophy’s 
prerogative to measure reality’s extent by its own powers alone?] 
 
from Le Lundi existentiel (LE 63; EM 29) 
 
Poetry can harness the paradoxes intrinsic to apophatic discourse. Despite his famous 
quote, Adorno stated that writing poetry after Auschwitz was both impossible and 
imperative: ‘philosophical reflection really consists precisely in the gap […] between 
these two otherwise so flatly opposed possibilities’ (Adorno 2001, 110). The 
unspeakable and the unsayable are intertwined. If there is a response to life during 
and after the catastrophe which is not simply suicide, then it is unlikely, in Fondane’s 
view, to be a purely rational response. Fondane’s activity between philosophy and 
poetry exemplifies a tension between the rational and the irrational. He is not a 
philosophical poet by in Santayanan terms, one who has a ‘scheme of the universe’ 
 
34 His volte-face is set out in ‘Mots Sauvages’, but anguish at the sterility of aestheticism also drives 




(T.S. Eliot cited in Vericat 2002, 166). ‘If we want to be honest about the reality 
around us’, writes Italian critic Olivia Salvadori in a résumé of Fondane’s attitude to 
philosophy, ‘we also need to try and avoid certain forms of Idealist cowardice, the 
sterility of the dialectical visions which most encourage us and reconcile the 
phenomena of the world with those of human life’ (Salvadori 2017, my translation). 
For Fondane modernity is a catastrophe, and modernisms, whether philosophical, 
artistic or political, cannot find a reconciliation for it. His quest then becomes the 
absurd one – absurd, yet important – of how to live without reconciliation. In the 
words of Anne Mounic in Poésie et philosophie: ineffable rigueur [Poetry and 
Philosophy: Rigorous ineffability], he leads the reader towards ‘an existential 
reflection provoking alarm, dejection and questioning’ (Mounic 2017, 89, my 
translation). 
 Fondane’s speaking from literal, philosophical and linguistic ruins necessarily 
resists its own repression or absorption into a stable framework. However, the drive 
to speak remains strong despite the impossibility of speaking adequately. For 
Fondane this drive is the desire of the Kierkegaardian living self to get beyond the 
writing self.35 Paradoxically, he wishes to attempt this in writing. Fondane’s thought 
attempts to be anti-discursive. He does not claim special status for his own 
philosophical incursions, admitting to the same old failures (HDH 450; EM61). His 
philosophy set itself the task of turning towards what Karl Jaspers called the 
‘incessant uneasiness of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’, of ‘shedding light upon that 
which is unconditioned, historical and hence not valid for everyone’ (cited in EM 7). 
Poetry, then, became a place where not only could this uneasy questioning be 
sustained, but the ‘strangeness of the existent’ (EM 19) could be acknowledged.  
 This move beyond philosophy is intimately bound up with catastrophe because 
disaster strips away all metaphysical answers. To Kierkegaard’s question ‘once all is 
completely lost… is there really nothing left?’ (from Kierkegaard’s Journal, cited in 
EM 19) Fondane replies ‘a cry’ (EM 19). Where philosophy suppresses this cry 
because it will not ‘cause something to be where there is no longer anything’ (EM 
19), for Fondane it is crucial. Where ‘this immense cry of human misery and 
 
35 ‘One lives in a different category than that in which one places oneself when writing.’ (From 
Kierkegaard’s Journal, cited in EM 17) 
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suffering throughout the ages, this lengthy waste of hope and of despair’ is not given 
‘the faintest echo throughout the entire history of philosophy’ (EM 20), where 
‘existential’ philosophy can only cry out negatively against this omission, poetry 
represents the only possibility for a positive move beyond the limitations of the 
‘writing self’. Joseph Acquisto argues that for Fondane attempts at systematic 
certitude are ‘an impossible and falsifying ideal’ (Acqusito 2015, 70). Pre-empting 
affect theory’s readings of the affective dimensions occluded in philosophical 
thought,36 Fondane argues, in Acquisto’s words, that ‘this philosophical move is itself 
[...] based in these philosophers’ own awareness of the impossibility of certitude and 
a reaction inspired by fear of anguish, absurdity and madness’ (Acquisto 2015, 70).  
 Poetry sustains contradictions, stands outside of discursivity, and gestures 
towards what is unreifiable. Although Fondane did not regain his faith in language, 
still less in poetry as a specialized language which transcended language’s failures, 
poetry could yet attempt to explore the cry in a way discursive thought could not. 
Mircea Martin argues that the Faux traité d’esthétique, Fondane’s most direct 
treatment of this context, targets  
 
aesthetics itself […] as a philosophy of art with ‘calm’ problems, which is to 
say abstract and atemporal ones; with its conceptualizing approach, an 
impoverishing one from an artistic perspective; with its will to autonomy, 
interpreted as the symptom of an undeniable ‘crisis of reality’ […] the author 
attacks all speculative, logical and rational approaches to art and poetry [...] 
In his eyes, poetry is a vital experience which supposes participation in life 
and not separation from it. (Martin 2007, my translation) 
 
 Even if it could never fully articulate the cry, poetry could assert the cry as an 
affirmation of life (see Salazar-Ferrer 2007 141–142).37  
 
36 See Redding 1999. It is possible to imagine Fondane’s response to the affective turn in academia in 
the 1990s associated with theorists such as Brian Massumi as akin to that he gave to psychoanalysis in 
the 1930s: a useful recentring of suppressed experiences that nonetheless betrayed their broader human 
context by aspiring to scientism and introducing new dualities, such as severing the physiological and 
the intentional. Spinoza, a major precusor of that turn, is one of Shestov and Fondane’s principal 
antagonists. Recently, scholars have challenged some of the interpretations in affect theory along 
similar lines (e.g. Leys 2011) as well as their scientific grounding (Young 2020). 
37 Martin argues that Fondane’s critique of aesthetics raises problems as well as opportunities for 
poetry. For example, in his view Fondane’s extra-rational approach fails to answer ‘what distinguishes 
a poem and a poetic manifesto, or an artistic confession and a cry’ (Martin 2007, my translation). I 
intend to leave these questions open, as Fondane and his Dada predecessors did. 
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 Although Fondane, like Kafka, Celan and Jabès in Hawkins’s study, ‘choose[s] 
literary forms that reflect a pervasive anti-systematicity’, often conveying ‘silence 
rather than speech’ (Hawkins 2003, xxix), poetry also strangely becomes a 
affirmation of the strangeness of the existent, a positive gesture though formed in 
failure. This affirmation is also a gesture towards the future, despite the resistance to 
teleology. As Hawkins puts it, ‘The non-fulfillability of the messianic wish is also the 
inexhaustibility of the written word. The “not-yet” is the condition for the now’ 
(Hawkins 2003, 161). This is reflected in Fondane’s endless reworkings of his poetry, 
his view that a poem was never final and fixed, his description of his output as edition 
sans fin.38 ‘Le poème || ne demande | rien! || Ce n’est | qu’un cri, qu’on ne peut pas 
mettre dans un poème | parfait [this poem || asks nothing! || It is no more | than a cry, 
which cannot be put into a perfect poem]’ (MF 153). It is a means of calling our 
living attention to the cry. 
 Following Miéville, we can read this cry, the cry of the living self trapped in 
language, in terms of the unsayable. Although doing it justice would require a 
detailed study, it is important to mention silent cinema, in which Fondane worked as 
a screenwriter, critic and director. He saw silent cinema as a kind of poetry, opening 
on to the absurdity of affectivity. Neither could surpass the ‘not-yet’, but they could – 
along with music and other non-verbal art forms – be attestations simultaneously of 
the cry of anguish and the value of the existent. Silent cinema was a major inspiration 
because it could unite a total audience: both the mass audience and the avant-garde 
were enraptured by Chaplin (EC 80). 
 Perhaps poetry, however, was primary for Fondane because it could flag the 
unavoidable failures of language through its very use of the medium: ‘nous sommes 
encore sous le règne des mots [we are still under the reign of words]’, he wrote in 
‘Mots sauvages’ (Fondane 1996a, 22). Dealing with a similar modernist problematic, 
one in which life’s limitations are exposed rather than overcome (as opposed, say, to 
the contradiction-crushing assertions of Futurism), Fabio Vericat argues that T.S. 
Eliot’s strategies ‘both adopt and subvert the medium he inherits’ (Vericat 2002, 
186). M.A.R Habib interprets this problematic:  
 
38 ‘Fondane rejected the imprimatur of literary aesthetics over the idea of the finished work. This is 
consistently emphasized by the note ‘endless editions’ which he appended to the various manuscripts 




The task of literature is precisely to achieve that unity between the subjective 
and the objective which has suffered dissolution in real life. And it must do 
this by an ironic process: by incorporating the romantic emphasis on 
subjectivity within a larger equivalence which reinstates a classical emphasis 
on the object. (cited in Vericat 2002, 187) 
 
For Fondane, the tension between subject and object is only overcome at the horizon 
where art and life cease to be independent of one another, where art loses its status as 
a concept. This is the situation he reads into ‘primitive’ cultures, and the poet’s 
activity is a step towards it (FT 32). However, for the modern mind the separation has 
already taken place. The awareness of language and logic’s insufficiencies cannot be 
unlearnt. In Martin’s words, ‘the recuperation of the primitive mentality is never 
completed, its restoration constantly under threat from omnipresent, omnipotent 
reason’ (Martin 2007, my translation). For Fondane the poet’s role is an absurd one: 
to strive towards that synthesis of subjective and objective without hope of fully 
realizing it. 
 To paraphrase Ursula Le Guin, ‘it is words that make the trouble and confusion 
[…] The artist deals with what cannot be said in words. The artist whose medium is 
[poetry] does this in words’ (Le Guin 2018, introduction). Fondane moves beyond 
philosophy and into poetry as a means of affirming the unsayable.39 But the 
unspeakable and the unsayable are revealed as inseparable by the catastrophe, which 
undoes the consolations of philosophy and force us to recognize the ‘trouble and 
confusion’ of words. How can poetry be a means of going-on when language is 
‘severedness from an ultimate significance’, as William Franke diagnoses in the 
‘apophatic poetics of Paul Celan and Edmond Jabès’ (Franke 2005, 621)? Claude 
Vigée gives us one of the clearest glimpses of Fondane’s holistic response. ‘How, [in 
Auschwitz], to “unwall the place from where the poetic word stems?” Fondane dared 
to sketch the beginning of a real response: it is, in fact, the cry of a clump of nettles’ 
(Vigée 2007, my translation).   
 
39 Reductive rationalist attacks pose a constant threat of incomprehension for this move. Forestalling 
such attacks, China Miéville argues that ‘there is more to rationality than rationalism 
versus irrationalism, let alone than in the model whereby, beyond the limits of the former, that 
dangerous obverse thrives. If the unsayable is a rebuke to the reductive one, it does not follow that it is 
a function of the obscurantist other.‘ (Miéville 2019, 22–23) 
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 In reading Fondane’s work, it is crucial to recognize the resistance to 
ineffability that is simultaneous to its foregrounding. Silence can of course be 
deathly, as both Wexler (e.g. on war as its correlate, 2017, 46–47) and Miéville (on 
‘apophatic fascism’, 2019, 14) point out (I will address some of the political tensions 
around poetry’s capacities of subversion in the third part of the thesis). Nowhere is 
this tension in Fondane’s writing between the inadequacy of speaking and the need to 
speak so urgently dramatized more than in the long poetic sequence L’Exode. Vigée’s 
‘clump of nettles’ are the famous words from the work’s Préface en prose, where 
Fondane turns mourning into participation and intervention on behalf of the 
unsayable. L’Exode ties together the threads of catastrophe I have attempted to 
delineate here in exemplary fashion. It is the fulcrum of Fondane’s resistance; it is a 
cinder smouldering beyond reason and beyond his own death. L’Exode stages the 
unspeakable catastrophe, resists the absorption of the catastrophe into reductive 
sense-making and resists the catastrophe itself through a gesture towards the 
unsayable. The second part of the thesis will read some of the ways in which this 
happens and some of the resonances of these catastrophic, apophatic, affirmative 
words. Before proceeding further, however, I will clarify some of the terms which act 





Introducing Disconsolation and Irresignation: Terminology and 
its Discontents 
 
Disconsolation and irresignation are two interrelated concepts which I consider to be 
fundamental to Fondane’s life and oeuvre and which I will use to anchor my readings 
of L’Exode. Irresignation appears as a term in his prose as he attempts to 
conceptualize his metaphysical and existential revolt. Disconsolation does not, but is 
a useful handle for both philosophical and literary contexts; I am using it to describe 
the relation of Fondane’s ‘unhappy consciousness’ (CM, EM 33) to the world in its 
‘situatedness’, and the literary expression of that relation. To attempt to honour 
Fondane’s antagonism toward conceptual thinking, I must problematize these terms 
even as I introduce them: they are not ideas that can be held down as principles or 
defined through syllogistic examples. Instead, I am outlining them as provisional and 
incomplete concepts that gesture to a wider field of indefinable poetic activity. 
Through these terms, I will extend the sense of Fondane’s work as poetic testimony. 
First, however, it is necessary to interrogate them. 
 As my concern is to polarize the light of Fondane’s work through the prism of 
his poetry, I will consider disconsolation and irresignation as literary notions of mood 
and tone, themselves suitably ambiguous critical handles. Despair and anxiety are 
important concerns in Fondane studies, and irrésignation has also been picked up as a 
keyword in French-language scholarship. I will now set out my analysis of 
disconsolation and irresignation, before considering their integration in his poetry 
more closely. I will also trace some of the issues around applying aesthetic categories 
to Fondane. This mapping is directed in particular towards the idea of poetic 
testimony which I will develop from my readings of L’Exode at the core of the thesis. 
The context of conflict between poetry and philosophy will be kept in view. I will 
also contextualize the wider body of Fondane’s work by examining some other 
important keywords, such as modernity and tragic philosophy, which are refracted in 
his thought. 
 The ‘unhappy consciousness’ is the state Fondane proposes as endemic to the 




and the impossibility of compensating for this suffering. Fondane does not dismiss 
calls to remedy material suffering, but he proclaims the ‘integrity and indivisibility’ 
(EM 36) of such suffering from its metaphysical counterparts: ‘the presence of 
unreality, of contradiction, of powerlessness, necessity, and death, and thereby from 
the Fatum [Fate] that inexplicably brings about the total alienation of man’s powers’ 
(EM 36). Disconsolation, therefore, is the state of existing within interconnected 
tensions: the intractable desire to escape suffering; knowledge of the impossibility of 
doing so; and consciousness’s confrontation with the evidence of suffering’s 
circumstances, which precludes accepting any proffered escape as a surety. The 
thematic and formal expressions of anguish in Fondane’s poetry are inseparable from 
those of the subject’s continued, vital drive to move on from that anguish, though 
unable to finally escape it. 
 My use of disconsolation is to be distinguished from despair. Where despair 
implies an acceptance of a dead end, a cessation of activity, disconsolation combines 
a refusal to accept one’s situation with a rejection of all alternatives. Irresignation 
comes out of this position or condition; it is the expression of an extra-rational revolt 
which affirms life against the proof of a hopeless situation. Fondane’s work manifests 
an absurd ‘hope in despair’, in which the subject experiences suffering as inescapable 
and yet does not lapse into cynicism or abnegation. It is this ‘going on’ which 
constitutes his response to this metaphysical catastrophe and to the material violence 
and deprivations which simultaneously coloured the circumstances of his writings. As 
a result, even the very expression of despair could represent a paradoxical affirmative 
gesture. This underpins what Fondane terms irrésignation, ‘la mobilisation de 
l’individu contre un réel hostile [the mobilisation of the individual against a hostile 
real]’ (SEBF 2020). In La Conscience malheureuse, he gives some examples of this 
mobilization: ‘tant que la réalité sera telle qu’elle est, de manière ou d’autre, – par le 
poème, par le cri, par la foi ou par le suicide – l’homme témoignera de son 
irrésignation, dût cette irrésignation être – ou paraître – absurdité ou folie [As long as 
reality remains what it is, man will attest to his irresignation, in one manner or 
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another – through poetry, through the cry, through faith or through suicide – even if 
that irresignation must be – or seem – an absurdity or madness]’ (CM xvii).1 
 The word irrésignation as used by Fondane in La Conscience malheureuse is 
not employed to do the work of a critical concept making a positive definition and 
delineating or manipulating elements of thought. It is closer to what affect theorists 
have termed an ‘ideo-affective posture’ (Ngai 2005, 74; Tomkins 1995, 111) and 
Fondane’s avowal of its potential for ‘absurdity or madness’ speaks to his need to 
subvert the operations of philosophy as much as to carry forward its project of critical 
enquiry. Similarly, the necessity of reading Fondane’s poetry in relation to the rest of 
his writing incurs a strong caveat, namely that there is no case for ‘applying’ his 
philosophical ideas to his poetry or straightforwardly reading them ‘through’ it. 
Instead, his prose and poetry must be considered different valences of his encounter 
with and response to existence, ideally to be treated holistically. Irresignation and 
disconsolation are useful primarily as means of writing about what cannot be written 
about, as umbrella terms for the senses that emerge from reading an aggregate of 
affects and intentions in Fondane’s work. 
 There is subterranean affinity between Fondane’s existential foci and more 
recent trends in affect theory. Books like Lauren Berlant’s Cruel Optimism tie 
together the personal situation of the individual with their macro ideo-affective 
context in subversive and potentially productive ways. Unlike in the existentialism of 
Sartre, Fondane does not seek to resolve the tension between the individual and 
society (or rather, philosophical and political efforts to organize society).2 Not that he 
considers social concerns trivial, but his foremost concern is always the affirmation 
of the singular, which he construes as constantly under threat from macroanalyses 
and logical frameworks which demote it in the name of the transhistorical. Berlant’s 
Cruel Optimism is a particularly apt example, in that it is an attack not so much on 
bad faith as on cultures of misplaced hope  which allow the individual to turn away 
 
1 The cry is an important existential topos in Fondane’s work, representing an individual’s proto- or 
paralinguistic expression of anguish against the meaninglessness and loneliness of reality. See 
Vanhese 2017 and Bikard 2005. 
2 See HDH and EDR in particular. There are of course strong affinites between Fondane’s 
philosophical essays and those of better-know contemporary thinkers associated with existential 
thought such as Simone Weil and Albert Camus (particularly later Camus), both of whom also 
distanced themselves from existentialism, as well as less well-known figures such as Rachel Bespaloff 
and Vladimir Jankélévitch. Fondane, Weil and the Camus of The Rebel share a mistrust of teleologies. 




from catastrophe and its revelations (the American dream, which drew the 
immigrants of Fondane’s poems Ulysse and Titanic, is Berlant’s principal object). 
The courage to live in despair and to hope only absurdly is Fondane’s principal 
context, whether we read this context as contingent to him or more fundamental, 
asking to what degree his existential anxiety was a product of his historical moment – 
a question he himself kept open (see Beray 2009 19–22).  
 Art becomes fundamental to him in large part because in art the rights of the 
singular, the situated, are paramount. Although much of Fondane’s focus is on 
personal experience, it is important to clarify that this valuation of art is not so much 
the struggle of the individual against the mass as the affirmation of the affective and 
fleeting extra-rational elements of life against the tendency of rational thought to 
aspire to the transcendent or universal. It is possible, he wrote, ‘that philosophy does 
not have to know a truth which is once and for all but can know a truth capable of 
changing, of being made and unmade, of becoming bored, perhaps; it is also possible 
that we have some effective influence on its procedures; that loving, crying, praying, 
indeed revolting or resigning oneself are acts that shape it to some extent’ (EM 25). 
Ultimately his preoccupation with these possibilities pushed him to art as a domain 
beyond philosophy, in favour of what Patrice Beray calls ‘l’affectivité créatrice’ 
(Beray 2009, 13). Ann Van Sevenant argues that for Fondane, any attempt by a poet 
to resolve their own contradictions ‘in the name of some noble idea turns out to be 
destructive’ (Van Sevenant 1998, 9, my translation). Art’s capacity to sustain the 
contradictions inherent in affect (and especially in disconsolation) are part of its 
capacity to give space to and articulate irresignation. 
 There is also a parallel between the emergent apprehensibility of disconsolation 
and irresignation and critical discussions of mood and tone in poetry.3 Mood in 
particular, but also tone, are also evident in the literature of psychology, though 
mostly resistant to full definition.4 Their slipperiness as terms is evident even in this 
empirically-oriented discourse: statements such as ‘[some emotions form] our 
 
3 Emergence itself is also a productively slippery notion, or as the Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy 
puts it, ‘emergence is a notorious philosophical term of art’ (s.v. emergent properties). 
4 It is not the place of this thesis to enter further into psychological delineations, such as the distinction 
between mood and affect wherein the latter is an instance of the former, although it is worth 
remembering the emphasis in psychology of affect as bound up with an interpenetrating interaction 
between subject and environment (or ‘stimuli’). 
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background, as well as the tone, the colour, the affective taste, the feelings of 
activities, relations and experiences’ (Stocker 2004, 137) are commonly made 
without specifying what tone is. Similarly, literary critics giving introductions or 
overviews to their field, from the popular, as in Stephen Fry’s The Ode Less 
Travelled (2007), to the academic, such as Derek Attridge’s The Singularity of 
Literature (2017), use the terms extensively without devoting space to pinning them 
down.5  
 It is partly the simplicity of mood and tone as terms that leads to their 
deployment without exposition, yet even authorities who offer simple definitions do 
not agree. Online educational materials, ultimately founded on the orthological efforts 
of New Critics such as I.A. Richards, will variously state that tone, for example, is the 
author’s attitude towards the subject of the poem, towards the audience or towards the 
poem itself. Many academic critics don’t find the mood/tone distinction itself 
(atmosphere of poem vs attitude of author or voice) useful, and tone is frequently 
preferred when discussing the effects irreducible to the ‘discursive prose elements of 
a poem’ (Voigt 1999, 77).6 The entry in the Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and 
Poetics is suitably confident and vague:  
 
tone has denoted an intangible quality, frequently an affective one, which is 
metaphorically predicated of a literary work or of some part of it such as its 
style. It is said to pervade and ‘colour’ the whole, like a mood in a human 
being, and in various ways to contribute to the aesthetic excellence of the 
work (cited in Voigt 1999, 77). 
 
It is the very simplicity and ambiguity of these categories, as well as their strong 
affective dimensions, that draw me to them in reading L’Exode. They permit a certain 
appropriate reticence, not in the form of a disavowal of criticality but in the sense of 
avoiding overdefinition.7  
 
5 I must avow that Fry specifies that his poetic glossary is ‘incomplete’. 
6 Without pursuing it, I would like to raise the question of whether this preference for tone over mood 
reveals a continuing preoccupation with intentionality. 
7 Such an approach is risky, of course. The malleability of tone renders it especially vulnerable to 
manipulation towards an agenda. For example, for want of actual evidence the FBI seized on tone in 
correspondence during the McCarthy era: ‘the tone of the letters indicated that they had […] been […] 
Communists’ (From a 1949 FBI report cited in Macdonald 2019, 185). I aim to navigate such risk by 
acknowledging the subjective elements of my critical approach up front, an approach which aims to 





In proclaiming the independence of art, Fondane sometimes has recourse to the 
idea of the Socratic daemon, the divine inspiration that is one figure for the extra-
rational elements of ‘poetic activity’ (Van Sevenant 1998, 14).8 Derek Attridge 
echoes this thought: ‘From somewhere – inspired by the Muse, Donne might have 
said – the right words, in the right rhythm, capturing the right tone of voice, emerge’ 
(Attridge 2017, 43). In Fondane’s view, for the modern poet this process is rendered 
tortuous by its subversion of their own rationality. In Baudelaire et l’expérience du 
gouffre, he picks up on Gérard de Nerval’s qualification of the disobedient poetic 
muse mutating, through the poet’s repression, into an anguished Pythia: ‘le poète, lui, 
est incapable, malgré sa “bonne volonté”, de les écarter [le Gouffre et la Pythie] de 
son drame [the poet is unable, despite his ‘willingness’, to banish the Abyss and the 
Pythia from his drama]’ (BEG 35). Whether the extra-rational impulse acts benignly 
or disruptively, mood and tone as extra-rational, emergent, recognizable but finally 
unsayable affective effects of a poem are fruitfully aligned with the subversive and 
affirmative affective modalities of disconsolation and irresignation. 
 Whatever the applications and limits of mood and tone in literary theory, they 
are particularly useful for reading Fondane, for reasons beyond their mirroring of the 
ambiguities of disconsolation and irresignation. Another of Fondane’s paradoxes is 
the way his writing shares avant-garde and existential disruptions of form and 
dismissals of style with an aptitude for and employment of fixed poetic forms.9 His 
dadaistic sensibilities led him to poetic effects of subversion and lacunae as well as 
positive style, while his readings of Dostoevsky and Shestov contributed to a kind of 
anti-aesthetics,10 wherein the ideal of Beauty was resisted as another devaluing of 
 
8 Although Fondane, through the influence of Shestov, read Plato, I also suspect the influence of 
William Blake, whom he translated (MF 260), in this regard. Look at Blake’s ‘Principle 1st’ from his 
All Religions Are One (subtitled ‘The Voice of one crying in the Wilderness’, a key Biblical reference 
for Fondane): ‘That the Poetic Genius is the true Man… the forms of all things are derived from their 
Genius, which by the Ancients was call’d an Angel & Spirit & Demon’ (Blake 1977, 77). 
9 We could read Fondane’s modernist collage of lyric and fixed form with freer approaches as a 
continuation of Baudelaire, in the Benjaminian sense that ‘Baudelaire’s poetry was able to convey the 
intensity of the experience of modernity through the very tension between that experience and his 
chosen, lyrical means; not merely negatively (like Kafka), but via the way in which modernity 
transformed those means’ (Osborne and Charles 2020). 
10 The idea of Dostoevsky as a writer who demonstrates the force of ‘having something to say’ by 
deliberately setting himself against aesthetic conventions was influential for Fondane, as is evident in 
his conversations with Shestov (Fondane 1982) and the Faux Traité. As Richard Pevear puts it, ‘the 
oddities of [Dostoevsky’s] prose are deliberate […] a willed imperfection of artistic means […] 
essential to his vision’ (Pevear 2002, xv). 
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existence (Rimbaud’s statement ‘j’ai assis la beauté sur mes genoux et je l’ai trouvée 
amère [I sat beauty down on my knee and I found her sour]’ became a lodestone for 
Fondane [RV 236]). 11 Fixed forms were crucial for him, particularly in L’Exode, as a 
means of avoiding solipsism, but they had to exist as ruins, recontextualised and 
undercut by strange juxtapositions and repurposings.  
 Discussion of form in Fondane’s literary criticism is conspicuous by its 
absence, but then calling it literary criticism is unsatisfactory. In addressing 
aesthetics, without denying the power of poetic effects, Fondane seeks to turn art 
away from abstracted readings, proclaiming art’s freedom and autonomy by 
wrenching it from the domain of aesthetic perfection (another paradox) and 
connecting it to life. This approach is most obvious in his book-length essay Faux 
traité d’esthétique, in which he grapples with art’s autonomy and its social 
presence.12 The title of this work is sometimes inadequately translated as False 
Aesthetic Treatise. In fact, Fondane is seeking to disrupt the boundaries of truth and 
falsity (as related to some longed-for objective aesthetic standard). Faux here is much 
better given as ‘pseudo’, akin to the way it is used when discussing early authors such 
as pseudo-Dionysus, who are not simply fakes but who metamorphose their subject 
material. His treatise is not ‘false’, but rather an approach which disjoints the very 
category of aesthetic enquiry.13  
 Given this background, mood and tone are especially good lenses (caveats 
aside) because they cover affective and literary aspects of Fondane’s poetry together, 
allowing a holistic treatment without dismissing stylistic considerations. Fondane’s 
priorities are perhaps summed up in the lying truth of a statement attributed to 
Cocteau: ‘Un vrai poète se préoccupe peu de la poésie. Tout comme le jardinier ne 
parfume pas ses roses [A true poet fusses little over poetry. Just as a gardener does 
 
11 The quote is from the prologue to A Season in Hell (Rimbaud 2009, 210). 
12 It is unclear whether Fondane read much Virginia Woolf, but I feel he would recognize her 
comments from A Room of One’s Own: ‘fiction is like a spider’s web, attached ever so lightly perhaps, 
but still attached to life at all four corners.[…] one remembers that these webs are not spun in mid-air 
by incorporeal creatures, but are the work of suffering human beings’ (Woolf 2002, chapter three). 
13 Ann Van Sevenant gives another slant on this problematic: ‘this treatise is only false [faux] from the 
point of view of traditional aesthetic […] The only possible aesthetics turns out to be one which 
stimulates the artist and poet to believe in artistic and poetic activity’ (VanSevenant 1998, 9–14, my 
translation). Compare Derek Attridge: ‘what if the most important reason for our high valuation of 
literary works […] is something we can’t talk about, or at least that none of our readily available 
vocabulary and conceptual tools – whether those of informal discussion or those of the traditions of 




not perfume his roses]’. The point being, in Fondane’s case, not that poets 
spontaneously bring forth beauty, but that a work can only be judged on its own 
terms. 
 One book which theorizes affect and literary mood and tone together is Sianne 
Ngai’s Ugly Feelings (2007). In reading Fondane’s poetry in this context of 
ineffability by way of disconsolation and irresignation, both terms fall into the orbit 
of Ngai’s mapping of literary tone, a concept which by any definition, as I have 
suggested, seems to be inherently open-ended and eludes positive capture. ‘Tone’, 
writes Ngai, ‘is the dialectic of objective and subjective feeling that our aesthetic 
encounters inevitably produce... the concept’s power resides precisely in its 
amorphousness’ (2007, 30).14 Like mood and tone, disconsolation and irresignation 
are at risk of collapsing into each other when deployed in a critical reading. This is 
why, for the purposes of this thesis, I have decided to use a ‘New Criticism’-inspired 
model of mood and tone as a way of examining their effects and resonances.15 
L’Exode is considered as having a mood or atmosphere of disconsolation, which is 
the context from which a tone or stance of irresignation is made possible. This narrow 
(even naïve) framing is not intended to dispute theoretical work which complicates 
the use of these terms but, ironically, because doing so affords a useful critical 
distance from which it is possible to approach Fondane’s poetry holistically, in 
context with his life and his other work (criticism, philosophy etc).  
 It is easier to approach irresignation when disconsolation is made a context for 
it, and thus distinguishing mood from tone is useful. However, I must emphasize that 
this is not intended as a strong claim for this differentiation as the ‘correct’ theoretical 
approach. Indeed I would like to further qualify my use of disconsolate mood as the 
poem’s ‘atmosphere’ and irresigned ‘tone’ as its ‘attitude’ by flagging the New 
Critics’ ‘mut[ing of]... the affective dimensions of the problem’ (Ngai 2007, 41). As 
an existential thinker, the relation of affect to thought and language was among 
 
14 As I understand it, the expression ‘objective feeling’, which uncontextualised may seem paradoxical, 
is being used here to emphasize the porousness of ‘objectness’, that is to say the sense that affect 
crosses the seeming boundary between subject and object and is not a property that can be situated in 
one of these alone. 
15 Consideration of mood, or feeling, and tone occurs diffusely across texts associated with New 
Criticism, and most overtly in IA Richards’ Practical Criticism. Cleanth Brooks and Robert Warren’s 
Understanding Poetry was instrumental to the genesis in the classroom of even vaguer notions of 
mood as atmosphere and tone as speaker’s stance, a vagueness I now want to leverage. 
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Fondane’s primary concerns. Fondane was one of the first Francophone 
commentators on Heidegger, and the mood and tone of his poetry in the New 
Criticism senses must be understood, in my usage, as interacting with Heideggerian 
mood and its ‘situatedness’.16  
 While the New Criticism terms are useful for discussing disconsolation and 
irresignation in separation, I would like it to be understood that this separation is a 
critical device and not absolute, and that my uses of mood and tone in reading 
L’Exode are both aligned with what Ngai calls ‘a global and hyper-relational concept 
of feeling that encompasses attitude: a literary text’s affective bearing, orientation or 
“set toward” its audience and world’ (Ngai 2007, 43). In all my critical endeavours 
towards Fondane’s poetry I have this warning from him ringing in my ears:  
 
le poète lorsqu’il s’écrie que ‘la vie est un songe’, ou encore ‘le rêve d’une 
ombre’, le prouve-t-il? C’est là que cesse la vertu de l’art vivant et que 
débute l’activité seconde de la ‘contemplation esthétique’, trop souvent 




[When the poet cries out ‘life is a dream’, or ‘the shadow of a dream’, does 
he prove it? With that question the virtue of living art ends and the 
secondary activity of ‘aesthetic contemplation’ begins, an activity too often 
confused with art itself and which sooner or later will have to be declared 
piteous and extremely impoverished.] (Fondane 1935)  
 
With these considerations in mind I will now develop a fuller examination of 







16 An existential umbrella term, enfolding Heidegger’s Dasein, used by the Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, though by no means all Heidegger scholars. See s.v. existent, 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/existent/#SH1d, accessed 23 April 2020. By using this term I am not 







At [the] instances where the emergent discourses of twentieth-
century post-Hegelian philosophy and modernism interfere, we 
see most clearly how bodily vulnerability is set against scientific 
over-determinism [...] disconsolate subjects [...] gain defining 




A man whose family had died under torture, who had himself 
been tortured for a long time in a concentration camp, or a 16th 
century Indian, the sole survivor after the total extermination of 
his people, such men, if they had previously believed in the 
mercy of God would either believe it no longer, or else they 
would conceive of it quite differently. I have not been through 
such things, I know, however, that they exist, so what is the 
difference?  
 
(Weil 2002, 115) 
 
Ce monde assis par le philosophe sur une Raison, un Esprit, un 
Logos immuable, déraille toutes les nuits sur un principe 
d’indétermination, sur un tremblement de terre, conçu et posé là 
par le poète [...]Il n’est pas l’Arbre de Vie: il est soif de l’Arbre 
de Vie. 
 
[This world placed by the philosopher on a Reason, a Spirit, an 
immutable Logos, comes off the rails every night because of a 
principle of indetermination, an earthquake, conceived and put 
forth by the poet [...] It is not the Tree of Life: it is a thirst for the 
Tree of Life.]  
 
from ‘Léon Chestov à la recherche du judaïsme perdu’ (Fondane 1936) 
 
 
Disconsolation is a tricky term. ‘A single moment of true sadness’, writes Chris 
Kraus, ‘connects you instantly to all the suffering in the world’ (Kraus 2013, 119). 
Here is a paradoxical attention to the body: knowledge which is created through an 
affective state, a desire of the self to exceed the self, an intensely individual 
experience that nonetheless opens outwards. To take Simone Weil seriously means 
seriously considering that thought is inseparable from its conditioning by bodily 
experience. In our time, the Cartesian separation of mind and body has been fairly 
90 
 
comprehensively demolished by neuroscience (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 391–
415). Although this science is beyond the scope of this thesis, its truths are also those 
of certain strains of existential philosophy, going back at least to Kierkegaard. 
Fondane’s take on the unhappy consciousness is certainly informed by 
Kierkegaardian anxiety and its revelatory potential (by way of Shestov’s discourse on 
anxiety and despair).17 His concern, however, is not so much theology as an objective 
as the endless negotiation between subjectivity and thought.  
 Fondane’s essay La Conscience Malheureuse responds to Hegel: ‘il a vu que la 
conscience était un appareil d’angoisse [he saw that consciousness was an apparatus 
of anxiety]’ (CM 47). The break he makes, through which existential philosophy 
works its subversions, is with the refusal of what Olivier Salazar-Ferrer calls ‘a 
conciliatory universal [un universel conciliateur ]’(Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 40). With the 
‘rational’ Enlightenment cosmology inaugurated by Hegel comes ‘the negation of the 
individual existent integrated into the great mechanism of Reason in History’ 
(Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 40, my translation). In Salazar-Ferrer’s reading, modernity 
destroys previous cosmologies which allotted a space for transcendence, but if the 
solution to immanence is not to be found in Hegel, then ‘a new form of tragedy, 
metaphysical in essence’ is created. ‘Fondane would never be able to allow History’s 
violence upon individuals to be integrated, as dialectical moments, into the process of 
Spirit’s reconciliation with itself’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 40–41, my translation). This 
refusal leaves consciousness in a catastrophic state of disconsolation in which the 
unspeakability of immanent violence and affective suffering meets an inability to 
reckon a way beyond their inevitability.  
 The mere mention of metaphysical aspects can lend a grand tenor to the 
discussion, but the territory of disconsolation in Fondane’s modernist context is as 
much what Sianne Ngai calls ‘affective gaps and illegibilities, dysphoric feelings... 
ambivalent situations of suspended agency’ (2007, 1). In Fondane’s work 
disconsolation occurs simultaneously in the consciousness of history and the intimacy 
 
17 It is also in dialogue with Heidegger, whom Fondane was one of the first in France to recognize 
(Serban 2015 note 8, Jutrin 1998). ‘La liberté, le néant, l’angoisse, le possible, la faute, toutes les 
catégories heideggériennes, se trouvent déjà amorcées et développées par le génie mobile de 
Kierkegaard [Freedom, nothingness, anxiety, the possible, error, in fact all Heideggerian categories, 




of paralytic and disaffected emotions.18 Art becomes primary, both in criticism and 
practice, because it goes beyond thought as we usually think it: ‘Fondane’s entire 
oeuvre is (...) haunted by the possibility of opening spaces closed by reason’ (Salazar-
Ferrer 2007, 41, my translation).19 As disasters in life tear away received existential 
comforts, art can concentrate the ways that catastrophe can be a ‘modality of 
liberation’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 42, my translation). In refusing both cataphatic 
attempts to explain suffering at a historical level and the tendency of philosophy to 
devalue affectivity, Fondane’s writing throws forward ‘a dissolution of history by the 
absurd in the name of an existential reappropriation’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 41, my 
translation).20 
 Although, like Kierkegaard, Fondane attempts to use philosophy against itself 
to make disconsolation evident, as ‘une pensée qui cherche quelque chose qu’elle ne 
puisse penser [a form of thought that seeks something it cannot think]’ (CM 200), it is 
this contradiction that leads him, apophatically, back to poetry.21 Poetry is a space 
that can honour the endless dimensions of disconsolation: personal anguish, 
macrocosmic disaster, metaphysical fissuring, groundlessness and unspeakability 
itself. A rejection of reasonable consolations leaves the divine (in its absence) as a 
foil for such expression. Foreshadowing China Miéville’s assertion that ‘there is a 
beyond-words, a politics of the unsayable. This is not an admission, as of failure, but 
 
18 A key example of this is his treatment of boredom through reading Baudelaire: in Bruce Baugh’s 
words, ‘Fondane attributes to Baudelaire the discovery that boredom is not simply a passing mood 
affecting individuals but can also be a state of mind affecting an entire culture, a “malaise of 
civilization” that gives rise to the most excessive and extravagant forms of cruelty: the manias of self-
torture during the Middle Ages, for example, or the horrors of the Second World War’ (Baugh 2016b, 
63). See also Jutrin and Vanhese, eds. 2003. 
19 As Bruce Baugh argues, this haunting is also why Fondane ‘takes general issue with the 
phenomenological appropriation of existential thought’ (Baugh 2010, 298). 
20 This reappropriation is given some theoretical grounding for Fondane in Shestov’s opposition of Job 
to Boethius’s conviction in the consolations of philosophy. See Shestov 1966, III, 4. There is great 
pathos in the comparison between Boethius’s consoled philosophical response to imprisonment and 
imminent death in the sixth century and Fondane’s disconsolate one in the twentieth. It is also worth 
mentioning Dostoevsky’s undergound man, whose refusal to be comforted by rationality was all the 
more relevant to Fondane when he was himself forced ‘underground’ in occupied Paris. With thanks to 
Olivier Salazar-Ferrer.  
21 By way, notably, of silent cinema, which for Fondane, Salazar-Ferrer argues, ‘recèle en lui des 
‘tendances catastrophiques’’ [contains ‘catastrophic tendencies’], offering freedom from ‘la parole et 
des aliénations de la syntaxe logique et linguistique [the word and the alienations of both linguistic and 
logical syntax]’. Salazar-Ferrer emphasizes the inseparability of Fondane’s philosophical and artistic 
practices: ‘les propriétés de l’arrière-plan philosophique sont les mêmes que celles de l’arrière-plan 
géopoétique [the properties of the philosophical background are the same as those of the geopoetic 
background]’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 42). 
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a declaration. A proud humility’ (Miéville 2019, 4), in Man Faced with History, 
Fondane argues disconsolately in favour of humility, against the confidence of 
teleological, logocentric politics: 
 
celle qui consiste à reconnaître que l’on n’a aucun pouvoir, que l’on est bien 
peu de chose, si peu que l’on peut sans honte avoir peur, et trembler, et crier 
et appeler au secours. Il y a plus d’humilité vraie à prier Dieu pour sa propre 
chair, à lui demander par exemple de vous délivrer d’un affreux mal de dents 
(comme cela arriva à Saint Augustin, Confessions, IX, c. 4) que de lui 
demander de nous livrer son essence intelligible et de confondre sa volonté 
avec la nôtre, dans les délices de l’union. 
 
[the kind which consists of recognising that one has no power, that one does 
not amount to much, that one amounts to so little that one can, without 
shame, be afraid, and tremble, and cry out, and call for help. There is more 
true humility in praying to God for one’s own flesh, in asking him, for 
example, for deliverance from a terrible toothache (as Saint Augustine did, 
Confessions, IX, c.4) than to ask him to reveal his intelligible essence or 
confuse his will with ours in the delights of [mystical] union.] (EM 60, HDH 
450). 
 
Fondane is arguing that it takes a certain kind of courage to admit to the limits of our 
reason and to express grief, despair and hopelessness, whether to give them 
metaphysical or political space. This near-unthinkable thought (which, I would argue, 
does not erase politics but only mechanistic or programmatic politics of the kind the 
Futurists and surrealists were leaning into) is only able to coalesce its mixing of the 
intimate, the material and the cosmic through absurd poetic expression. In writing the 
roads full of refugees harassed by the Luftwaffe, L’Exode offers an impossible 
teshuva, a hedged and self-subverting ‘return to God’ where the locus of return could 
only be ‘shattered and torn apart’ (Meher 1990, 108). The poetic voice cries out: 
 
Nous laissions derrière nous Paris. Ah!   
                                                si jamais 




Je me mets à genoux et je sanglote et 
                                                        crie 
en une langue que j’ai oubliée, mais   
                                                       dont 
We were leaving Paris behind us. Ah!  
                                                   if ever 




I go down on my knees and I sob and  
cry 





je me souviens aux soirs émus de Ta  
                                                 Colère: 




Tu sais que lorsque tout se sera apaisé 
sur la terre et dans les cieux 
nous T’aurons oublié. Tu sais, dès à  
                                                  présent, 
que seul le souvenir secret de ma prière 
me remplira de honte. Je T’en voudrai,  
                                                 vois-Tu, 
de l’avoir écoutée. Je m’en voudrai  
                                                      aussi 
de l’avoir dite. J’ai, Tu le sais, d’autres  
                                                     dieux  
que Toi, secrets, perfides! 
Mais ici, sur la route, dans le désastre  
                                                   et dans 
le chaos, il n’est pas d’autre Dieu. Tu  
                                                   es seul! 
Terrible, Igné, Miséricordieux, Unique! 
 
I remember in the impassioned  
evenings of Your Anger: 




You know that when all is calm 
on earth and in the heavens 
we will have forgotten You. You know,  
                                               from now, 
that merely the secret memory of my  
prayer 
will fill me with shame. I will be angry 
 with You, do You see, 
for having listened. I will be angry with  
                                             myself, too 
for having said it. I have, as You well  
                                   know, other gods 
than You, secret, perfidious gods! 
But here, on the road, in disaster and in 
chaos, there is no other God. You  
alone! 





Fondane’s poetry creates a space where consolations, whether Hegelian or divine, 
may be rejected, yet where the extra-rational need to reach out persists over the 
reasons of defeat.22 The irrefutable evidence of the absoluteness of ananke, that what 
has been cannot be changed, bereft of possible absolution derived from the nous, 
opens the way to a revolt which starts in an acknowledgement of the extra-rational, 
even against the poet’s ‘better judgement’. 
 Against Eliot’s declaration of the ‘eternal utility, in a world of change, of any 
achievement of perfection’ (cited in Vericat 466), for Fondane the capacity of 
poetry’s ‘singular’ energy to open up cracks is its intrinsic value. In a world of 
generalized catastrophe, the very imperfections of poetry are apposite to the ‘kairotic’ 
 
22 See Eliphaz’s rebuke to Job, which holds up orthodoxy against the disrupting affect of the 
individual: ‘Are the consolations of God small with thee? Is there any secret thing with thee?’ (Job 
15:11). Compare also this recollection of Fondane’s friend Emil Cioran: ‘One day at dinner we were 
talking “theology”. The maid, an illiterate peasant, stood by listening. “I only believe in God when I 
have toothache”, she said. A whole life later, her intervention is the only one I remember’ (Cioran 
2012, 22, my translation). 
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time of modernity, the value of the suspended instant, its frustrated yet unfinished 
potentiality 23 (see Kolocotroni, forthcoming). These lines from Fondane’s sequence 
Titanic, his poetic figuration of modernity itself as catastrophe, tie together the 
material and the metaphysical: 
 
[il est] un temps pour demander quel  
                     est le sens de l’homme, 
que cherche-t-il donc sur cette terre  
                                             branlante 
pourquoi le fait-on descendre dans les  




pourquoi lui crache-t-on au visage, 
et lui arrache-t-on sa chanson? 
it is a time to ask what is the meaning  
of man 
what is he seeking on this shuddering  
earth 
why is he made to go down in the  




why is his face spat upon, 





Fondane does not deny the urgency of seeking answers beyond suffering and despair. 
His primary concern in the dark times, however, is how to hold on to one’s song. 
  His final philosophical essay, Le Lundi Existentiel, draws directly on Kafka. 
Neil Lazarus argues that disconsolation is the ‘central aesthetic effect’ of Kafka’s 
writing. He calls for a reactivation of the modernist work that ‘says “no”; refuses 
integration, resolution, consolation, comfort; protests and criticizes’ (Lazarus 2011, 
31). Though Fondane considers progress an impossibility, the restless mood of 
disconsolation, of an absurd living’ in despair, must be opposed to the mere dedition 
of despondency. Fondane’s poetic protest is primary, starting from the refusal of the 
singular existent to succumb to despair despite demonstrably living in its 
 
23 Like Adorno’s Beckett, For Fondane ‘the need for progress is inextricable from its 
impossibility’ (Adorno 2002, 30, with thanks to Vassiliki Kolocotroni: See Kolocotroni 2019). 
Disconsolation holds within it elements of the modernist paralysis Sianne Ngai explores through the 
figure of Melville’s Bartleby, a characterization also used by of Slavoj Žižek when warning against 
precipitous or pseudo-action in The Parallax View (2006, from 342 onwards. This is a strange affinity 
which sits alongside radical divergence, highlighting the care required in positioning Fondane in 
nuanced discourses around modernity). Bartleby has been theorized extensively. A recent survey, 
however, warns against ’a redemptive reading on precisely that which exceeds such a reading’ 
(Bojeson and Allen 2019, 64). Analagously, while disconsolation is ambiguous, it has potential as a 




conditions.24 His disconsolation aligns with that diagnosed by Lazarus in ‘the 
wreckage of lives that have been lived wrongly, in the shadow or under the auspices 
of malign social, cultural, ideological, and familial dispensations [...] acts and 
thoughts that cannot be forgiven or apologized for or reconciled [must] be glimpsed 
in the light of a yearning for fellowship or collectivity’ (Lazarus 2011, 31). If 
disconsolation consists of a combination of despair with a yearning for a utopia that 
cannot be construed, then Fondane’s poetry too contains Benjaminian ‘splinters of 
messianic time’ (Benjamin 2003a, 397). I leave the last word here to Lazarus: ‘it is 





The destructive character sees nothing permanent. 
But for this very reason he sees ways everywhere.  
 
Walter Benjamin, from ‘The Destructive Character’ (Benjamin 2005, 542)25 
 
 
La poésie [...] vit et ne conclut guère. 
 
[Poetry [...] lives and never comes to a conclusion]  
 
from ‘L’expérience poétique’ (Fondane 1935) 
 
 
While disconsolation is a mood engendered by modernity and the modernist texts 
which make it evident, irresignation is a term specifically thought in Fondane 
scholarship. If tone is taken to denote a stance or attitude, then irresignation fits 
nicely, being explicitly formulated in Fondane’s prose. In his Lundi Existentiel, he 
exposes Louis Lavelle’s firm refusal of disconsolation: 
 
if all the pain in the world, writes Lavelle, left us no alternative save 
choosing between revolt and resignation, that would be to despair of the 
 
24 Olivier Salazar-Ferrer: ‘The specificity of Fondane’s approach is found in his affirmation of the 
singular existent, even when affected by the dislocation of the self occasioned by the deconstruction of 
the concepts of rationalism’ (2007, 181, my translation). 
25 With thanks to Vassiliki Kolocotroni. 
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value of the world; but this pain can have meaning only if it nourishes the 
very ardour of spiritual life. (EM 21)26 
 
As I stated in the previous chapter in relation to Adorno and the unspeakable, 
Fondane, against that body of philosophy which refuses to countenance it, takes 
seriously the question ‘how could one live if all the pain of the world was for 
nothing?’ (EM 21). Lavelle set out the options for him, and, as is evident from Olivier 
Salazar-Ferrer’s title Benjamin Fondane et la révolte existentielle, there could only be 
one choice, ‘dût cette irrésignation être – ou paraître – absurdité ou folie [even if that 
irresignation need be – or seem – absurdity or madness]’ (CM xvii).  
 This thesis builds upon work done by Salazar-Ferrer and other Fondane 
scholars to bring together the variegated elements of Fondane’s work – philosophy, 
poetry, cinema, visual art, translation – in a holistic manner that emphasizes the 
seriousness of his theoretical critique while centring the artistic work that reaches 
beyond it. The latter third of Benjamin Fondane et la révolte existentielle sets out the 
affirmatory power Fondane finds in this revolt, despite the context of what I am 
calling disconsolation. My readings of L’Exode develop from this direction and I will 
also use irresignation as a way of sparking Fondane off other contemporary (and 
indeed subsequent) writers, thereby enriching both their contexts and his own. 
 Just as we may read Fondane’s poetry as a tentative, pre-emptive response to 
Adorno’s problematizing of the catastrophe that killed him, we can also see it in the 
context of modernity more broadly, as not only an acknowledgment of the affective 
paralysis (and its valuable subversive qualities) framed by Ngai or Žižek but an 
absurd attempt to move beyond it. Absurd, because there is no obvious exit or 
destination in view – pas d’issue, pas d’issue!27 – but not therefore, syllogistically, 
valueless: is poetry not mutilated if reduced to a rational purpose? Part of Fondane’s 
resistance to totalizing logics is a Nietzsche-inspired assertion of humanity as an end 
in itself through art:  
 
 
26 The Lavelle quote is from L’Erreur de Narcisse, published in 1939 by Grasset (Paris), pp. 102–103. 
27 ‘No way out, no way out!’. From Ulysse (MF 18). Fondane draws this line on the inescapability of 
facticity and force from John Gay’s Polly (‘no retreat’ in the original). There was a revival of interest 
in The Beggar’s Opera in the 1920s; Fondane and Bertolt Brecht may have been reading it around the 
same time. Fondane probably saw the 1931 film L’opéra de quat’sous, directed by Georg Wilhelm 




une frivolité par rapport au social, mais de beaucoup plus terriblement 
sérieuse que le sérieux le plus grave [...] cette frivolité […] contienne un 
instant de l’éternel ou la plus désespérée des croyances en l’homme[.] 
 
[frivolity in social terms, but far more terribly serious than the gravest 
seriousness [...] this frivolity […] contains an instant of the eternal or the 
most desperate beliefs within man] (EDR 90–91) 
 
Salazar-Ferrer raises the question of the limits of Fondane’s discursive refusal of 
logics and sets out the frame of his (fragile) positive response: 
 
Coming as it does out of the pure subversion of Dadaism, is Fondane’s 
subversion purely refutatory? Does it lead to a threshold beyond history 
where subjectivity, in its catastrophic insurrection, would have no resort but 
the experience of an incommunicable religious ordeal? [...] this is not at all 
the case [...] it [Fondane’s subversion] does not lead towards nihilism, but 
instead to what we might call an existential testimony. (Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 
139, my translation) 
 
It is my contention that this paradigm of testimony is necessarily a poetic one for 
Fondane, as I shall develop further in the third part of the thesis. 
  Irresignation happens at the moment when disconsolation becomes apparent. I 
love this line from Ursula Le Guin, a writer whose entire oeuvre walks the line 
between subversion and affirmation: ‘Her despair grew so great that it burst her 
breast open and like a bird of fire shattered the stone and broke out into the light of 
day’ (from her novel The Tombs of Atuan, 2020, 139). Despair can be revelatory, 
opening the vista to other horizons, which hope had blinkered. Irresignation is a step 
towards them in the acceptance of all that is lost by it. Thus it is at once subversive 
and affirmatory, moving against what we might call the violence of hope: I am 
thinking of Berlant’s cruel optimism, or the hope (and fear of loss) which may keep a 
person experiencing domestic abuse from leaving (Michaels 2016, 37). I believe that 
Fondane demonstrates that only art can really express irresignation, both by writing 
towards such an opinion in his prose and by the very fact of his poetry. The pre-Le 
Guinian move corresponds with the recurrence of the emigrant as a motif in the latter, 
imbued with loss and the step towards unknown horizons, for example in Ulysse: 
 
Émigrants, diamants de la terre, sel  
                                            sauvage, 
 




je suis de votre race, 
j’emporte comme vous ma vie dans ma  
valise,  
je mange comme vous le pain de mon  
angoisse, 
je ne demande plus quel est le sens du  
monde, 
je pose mon poing dur sur la table du  
monde, 
je suis de ceux qui n’ont rien, qui  
veulent tout 
– je ne saurai jamais me résigner. 
I am of your race, 
Like you I carry my life in my suitcase, 
I eat like you the bread of my  
affliction, 
I ask no more for the meaning of the  
world, 
I pound my fist on the table of the  
world, 
I am one of those who have nothing,  
who want everything 
– I will never be resigned. 
 
(MF 35; Fondane 2017, 51) 
 
Poetry is particularly apt for irresignation because it also confronts the limits of 
language and logic in its very medium.28  
 If disconsolation is infused with the paralysis of the unspeakable, irresignation 
is the refusal to submit in the face of existential despair, a gesture towards the 
unsayable. From within the atmosphere or mood of disconsolation, Fondane strikes a 
tone of resistance, a paradoxical ‘going on’ in the face of failure. Fondane 
acknowledges despair without accepting it. He is thus a descendant of Dostoevsky’s 
‘underground man’ and of Shestov in his ‘struggle against evidence’ (see Martin 
1975), refusing to accept the victories of reasonable truths as finally settling their 
questions, that is, refusing to accept philosophical, political or artistic systems as 
finally authoritative. Far from imagining him happy, Fondane must imagine Sisyphus 
 
28 Acts of everyday existence may also be instances of irresignation, but by their transcience they are 
more shadowy. I believe this is the argument Fondane makes in (for example) ‘La Conscience 
Malheureuse’, an essay published in 1935 in the Cahiers du Sud, originally envisioned as a chapter for 
the full work La Conscience malheureuse but later expanded into the Faux traité d’esthétique: ‘Cette 
pensée de l’existence a sans doute trouvé ses meilleures expressions dans la vie d’individus qui n’ont 
point laissé de traces dans l’histoire; elle est le principe anonyme qui donne à l’histoire, son sens et sa 
plénitude […]Qu’il nous soit donc permis de jeter un regard sur une expérience impure, mêlée, parfois 
grossière, mais hautement significative qui porte sur le singulier et le vivant et ne peut le trahir sans se 
trahir elle-même — je veux dire l’expérience poétique, dont le résidu lyrique se trouve former la base 
nouménale de toutes les activités qui se rangent sous la dénomination générique de l’Art’ [This 
experience of existence has almost certainly found its best expressions in the life of individuals who 
have left no trace in history; it is the anonymous principle which gives history its meaning and its 
plenitude […] Let it be permitted me to cast my eye on an impure, mixed, sometimes coarse, but 
highly significant experience which concerns the singular, the living being, and cannot betray it 
without betraying itself – I mean the poetic experience, whose lyric residue in fact forms the noumenal 
base of all activities found under the generic name of Art] (Fondane 1935). An interesting correlate to 
the ‘lyric residue’ is found in Roland Barthes’s notion of the biographème, the affective trace of life 
that may be read from even philosophical texts (Barthes 1971, 13). Art for Fondane represents an 





resisting at some level. Resistance is humanizing, as Priya Gopal, for example, has 
recently argued in an anti-colonial context (Gopal 2019). Fondane’s irresignation 
exceeds the huis clos of rationality diagnosed by Shestov’s ‘negative philosophy’ 
because it irrupts in the extra-rational activity of poetry. The poetics of irresignation 
is also a refusal to submit in the face of representational aporiae. 
 As I have already suggested, we might describe Fondane’s position, 
oxymoronically, as an anti-Humanist humanism.29 As such it is not a politics, but the 
irresignation that is its articulation speaks, in its unsayability, to the open-ended 
negotiations of apophatic politics. In this vein, China Miéville criticizes 
 
imaginations that are impoverished, blind [...] to [the] sheer otherness [of a 
better future]. [...] unsaying is not evasion but respect, taking seriously the 
scale of potential, of alterity necessary [...] escaping ‘realistic’, articulable, 
reformist visions truncated by the real, actually-existing hope. It is thus, to 
appropriate from the eschatology of the theologian Jurgen Moltmann, a hope 
against hope. Its horizon, like that he recalls from his youth, ‘is a boundary 
which does not confine but rather invites one to go beyond’. It is in such 
unsaying, rather than in anxious left assurance that the world can be said, 
that true radical Prometheanism inheres. (Miéville 2019, 16) 
 
While ‘Promethean’ would be an uncomfortable label to attach to Fondane in his 
commitment to disconsolation, as it still implies the possibility of salvation through 
knowledge, this radicality certainly applies. 30 As Olivia Salvadori argues, ‘Shestov 
and Fondane’s positions are radical but, paradoxically, their lucidity is invigorating, 
and they are not at all nihilistic’ (Salvadori n.d., my translation). They are 
invigorating because they provoke us to seek beyond the limits of our knowledge, as 
Shestov calls upon us to do in his philosophy and Fondane enacts in the irresignation 
of his poetry. This is why he can write that ‘L’homme a besoin de désapprendre le 
langage [...] la grande joie de ne pas savoir ce que c’est la poésie. Mais en échange 
 
29 A seemingly paradoxical notion akin to the Benjaminian ‘plumb line’ of Simon Critchley’s ‘violent 
non-violence’ (Critchey 2009). 
30 ‘Prometheus was lucky,’ wrote Shestov, ‘He had a "cause” (Shestov 1969a, Chapter 15). Although 
Prometheus is not central to the thought of Shestov or Fondane, he is an interesting figure because he 
captures the double-edgedness of knowledge, its costs and its unforeseeable consequences. This 
ambiguity is also present in his role as origin of both human science and art. 
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nous avons arracher [sic] le loup à son ennemi le plus mortel: le poétique31 [Man 
must unlearn language [...] what a great joy to not know what it is that poetry is. But 
in exchange we must tear off the mask of its most deadly enemy: the poetic] (AG 55–
56). 
 Irresignation implies the defence of an absurdity that reaches its full expression 
in poetry. ‘Un poète’, wrote Fondane, ‘ça ne sait pas ce que c’est la gravitation, le 
code de la route, le lien de cause à effet [a poet doesn’t know what gravity is, or the 
highway code, or the link between cause and effect]’ (AG 56). 32 Far from being a 
distraction, poetry’s very ‘frivolity’ (EDR 90) keeps a space open for the unsayability 
of existence. This is why Fondane can countenance humour even within terrible 
seriousness, as long as that humour fights against what we could call dehumanization, 
or reduction to bare life, or reification (as opposed to the other pole, the cold joke; see 
Glover 2001, 36).33 In the final words of ‘Mots Sauvages’, Fondane sets out the 
newly irresigned intent of his poetry with a use of absurdity that chaotically affords 
his very sincerity:34  
 
La poésie n’est pas une fonction sociale mais une force obscure qui précède 
l’homme et qui le suit [...] une seule fleur jetée d’une loge perfide et 
l’acrobate perd pied, l’équilibre casse l’air comme une bouteille [...] La 
représentation continue [...] Rien de ce qui a été ne sera plus jamais. Au 
jugement dernier, la poésie seule jugera l’être. Elle seule ne l’a jamais quitté 
du regard. Qui osera relever la tête afin que les mots se soulèvent? L’homme 
est un animal que la poésie pétrit dans l’argile, ou qu’elle fait sauter à coups 
de dynamite.  
 
[Poetry is not a social function but an obscure force that precedes man and 
follows him [...] a single flower thrown from a treacherous box and the 
 
31 Presumably there is an omission in the original and it should read ‘nous avons à arracher’. As 
Fondane continues, he resonates with Cocteau, though in a more modernist idiom: ‘La poésie n’a pas 
besoin de devenir poétique, ni le fer ferrugineux [Poetry does not need to become poetic, nor iron 
ferruginous]’. It sounds better in French. 
32 The exemplification of this principle by Charlie Chaplin was why Fondane wrote ‘le plus grand 
poète moderne écrit en cinéma [the greatest modern poet writes in film]’ (AG 56), a statement that in 
itself is pleasingly absurd. 
33 The serious, troubling relationship between disaster and humour has surfaced in discourse around 
the Holocaust, as is apparent in the controversy over the film La Vita è bella [Life is Beautiful] (see 
Lerner 2018 and Dak 2005). I will return to humour when exploring poetic testimony more fully in the 
third part of the thesis. 
34 As I hope is clear from my employment of its terms, affordance as a critical concept is very useful 
for considering Fondane’s critical and poetic moves in their apophatic and affective dimensions. See 




acrobate loses her footing, balance breaking the air like a bottle [...] 
representation continues [...] nothing that has been will ever be again [...] At 
the last judgement, poetry alone will judge (the) being. It [poetry] alone has 
never lost sight of it [(the) being]. Who will dare stick out their neck in order 
to whip up the words? Man is an animal whom poetry hardens into clay, or 
else blows up with blasts of dynamite.] (Fondane 1996a, 23, emphasis in the 
original) 
 
The Nietzschean tone of Fondane’s last sentence, strengthened by the Zarathustran 
image of the rope walker, emphasizes a negotiation between horror and comedy, the 
Dadaistic refusal, in a world gone mad, to be constrained by what is ‘appropriate’. 
‘Un poète ça doit sentir le souffre, ça doit souffrir [a poet must smell of sulphur, she 
must suffer] Fondane had earlier asserted (AG 56). It is this mixture of suffering and 
subversive, devilish mischief that sets an (anti-)poetics of irresignation against the 
bounds of propriety, with the most sincere motivations. ‘Mots Sauvages’ declares an 
intention to attempt to move beyond Dada’s ‘reluctance to signify’ (Bell 2010, 2) 
without compromising with cultural and linguistic hegemony. 
 Reading Fondane’s reading of Rimbaud, Salazar-Ferrer writes that ‘Rimbaud’s 
metaphysical revolt against necessity, logic, death and morality, against the moral 
God of the bourgeoisie, took the shape of an existential struggle in poetry’ (Salazar-
Ferrer 2007, 66, my translation). We can say much the same for Fondane himself. 
Even a statement of despair can be a gesture of irresignation when made poetically, a 
gesture towards the other, ‘across the centuries’, as Margaret Teboul puts it (Teboul 
2011, my translation). An already-ruined speech is discernible, unable to attain the 
wholeness for which its existence proves a longing, yet holding the promise of a 
future ear or eye. In the 1942 Préface en prose, Fondane literally describes himself 
amongst ruins, a ‘bouquet d’orties [clump of nettles]’ in a wasteland, speaking 
towards an other for whom his historical era will be ‘périmée [obsolete]’ (MF 153). Is 
this a poetic accordance with Walter Benjamin’s ‘alternative theory of ruin value’ in 
modernity? Fondane seems to pre-empt the possibility in us of what Vassiliki 
Kolocotroni calls Benjamin’s ‘conviction that amongst [...] ruins remain signs of a 
salutary witnessing’ (Kolocotroni 2019, 239). When ‘le poème lu | se trouvera devant 
vos yeux [this poem | will find itself before your eyes]’ (MF 153, CO 143), readings 
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do not reconcile or reconstitute, but they can restitute and vitalize.35 The nettle draws 
our attention to destruction and to growth; it is both an encouraging sign of life and a 
discomfiting, prickly presence. 
The refusal of the principle of non-contradiction that is the poet’s prerogative, 
in Fondane’s eyes at least, is essential to such apophatic utterance. Amongst the 
forceful lines which conclude Titanic by proclaiming the generalized context of 
catastrophe (‘Tout l’histoire me suit [...] j’avance sous l’oeil de tonnerre [All history 
follows me [...] Under the eye of thunder I proceed]’, Fondane uses a discomfiting 
double-sided image:  
 
l’homme [...] changera-t-il jamais le monde avec son cri? | Il est un temps où l’eau 
est froide, mais un temps où elle bout, | le gaz irrésigné distend les parois et éclate, 
| il est un temps de mourir et un temps de ne pas mourir | de révolte perpétuelle  
 
[man [...] will he ever change the world with his cry? It is a time when the water is 
cold, but a time of its boiling | the irresigned gas stretches its confines and bursts 
out, | it is a time to die and a time not to die | of perpetual revolt] (MF 147) 
 
As Margaret Teboul (2011) says, this is the moment when the poem makes a move 
‘from renunciation to irresignation’.36 The use of gas as an image is uneasy, a 
metaphor for the spirit with a troubling material resonance, starkly reminiscent of the 
trenches and, prophetically, of the camps. In its disquiet this figure asserts the 
indeterminate but caustic natures of both catastrophe and Fondane’s revolt. 
 The lines that close Titanic are characteristic in that they proclaim unceasing 
revolt even as they subvert its chances of ‘success’ (‘changera-t-il jamais le monde 
avec son cri?’). To come back to Benjamin as a fellow traveller in this work of 
speaking with and from ruins, let us look at the way Teboul brings them together 
under the aegis of Benjamin’s ‘weak messianic force’ (Benjamin 2003a, 390): 
 
It is just as if it were the subject itself that had to bring forth the messianic 
spark [...] A means of wresting messianic hope from the tradition in the 
shadow of the death of God. Interpreted by Benjamin as eternal return and 
 
35 We can read Fondane’s poem as a Celanian message-in-a-bottle thrown into a dark sea: it carries an 
absurd hope of reaching its destination despite the certain erasure of its locutor. Although the full 
intricacies of Fondane’s debt to Levinas is beyond the scope of this thesis (see Monseu 2005), the 
importance of the other in Fondane’s work will be treated in chapters 8 and 9. 




the absence of the new, it suffuses Fondane’s poetry. (Teboul 2011, my 
translation) 37 
 
Amongst the ‘insistant, haunting background noise that comes to us from the 20th 
Century, the century of avant-gardes, who give the tone of the era’, Fondane’s own 
tone of resistance, according to Louis Janover, entails ‘a radical problematization of 
what the world presents to our eyes’ (Janover 2009, 33 and 55, my translation). The 
tone of Fondane’s irresignation is found not in technique but in affirming the 
necessity of speaking despite acknowledging its impossibility,38 of having something 
to attempt to say, ‘En tant qu’objet singulier, non en tant qu’essence [as a singular 
object, not as an essence]’ (FT 29, emphasis in the original). It does not entail a 
dismissal of technique but of the prescription of technique. He continues:  
 
C’est peut-être grâce à cette misère, à cette intime blessure, qu’elle ouvre sur 
quelque chose. Sur quoi? C’est à la poésie elle-même de nous le dire […] La 
poésie peut penser bien des choses qui ont été refusées à la philosophie […] [le 
succès de la poésie] est dû à l’échec des buts poursuivis, à l’oblitération de la 
théorie, à la matière inespérée que la poésie profonde a su jaillir d’une position de 
conflit, qu’elle n’a cessé d’ailleurs de provoquer, afin de se défaire de tout but et 
de toute théorie. 
 
[It is perhaps thanks to this misery, to this intimate wound, that it opens onto 
something. Onto what? It is for poetry itself to tell us […] Poetry may think many 
things that have been refused to philosophy […] [the success of poetry] is due to 
the failure of the goals pursued, to the obliteration of theory, to the unhoped-for 
material that subtle poetry has been able to elicit from a position of conflict, 
indeed a conflict that it has never stopped provoking, in order to break away from 
every goal and theory.] (FT 30–31) 
 
37 Sometimes the parallels between Fondane and Benjamin’s apprehensions of the potential inherent in 
catastrophe, though nurtured in similar quasi-mystical reading, border on the uncanny. Compare these 
words of Benjamin: ‘just as the slopes of Vesuvius, thanks to the layers of lava that cover them, have 
been transformed into paradisal orchards, so the lava of revolutions provides uniquely fertile ground 
for the blossoming of art, festivity, fashion’  (Benjamin 1999, 83, with thanks to Vassiliki Kolocotroni) 
with this line from Titanic: ‘je chante: terribles volcans merci de mûrir les vendanges [I sing: thanks be 
to terrible volcanoes which ripen the grapes]’ (MF 146). 




If Fondane’s position here, namely that poetry is the linguistic activity that happens 
beyond the bounds of the theorizable, lays him open to accusations of mysticism, 
then the least of his defences is that he works towards what Catherine Keller calls ‘an 
emancipation of mystery from mystification’ (Keller 2014, 288). Fondane’s tone of 
irresignation is struck against the poet’s ‘shameful conscience’39. Just as he urges 
poets not to resign themselves to aesthetic contemplation or moral servitude, he dares 
to revolt against knowledge and enact poetry’s traversing of the unsayable. 
 
Modernity, Tragic Philosophy, Poetic Testimony 
 
In writing on a poet who Dadaistically castigates language for its betrayals, 
exclusions and misprisions, the critical exigency to define terms feels somewhat 
Quixotic. I hope that the field of usage of some of the terms I have cast around thus 
far will have osmotically pushed their way into the understanding between my text 
and the reader. Nonetheless I shall devote a little more time here to further stabilize 
the topography of some of the conversation’s particularly recalcitrant words 
(modernity, rationality, the existent) and better introduce others particularly germane 




This thesis participates in the work of mapping Fondane within modernism. Yet in 
doing so it immediately bumps into a lexical difficulty present for anyone writing in 
English on twentieth-century French culture. Whereas in the English-speaking world 
the word modernism primarily conjures up swathes of movements in art and thought 
at the end of the nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries, ‘a break with the past 
 
39 The unease of the poet towards the frivolity of their own activity and the internalized superegoic 
pressure to serve a social objective comes up repeatedly in works like the Faux Traité and Fondane’s 
works on Baudelaire and Rimbaud, as well as in L’Ecrivain devant la révolution. The idea took a more 
defined shape in reaction to the publication of Roger Caillois’s ‘neopositivist’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2009) 
book Procès intellectuel de l’art (1935). ‘Fondane reacted to defend the living, interior autonomy of 
poetry against alienations of all kinds that could surveil it, control it or force it back into line on the 




and the concurrent search for new forms of expression’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
s.v. ‘Modernism’),40 it does not have traction as a parallel umbrella term in 
Francophone discourse. Modernisme is not so much associated with the artists and 
thinkers of the first half of the twentieth century who responded to the 
transformations in Western society as with these changes themselves. Whereas the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica centres a British perspective with the statement 
‘Modernists felt a growing alienation incompatible with Victorian morality, 
optimism, and convention’, contemporary French commentators associated 
modernism with the development of the idea of a rationally-ordered society, from the 
Revolution through nineteenth-century positivism to the techno-dominance of the 
twentieth. In such a framing, Fondane often cast himself as anti-modern, despite 
sharing the alienation of the avant-gardes and their search for new modes of 
expression, because of his commitment to critiquing the post-Enlightenment notion of 
progress.41  
 Fondane figures, like Benjamin’s apocalyptic visions of Paris (Benjamin 2012; 
see Kolocotroni 2019 and Lee 2016), both modernity and its antitheses. He 
personifies a tension in modernism: the extent to which avant-gardes were variously 
confronting modernity or inaugurating it (Janover 2009, from 33). Like Eliot’s, his 
poetry is unquestionably modern yet written in the ruins of tradition rather than 
building on a tabula rasa. He was an avant-gardist without hope of a rearguard or 
even a victory plan. He endorsed Dada’s attack on the limits of reason (notably in 
‘Signification de Dada’, AG 76–82) while refusing the transcendent or material 
confidence distinct in Suprematism or Constructivism. In his existential philosophy 
he also responded to the very French context of ‘modernism’ in the sense of the 
attempts of Catholic freethinkers to apply liberal and rational approaches to Biblical 
studies in the late nineteenth Century, a context which heavily influenced debate 
among French intellectuals in the interwar period.42 Fondane was an avant-gardist 
 
40 https://www.britannica.com/art/Modernism, accessed 22 April, 2020.  
41 For more on the idea of Fondane as anti-modern, see Soare 2013. 
42 See Koloctroni and Taxidou 2018, 1, and Conner 2014, 54. Vatican I in large part represents the 
surfacing of these concerns. It almost goes without saying that the conservative reaction was extreme, 
as exemplified in the watershed moment of the Dreyfus injustice, and continues today (see the 
pertinently-named Crisis magazine’s article ‘The Modernist Roots of our Current Crisis’, Gregoris 




who did not believe in progress or in grand narratives of history, and who, as we have 
seen, prefigures what is often called postmodern thought. When his Francophone 
critics discuss modernity, this is what they tend to mean: ‘modernity anchored in the 
utopia of progress and of the autonomy of knowledge’ (Guedj 2003a, 110, my 
translation). Fondane is not anti-modern in the sense of being conservative, but as we 
have seen, if he accepts any possibility of renewal, is not be to found in manifestoes, 
but rather is unconceivably messianic. 
 Dominique Guedj argues that for Fondane ‘le malheur’ contains a liberatory 
aspect because it ‘ends up creating a radical calling into question’ (2003, 110, my 
translation) of modernity thus conceived. There has been a tendency in Fondane 
criticism to emphasize a relationship with spirituality, yet doing so immediately 
threatens to pigeonhole and constrain his work, which must be looked at as a whole.43 
For Fondane the existence of the possibility of faith was more central than its 
presence. Once again, a parallel with Walter Benjamin is inescapable (see Staal 2008 
and Feuer 2014). Rein Staal argues that  
 
Modernity itself brought man face to face with everything at stake in the 
opposition of the personal to the impersonal. What had been discredited was […] 
the hubris of the great impersonal systems, whether the naturalistic reductionism 
of modern scientism or the dialectical sleight of mind of modern ideologies. The 
central intuition of this theistic revival [of the interwar period]—this preemptive 
postmodernism—is the irreducibility of the person. (Staal 2008) 
 
Despite much heat around theory’s ‘religious turn’, the citation of Staal here is not 
intended as a claim for theoretical ‘postmodernism’ as inherently theological. When 
Fondane writes ‘avec Pascal, Nietzsche et Dostoïevski, contre Hegel et Husserl, […] 
il [Shestov] est résolument antimoderne [with Pascal, Nietzsche and Dostoevsky, and 
against Hegel and Husserl, […] he [Shestov] is resolutely anti-modern]’ (Fondane 
 
domains of thought (Conner 2014, 37), but the influence of debates around Catholic modernism 
infuenced inter-war intellectuals in ways that complicated the social polarization of anti-rational 
conservatives versus programmatic progressives. As Ethan Kleinberg puts it, ‘traditional French 
philosophy’ of any stripe ‘had been unable to explain the senseless killings and mass destruction that 
marked the French “victory” in World War I, or the precarious position of an industrializing France’ 
(Kleinberg 2005, 280). See also ‘Christian Philosophy: The 1930s French Debates’ in the Internet 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, https://www.iep.utm.edu/chri1930/ (accessed 2 November 2020). 
Jacques Maritain was a key interlocutor for Fondane for this context; see Salazar-Ferrer 1999. 
43 This is in large part because Shestov has been defined as positively theist, although even his position 




1936), perhaps it is helpful to consider this anti-modernity not as the antithesis of 
modernity, but rather as untimely. Suffering, including in its metaphysical aspects, is 
crucial for Fondane, not as a gateway to divinity but in its post-Nietzschean 
implications.  
These shades of affect and theology also return us to the question of Fondane’s 
Jewishness, another label which threatens to cordon off his work. It is in fact difficult 
to conceive of modernism without Jewishness (Mann 2006, 674; Meyer 1989, 151). 
William Franke (2005, 1) claims that in the twentieth-century ‘rediscovery of the 
oftentimes-repressed resources in the Western tradition of apophatic discourse... 
Jewish writers have been particularly important’.44 He relates this to ‘the biblical 
interdictions on representations of the divine’ which ‘gave Jewish tradition a peculiar 
attunement to the limits of representation and an especially acute sensibility for the 
Unrepresentable’. Franke adds a general point that has often been connected to Celan 
specifically: ‘the Holocaust experience has become recognized as a culture code for 
the unspeakable par excellence’ (2005, 1). These contexts cannot be ignored in 
relation to Fondane, the first necessarily informing his poetic takes on Judaic 
tradition, the second foreshadowing itself in his writing and influencing his reception. 
To these it is possible to add the instances of abandonment or seeming abandonment 
of the community by the supreme deity in the Jewish mythos, notably in the breaking 
and reshaping of the covenant in the Torah and in the Book of Job, both touchstones 
for Shestov and Fondane.45  
 Beth Hawkins argues that ‘[t]he tropes of exile, wandering, absence, 
disappearance, the simultaneous power and insufficiency of language – these have 
entered into a shared vocabulary’ (Hawkins 2003, xxi). As Jewishness itself straddles 
the categories of ancient and modern, Fondane, generously and paradoxically, 
energizes its traditions not to create an exceptionalism but to extend their frameworks 
of perception and response to all, using, in Hawkins’ words, a ‘specifically Jewish 
paradigm as the means for promoting a universal ethics’ (2003, xx; see also Kronick 
1991), if by ethics we do not mean a system and if universal means open to all 
 
44 Gershom Scholem, who triangulates Benjamin and Shestov, is the most obvious link between Jewish 
traditions and the writing of modernity. See Hamburger 1982 and Sugarman 2012, as well as section 8 
of the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry on Scholem. 
45 ‘With the Book of Job, the notion of the absurd is born.’ (Hawkins 2003, xxii). 
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humans rather than transcendent or absolute. This negotiation of the secular, of God’s 
absence, through spiritual conceptions, surely owing something to traditions of 
Talmudic commentaries and their contextual emphases, connects to the work of 
Levinas and Derrida (Stone 1998, 5; Arnett 2017, 98) as well as Jabès and Celan (see 
David 2007 for a link with Fondane specifically). Fondane, Celan, Jabès and (Riding) 
Jackson are all of Jewish extraction and have a complex relation to this, holding 
interesting liminal positions. They are unquestionably modern poets without 
belonging to a modernist school, though Celan and Jabès, like Fondane, were 
associated with surrealism without firmly attaching themselves to it. While (Riding) 
Jackson ultimately cleaves to the defence of what might now be called logocentrism, 
all four problematize language in their work. 46 
 All of these contradictions – the impossibility of speaking and its necessity, 
modernity and anti-modernity, Jewishness and post-God universal community – 
vitalize Fondane’s modernism. If some modernisms sought to use art to make the 
world anew, whether transcendentally or materially, and others to turn away from it,47 
Fondane’s catastrophic aesthetics aligns instead with modern writing’s apophatic 
tendencies. Hawkins’ words on Jabès are pertinent: 
 
What binds the reader to the writer, and by extension, Jew to non-Jew [...] is 
the condition of exile – exile characterizes the postwar trauma, the divisive 
split between the idealistic humanism of the Enlightenment and the atrocities 
that humanity found itself committing. We have been exiled from our own 
source of humanity, that is [...] the voice of the margin is the human voice, 
the voice that we all share in a world so deeply betrayed by and cut off from 
its own sense of value. (Hawkins 2003, 162–163) 
 
 
46 See also Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 41 on Fondane recuperating Hegel’s unhappy consciousness for a 
restitution of Jewishness, a restitution I believe to be an imaginative opening towards all of humanity 
rather than a religious exceptionalism. Jewishness may also complicate the centring of modernism on 
the West, as does the fact that Fondane, like so many Parisian modernists, was Eastern European. For 
more on this subject see Mathur 2008 and David 2007. 
47 The tension in artistic modernism between aestheticist quietism and interventionist disquiet is 
perhaps best exemplified in the similarly multiplicitous, multivocal work of Fernando Pessoa, whose 
oscillations between the avant-garde and what Helena Buescu refers to as the ‘arrière-garde’ resonate 
with Fondane’s nuanced modernity (Buescu 2013). Modernist fluctuation between art and politics is 
also usefully surveyed from another angle in David Weir’s Anarchy & Culture: The Aesthetic Politics 




Although Fondane strove against the desire to intellectually conceive a total ethical 
restitution, in his ‘malheur’ the defence of this human voice was the context of his 
modernism.  
 The recent publication of Fondane’s philosophical reflections on the 
anthropology of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Le métaphysicien malgré lui (Fondane 2019), 
emphasizes another facet of his thinking on modernity.  Lévy-Bruhl’s use of the 
notion of a ‘primitive’ mentality is highly problematic in its framing of civilization 
and primitivity, both politically, for obvious reasons, and philosophically, in the 
assumptions and exclusions required to construct such a binary.48 However, beyond 
the flawed societal analysis, his work did bring an attention to extra-rational – ‘pre-
logical’– aspects of thought, in a manner that attracted the attention of 
contemporaries such as the surrealists and Georges Bataille (Engel 2020). 
  Fondane grasped at the possibility that Lévy-Bruhl’s surveys of non-Western 
modes of thought that were not harnessed to the epistemological values of positivism 
could point a way to a reconcilation between imagination and reality. Against the 
Weberian disenchantment of modernity, such modes could, in Pascal Engel’s terms, 
‘offer an escape hatch out of the idea that the world was to be known and thought 
logically’ (Engel 2020, my translation).  On these grounds, poetry appeared as a 
means towards re-enchantment (this form of enchantment is to be distinguished from 
the enchantment of the ‘aesthetic veil’ critiqued by Fondane in texts like ‘Mots 
Sauvages’, Faux Traité and his Baudelaire).  
  Lévy-Bruhl was later to concede that ‘the very idea of an ‘other’ thought 
system, obeying radically different laws to those that founded classical logic, doesn’t 
make sense’ (Engel 2020, my translation). Neither logic nor the extra-logical has 
primacy, they are in constant negotiation. Fondane’s own writing betrays this, and as 
Til R. Kuhnle points out (Kuhnle 2007), this tension animates the very activity of 
poetry. Perhaps Fondane’s insight into modernity is that whereas in pre-modernity 
there was the possibility of harmony between the two (a theme shared by some of his 
decadent predecessors, such as Huysmans), the extra-rational is now suppressed and 
cannot be incorporated into a rational framework (in the manner of, say, the 
 
48 Recent scholarship has pointed out that Levy-Bruhl did not consciously intend to place ‘civilized’ 
mentality over his ‘primitive’ one but merely to illuminate human psychology as a whole. Obviously, 
this intention does not erase the epistemological and political violence of the binary. 
110 
 
Scholastics). The very desire for re-enchantment, though absurd, becomes a driver of 




One of my guiding lights in reading Fondane is the commitment to approaching him 
as an artist, despite the manifold philosophical concerns that permeate his work. As I 
have already stated, it is crucial to read his poetry in the context of his life and his 
other work, yet without allowing any one facet of these to overdefine it. There is no 
question of reading his poetry as an application or practice of ‘his philosophy’. 
However, given the intense, though informal, philosophical formation he underwent 
through his encounters with Shestov, as well as with Gaston Bachelard and other 
contemporaries,49 the influence this had on his poetic practice and the unresolvable 
struggle he maintained between critique and creation,50 in the interests of clarity I will 
briefly plot some of the philosophical territory he set his bearings by and against.  
 As should already be clear, the antagonism towards reason Fondane 
encountered through Dada found a philosophical direction in his readings of and 
relationship with Shestov. ‘Antagonism towards reason’ is a statement broad and 
vague enough to be almost paralyzing. Shestov and Fondane’s ‘opponents’ represent 
a similarly broad grouping, from Plato to Husserlian phenomenology. Yet despite the 
polemical nature of much of their writing, they do not oppose in the sense of having a 
counter-theory to this or that proposed by another. Instead, they offer a critique and 
corrective of knowledge itself, which is not a dismissal of it but a reading of its 
limitations and of the existential ramifications of living with it, of the way in which 
knowledge tends to alienate through the very creation of a subject-object position.51 
 
49 This development flourished when he began writing a philosophy column for Les Cahiers du Sud, 
alongside the likes of Benjamin and Simone Weil, and where he was one of the first French 
commentators of Heidegger (Jutrin 2006). 
50 A tension he refers to in the Faux Traité as ‘la duplicité tragique de soi’, ‘the tragic double-dealing 
of self’ (FT 25). 
51 Butcher 2013, 18: ‘Shestov’s epistemic irrationalis[m] does not, by that fact, make him a moral or 
prudential irrationalist as well.’ Nicolas Monseu highlights the troubling presence of affect in their 
work, raising ‘a central philosophical problem: that of the capacity of a philosophy – and therefore a 
phenomenology – to envisage the different modalities of existence and, in particular, the irreducible 





Fondane cannot be considered simply ‘anti-knowledge’ and has no project of 
returning to an Adamic state. What differentiates his version of existential philosophy 
from what we might call the philosophies of the nous, that is to say of any which aim 
to successfully mediate life with the tools of the intellect, is its commitment to living 
with – or in spite of – this alienation rather than rationally overcoming it.52  
 As I have argued in introducing disconsolation, this position is not one of 
despair, leaving as it does an extra-rational horizon of possibility. In ranging 
Shakespeare, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche on their side Shestov and 
Fondane are not anti-rational bogeymen of the kind hand-wringing critics of 
‘postmodern philosophy’ love to hate.53 Their negative philosophy is not an anti-
philosophy in the sense of cancelling philosophy out, but of subverting it, opening up 
its gaps. They oppose idealism of any kind, which goes beyond the usual 
philosophical uses of the term to include any project which treats the intellect as 
capable of capturing absolute truths and offering a model for human organization.54 
However, this opposition is not proclaimed as a triumph. Their (anti-)philosophy is 
termed the philosophy of tragedy because they too hold the desire to think their way 
past this alienation.55 The commitment to reasserting the impossibility of doing so 
divides them from existentialism as commonly understood; Fondane could never 
proclaim that his philosophy was a Humanism (see Beray 2009, 21). 
 
2005, my translation). Although it remains problematic for its participation in imperializing discourse, 
Fondane’s consideration of non-Western cultures was important for his attempts to think beyond this 
alienation. See Guedj 2003b. 
52 Fondane insists on the irreconciliability of the plenitude of existence with the operations of the 
logos, what he calls ‘l’irréductibilité profonde […] entre ces deux genres de “connaissance”  [the 
profound irreducibility between these two kinds of “knowing”]’ (CM 198). See Christopher 
Hamilton’s The Philosophy of Tragedy (2016) for a concise overview of the philosophical context 
from which Fondane’s work begins. 
53 Monseu 2005 (my translation): ‘It must be said that Shestov and Fondane’s existential philosophy 
does not renounce all truth but rather prioritizes a struggle against the idealist interpretation of truth, 
which glorifies logical truth.’  
54 It must be noted that Fondane’s Hegel comprises in large part the Hegels of Shestov, Alexandre 
Kojève and Jean Wahl, which goes some way to explaining his preoccupation with resisting the 
precipitation towards the ‘end of history’ (a very contemporary concern). See Baugh 2003 and 
Bernasconi 2004. The question of whether Fondane falls foul of Gustav Mueller’s warning against 
‘transform[ing] the great critic of rationalism and irrationalism into a ridiculous champion of an absurd 
pan-logistic rationalism and scientism’ (Mueller 1958, 411) is for another thesis and probably 
inconsequential for his appropriative readings in the name of the philosophy of tragedy . 
55 Note these words from the poignant closing pages of Man Faced With History: ‘Tout comme vous, 
mon cher lecteur, je m’accroche désespérément à l’intelligibilité de l’histoire  [Just like you, dear 
reader, I cling desperately to the iintelligibility of History]’ (HDH 450, EM 61). Fondane in particular 
fought against the temptations of solipsism. 
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 Fondane critiques existential philosophers of the 1930s for falling foul of the 
risk inherent of conceptualizing even those concerns, such as affect, which they seek 
to restore into discourse. In Existential Monday he writes: 
 
If one regards existence as an object of knowledge, then it is clear that 
philosophy has never neglected it [...] Philosophy has always taken itself to 
be the Positive, just as it has always taken the existent for the Negative. If 
existential philosophy gives itself the same task, in what way does it differ 
from the philosophy that preceded it? (EM 8–10, emphasis in the original)56 
 
Hence my clarification that the use of ‘vitality’ as a term when discussing Fondane’s 
work should be understood ‘naively’, prompting critical reflection rather than 
absorption on the part of the reader, in a manner analogous to Brecht’s dialectics of 
alienation. The same goes for the crucial word l’existant, ‘the existent’, which rather 
than being shaped as a critical lever with highly contextualized applications in 
discourse is held open, resisting overdetermination. I hesitate to reduce it at all – 
Fondane defines it only negatively, maintaining the rights of the feeling and 
conscious being against reductive discursive deployments. He seeks to hold open a 
space for the spatially and chronologically singular against thought’s drive to 
generalize. Despite this sense of singularity, I prefer the term ‘existent’ to 
‘individual’, as Fondane’s philosophy is quite capable of sustaining itself alongside 
critiques of the unified subject. This point underlines the paradoxical nature of 
Fondane’s anti-Humanist humanism; it includes an attack on the centring of 
Humanist values combined with an extra-rational compassion for and affirmation of 
the experience of human life.57 
 My attempts to heed the warnings of Fondane’s negative philosophy should be 
apparent in my own apophatic approach. My text is littered with ‘not... but...’ 
constructions, ‘not... rather...’ and ‘however’. In this it attests to the limits of logic so 
strongly pushed against by Fondane. Yet his attack on reductionism and the principle 
 
56 Heidegger later made a similar critique of Sartre: ‘he stays with metaphysics, in oblivion of the truth 
of Being’ (Heidegger 1978, 208). 
57 For a survey of similar trends in post-war theory, see May 2013. This Lyotardian consideration by 
Peter Gratton is also resonant: ‘“Being prepared to receive what thought is not prepared to think”, 
[Lyotard] writes, “is what deserves the name of thinking” [from The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, 
73]. This form of the inhuman, against those who would think of Lyotard as a celebrant of the 1960s 
death of man and the end of humanism, stands as a testament to the inventiveness of the human and its 




of non-contradiction also contains its own limits. Negative philosophy is just that, and 
the expression of his anti-Humanist humanism there hits a stumbling block. Fondane 
engages with this problem in his interventions in the ancient quarrel between 
philosophy and poetry.58 His (negative) philosophical writings on art do not proclaim 
an ‘answer’ in the form of a victory for poetry over philosophy, either. Rather, they 
indicate his path beyond philosophy, beyond prose argumentation itself. Onto what, 
he asks in the Faux Traité, does poetry open? ‘C’est à la poésie elle-même de nous le 
dire’, it is for poetry itself to tell us (FT 30). Only in the actual practice of poetry did 




I have already built up some notion of poetic testimony through the idea of 
irresignation and its place in Fondane scholarship. The existential revolt Salazar-
Ferrer reads in Fondane is both negative and positive – a subversion of rationality’s 
limitations in the name of the existent. Yet the positive expression of this is 
problematic when it subverts the powers of language and logic in advance. Fondane’s 
correspondent Victor Serge wrote ‘I am irritated by this hint of revolt that results 
neither in willing it or [in] an act’ (Serge 2019). Fondane’s poetry, however, is not 
only an outlet for disconsolation: if it were such it would surely be a space only of 
despair, and would then not exist at all. His philosophy of tragedy is not a gesture, 
still less a politics, yet it fights on behalf of the situated place of affect and intention 
where each of these begin. A space of suffering, but also of joy, love and compassion, 
and of the contradictions of consciousness’s experience of them, in anguish, 
 
58 ‘On a le droit de dire que l’artiste est humain: il est impropre de l’appeler humaniste [We may say 
that the artist is human; it is incorrect to call him humanist ]’ (EDR 81). The ‘deadly confusion 
between ethical values and artistic and cultural values [confusion meurtrière entre les valeurs éthiques 
et les valeurs artistiques et culturelles]’ (EDR 83) is treated with particular urgency in L’écrivain 
devant la révolution. 
59 Fondane moves back and forth between using poetry in a broad, multimedia sense and the narrower, 
more common meaning. This thesis is primarily concerned with the latter, the poetry of words. 
Crucially, poetry in this sense resists logic from within its own medium, a point I believe was also very 
important to Fondane. 
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dissatisfaction and the desire to ‘go on’. The poem, then, is a gesture – an opening of 
this space, a subversion of discourses which reduce, reject or sideline it.60 
 The literary framing of mood and tone helps to anchor poetry and testimony 
together without subordinating poetry to external criteria. But what are the features of 
this testimony? I propose four aspects to help consider it: anamnesis, subversion, 
celebration and performance or gesture. 
 
 Anamnesis: Poetic testimony differs from legal or reporting testimony because it does 
not claim ethical or intellectual authority, only affective and interlocutory energy. In 
doing so it offers powerful possibilities towards anamnesis in the sense used by Jean-
François Lyotard, the struggle ‘to keep events from sinking into the oblivion of either 
representation [...] or silence’ (Readings 1991, glossary s.v. Immemorial). Lyotard’s 
détournement of the psychoanalytic context of ‘a complete knowledge concerning the 
things happened in the past’ (J. Jones, n.d.) is particularly appropriate given Fondane’s 
insistence, against Freud and the surrealists, that the unconscious cannot be fully 
captured or understood. Further, it breaks with its underlying origin in the sense used 
by Plato of remembering the ideal outwith the apparent real, which is fruitful when 
discussing Fondane’s subversions of idealisms.61 As I shall develop further in the third 
part of the thesis, Fondane’s poetry, in its apophatic contexts, accords well with 
Lyotard’s indication of an ‘aesthetics of pathos’(Readings 1991, 23; Lyotard 1990, 45) 
in the service of this anamnesis, this remembering which is not a resolution. 
 
Subversion: I have already discussed the subversions of thought in Fondane’s 
philosophy. The poetic intervention is doubly subversive because it has the capacity 
to undermine oppressions while simultaneously complicating the very notion of 
judgement.  
 
60 This gesturing, indicative aspect of poetry will be discussed further in chapters 7 and 8, along with 
the performative aspects that link writer and reader. 
61 For Plato, anamnesis is concerned with ‘the transcendent Ideas that represent the real nature of 
things’ (Samet 2019), one of the starting points for what Fondane sees as the devaluing of actual life in 




Celebration: In going beyond critique, poetic testimony offers an affirmation of the 
human voice without objective or authority and pre-empts dialogue with another. 62 In 
thinking this fragile, paradoxical and absurd role for art, both autonomous and – in 
the words of Virginia Woolf cited earlier – ‘attached ever so lightly perhaps, but still 
attached to life at all four corners’ (Woolf 2020), I have found Chinua Achebe’s 
notion of celebration very helpful, as an extra-rational manifestation of suffering and 
joy. It decouples celebration from a purely joyous sense, expanding towards an 
affirmative plenitude that also comprehends sorrow (and many other affective states). 
 
Performance/gesture: This dimension of celebration depends upon an understanding 
of the poem as performance or gesture of immanent affect, rather than aspiration to 
eternity or revelation of higher truth. Though this affect may necessarily be 
disconsolate – even when joyful and participating in plenitude (due to its transience) 
– its performance is always affirmative. Suffering – le malheur – may be revelatory 
(in an immanent sense), but in poetic testimony it may also be an affirmation. I will 
develop the idea of the performance of existential affirmation further in chapter 7, 
along with these other aspects of poetic testimony which help to afford my readings 
of L’Exode. I do not hope to capture poetic testimony as an objective tool of critique, 
but rather to encourage the reader into dialogue with it in its instances in Fondane’s 
work and beyond. 
  
 
62 Again it must be clarified that this move is not a dismissal of critique but a reclaiming of space for 
what is necessarily made unsayable in rational discourse. In her essay Paranoid Reading and 
Reparative Reading, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick writes ‘it is sometimes the most paranoid-tending people 
who are able to […] develop and disseminate the richest reparative practices’ (Sedwick 2003, 150). 
Fondane’s own critical approach is often astringent, yet he also insists upon the spaces across which 
reparative readings must operate, spaces which his poetry dives into. 
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Chapter 4 (Interlude) 
Words Fail: Fondane and Laura (Riding) Jackson, Two 
Opposing Responses to the Imperfection of Language 
 
 
And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. 
 
John 8:32  
 
Si même il n’y a lieu que pour une expression manquée, n’est-
ce pas, là encore, une expression? 
 
[Even if there is only room for a failed expression, is that not, 
still, an expression?] 
 
from Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre, 409 
  
In this chapter, I will draw out  the crucial importance of the very capacities of 
language as central to understanding Fondane’s response to the philosophical and 
existential (in all senses of the word) crises in which he found himself embroiled. On 
his own account (as given in ‘Mots Sauvages’), in 1924 he abandoned poetry as 
escapist and inadequate to the task of representing reality (represent in the senses of 
both mimesis and affirmation). In 1929 he began writing poems again. This renewal 
was not a ‘return to the fold’. Fondane had not revised his disappointment in the 
inadequacies of language nor found a new light to compensate for them. Instead, his 
return heralded a recognition of the inescapability of language and the need to resist 
the despair engendered by these inadequacies, through a new engagement with the 
ruins of the dream of linguistic perfection, poetic or otherwise. 
 At the same time as Fondane was wrestling with these problems, Laura 
(Riding) Jackson,1 who was born just three years after Fondane and moved to 
England a year after he moved to Paris, was engaged in her own unique confrontation 
 
1 (Riding) Jackson scholar Carla Billiteri addresses the confusion around (Riding) Jackson’s name: 
‘there is not yet a convention in place for referring to Riding/(Riding) Jackson by name when 
discussing all phases of her career […] I will use (Riding) Jackson throughout this study except when 
the anachronism of the name would introduce confusion. In the bibliography, all publications are 





with poetry and the ‘ambiguity of language’ (Wexler 1994, 193). (Riding) Jackson 
may seem an unexpected point of comparison, situated as she is on the edges of the 
canon of anglophone modernism, with an idiosyncratic poetic style that threw down a 
gauntlet to English-language poets who came in her wake (McGann 1992, 466–467). 
Yet there are striking parallels. As well as the dates I have just mentioned, (Riding) 
Jackson’s biography mirrors Fondane's in other ways. Despite being born in America, 
she arrived into what was essentially Eastern European Jewish culture.2 Like 
Fondane, her work has been ‘under-canonized’ despite its quality, range, influence 
and contemporary regard. As with Fondane, in the past few decades scholars have 
worked to recuperate and contextualize (Riding) Jackson’s work (despite her own 
opposition at times), beginning with Joyce Wexler’s 1974 study Laura Riding’s 
Pursuit of Truth. This pursuit, it is fair to say, was the driving force in (Riding) 
Jackson’s life. Her own abandonment of poetry was very similar to Fondane’s in that 
it came through a disenchantment with aesthetic ideals (McGann 1992, 458).3 Yet 
where he came to acknowledge the profane imperfections of language and returned to 
poetry as a nexus of the rational and irrational, (Riding) Jackson remained committed 
to a logocentric quest for ‘rational meaning’ (the title of the linguistic polemic co-
written with her husband Schuyler Jackson and eventually published in 1997). Both 
she and Fondane stand at odds with modern positivist and structuralist theories of 
meaning, resisting what (Riding) Jackson scholar Claudia Billitteri calls ‘reliance 
upon definitions of things from socially constructed or philosophically systematized 
frames of authority’ (Billitteri 2009, 106).   
 However, where Fondane subverts language’s entanglement in rationality to 
open up its inherent plenitude and possibility, and emphasizes its performative and 
relational contexts, (Riding) Jackson doubles down. Where Fondane’s poetic 
subversions prefigure deconstruction (Fotiade 2006, 14), (Riding) Jackson insists 
upon a perfection of utterance grounded in an Adamic obsession with nouns: 
‘knowledge of the meaning of words is, basically, adequate knowledge of language: 
know the words (know what they mean), and all the grammatical and syntactical 
 
2 ‘When she met John Crowe Ransom in 1924, Miss Laura Riding Gottschalk spoke as if English were 
not her first language.’ (Wexler 1994, 192) 
3 Without speculating, I will note here that Riding’s abandonment of poetry coincided with the horrors 
of the 1940s, a fact that as far as I am aware has not been greatly investigated in Riding scholarship. 
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processes will be found deducible from the knowledge’ ([Riding] Jackson and 
Jackson 1997, 13). Where Fondane deplores the exclusions wrought by the 
abstractions of conceptual thought, (Riding) Jackson ends up attacking the use of 
language in scientific discourse as insufficiently precise. She remains committed to 
the assumption that ‘rationally coherent existence’ is possible and necessary, and that 
all that is required is to determine the correct ‘forms of understanding’ ([Riding] 
Jackson and Jackson 1997, 14), looking for meaning to be ‘complete, perfect and 
intrinsic’ (Billitteri 2009, 106). Where Fondane seeks to live in the ruins of Babel 
with an exploration of the relational aspects of language, (Riding) Jackson triumphs 
an absolute referential achievement reminiscent of Adam’s acts of naming.  
 Comparing (Riding) Jackson and Fondane is useful for several reasons, not 
least for the continuing work of situating Fondane within modernism: they are both 
complicated figures for the canon, meriting further acknowledgement yet also 
standing at a tangent to many of their contemporaries. They emerge from similar 
spheres of literary influence: not only Nietzsche (Samuels 2001, li) and Whitman 
(Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 159), but also Baudelaire and Rimbaud. Significantly, as 
Fondane took on the mantle of what he saw as Rimbaud’s existential work at the 
point where poetry failed as an ideal, (Riding) Jackson defined herself against her 
predecessor, her faith in rational coherence affirmed against his example ([Riding] 
Jackson 2007, 65). In terms of Fondane’s English reception, what could be more 
useful than comparison with an Anglophone poet-writer – of the ‘Other’ tradition 
(Samuels 2001, xiii) – who struggled with such a similar linguistic problematic and 
was similarly committed in her response?4  
 The comparison of (Riding) Jackson’s and Fondane’s responses to the 
problems of poetry and language exposed in modernity is all the more useful for the 
fact that they were so antithetical. They can act as mirrors, each showing the opposite 
direction of the other. Where (Riding) Jackson’s disgust at poetry’s ‘falseness’ 
carried her into a project of overcoming all ambiguity in language (Wexler 1994, 
193), Fondane came to understand the failure of aesthetics as an aspect of a more 
profound failure. (Riding) Jackson’s insistence that ‘anarchism is not enough’ is 
 
4 Alexander Dickow has studied (Riding) Jackson and her canonical status in relation to French poetry 




opposed by Fondane’s ‘metaphysical anarchism’: words are both insufficient and 
inescapable. Where (Riding) Jackson discarded poetry to plough on with the quest to 
make words sufficient, Fondane returned to it as a means of living with their 
insufficiencies. 
 The negative image is strengthened by the respective relationships between 
Fondane and (Riding) Jackson’s life and their works. Where Fondane feeds the 
surrealistic and mythical aspects of his poetry with a committed subjectivity and lived 
testimony, (Riding) Jackson strives for a kind of rigour and objectivity. The 
Barthesian excess of writing mentioned in chapter 3 is present here too: her ‘poems 
express the depth of her feelings by the intensity of the effort necessary to repress 
them’ (Wexler 1994, 194). (Riding) Jackson longs for an escape from this excess 
where Fondane embraces it. I venture that this is evident in their relationship to their 
shared Jewish heritage. (Riding) Jackson effectively effaced it in her life and work, 
where Fondane expansively engaged with it not only as a context his poetry, but also 
– like Edmond Jabès – as a tradition of thought in regards to the word.  
 (Riding) Jackson and Fondane both rejected the primacy of form in a way that 
complicates their relationship, as poets, to modernity. Like Dostoevsky, they saw le 
beau style as a deception. Yet as Wexler points out in regards to her later prose 
attempts at perfect meaning, ‘contrary to [(Riding) Jackson’s] intention, her attempt 
to articulate what she could not express in poetry demonstrates that form is an 
essential part of meaning; ignoring form does not eliminate its rhetorical effects’ 
(Wexler 1994, 193). Fondane, without regaining faith in form as a conduit to a higher 
truth, recognised this.  
 (Riding) Jackson was insistent that words should have intrinsic value. 
However, context, too, is an essential part of meaning, as twenty-first century 
linguists, in revision of some of the theories of the twentieth, are acknowledging 
(Everett 2017). Any utterance is always already part of discourse. Wexler argues that 
‘Riding’s demand that we read her poems “literally, literally, literally” inevitably 
invites the opposite’ (Wexler 1994, 194). We cannot escape words but there is always 
something beyond them. Where (Riding) Jackson, like Plato before her, ended up 
attacking poetry for not being fully committed and only playing at the truth, Fondane 
follows Nietzsche: it is the poet’s very frivolity, their understanding that the play of 
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meaning is endless and depends upon the agency of all who engage in discourse, that 
is so valuable and deserving of commitment. 
 
Poetry as Anti-Systematic 
 
In her introduction to Laura (Riding) Jackson’s early essays collected in Anarchism Is 
Not Enough, Lisa Samuels interprets her ‘manifesto against systematic thinking’ as 
valuing poetry as an ‘asocial force’ with ‘saving inutility’ (Samuels 2001, xviii-xix). 
Although the context of (Riding) Jackson’s critical negotiation with the value of 
poetry in the 1920s was at a remove from the polemical and political territory-
marking of the Parisian avant-gardes, essays such as ‘Jocasta’ reveal a dialogue 
between her underlying concerns and the philosophical politicization of poetry, most 
obviously with Wyndham Lewis. Just as Fondane stood against the practical and 
philosophical sublimation of the poetic into the social enacted by the surrealists, 
(Riding) Jackson insists that ‘any philosophical position is irrelevant to the individual 
and relevant only to a symbolic mass of individuals’ ([Riding] Jackson 2001, 69).5 
Samuels puts it that she sees poetry as ‘a realm for engaging with unknowables, not 
an historical accumulation of improving points of view’ (Samuels 2001, xix).  
 This assertion of poetry’s asociality aligns (Riding) Jackson and Fondane by 
way of Nietzsche’s territory, defending the importance of poetry’s particular kind of 
‘frivolity’ against the use of language as a means to an end.6 ‘La poésie n’est pas une 
fonction sociale [poetry is not a social function]’, wrote Fondane in ‘Mots Sauvages’, 
‘mais une force obscure qui procède l’homme et qui le suit [but an obscure force 
which preceeds man and which follows him]’ (Fondane 1996a, 23), while as Samuels 
highlights, ‘in Contemporaries and Snobs, [(Riding) Jackson] challenges the 
subordination of poetry to the “social offices” of inspiriting message or compensatory 
pleasure’ (xlvii). In other words, in their own ways they each define themselves 
 
5 If the first principle of surrealism, asked Fondane in 1926, was ‘l’automate psychique pur [pure 
psychic automation]’, then ‘comment la transformation s’opère-t-elle en faveur d’une discipline, 
révolutionnaire il est vrai, mais de nature social, issue d’un malaise matériel [?] [how could it be 
transformed into a discipline, even a revolutionary discipline, of a social nature, stemming from a 
material disorder?]’ (AG 47, emphasis in the original) 
6 In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche responds to Plato’s characterization of poets as frivolous in the Ion 
dialogue by reclaiming that frivolity, against the dismissal of poetry as ‘ancillary to philosophy rather 




against those ‘qui pensent sauver la poésie, en la faisant passer pour un “document 
mental”, une accoucheuse d’idéals et de nobles sentiments [who think to save poetry 
by making it out to be a “mental document”, a midwife of ideals and noble 
sentiments]’ (FT, 12). 
 Like Fondane, (Riding) Jackson also resists the intrusion of systematizing 
thinking in the other direction, that is to say the anchoring of individual experience to 
the ground of a defining framework, such as psychoanalysis. In ‘Jocasta’, she 
employs her own ‘case’ with the story of mispronunciations embedded in her speech 
due to teenage experiences of reading to a blind man with eccentric accents:  
 
Now, if I were a psycho-analytic individual-realist, I should symbolically 
refine this… it is merely an incident… I have never told it… to illustrate this 
or that… and in treating it in this way I am sure I am closer to the incident as 
it happened and as it affected me, although I am not closer to what is called 
the reality of the incident. (2001 60–61) 
 
‘Reality’ in this instance symbolizes the conclusion posited in a predefined 
interpretative framework. Its ironic rejection here is not so much an absolute refusal 
of interpretation as a resistance to the foreclosure of meaning enacted by the 
application of (would-be) systematic methods. The humility of the limits of 
interpretation here has a resonance with Fondane’s reading of the theological ‘case’ 
of Augustine and his toothache: ‘Il y a plus d’humilité vraie à prier Dieu… de vous 
délivrer d’un affreux mal de dents… que de lui demander de nous livrer son essence 
intelligible [there is more true humility in praying… for deliverance from a terrible 
toothache… than to ask [God] to reveal his intelligible essence)’ (HDH 450, EM 60). 
Sometimes a toothache is ‘just’ a toothache. 
 In Anarchism Is Not Enough (Riding) Jackson seems to value poetry for the 
‘absolute uncertainties’ that it protects from ‘pseudo-realities of achievement’ (2001, 
l). These ‘uncertainties’ occur in the space that she calls the ‘unreal’, which is 
perhaps the imaginative or metaphysical, and which she would protect from thought-
systems of the ‘collective-real’ such as Marxism or the ‘individual-real’ of 
psychoanalysis. Her definitions are somewhat slippery, and she would later abandon 
them along with a denunciation of the value of uncertainty. Yet a kernel of this 
protection of the subversive unknown would remain present in her explorations of 
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language through and beyond poetry. It is certainly possible to write of her approach 
in 1928 that she  
 
wants to forestall the increasing division of intellectual and artistic life into 
organizations based on historical and natural fact […] one way to stop such 
destructive analogies is to keep changing the language, to imagine it as 
‘unbecoming’. (Samuels 2001, xxvii) 
 
Fondane makes a strong claim for poetry’s capacity to act with epistemological 
violence to the same ends. In his view, the systematic divisions of ‘organized’ 
thought which became dominant in the nineteenth century, as Huysmans and others 
diagnosed with unease, necessitated the occasional Rimbaud come along and ‘jeter le 
trouble dans l’idée que l’esprit se fait de lui-même [throw the idea that the mind 
makes for itself into turmoil] (RV, 31). In order to break open the reification of 
thought, subversive poets such as Rimbaud wound language and piety, foregrounding 
the uncertainties of their own words even as they confidently assert their newness. 
 The (Riding) Jackson of Anarchism Is Not Enough and Contemporaries and 
Snobs, then, stands against ‘this philosophy, this merchant-mindedness: how much 
have we here? what sum? and of what profit?’ ([Riding] Jackson 2001, 15). Poetry 
seems to resist this quantification: ‘the end of a poem is the poem’ ([Riding] Jackson 
2001, 34). The ‘nothing’ of poetry insisted upon by (Riding) Jackson would seem to 
correspond with the subversive project of Shestov, being the remainder left when the 
foundations of rational thought are radically questioned. Samuels glosses her ‘poetic 
intelligence’ as ‘an inspired comprehension of the unknowable’ (Samuels 2001, 
xlvii). Yet despite her defence of poetry from external ends, (Riding) Jackson’s 
‘inspired comprehension’ conflicts with Fondane’s subversions of knowledge. It is 
closer to the claim of the poet as privileged interpreter of the irrational into the 
rational which Fondane attacks in the surrealists. 
 For Fondane, poetry performs affective subversions as well as intellectual ones. 
Poetry can participate in a ‘sensation of the unknown’ (Samuels 2001, xlvii), 
certainly. It can acknowledge the presence of the unknown, of ‘la vie qui déborde les 
formes [the life that overspills forms]’(BEG, 14). Poetry can enact an experience of 
the unknowable, can move into it, but is not for all that a comprehension or an 




least expose the limits of) all ideals, and in this it accords with Fondane. Yet in doing 
so she institutes her own ideal of poetry as a space for truth, straining to surpass 
language’s ‘compromise between what it is possible to express and what it is not 





Like Rimbaud before them, (Riding) Jackson and Fondane both broke off into poetic 
silence at the point where they found the maxim beauty = truth to be unsustainable. 
In 1965, (Riding) Jackson made public the process of self-reflection on poetry’s 
‘failure to be truth-speaking’ ([(Riding) Jackson] Jackson 2007, 2) which she had 
already begun and which, along with its following concerns (‘not anti-poetic but pro-
linguistic’ [235]), would occupy her, without conclusion, for the rest of her life. In 
‘The Failure of Poetry’, she wrote that she ‘renounced it’ as ‘disappointing the hopes 
it excites as seemingly the way of perfect human utterance, or articulate truth’ (29). 
Like Fondane, she despaired of poetry when she saw its truth-seeking fail, when the 
art-for-art’s-sake, Symbolist, aesthetic compensation for the world, the beauty of 
what (Riding) Jackson termed the ‘individual-unreal’, finally came to be seen as 
inadequate.  
 But inadequate in what sense? For Fondane, the ideal of truth itself became a 
kind of hinterland, ‘l’esprit qui n’a soif que de soi [the spirit thirsting only for itself]’ 
(Ulysse, MF 71). The desire for it was not lessened, but it could never be guaranteed. 
The pursuit of such a guarantee is not easy to abandon. As Shestov put it,  
‘Plato was not content with the sources of truth… he knew that it is difficult to find 
‘the Father and Creator of all the universe’ and that ‘if one finds Him, one cannot 
show Him to everyone.’ (Shestov 1966, 1:4) 
 Though (Riding) Jackson did not couch her experience in theological terms, she 
did not give up on the ‘hope’ poetry had ‘excited’, but transferred it, her straining, 
like that of Shestov’s Plato, ‘an attempt to overcome these difficulties as well as this 
impossibility’ (Shestov 1966, 1:4). (Riding) Jackson’s move towards a rationality of 
meaning abandoned poetry for ‘the promise of language itself’ ([Riding] Jackson and 
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Jackson 1997, 447). This is akin to the promise Sartre claimed for prose in his writing 
on Mallarmé, that it was the ‘lieu naturel de l’engagement [natural site of 
engagement/commitment]’ (Denis 2006). The hope of ‘perfect utterance’ is sustained 
in what (Riding) Jackson called ‘the style of truth’ (2007, 28). Carla Billitteri argues 
that 
In poetry’s place (Riding) Jackson sought ‘the open ground of general 
human speaking’, which she came to see as a ‘pure language’ that could 
naturally and effortlessly speak the ‘style’ of ‘truth’. As she affirmed in her 
first public appearance after two decades of silence, a BBC broadcast of 
1962, ‘[F]or the practice of the style of truth to become a thing of the 
present, poetry must become a thing of the past’ […] Poetry, she came to 
believe, was not only ill-suited to the unveiling of truth; its reliance on craft 
made poetry a greedy, material obstacle to this revelation as well. (Billitteri 
2008, 332) 
 
(Riding) Jackson clearly maintained that the possibility of language freed from 
material corruption, able to offer direct access to an object truth, was an achievable 
goal. 
 According to Robert Nye, (Riding) Jackson ‘believed that poetry itself was 
exhausted… it stood revealed as never having truly possessed those possibilities for a 
complete propriety of word to thought which it seemed to have in the hopes of its 
adherents’ (Nye 1994, 2). She continued to resist ‘definitions of things delivered from 
socially constructed or philosophically systematized frames of authority’ and Lisa 
Samuels situates this ‘self-reliance’ in a context of American idealism (Samuels 
2001, xvii). However, this same idealism reveals itself in the expanded hope for this 
‘propriety’. She would come to abandon her position that ‘nothing is enough’ 
([Riding] Jackson 2001, 132), that, as Samuels interprets, ‘our knowledge of the state 
of emptiness – of positive ‘nothing’, of the poetic ‘vacuum’ – suffices, is enough’ 
(Samuels 2001, lix). But though her response strived for the empirical, ‘an experience 
of gradual learning of the full potential of language’ ([Riding] Jackson 2007, 179), it 
was underpinned by an idealistic assumption revealed in her own direct contrast of 
herself with Rimbaud’s despair: ‘I had hope, built in the terms of faith in the Good as 
ultimate necessity’ ([Riding] Jackson 2007, 65).7 
 
7 This rationalist take on the Good and necessity, which parallels neo-platonist conceptions of cosmic 





 Fondane would never have agreed with his contemporary’s startling earlier 
conclusion that nothing could ‘suffice’, which could be interpreted as an injunction to 
imagine Sisyphus happy. He is closer to Samuels’s interpretation of ‘nothing is 
enough’ as implying ‘no satisfaction is possible in the ongoing, desiring self’ 
(Samuels 2001, lix). The ‘faith in the Good’ as a response led (Riding) Jackson close 
to a condemnation of poetry aligned with Plato’s Republic, warning against poetry’s 
misleading distractions and cowardly ‘beguilement of the soul’: ‘the final value of 
poetry is play – not purposively, but by organic deficiency of seriousness’ ([(Riding) 
Jackson] Jackson 2007, 26).  
 Despite the Platonic overtones of such a statement and (Riding) Jackson’s 
insistence on the promise of truth in language in general, her disillusionment with 
aesthetics represents a parallel to a similar stage in Fondane’s movement. (Riding) 
Jackson’s ‘faith in the Good’ offered her ‘shelter’ to the effect that ‘nothing has 
changed for me but my judgement as to the field in which human utterance can best 
find its perfections’ ((Riding) Jackson 2007, 65). Nonetheless, her assertion that ‘the 
poetic shadows that veil [the truth] must be torn away’ before ‘the speech of truth’ 
becomes ‘a real and immediate possibility’ resonates with Fondane’s own 
disappointment in the power of artistic beauty. He arrived there by way of his own 
master in beauty, Baudelaire, who wrote ‘the intoxication of Art is better than any 
other at veiling the terrors of the abyss’(Baudelaire 1869, 81, my translation). This 
view of art as a kind of painkiller, akin to Marx’s view of religion as the opium of the 
people,8 was ultimately insufficient for (Riding) Jackson and Fondane both. Neither 
could continue to live in ‘a paradise which excludes any notion of the tomb and of 
destruction’ (Baudelaire 1869, 81, my translation). 
 The image of the veil occurs in (Riding) Jackson’s work as well as 
Baudelaire’s: it is unclear whether this is a direct or unconscious inheritance. Where 
for Baudelaire the veil hides a terrifying sublimity, (Riding) Jackson posits an 
 
same desire for a justification of existence, her move is essentially mystical, abandoning the logical 
search in favour of one based on personal experience of divine revelation (see Basevich 2020). For 
Fondane, an ethical justification of necessity is also an impossibility, but, bereft of Weil’s religious 
experience, one that leads him to his absurd revolt (Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 85). 
8 That is, in (for example) Kurt Vonnegut’s reading, which emphasizes Marx’s famous comment on 
religion as opium as an empathetic statement on religion as a cultural buffer against the anguish of a 
miserable and otherwise meaningless existence, rather than a simplistic dismissal of religion as a 




objective truth waiting to be revealed. For her, ripping away the veil is a 
straightforward objective, opposing the ‘mere human dreaming of truth’ found in 
poetry with a will to overcome ‘the embarrassment and pain of human reluctance to 
face in actuality the full potential of truth implicit in words’ (2007, 98). She stakes 
everything on the idea that truth is immanently and imminently seizable. Her 
concerns for truth in language, which occupied the rest of her life and were never 
conclusive, seemed to defer questions of its content. She repeatedly asserts in her 
post-60s essays that her inquiries are not philosophical or critical but linguistic. And 
yet, from the revealing of the extra-rational impulse behind the creation of utterance 
inherent in the ‘inspired comprehension’ of Anarchism Is Not Enough quoted above 
to the ‘faith in the promise of language’ (my emphases) of Rational Meaning to the 
‘waiting for words’ found in The Telling, her theories have an implicit messianic 
kernel, even if she would reject the notion and counter it with a belief in the 
attainability of what she calls ‘the style of truth’ and what is ultimately an Adamic 
pure language. 
 Although (Riding) Jackson does not confront the notion that poetry, like 
religion, could participate in the question of what Marx called ‘the expression of real 
suffering and a protest against real suffering’ (Marx 1970, introduction) her critique 
of it dovetails with the crisis experienced by Fondane in the moment of his loss of 
poetic voice: ‘poetry is a sleep-maker for that which sits up late in us listening for the 
footfall of the future on today’s doorstep’ ((Riding) Jackson 1973, 11). Fondane too 
came to reject his experience of the art as the false promise of a dreamlike, childish 
happiness. In Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre he explores this idea through 
Baudelaire’s image of poetry as a child’s toy (BEG 133).   Yet for Fondane 
the collapse of poetry as consolation and the rejection of its purpose as a distraction 
led him in the opposite direction to (Riding) Jackson. The messianic import of her 
listening was contained for her by a kind of willed idealism which kept irrationality at 
bay with a faith in the perfection of language. While she discarded poetry in order to 
reassert the triumph of language as absolute, he saw the failure of poetry as evidence 
of the groundlessness of all thought, as well as its affective failure: ‘la vie est 
impuissante à atteindre le concept; le concept est impuissant à soulager la vie [life is 





Pursuit of Truth 
  
The Laura Riding of Anarchism Is Not Enough shares a project with the (Riding) 
Jackson of The Failure of Poetry, The Promise of Language, seeking ‘the way… to 
full exercise by human beings of their truth-function’ ([Riding] Jackson 2007, 43). 
(Riding) Jackson the poet already held a latent dissatisfaction with poetry-as-dream. 
Samuels argues that ‘(Riding) Jackson’s poems… are meant to prick the reader to 
self-consciousness rather than to function as dream events (for writer or reader)’ 
(Samuels 2001, lii-liii). The apophatic contradiction of that ‘compromise’ of poetic 
expression was well within her awareness in 1928. Her rejection of poetry’s soporific 
qualities was nothing less than a rejection of the compromise. ‘At stake’, she wrote in 
1972, ‘is the effort to do otherwise with words than can be done within the range of 
the respectable or the accepted in imperfection’ ([Riding] Jackson 2007, 101, my 
emphasis).  
In (Riding) Jackson’s view, poetry could only ever be an acceptance of 
imperfection. Its pathways to self-consciousness ultimately contained too many 
aesthetic distractions and dead-ends. Her stakes remained the same, but the faith in 
perfectibility had been transferred from poetics to linguistics. Her broaded search 
represented a refusal to deal with the materiality of words themselves. It is fascinating 
that her move towards a kind of science of language takes her in this Platonic 
direction, when compared to Fondane’s warning that the notion of unsullied truth 
tends towards a valuing of ideas over existence. 
 Despite (Riding) Jackson’s insistence on a strict difference between her writing 
and philosophy – ‘I dealt with [my subjects] personally and not philosophically’ 
([Riding] Jackson 2007, 78) – the idealism which grounds her expression 
contextualizes her valuing of what is most ‘human’, and for (Riding) Jackson what is 
most valuable in humanity is abstraction. Her pursuit of truth leads into a problematic 
similar to Sartre’s pursuit of the authentic, and similarly never reaches a conclusion. 
Her prickings at ‘self-consciousness’ can be revealingly juxtaposed with Fondane’s 
own philosophical and poetic attempts to provoke self-reflection in his audience. 
When Fondane’s dramatic poetry, with its contradictory voices and interpellations, 
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sometimes produces effects close to Brechtian alienation, or uses apostrophe with 
hints of Baudelaire to implicate the reader, it does so in order to startle consciousness 
into awareness of its contexts and, at least momentarily, strip away the buttresses of 
rational thought which allow being to rest in complacency. (Riding) Jackson may 
share a similar project of tearing open received ideas, but with, instead, a confident 
faith that in doing so she is moving closer to the revelation of hidden truth. 
 Through their experiences of poetry failing and ‘the deceit that [its] 
commitments to beauty always entail’, as (Riding) Jackson scholar Jerome McGann 
puts it, (McGann 1992, 465) (Riding) Jackson and Fondane share many of the same 
premises. The difference in their responses is succinctly opened up in a paragraph 
(Riding) Jackson wrote in 1967 as part of an introduction to her work Epilogue, 
which was written in the latter part of the 1930s as she moved towards abandoning 
poetry. At that stage she still considered poetry a rational means to immediate truth. 
In 1967 she condemned its mediation, but articulated the ideal of a rational linguistic 
immediacy she would never let go: 
 
Only by the government of the Word can human existence become 
consistent with itself, break through the barrier of inconsistency of efforts 
dividing it ever from itself as the Good in the form of articulate life. Where 
to find this government? The search for it has been philosophy’s most 
serious object, and religions’ most serious passion; and when, as now, 
human beings decide to attempt nothing more of that sort, fearing to come 
face to face with ultimate failure, they are all inconsistency – and use their 
human talent to piece themselves together from moment to moment. 
([Riding] Jackson 2007, 166). 
 
Here she parts categorically with Fondane’s confrontation with catastrophe. 
 To her ‘government’ must be opposed Fondane’s ‘anarchisme métaphysique 
[metaphysical anarchism]’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2008, 86). It is exactly the challenge and 
the pathos of ‘piec[ing] themselves together from moment to moment’ that Fondane 
attempts to accept, despite the constant desire to go beyond that ‘inconsistency’. The 
concordance of their premises is worth re-emphasizing. Unlike his surrealist or 
Catholic contemporaries who appropriated poetry in their claims to the status of 
gatekeepers of the unconscious or mystical revelation, (Riding) Jackson saw the same 
exposed fault lines of meaning as Fondane. Like Simone Weil, her own work of 




this panic with an overarching – though not systematic – project of rationality. In the 
most mischievous of interpretations, she could be cast as a kind of poetic 
Robespierre, sweeping away befuddling ideas to usher in a new age of rationality that 
nonetheless rests on faith in a Supreme Being (or supreme Good) whose rational 
existence is proclaimed all the more fervently for its intangibility. 
 Although she originally defended poetry from the pressure of social utility, 
(Riding) Jackson eventually took that pressure to another extreme, pushing what 
Fondane called ‘la conscience honteuse du poète [the poet’s shamed conscience]’ to 
what amounts to a metaphysical accusation of truth-failure: ‘it stops short of literal 
truth-achievement in a rhetoric of truth-love: its history is more a record of 
propaganda for the effort of “truth”, in loving word-detail, than a testament of 
accumulative human realization of the truth-objective’ ([(Riding) Jackson] Jackson 
2007, 239–240). The earlier Benjaminian engagement with the unknown was rejected 
for ‘an accumulation of points of view’ – not subjective viewpoints, but gradual 
uncoverings of ‘the truth’. The nobility of such a purpose is not in question, and 
Samuels argues that (Riding) Jackson presages writers like Kathy Acker with the goal 
to ‘speak up, to make human attention the central event of the literary act’ ((Riding) 
Jackson 2001, xxxiii), a goal she carried past her use of poetry. 
 Her use of ‘truth’ as a concept conflicts with Fondane’s ultimate belief in the 
need for poetry, but she aligns with him in her resistance to the abuse of language by 
systematic agendas. Her desire for autonomous language is haunted by longing:  
 
  Were this not a poem 
I would speak on speaking 
[…] 
That saved itself for the other, others 
[…] 
Needed no grace of time to rescue it 
From total loss. 
 
Or so I would speak, so write, 
Endeavour to construct, I mean, 
Something binding in our understandings 
In a reality of words, selves, others, 
More utterable, enterable, occupiable, open. 
 




(Riding) Jackson refuses to give up on the pursuit of a saving Truth. Her meta-poetic 
mode here is strikingly similar to ways in which Fondane explores his dissatisfaction 
with poetry while writing it: a foreword (written with ironic reverential capitalization, 
a style Fondane often employs), modal verbs, conjectures and negations. He also 
shares a desire for the ‘reality of words’ she envisions. But he does not share her faith 
in its actualization. 
Against Despair 
 
It is tempting to read (Riding) Jackson’s assertion that ‘the total import of what I have 
to say is a happy one… the speech of truth… is a real and immediate possibility’ 
(2007, 54) as a nonchalant but resolute denial of doubt and tragedy. From Anarchism 
Is Not Enough (which Samuels identifies with the anti-tradition of modernist ‘Other’ 
criticism) to The Telling, she maintains a searching and fastidious pursuit of the 
relationship between the individual and truth. Despite acknowledgement of the 
difficulties of consummating that relationship, her prose maintained an exclusion of 
failure or anguish by its consistent commitment to the apparently imminent 
expression of ‘the fundamentals of being’ and ‘an exact self’ (1973, 59). Although 
she sought to bring the problems of expression back to the experience of the 
individual, her firm belief in an abstract ‘Subject’ of truth to be apprehended left the 
individual in an abstracted position while that apprehension was yet to occur. 
 Despite her rejection of the fragmentations of science and materialism, her own 
search for truth, like Rimbaud’s (in Fondane’s view at least), ultimately steered close 
to a kind of positivism in seeking to rationally capture knowledge. Like most 
positivisms, it depended upon a foundation of assumption. Her linguistics, with its 
‘faith in the Good as ultimate necessity’ ([Riding] Jackson 2007, 65) veils its own 
faith-based guarantee by hiding it in plain sight as a rational imperative. The intensity 
of the exclusion of existential affect from (Riding) Jackson’s rigorous grapples with 
meaning is given pathos by her suicide attempt, as well as the coincidence of her 
abandonment of poetry and the coming of war. If read in these terms, her post-poetic 
project may be understood as a determined rejection of despair. 
 For Fondane, following Shestov, Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, the 




mention messiness, of reality. Poetry indeed contained the danger of becoming a 
distracting illusion, yet in its capacity to consciously express something of the 
experience of this gap it nonetheless retained a subversive potential for affirmation. 
In the midst of despair, paradoxically, 
 
il consiste, pour le poète, à ne pas désespérer, à persévérer, à croire en la 
mystérieuse vertu de la poésie, à la vertu existentielle qu’elle supporte, et 
cela dans la mesure même, précisément, où il ne la comprend pas [it 
consists, for the poet, of not despairing, persevering, believing in the 
mysterious virtue of poetry, the existential virtue that it bears, and in the very 
measure, in fact, that he or she does not understand it] (FT, 18) 
 
Where (Riding) Jackson hoped for the realization of an ultimate truth that would 
compensate for false truths which seem to offer objective frameworks, Fondane saw 
such a hope as messianic and beyond human scope. It was precisely poetry’s capacity 
to escape linguistic and conceptual rationalism which allowed it to confront this 
situation. 
 Though (Riding) Jackson despaired of poetry and could not accept persevering 
in despair, could not accept the trace of the real among the abstractions of poetry nor 
admit the operations of abstraction into the positivism of linguistics, her poetry as 
Riding haunts her life’s projects. In Ode to the Triumph of Bodily Intelligence she 
wrote 
 
Be blessed, passionate intelligence, 
In this prime, that has uncovered 
The fond geography of ghosts. 
You are enchanted against ruin 
By that you are but ruin 
And nothing but ruin can love or know. (quoted in Samuels 2001, lvii) 
 
 These wistful lines attest to the escape of the mind from the corruption of 
existence, an escape finally rejected as sterile. Yet the ‘ruins’ of the imagination can 
be read another way. To read ‘ruin’ in the final line as the subject of the phrase would 
be to affirm the resurgence of the existent, imperfect in utterance. In fact this 
imperfection is an inescapable condition of experience. If, as Samuels puts it, ‘the 
languaged self walks through the privilege of historical ruin’ (lviii), the eternal 
waiting for a soteriological linguistics offers no consolation to those without faith in 
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it. (Riding) Jackson’s ‘geography of ghosts’ may refer to the shadow-play of the 
mind, but the lives reduced to shadow by modernity’s abstractions remain as 
underserved by scientific language as they are by poetry-as-nothingness. The constant 
deferral of the quenching of metaphysical thirst entails the need for some means of 
existential attestation in the meanwhile. 
 The tension between the limitations of existence and the transcendent 
possibilities of poetry was unsustainable for (Riding) Jackson.  
 
I had accepted poetry at the hands of history as the Somehow that would 
rescue words and their speakers from the ever-insufficient speaking of 
impermanent time-cramped life – as all poets who take the name not from 
self-concerned ambition must in their dedicatory spirit accept it; in pressing 
upon the poetic possibilities of utterance for evidence of the actual feasibility 
of saying poetically what appears to be otherwise not entirely sayable, I was 
doing no more than what poetry – as a pursuit of genuine high human 
purpose – has always called poets to do. (2007, 66–67) 
 
For her it seems that in terms of ‘genuine high human purpose’ there was no 
alternative to the pursuit of perfect utterance and that living with ‘ever-insufficient 
speaking’ was intolerable. Whatever Nietzschean subversions had stimulated her 
poetry, she insisted upon the rationality of seeking a moral guarantee. The paring 
knife of her prose left no room for the consideration that not only was beauty 
insufficient as a means to reach truth, but truth itself could be deficient as a goal. That 
transcendent truth could be not only untranslatable, but absent. 
 If other values, other possibilities, for poetry exist, for Fondane they cannot be 
absorbed into a project of enlightenment, or, in fact, ever adequately rationally 
expounded. He was not satisfied with poetry as a ‘Nothing’ either, but while the 
failure of its ‘high’ purpose initially seemed aporetic, the undefined impulse to write 
imposed upon him the consideration that perhaps it was not the means that was to be 
abandoned but rather the goal. He saw that poetry could perhaps offer something 
other than the exposition of a hidden truth, or a sterile escape. In the absurd 




from objectivity and a potential space for the ‘liberté de mon triste moi’ (BEG 294).9 
Along with the rejection of poetics as an aesthetic means of revelation of an 
otherwise unsayable truth came an understanding that a generalized theory of poetry 
was impossible.  
 
The Self that Sings  
 
Instead of a theory, a kind of anti-aesthetics predicated on the communication of 
affective experience hove into view for Fondane. What if art’s expressive power was 
not merely vehicular, but 
 
…une activité créatrice qui alors même qu’elle semble emprunter une idée, 
s’en empare et la bouleverse au point d’en rendre la signification 
méconnaissable? Une idée vécue par une douleur, est-ce toujours la même 
idée? Une idée portée par la joie, ne nous dit-elle rien de plus que son 
contenu logique? [a creative activity that while it seems to carry across an 
idea, in fact seizes it and convulses it until its meaning is barely 
recognisable? Is an idea lived through pain still the same idea? Does an idea 
carried through joy tell us nothing more than its logical content?] (BEG 298)  
 
What if poetry were not an aesthetic move towards the communication of objective 
truth but a need to ‘montrer le moi qui chante [show the self that sings]’ (BEG 253)? 
This statement would need to be distinguished from ‘self-concerned ambition’. That 
is, not an argument for poetry as the vaunting of biography for fame, but an exposure 
of the affective experience of life left wanting by the failure of idealisms to provide 
metaphysical security. An attempt to honour immanence despite the anguish caused 
by the failure of the quest for transcendence, whether theological or linguistic. 
 
9 Fondane’s use of the term triste moi is complex. It originates in Schopenhauer as the ‘miserable self’ 
(Schopenhauer 2011, 264) which the idealist seeks to escape, which Fondane reads as a tension in 
Baudelaire’s work. Without denying the reality of suffering, Fondane inverts the value-judgement of 
the self as miserable in the sense of worthless. It is the only self we have. As Baldine Saint Girons 
notes, ‘when Fondane evokes the “miserable self” […] he does so with great irony […] “there are no 
others” [FT 253] […] this complex self that wonders and panics, that suspends itself and finds itself 
again, is the only representative of our body: our life is bound to it. This self is my face, my sadness 
and my joy, one day to be a pile of ashes from which a clump of nettles will grow. All life quivers in 
it’. (Girons 2017, 109, my translation). This is the existential starting point from which Fondane works 
towards poetry as a kind of ‘“strange truth” which opposes rational truth’ (Girons 2017, 109). 
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 Where (Riding) Jackson retained her anti-systematic position through 
insistence on the possibility of immediate truth in language, Fondane’s ‘post-silence’ 
statements on the uses of poetry are necessarily guarded and consciously apophatic. 
His wish was not so much to ‘établir une doctrine nouvelle [establish a new doctrine]’ 
as to ‘affaiblir celle qui a cours [weaken the one currently in place]’ (BEG 296). In 
Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre he affirms the existential grounding of this 
resistance to the categorization of poetics: 
 
La poésie est toujours autre chose que ce à quoi on tente de la réduire, elle 
n’est, finalement, réductible qu’à l’acte de son créateur (sans qu’on sache 
exactement ce qu’il est) et débordant toujours sa définition. Quand on parle 
de la poésie, on évite toujours sa définition. Quand on parle de la poésie, on 
évite toujours de se souvenir qu’elle est faite par quelqu’un. Comment alors 
n’aurait-il pas quelque chose à dire?  
 
[Poetry is always something else than what one tries to reduce it to. In the 
end it is reducible only to the act of its creator (without our knowing exactly 
what it is) and always exceeds its definition. When one speaks of poetry, one 
always avoids defining it. When one speaks of poetry, one always avoids 
remembering that it is made by someone. How then could it not have 
something to say?] (BEG 298, emphasis in the original)  
 
Such a perspective is not to be confused with a partition of form and content. Rather, 
it is saying something about the communicative impulse and poetry’s place as a 
response to the insufficiency of other forms of speaking – not as a sufficient answer 
in itself such as (Riding) Jackson searched for, but as a possibility of saying 
something, even though that saying be incomplete.  
For Fondane, poetry had to participate in an interrogation of its own why of 
speaking, even though, without external guarantee or goal, this meant an exploration 
of the impossibility of defining that why. The truths of poetry are inseparable from its 
masks and lies, and resist the circumscription of an attempted science of Truth. The 
(Socratic) daemonic aspect of the decision to speak is always supplementary to the 
process and objectives of speaking. Beyond (Riding) Jackson’s disenchantment with 
the techniques of poetry, amidst the restless anxiety of truth, the trace of her impulse 
remains: ‘the destruction of poetry as a tradition would not destroy poetry itself’, she 
wrote in Contemporaries and Snobs ([Riding] Jackson 2001, xix). Nor, apparently, 




poetry betray an impulse of speaking which exceeds the capacity of rational truth-
seeking. As Tom Fisher puts it, ‘For (Riding) Jackson […] it is as philosophy that 
poetry is abandoned’ (2017, 58). 
 The suspicion of poetry’s obfuscatory potential places Fondane and (Riding) 
Jackson on shared ground. A concern for the stakes of human speaking, against the 
inadequate compensations of art for art’s sake, seemingly draws them closer. 
Ultimately however this closeness sharpens the contrast between (Riding) Jackson’s 
idealised quest for immediate truth and Fondane’s anti-idealistic position. Where 
(Riding) Jackson cedes the ground of poetry to philosophy and linguistics, Fondane 
moves in the opposite direction. For him (idealist) philosophy also acts as a false 
comfort in the same way as poetry in its escapist or consolotary guises: if a 
‘metaphysical proposition… gives your mind satisfaction’, then 
 
vous êtes certes un philosophe ; mais vous n’êtes pas, ou n’êtes plus, ou pas 
encore, un existant – au sens existentiel du mot […] ‘Il ne faut pas, écrivait 
Kierkegaard dans son Journal, que mon histoire avec elle s’évapore en 
poésie’ ; et il entendait par là: en philosophie hégélienne. (LE 61) 
 
you are certainly a philosopher, but you are not, or are no longer, or not yet, 
an existent – in the existential sense of this term […] Kierkegaard writes in 
his Journal: ‘My history with her must not evaporate into poetry’, by which 
he means: into Hegelian philosophy (EM 28) 
 
While (Riding) Jackson is far from being a Hegelian philosopher, her turn to 
linguistics would surely be understood by Fondane as a turn away from the questions 
of being an ‘existent’.  
 Yet although their approaches cannot be reconciled, (Riding) Jackson’s 
commitment to ‘life-fulfilling speaking’ (2007, 60) parallels Fondane’s own efforts. 
His endeavour to keep Kierkegaardian or Shestovian questioning alive in poetry is 
precisely a means of resisting their ‘evaporation’: every rational effort to finalize such 
speaking in fact betrays it. (Riding) Jackson wrote that she ‘moved; and I think I am 
much closer, for having chosen my own movement, to keeping the ultimate 
appointment I have with others – we all have with one another…’ (2007, 166). She 
situates her quest in the same existential context of waiting as Fondane. The 
difference is that he, along with Kafka, has accepted that ‘Sunday will never end’ 
(EM, 2). In confronting the poet’s ‘shameful conscience/shamed consciousness’, he 
136 
 
turned away from rationally establishing the conduits of truth and towards existential 
testimony: an affirmation of life, the worthwhileness of listening. Facing the 
impossibility of ultimate definition he sought to reckon with the implications of 
suffering and joy for meaning. 
 Both writers attempted to join meaning and expression while avoiding getting 
caught up with the ‘mechanics of magic-making’ ([Riding] Jackson 2007, 26) for 
their own sake. Though she rejected poetry, (Riding) Jackson also rejected despair 
and held firmly that the ‘margin of speaking-achievement to be crossed’ ([Riding] 
Jackson 2007, 66) was almost within reach. Perhaps she considered herself a worker 
of a linguistic form of Benjaminian weak messianic force, on the point of redeeming 
the almost-truths of poetry with the exposition of the linguistics of Truth. She sought 
to ‘treat of main things of being, in thought & expression from a position of self-
reliance as against reliance upon definitions of things from socially constructed or 
philosophically systematized frames of authority’ ([Riding] Jackson 2001, xvii). 
These words could equally apply to Fondane, but where (Riding) Jackson considered 
that such an independence would lead to the appearing-through of true Truth, 
Fondane saw endless worldly groundlessness. (Riding) Jackson was led through the 
individual consciousness to a rejection of the particular for the universal, where 
Fondane sought to negotiate identity and contingency. 
 The imperfectibility of the poem was unacceptable for (Riding) Jackson and 
countered by a striving for a higher perfection. For Fondane, such striving was 
stricken with impossibility, and the poem’s very imperfectibility made it appropriate 
for exploring the pathos of this impasse. He would surely have viewed (Riding) 
Jackson’s linguism as another form of idealist abstraction. The bifurcation of their 
paths is evinced in their own attitudes to their oeuvres as they developed. (Riding) 
Jackson insisted upon the totality of her work, its movement towards the truth 
requiring an encyclopedic illumination: ‘her poems are one poem’, writes Robert Nye 
(Nye 1994, 7) and her prose is similarly totalizing (though still unsystematic), by her 
benchmark. Fondane, on the other hand, viewed his poems as traces, fragments, to be 
abandoned (and revisited) but never completed. Speaking can be on the side of life, 
but never completely fulfil it. The final truth is never arrived at, never immediate, and 




 Jerome McGann writes that (Riding) Jackson ‘brought the practice of poetry to 
a crisis’ and claims that ‘later writers who have not at least attempted to meet its 
challenge risk being seen…as trivial’ (McGann 1992, 466). McGann offers an 
alternate view to her personal responses to the challenges of beauty and truth, arguing 
for ‘eradicating the idea that the postpoetical (Riding) Jackson has been seeking a 
transcendental ground of truth’ (McGann 1992, 466). Other eminent (Riding) Jackson 
critics would seem to disagree, as Carla Billitteri arguably does, citing, for example, 
(Riding) Jackson’s statement in The Telling: ‘What I have aimed at [i.e. ‘normal 
diction’] is an ideal. It is not my invention, but a linguistically ordained ideal […] 
outside of it there is only place for saying what is mad or wicked to say’ (quoted in 
Billitteri 2009, 96).  
 Perhaps the judgement of whether or not (Riding) Jackson’s search is 
transcendental rests upon an interpretation of the concept of hidden truth and whether 
such an absolute reality could ever be immanent. Even if we accept McGann’s 
interpretation, many of her contemporaries (such as Fondane or the Dadaists) were 
already responding to the contradictions of poetry from within, breaking and 
reforming their poetics as they did so.10 In doing so they certainly made a linguistic 
turn of the kind McGann identifies, yet in refusing (or finding themselves unable) to 
abandon poetry despite its failures they were doing something else from (Riding) 
Jackson’s post-poetic linguistic project. They were not clinging on to the illusory 
comforts of beauty either, but groping in the dark of inspiration, testimony and 
performance – not only acknowledging the imprisoning aspects of language, but 
gesturing towards the horizons beyond it. Perhaps this is the territory (Riding) 
Jackson herself arrived upon in The Telling.  
 In chapter 9 I will return to these horizons to better explore their non-secular 
resonances (Rodger 2015), leaving behind the measures of (Riding) Jackson (and the 
question of to what extent they are ultimately empirical or poetical), and comparing 
Fondane with a writer who shares his desires of linguistic expansion at the threshold 
 
10 McGann’s argument against a transcendental reading of (Riding) Jackson’s project is also 
complicated by the ethical dimension, the ‘faith in the Good’ which she uses to distinguish herself so 
sharply from Rimbaud, that ur-predecessor of dilemmas in modernist poetics. The question of who 
defines what is ‘mad or wicked’ is once again the question of Plato’s Republic, and the refusal to 
assume a transcendental ethics informs both existential philosophy and the concurrent proliferation of 
subversive modernist poetics in the 19th and early 20th Centuries, from Baudelaire and Lautréamont to 
Fondane and many of his contemporaries. 
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of existence and divinity: Edmond Jabès. For now (Riding) Jackson has provided a 
foil to elucidate the linguistic failure and poetic revolt of Fondane’s break with and 







Pas chez lui sur cette terre: Disconsolation in L’Exode 
 
L’Exode is an exemplary text for reading the ‘mood’ of disconsolation discussed in 
the thesis introduction, because it unites worldly and metaphysical anguish in a 
context of exile. Its poetic expression alchemizes Fondane’s broader existential 
concerns into a sustained engagement with the limits of language and the desire to 
communicate. The use of different ‘characters’ across the poem mediates the 
destructive impact of catastrophe while simultaneously registering its fragmentizing 
force. In the midst of this mediated chaos, past, present and future collide with 
imagined times as the poem confronts a breakdown in meaningful narratives of 
history. L’Exode also contributes reflexively to Fondane’s interrogation of the role of 




Le jour de Colère est venu et chaque pierre est une bouche  




L’Exode develops through a plethora of voices. Polyvocality and heteroglossia allow 
Fondane to emphasize the specificity of separate instances of disconsolation while 
simultaneously extending them into a plurality. This multiplicity both connects, 
creating identifications across time and space, and fragments, performing the effects 
of catastrophe. In his ‘Afterword’, Fondane refers to it as a ‘poème dramatique à 
plusieurs voix [dramatic poem in several voices]’ (MF 207). Unlike famous polyvocal 
modernist texts such as The Waste Land, the poem gives the impression of having 
some traditional formal structure, with the titled characters (titled, but not named – 
e.g. the chorus, the narrator, a priest, a man) sometimes recurring. Yet it is not a play 
or a dramatic poem in the sense of a story with a narrator. Instead it is as if the text 
were written in the ruins of some older dramatic form: a Greek tragedy perhaps – yet 
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the irony is that the catastrophe of the work’s circumstances has arrived before its 
dramatic catastrophe and precluded it. It is written in the ruins of civilization and of 
language. 
 There are dramatic titles, including for a chorus which appears intermittently, 
but there is no clear dramatic shape – instead, a fusion of pastiched Hebraic poetry 
(which itself contains dramatic elements such as titles and was often written to be 
chanted), Greek choruses and narrators and a grab-bag of other elements are 
juxtaposed. There is also a wide-ranging heteroglossia, with a switch in registers from 
religious incantation to barrack-room slang to medieval ballad to Biblical song. It is 
also longer than Eliot’s poem, at around 60 small-poetry-book pages, adding to the 
play-like feel. However, there are many parts where the division of voices is 
disturbed and becomes ambiguous, at points even cacophonous. An ‘I’ sometimes 
intercedes in and among the dramatic forms, very much more in the style of lyric than 
soliloquy (we will come back to the status of this lyric voice in the next chapter). 
Moreover, in the middle of the work is an ‘Intermède’ with 18 individually numbered 
poems which slip between an ‘I’, a ‘we’ and passive narration. This section dislocates 
the structure, multifarious as it is, of the rest of the work and its Biblical themes, with 
a direct treatment of the experience of the 1940 German invasion of France.  
 The voices of L’Exode make assertions that are then subverted by other voices 
which cut across them. Despite the instability of the demarcation and status of 
different voices in the poem, the unusual, ‘ruined’ dramatic structure distinguishes it 
from the ebb and flow of voices in Eliot, Joyce or Woolf, for example, or from the 
splintered voices which make up the self in the work of Mina Loy or Dorothy 
Richardson. In its author’s own words, 
 
C’est un poème dramatique à plusieurs voix. Cela explique l’emploi, ici et 
là, de formes et d’intentions tenues pour périmées en poétique – sonnets, 
ballades, odes, pastiches, voire de formes remontant à certains psaumes 
davidiens (alphabet sacré). La poésie dramatique exige des caractères, elle se 
doit de revêtir chaque personnage de l’expression où, le mieux, éclate sa 
manière d’être. Les formes fixes, par opposition aux formes libres, instituent 
un dialogue où celui qui parle décline son identité tout de suite. 
 
[It is a dramatic poem in several voices. This explains the use, here and 
there, of forms and intentions considered outdated within poetics – sonnets, 




(the sacred alphabet). Dramatic poetry requires characters, its duty is to dress 
up each one in the form of expression which best causes its essence to shine 
forth. Fixed forms, as opposed to free forms, establish a dialogue wherein 
the one who speaks immediately discloses their identity.] (MF 207)  
 
The voices speak of connected narratives (or at least connected themes), but the fact 
they mostly do not actually interpellate each other means the narrative does not fully 
cohere. There is irony in his assertion that forms establish a speaker’s identity. In 
L’Exode the forms vary even within the speech of a particular speaker, as though 
identity were unstable. Many of these identities are vague: ‘a man’ (MF 171) , ‘the 
voice in the desert’ (MF 202), or simply without name (e.g. the sonnet at MF 165). 
The bureaucratic formulation of ‘décliner son identité’ recalls the too-present regime 
of document checks Fondane was living under. The poem’s discernible but marred, 
incomplete identities indicate an indeterminability both ruined and containing a 
vitality beyond bureaucratic categories. The Babylonian guards can name their 
captives (‘Chante. Juif!’, MF 190), but they cannot define them. 
 For Fondane the ruins of civilization (both figurative, in terms of cultural 
breakdown, and literal, in terms of the chaos of war) expose an essential existential 
disorientation and ‘adriftness’. The lyric voice, the voices of the chorus and those of 
the Hebrew letters, which speak in two sections which bookend the work, all ask 
anguished questions in search of meaning and purpose. The context and expression of 
these questions vary from immediate personal concerns to mystical interrogations of 
abstract spirituality. Thus the spread of voices manifests a kind of universality (or at 
least plurality) of disconsolation, underlining the lack of refuge anywhere (see 
Salazar-Ferrer 2005, 55). ‘Qui veut monter dans les ténèbres? [Who wants to climb 
among the shadows?]’ the Aleph asks itself at the beginning of the poem, before the 
Beth utters ‘Je cherche en un moi qui coule… le dieu qui ne coule pas [I seek within 
an I that flows… the god that flows not]’ (MF 154, CO 145). The letters, talking 
across one another, attest to a fluidity that allows no rest, even in language, the literal 
Alpha of thought. In giving them voice, Fondane both centres and destabilizes the 
very foundations of language.  
 This crosstalk of the literal characters of the alphabet is paralleled by the 
clashing of more embodied voices, which manifest in the Biblical exiles who 
compose the Chorus and their guards, as well as Fondane-the author-the narrator in 
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the Interlude section. The sotto voce musings of the speakers by the fire (if they even 
speak aloud) are juxtaposed with the drunken singing of the guards; which is 
followed by a four-line ‘Envoi’;1 then a miniature version of the Song of Songs, 
beautiful in its simplicity, which trembles around the campfire (sung by a nameless 
exile, a dead ancestor, a spirit?); this is interrupted by the half-hearing guards who 
demand a song of their captives, which turns its address to the guards towards God in 
his absence (‘Rompez nos chaînes… Celles qui nous lient | à cette terre’ [Break our 
chains… These, that tie us | to this earth]’); which is interrupted once more: ‘C’est 
alors que les gardes crachèrent sur notre voix [At this the guards spat at our voices]’ 
(MF 192), and so on. The voices subvert and redirect each other, speaking around the 
same subject of God’s abandonment of humanity without agreeing or even 
establishing truly reciprocal dialogue.   
 The heteroglossic deployment of different forms reinforces the semiotic 
instability. The voice lamenting the lack of peace (MF 186–187) is written in the 
first-person plural prose-poetry of the Choruses, though it is given no such title, 
pulling us back into Babylon in medias res. The drinking song is overtly Villonesque 
verse, a sonnet if we take each line for a hemistych, though its syllables drunkenly 
overstep the alexandrine, and manages to combine pathos and bathos in pastiche lines 
like ‘sous quelles neiges sont les ans? [what snows have covered up the years?]’ (MF 
187), which reminds us that loneliness and angst may be found even in the tavern and 
yet seems maudlin given the plight of their captives.   
The guards overlay lewd archaicisms with the slang of 20th-century soldiers 
(another reconfiguring of voice which adds to the palimpsestic effect for the reader): 
‘Où sont les bistrots, les casse-croûte | où les vieux boxons d’antan [Where are the 
pubs, the fish and chips, | the knocking-shops of yesteryear]’ (MF 187). The guards of 
Babylon use not only modern French – ‘bistrots’ – but the earlier ‘boxon’ (‘fish and 
chips’ is an attempt to render ‘casse-croûte’ into an appropriate English register). 
Bathos is added to the irony already present in Villon’s Ballade des dames du temps 
jadis. Two expressions of disconsolation are thus expressed side by side, and the 
contrast is increased by the differences in register. 
 
1 This ‘Envoi’ is another instance of formal indeterminability – does it round off the Interlude, which 
seemed to already be over? It seems addressed to the ‘audience’, though it is not given the title of 




 Around the middle of L’Exode, the eighteenth section of the Interlude is 
followed by one of the typographic black diamonds which have been used as section 
breaks earlier in the work. The new line falls with exquisite ambiguity: ‘La nuit 
descend comme autrefois [night falls as it used to do]’ (MF 186). Who speaks? The 
description of the scene suggests an omniscient third-person narration. Is this night 
the night of France falling upon refugees on the road? Or are we back with the 
Babylonian exiles, or somewhere else entirely? Time telescopes – whose ‘autrefois’ 
(which means ‘once’, or ‘in days gone by,’or ‘once upon a time’)? Six lines later, we 
meet a first person plural pronoun. Who is being addressed? The reader? The 
unnamed community of the ‘nous’? Then a ‘Gardes!’ breaks out of an ellipsis and 
collapses us back into the Hebrew exile. The guards are addressed, yet the address is 
ambiguous, the speaker(s)’ attention wandering as if in a dream. This is the wish of 
what the Jews do not dare to demand, that the guards cease their drunken carousing to 
give reign to the contemplative space of night: 
 
Cessez vos clameurs insolentes 
qui éloignent la mort comme le feu  
les loups, 
les chansons où le désir  
grince des dents 
où la soif se réveille plus grande  
que la faim 
où l’homme se retourne contre lui- 
même et crie 
… où la nuit s’émiette comme ces  
pains rassis 
que l’on donne à manger aux  
colombes sacrées. 
 
Stop your insolent clamouring 
that keeps death at bay as the fire  
does the wolves, 
those songs where desire grinds  
its teeth 
where thirst wakes up greater  
than hunger  
where man turns against himself  
and cries out 
… where night crumbles like the  
stale bread 




The speaker’s resistance to the songs of their persecutors actually makes evident the 
vitality of those songs, and by way of that vitality maps all human songs (‘il n’est de 
chanson que l’humaine’; MF 188), despite their differences in tone, aesthetic, 
sincerity and dignity, upon the place of anguished thirst the drinking songs betray. 
Night fragments through the fragmentation of voices. 
 The boundaries between each narrating voice and knowledge of who is 
speaking are not completely clear. The peace, even salvation, the Jews long for is not 
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to be found in their songs either, despite the beauty and pathos of the version of the 
Song of Solomon which the reader is privileged to encounter among the sleepless 
prisoners, on the following page. Thirst, desire and ‘crying out’ – that is to say, 
making a sound against silence with no assurance of being heard or understood – are 
conditions of speaking, whether the speaker focuses on mundane or on spiritual 
concerns. These lines speak, directly in their words and indirectly by way of their 
placement in the work, to its shifting voices and the shifting status of its voices. They 
are even a dramatization of silence: these lines, ostensibly addressed to the guards, 
must be read as sotto voce. They are heard only by their own speaker, the reader and 
the night.  
Single and Multiple voices 
 
While Fondane’s other poems also engage with myth and Jewish culture (‘Juif, 
naturellement, tu étais juif, Ulysse [a Jew, naturally you were a Jew, Ulysses]’ MF 
20; Fondane 2017, 11), it is the use of characters in L’Exode that allows him to fully 
deploy that potential, even when the ‘character’ is a voice in the night. The variation 
of both form and register makes the entrance of the Song of Songs especially 
powerful. His version of the Biblical song is made fresh in the simple, everyday 
language of its ‘translation’ (‘je suis ici, je suis partout’, calls the voice of the 
Beloved, ‘comme duvet de pissenlit [I am here, I am everywhere | like dandelion 
seeds]’ MF 189) yet carries a timelessness in its music, which Fondane accentuates 
formally with varied end rhymes and with refrains (‘ouvre-moi | (que mon coeur, que 
mon coeur a de joie) [open to me | (my heart, my heart sings joyfully)]’ [MF 189]).  
 In some interpretations, the Song of Songs is an emblematic poem of 
disconsolation, articulating the ‘agonies of separation’ (Kehoe 1952, 339) 
experienced not only by a woman for a man she loves but by the people of Israel for 
God, whose renewed covenant is looked to in the song’s nuptial consummation – an 
ending which fails to appear in L’Exode.2 Through its admixture of beauty and 
tragedy, the sacred and the despoiled and absence and presence, which extend beyond 
 
2 Scriptual status aside, the Song of Songs, like L’Exode, also occupies a liminal formal status between 
poetry and drama, as Keith Bosley points out in a succinct survey of its interpretative history, from 
Jewish and Christian allegory for the relationship between the people and God or between Christ and 




the narrator as lover or seeker of God to a condition of loss and searching which 
parallels the experience of living through any catastrophe. The search for 
metaphysical solace is fused with worldly affect through the motif of the heart (‘que 
mon coeur, que mon coeur a de peine [my heart, my heart is in pain]’ MF 189). Here, 
too, contrasting voices interweave and miss each other, and the Beloved’s 
disembodied call adds all the more anguish to the material condition of the searcher. 
Her lines ‘Les gardes de nuit m’ont trouvée | (que ma chair, que ma chair est blessée) 
[The city watchmen found me |(my flesh, how my flesh is wounded)]’ MF (189) once 
more entangle different dimensions of disconsolation, not only touching back to the 
mythologised Jewish captives in Babylon but also to those bodies who were similarly 
suffering in the 1940s.  
 Despite the weight of his own persecution pressing on the poem, Fondane’s use 
of ‘characters’ spreads the load, preventing his own voice from being crushed by the 
story it must attempt to tell. These lines ‘spoken’ by the Qoph may be read as the 




Écoute mon cri dans la nuit 
et ouvre ton oreille avare. 
Ce cri redresse et multiplie, 
il sollicite et prophétise, 
il crée d’énormes figures, 
il sème une neuve Justice, 
un monde plein qui tournera 
autour du cri d’un homme seul!  
 
QOPH 
Hear my cry in the night 
and open your miserly ear. 
This cry makes straight and spreads, 
it appeals and prophesies, 
it creates enormous forms, 
it sows a new Justice, 
a full world that will turn 
on the cry of a solitary man! 
 
(MF 162; CO 163) 
 
 
The cry that expresses a desire for consolation with little hope of an answer 
‘multiplie’ despite being that of ‘a solitary man’. A multiplication that refers to the 
anguish of every human being as well as the different mouths Fondane shapes in 
L’Exode. Here he describes the power and ambition of this work, both aesthetic – 
‘enormous forms’ – and ethical – ‘a new Justice’ – but all is undercut by irony: 
singing the fullness of a world does not overcome solitude. Despite the superficial 
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swagger of these lines, in the context of the poem’s other voices this solitude 
becomes not the triumph of the übermensch, but rather that of an author marshalling 
their imaginative powers with tragic irony. 
 From such a position, there is a contradiction: the poem enacts a virtuosity and 
plenitude of voice and expression, yet mastery over the magic of words must be felt 
an illusion.3 Despite his use of fixed forms and characters, line patterns (such as the 
quatrains of the alphabet sequences) break their bounds, rhyme schemes break down, 
voices blur and confuse their identities. Multiplicity of voice reproduces the 
shattering effects of catastrophe and individual voices lose their integrity and 
confidence (‘ai-je une voix dans la gorge? [Have I a voice in my throat?]’, the 
desolate Chorus asks itself [MF 190]). The plethora of ‘vocal’ forms suggests an 
exploration of possible satisfactory means of expression and the result that none of 
them are. No part can effectively assert an authority or impression of correct 
direction. 
 L’Exode confronts the problem that speaking may also be a form of silencing, 
and resists the masking of absence. Perhaps the most important voices in the poem 
are the ones that cannot be heard at all. In mobilising dramatic voices, Fondane 
‘refuses his identity’, but in the disunity of the text he also refuses to fill the space left 
by the silence of those who cannot speak, the excluded and the dead. From the silence 
of God made manifest by the ruin of the temple (MF 192–197), to the compassionate 
address to the horse that ‘cannot speak’ but dances around its thirst (MF 185), to the 
empty homes of the shtetls mourned by the Chorus (‘comment voulez-vous que 
chante une maison sans lampe? [how can you expect a house to sing without a 
lamp?]’ MF 191) speechlessness is everywhere honoured and lamented. 
 Through the text’s many voices, unspeakability and unsayability are 
intermingled, as the mood of disconsolation unfolds through both the impossibility of 
truly turning away from suffering and of metaphysically transcending it. The voice of 
 
3 In the Faux traité d’esthétique Fondane addresses a predicted critique of his irrational poetics: ‘Le 
mieux que vous obtiendriez ce serait un état de conflit, de tension, qui romprait l’harmonie, l’unité si 
laborieusement conquises par la connaissance. – Eh bien! Ce ne serait déjà pas mal que ça, pour 
commencer… Le conflit, la tension, voilà qui serait plus vrai que la fausse unité, que la fausse paix, de 
la connaissance!’  
[The best you would achieve would be a state of conflict, of tension, that would break apart the 
harmony and unity so painstakingly won by knowledge. – Well! That wouldn’t be such a bad start… 




the Sadhe condenses many of the traditions and concerns that animate the text’s 
disconsolate mood: via negativa mysticism; a spiritual horizon of absence; the 
finitude of language; and the urge to listen for, and impossibility of speaking on 
behalf of, the voiceless: ‘Je vois une chose sans vue | dans la ténèbre où je remue | ma 
langue ne peut pas la parler | mon oreille ne peut la taire [I see something without 
sight | in the shadows where I flit | my tongue cannot speak it | my ear cannot make it 
quiet]’ (MF 157) L’Exode’s polyvocality suggests disconsolation through a 
subversion of consensus. However, at the same time, it prevents the reduction of 




The dimensions of disconsolation are extended throughout the planes of the poem, as 
Fondane assembles voices which push back against the limitations of their 
circumstances. They form a plurality, sharing this mood despite their differences and 
contradictions, saturating the text with interrelated meaning yet resisting a synthesis 
which would make such meaning final and complete. Whether in the quiet song of 
Solomon’s lover or railing (in what may be the authorial voice, or a ‘stage’ version of 
it) at the ruins of France, injustice and suffering are figured as senseless, as the ears of 
the speakers listen out for the answer which would explain them, and which never 
comes. Section XIII of the Interlude declaims the totality of the catastrophe of the 
German invasion with ‘burning actuality’(Salazar-Ferrer 2005, 58, my translation). 
Biblical catastrophe is invoked, but is immediately (and characteristically) subverted 
by another voice: 
 
La trompette du Jugement,  
dans cette vaste journée 
de juin. — Oui, j’y étais,  
mais je ne l’ai pas entendue 
— Sourd!  
 
The trumpet of Judgement, on that  
vast day 
in June. – Yes, I was there, but I  





In this section, the beauty of a June day is contrasted with the devastation of war. The 
accusing response to ‘je ne l’ai pas entendue’ offers two readings. In one sense, it 
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interrogates all who were not caught up in events and how much attention they chose 
to pay (and also the reader who comes after, as the reality of the events is flattened 
into history). In another, its portent is more metaphysical – ‘j’y étais’, but ‘I’ heard no 
divine message.   
 The allusions to divine time reinforce the sense that the experiences of 
catastrophe exceed attempts to contain them (see Salazar-Ferrer 2017a, 64). The 
disaster is apocalyptic, but no revelation is forthcoming, and focusing on the search 
for it risks neglecting  
 
le torrent de faim, de soif et  
de désordre 
— pendant que la Stupeur  
nue, écarlate et chauve 
mangeait les excréments des  
morts 
 
the torrent of hunger, thirst and  
disorder 
– while naked Stupor, scarlet and  
bald, 




Telling the reader of the ‘gros nuages rouges [fat red clouds]’ which run across the 
‘oeil épouvanté des routes [the horrified eye of the roads]’ (MF 184, an image which 
recalls the intimate, creepy shock of the eyesplitting in Un Chien Andalou) the 
narration implies that, as for Milton’s Satan or Dostoevsky’s underground man, the 
revelation of such waste is so horrific that it would demand rebellion were it part of 
God’s very plan. As for human teleologies, despite their implicit claims of ‘ending 
history’, the implication is that neither the ‘defence of democracy’ nor the 
establishment of the Third Reich could rescue the dead. 
 L’Exode pulls together human times to a pitch and degree that is near-cosmic, 
activating the deep time of the dead, the transversality of mythic time, the porousness 
of the present and the latency of the future. The marking of time is an inescapable 
aspect of exile: from the originary exile which so occupied Shestov, the fall from a 
timeless Eden into the knowledge of death and hence of aging to the qualification of 
the present by the time spent far from home, to the dead time of being without a 
place, of hiding and of bureaucracy, of restless stasis. After the first ‘alphabet’ 
section, Fondane/the Hebrews address the rivers they come to, and describe the seas 
as being, like themselves, ‘immobiles, à force de toujours être en marche [still, 




these aspects. The rivers were still watering the ‘paradis terrestre’ on the evening that 
‘nous avons mangé du fruit amer de l’arbre | de mort [we ate the bitter fruit of the tree 
| of death]’ (MF 164). Time seems to have stopped in the endless wandering and 
waiting of exile, yet the ‘before’ time is ever present in the mind: 
 
Avant d’être damnés  
d’être à jamais la route 
cassiez-vous votre croûte 
au bord des années?  
 
Before you were damned 
to be always on the road, 
did you break stale bread 





The rivers are reminders of the constant passage of time, though their presence is also 
dependable: ‘que de fois nous nous sommes jetés dans votre nasse | pour éviter la 
route [How many times did we throw ourselves into your creels | to avoid the road]’ 
(MF 165). Though the road is a means of escape, it is also relentless and offers no 
refuge; its time is ‘infinie [infinite]’ (MF 165). 
 The combination of different dramatic voices with a crossing and melding of 
narrative boundaries allows for a transparency of perspectives which associates 
different temporal conditions to a commonality, while allowing them to retain their 
specific character and pathos. The flow of the rivers parallels the fluidity of voice. 
The section where the Chorus is speaking to them exemplifies the palimpsestic 
effects in the text. Ostensibly addressing the rivers, the voice also seems to speak 
back to the ancestors whose experience, despite their physical absence, is folded in 
time alongside that of 1940s refugees: ‘Chantiez-vous de la harpe | en sanglotant – 
Abba! [Did you sing with the harp | sobbing ‘Abba!’]’ (MF 164). It speaks, moreover, 
more broadly, including all of humanity, not only in the condition of the Fall, but by 
identifying the rivers with their mortal plight: ‘vous étiez comme nous prisonniers de 
la terre [like us you were prisoners of earth]’ (MF 165). This epithet defines the 
stories of the Biblical Jews and of people scattered by the Second World War, but 
also extends out to the universal imprisonment of worldly contingency.   
 Thus, in the same section, the expansive, overarching time of metaphysical 
exile merges with the mythical time of Biblical exile, which in turn flows into and 
colours the continuing upheaval and burden of displacement in the present. The 
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generosity of this poetic overlayering and co-identification of oppressions and loss is 
further developed by the appearance of the time of African-American slavery. The 
emphasis on powerful actual examples of exile and enslavement prevents the 
symbolism from being compartmentalized to a singular cultural reading. How far it 
is, declaims the voice ‘jusqu’au Mississipi | qui nous a vus gagner le pain | à la sueur 
de notre front! [to the Mississippi | which saw us earn our bread | by the sweat of our 
brow!]’ (MF 164).  
 The appearance of the Mississippi links the rivers of Babylon to the American 
South, foreshadowing the Interlude’s description of the French rivers passed by those 
fleeing the German advance.4 The sudden shift from ‘je’ to ‘nous’ makes this more 
than a simple juxtaposition. Once again, there is merging of voices which confuses 
identity and ties together experience. The time of memory is re-folded like a puzzle 
box. The black slaves remember the myth as if they lived it:  
 
Et ces chansons de nègres! 
le soir, avec des paniers de coton 
sur la tête 
les ai-je assez entendues 
sur tes eaux vastes, boueuses 
qui nous faisaient souvenir  
bêtement 
du Nil, où des ibis 
sacrés nous regardaient pleurer au  
crépuscule! 
 
And those Negro spirituals! 
In the evening, with baskets of  
cotton 
on their heads 
I heard them often enough 
across your wide, muddy waters 
which reminded us – fools that  
we were – 
of the Nile, where sacred  




The poet hears all these voices and reorchestrates them in a modernist composition 
whose shifts, gaps and dissonances formally perform the themes of lament. 
 The Nile is also where God once was, ‘errant comme une vieille chanson | de 
nègres, sur les routes [wandering like an old song | the Negroes sang, on the roads]’ 
(MF 164). God too has gone wandering, and without a theologically-prescribed 
framework of time to rely on, people move to other rhythms, be they those of the 
eruptions of disaster or their own attempts to find a common movement, exemplified 
 
4 There would be ample scope for comparison between Fondane’s poetic engagement with rivers and 




in song. Music can be considered a manifestation of time, and as such had a 
fundamental importance to Fondane. His lost film Tararira took music as its central 
concern, influenced in part by Ravel, notably the Bolero (EM, introduction xv), as 
well as Jewish song. Bolero parallels L’Exode in using older forms in a modern 
idiom, and in its repetitions prefigures minimalism (Iliescu 1998, 192), music which 
is more inhabited as a condition than followed as a narrative. Such repetition also 
speaks to the time of mechanization and the standardized clock in its rhythms, as 
Fondane’s Dada contemporaries were exploring in films and performances in Paris.5 
As in Modern Times, the masterpiece of Chaplin, whom Fondane regarded as a great 
artist (Fondane 2007, 88), individual human experience reacts to each repetition with 
its own subjectivity, whether that of the musician or the mourner. Life may be 
trammelled by circumstances beyond the individual or community’s control, but their 
reaction is their own. 
 The rhythms of L’Exode play with different experiences of time. The 
polymorphous quatrains of the first alphabet section speak from the void, declaiming 
with anaphore (e.g. Nun, Pe, Shin) or condensing into Cabbalistic riddle of a mere ten 
words (Qoph). Together, they create a feeling of abstraction, a context of Beckettian 
sparseness, exposing disconsolation at the very root of thought; that is to say, the 
need for language being intrinsically catastrophic: ‘Faudra-t-il la chute des mondes | 
pour que jaillisse une parole? [‘Do worlds need to fall | for a word to spring forth?] 
(MF Samech 156, CO Samekh 148). Like the shadows they address, these voices 
only hint obliquely at the passage of time, speaking in generalisations (pierre, figures, 
Esprit, Justice…).6  
 If the Hebrew alphabet is intimately bound up with a relationship to God, 
Fondane’s version of it is fragmented and crying out in His absence. The irresistible 
force of disaster resonates in these shadows, its wave constantly about to break upon 
the future. Fondane’s vision complements Walter Benjamin’s angel of history, who 
 
5 Such as Entr’acte with Satie’s repetitive score, or George Antheil’s Ballet mécanique (both 1924).  
6 Louis-Thomas Leguerrier, reading Adorno reading Beckett, explores a similar nexus of the existential 
and the linguistic: ‘According to Adorno, the catastrophe operating in Beckett in terms of language is a 
response to the historical catastrophe of the Second World War and the way in which it broke the 
continuity between human suffering and the possibility to articulate it with language […] while Sartre 
responds to the catastrophe of the Second World War with committed literature, Adorno, from his 




sees ‘one single catastrophe’ instead of a ‘chain of events’, ‘piling wreckage upon 
wreckage’. He too sees, under the narrative of mechanized progress – Benjamin’s 
‘storm’ pushing ‘irresistibly into the future’ (Benjamin 2003a, 392) –  a piling-up of 
foresaken human lives:  
 
TSADE 
Marché aux puces du Futur! 
Les mêmes usines de viande 
pour le séisme et les massacres –  
encore un transport de mannequins 
pour l’accident perfectionné! 
 
SADHE 
Flea market of the Future! 
The same meat factories 
for earthquake and massacres –  
another cargo of mannequins 
perfected for calamity! 
 
(MF 162, CO 161) 
 
The temporality of this verse gathers horror into repetition, at once banal and terrible. 
The lack of narrative coherence among the voices of the letters contributes to the 
unease created by the collage of images, leading to a sense of paralysis and nervous 
expectation. Towards the end of the section, the unbearable weight of suffering 
promises to break through:  
 
RESCH 
Les temps sont venus, je l’annonce, 
des fusillades, des émeutes, 
nous organiserons 
le gaz, la pierre et le métal 
 
RESH 
The times are at hand, I proclaim, 
of shootings, of riots; 
we will organize 
gas, stone and metal 
 
(MF 162, CO 163) 
 
As the war machine bore down on Europe, pogroms and the First World War were in 
Fondane’s living memory. 
 The ‘disembodied’ alphabet section is succeeded by the coalescence of mythic 
and metaphysical exile upon the rivers of Babylon, introduced by the rhythm of the 
psalm’s refrain. The poem’s first embodied voices (other than that of the Préface) 
speak together to the surface of the water: 
 
fleuves qui charriaient nos âges, nos  
    visages 
rivers that carried our ages, our faces 




il s’en allaient comblés de chants et  
  de chalands 
avec leurs marins périssables 
à travers les chimies du monde. 
 
                         barges 
with their perishable sailors 
through the chemistries of the world. 
(MF 163) 
 
Lifetime and identity float into the water, to be heard only as snatches of song by 
those downstream. This mythic quality is carried over the next twelve pages, as the 
named voices of the Chorus, ‘the Narrator’, a ‘man,’ a ‘second’ and a ‘third’ speak of 
their exile, intermixed with the ‘Voice of the Spirit’ and untitled verses which seem 
to be metaphysical asides. In fact, this entire section has a certain dreamlike quality, 
full of introspective questioning and metaphysical incertitude. Only the Chorus and, 
in particular, the guards, speak more directly and concretely. The most metaphysical 
passages are written in sonnet form, whereas the Chorus recalls song and the guards 
harangue repetitively.  
 The collective effect of meandering uncertainty fits the endlessness of the 
rivers and of wandering. It also means that the interruption of the Interlude, with its 
Colère de la vision [Visionary Anger] (MF 176, CO 166) bursts through with 
startling immediacy: ‘Et brusquement je fus jeté dans la campagne de France’ [And I 
was abruptly thrown into the countryside of France]. It is as though, however fitting 
Fondane found his theological and mythic figures of disconsolation for the attempt to 
get under the skin of ennui and anomie, it took the arrival of catastrophe in its most 
immediate form to truly animate the destabilizing and decentering effects of 
modernity. As the First World War had shattered the dreams of Humanist progress 
and aesthetic solace, the breaking wave of the Second invaded the poet’s reflective 
distance:  
 
si les cris des humains tombent comme 
châtaignes 
à terre, au gré du vent, 
sans altérer la paix des anges 
 qu’est-ce que donc que l’Exode? 
 
if human cries fall to the ground 
like chestnuts, as the wind wills 
without disturbing the peace of Angels, 
what then is Exodus? 
 
(MF 176, CO 166) 
 
 
The Interlude moves us into real time, as it were. The language is pacy and direct, 
spoken with a lyric I/eye which roves over the flashes of landscape seen on the run, 
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finding that even geography can no longer be relied upon (‘La Meuse nous a fuis, la 
gueuse, | et la Somme s’est fait enlever [The Meuse gave us the slip, the bitch | and 
the Somme’s been carried off]’ MF 177, CO 169); over the fellow refugees, united in 
their persecution and perilous future (‘Je vous ai tous comptés[…] devenus français, 
selon la mort [I have counted you all[…] become French, by right of death]’ MF 178, 
CO 171); over the night sky which countless exiles have looked up to in the past 
without answer (‘encore un siècle sans sommeil [another century without sleep] (MF 
179, CO 173). The Biblical images are given new resonance as the experience of 
dispossession is literally relived (‘ô Siloé! | O Seine! [O Siloam! O Seine!]’ MF 
179,CO 173).  
 The time of catastrophe thus draws in other times, both experienced and 
imagined, into its chaos. This flood of temporality, full of the flotsam of broken 
stories, overwhelms attempts to restitute an intellectual tranquillity which could 
reckon with it. The closest L’Exode comes to a net which can draw together its 
disparate elements of disconsolation, of past, present and future denied sight of refuge 
or resolution, is in the extension of Jewish exile to embrace all humanity. Fondane 
had already used the figure of the Wandering Jew as an emblem of the individual 
adrift in the alienation of modernity, their voice lost in the crowd. In Titanic he 
writes:  
  
La mort saisit le vif  
 
en marche, juif errant, changeant de  
pose, 
tournant autour de quelque chose qui  
tourne à son tour autour de quelque  
chose… 
 
Death caught life 
 
on the hop, wandering Jew,  
changing pose 
turning around something that 





This sense of movement is reprised in Ulysse, where, as in Joyce’s work, the 
everyman of modernity is ‘naturellement’ Jewish and everywhere out of place (MF 
20; Fondane 2017, 11). The Wandering Jew’s origins are essentially anti-Semitic; the 
mythical figure is cursed by Christ to wander the ‘infinite’ road (MF 165). The story 




twentieth centuries, when it informed the coalescing of the ‘Jewish Question’, 
including the Nazi framing of it. Fondane consciously appropriates the trope, 
inverting its anti-Semitic significations to stand as an image of literal and 
metaphysical exile accessible to all. 7 At the same time, the particularities of Jewish 
persecution are kept resonant in the trope. 
 Fondane’s use of Jewish tropes is not what could be called a religious 
programme, but neither is it incidental. The Biblical Exodus is surely one of the 
world’s most sustained scriptural engagements with exile, not ony physical, but also 
from God, in its treatment of the breaking of the covenant.8 Fondane’s work 
mobilizes this relationality to associate the time of modernity with a deeper 
catastrophic time in which a fundamental breakdown between human experience and 
mortality, on the one hand, and the possibility of future consolation, on the other, is 
revealed. God’s absence becomes an absence of meaning. The only response is an 
absurd cry to the space left behind (‘aie pitié, aie pitié de la terre de France! [Have 
pity, have pity on the land of France!]’ MF 180). Here is the desperate relevance of 
the Jews who turn back to seek God only when all their plans have collapsed around 
them: ‘ici, sur la route, dans le désastre et dans | le chaos, il n’est pas d’autre Dieu 
[here, on the road, in disaster and in |chaos, there is no other God]’ (MF 180). The 
subjunctive mood of ‘aie pitié’ typifies its use throughout the text, particularly in 
prayer and implication. The uncertainty of the grammatical mood matches the uneasy 
poetic mood of disconsolation. 
  The Jewish ‘model’ of exile is grafted into the French experience of 1940. The 
French identity granted to all fleeing the Nazis, whether ‘du Congo, du bled algérien, 
d’Annam […] des Tchèques, et des Polonais, des Slovaques [from Congo, from 
deepest Algeria, from Annam (…) Czechs, and Poles, and Slovaks]’ (MF 178) is 
raised to aspirations of universality by dint of the historical struggle to transcend 
human divisions (‘fils de la barricade et de la guillotine [sons of the barricade and of 
the guillotine]’ MF 178), but the true anguish of the catastrophic subject is reached 
 
7 There are other precedents: the painter Samuel Hirszenberg, for example, had exhibited a painting of 
the Wandering (or ‘Eternal’) Jew as a victim of the pogroms at the 1900 Paris Salon. When signing the 
poems published by Resistance magazines, Fondane used the pseudonym Isaac Laquedem (Salazar-
Ferrer 2007, 127), a French name for the Wandering Jew which had previously featured in literary 
works by, for example, Alexandre Dumas (Isaac Laquedem) and Guillaume Apollinaire (Le Passant 
de Prague). 
8 Chapter 9 will pick up this theme in relation to Jabès. 
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only through an engagement with Jewish tradition which both reveals the Jews as the 
wretched of the wretched and generously offers the Jewish experience as a means to 
confront the time of catastrophe: ‘Que de Juifs sur cette terre, Seigneur! [how many 
Jews there are on this earth, Lord!]’ (MF 180).  
Fondane’s engagement with historical events critically deploys the tropes of a 
Jewish messianism in which hope exists only beyond human comprehension. His 
work has some close affinities with the philosophical projects of Walter Benjamin, as 
Margaret Teboul has shown (2011). It is crucial to state that for both writers it was a 
case of ‘free appropriation’ (Teboul 2011) rather than ‘applying’ a theology. Such a 
framework afforded new perspectives for thinking catastrophe. As Teboul puts it, 
 
Benjamin came to think progress as a catastrophe, while Fondane, following 
Leon Shestov, restored full intensity to the struggle against the evidence of 
reason by introducing a confrontation with history. Their deconstruction of 
historical time sought to integrate the ‘state of exception’, which is to say the 
catastrophe. (Teboul 2011, my translation) 
 
L’Exode resists an Enlightenment teleology of progress, much like Benjamin’s 
‘historico-poetic’ (Hayes, 2018) Theses on the Philosophy of History. In its conflation 
of mythic and actual time, it performs this resistance affectively, as an alternative to 
the projects of Fondane’s critical prose, which bow to the imperative to attempt to 
stand outside of history in order to assess it.9 Through the very particularities of its 
voices, interwoven across time, it offers to the future the latency of exceptional 
catastrophic time, not simply as aesthetic object but as active questions to the reader, 
subverting the distance between audience and speaker, between the ennui and 
paralysis of living in a catastrophic world and the terror of actually being caught 
under the breaking wave. L’Exode saw Fondane not simply argue against the 
dominance of ‘reason’, but intervene to force the time of anguish into the present.  
 
 
9 In his dark and challenging essay, L’Homme devant l’histoire [Man Faced with History], written in 
the depths of 1939 and still discomfiting today, Fondane wrote ‘Sans doute, tout comme vous, mon 
cher lecteur, je m’accroche déespérément à l’intellgibilité de l’histoire; tout comme vous, j’espère, 
alors même que je doute; tout comme vous, je songe aux réformes utiles, aux grands moyens à 
employer [Admittedly, just like you, dear reader, I cling hopelessly to the intelligibility of History; just 
like you, I hope, even though I have my doubts; just like you, I dream of useful reforms, of great 








car l’homme n’est pas chez lui sur  
                                        cette terre 
étranger où qu’il aille 
 
for man is not at home on this earth 
a stranger wherever he goes 
 
(MF 170)  
 
 
The role of myth and imagination, though broken open and reconfigured in 
Fondane’s modernist deployments, is key to approaching L’Exode and its 
disconsolations. Though he had abandoned Symbolist confidence in the power of 
artistic symbols to convey immaterial truths, Fondane still sought ways to approach 
the unspeakable. The time of catastrophe is perforated with absences. The Alpha of 
upheaval and violence is concurrent with the Omega of stillness and muteness. In the 
last numbered section (XVIII) of the Interlude, we are met with the image of the 
alarm clock. Yet the call to awaken finds no ear: ‘Les réveille-matin ont sonné | dans 
des milliers de maisons vides [The alarm clocks have rung | in thousands of empty 
houses]’ (MF 186).10 For Fondane and for millions of displaced people in France, the 
alarm is unheard, or unheeded. Like Benjamin, Fondane in part regarded his 
philosophical writings as a wake-up call. Yet for all its prophetic force in revitalizing 
the Biblical Exodus for the 20th Century, L’Exode shows that Fondane’s concern is 
not so much preventing the catastrophe as living (and indeed dying) with it.11 No 
 
10 This instance of an alarm clock mechanically sounding in the place where human life has vanished is 
strangely reminiscent of Benjamin’s discussion of surrealism, where he describes the exchange of ‘the 
play of human features’ for ‘the face of an alarm clock’ which rings incessantly (Benjamin 2005, 218).  
Michael Löwy argues that ‘we cannot reduce the position of the Passagenwerk to a static dichotomy 
between dreaming and wakefulness: Benjamin’s ambition – like that of Baudelaire and Andre Breton – 
is to create a new world in which action will finally become dreaming’s sister’ (Löwy 1996, 22). 
Although Fondane is contrasting progress with loss where Benjamin is lauding surrealism’s annoucing 
of revolutionary possibility, he is also concerned with the relation between dream and action, between 
imagination and rationality. 
 
11 Much of L’Exode was composed, according to its author, in 1934, when he was clearly aware of the 
threat of Fascism but could not have known how prescient he was in his visions of catastrophe, though 
his interpretation of the First World War and of modernity by way of Shestov’s subversive philosophy 
made him more clear-sighted in that regard than many. It is hard to ‘date’ Fondane’s poetry as he 
never stopped editing and rewriting it, but the Prose Preface (date 1942) and Interlude were obviously 
written after the war started. 
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rescue, no break from the nightmare of history, would repair the loss that has already 
occurred. The poem continues: 
les blés ont mûri, sauvages 
loin du regard du paysan. 
 
Personne n’est allé aux champs 
personne n’est allé à l’école 
personne n’est allé à l’église 
et la nuit est tombée brusquement. 
 
the wheat has ripened, wild 
far from the peasant’s eye. 
 
No one has gone to the fields 
no one has gone to school 
no one has gone to church 





These lines recall those sung with rich imagery by the Chorus, which also give the 
sense of lands forcibly abandoned and gone to waste, despite their bounty (‘sources 
sur les genoux [springs pouring from their knees]’, holding out harvests ‘paumes 
ouvertes [with open hands]’ MF 167). The style is much simpler here, however. The 
simplicity of this section helps it to act as a moment of breath after the rushing diction 
and chaotic images that pervade the Interlude. There is a sense of being in the eye of 
the storm, an unexpected instant of stillness that allows the dispossessed to briefly 
and inadequately take stock of the new situation through their shock. The second 
quatrain recalls a child’s rhyme, and the ‘night’ of history that has fallen plunges all 
back into a naked fear akin to a child’s fear of the dark. 
 Yet a mood of disconsolation, despite its definite notes of despair, would 
merely be dull and deadening without the notes of absurd sweetness it requires. The 
third and final quatrain of the section runs: 
 
Mais les rossignols ont chanté                       
tout de même! 
C’était une vieille romance 
du temps où le monde existait. 
 
But the nightingales have sung 
all the same! 
It was an old ballad 




Section XVIII of the Intermède condenses the blunt sense of pain, shock and 
dispossession intrinsic to disconsolation, but also the equally intrinsic pulsion of life 
that ties them together. The mood L’Exode creates is not simply tragedy in the 




ending, in a new time in which the consolations which used to work upon everyday 
fears and sufferings are revealed as insufficient, yet the experience of life remains 
acute and filled with longing. The admixture of longing, suffering and continued 
seeking exemplified in the Song of Songs section discussed earlier is found 
throughout L’Exode and its tracing ofthe faultlines of disaster by way of Jewish 
theology and of mythology. 
 There is an emphasis on the role of art in articulating the experience of disaster 
in much of Fondane’s critical prose. For Shestov, Shakespeare and Dostoevsky were 
as important for existential thought as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Fondane, 
unsurprisingly, was interested in the role of art to an even greater extent – a much 
greater extent, for where Shestov drew upon literature as fuel for his philosophy, his 
influence on Fondane led the latter to pursue philosophical engagements with art that 
not only extended Shestov’s approach within aesthetics (if that is the appropriate term 
to use, given Shestov’s existential priorities) but also to engage creatively and 
subversively as a literary essayist, in works like Faux Traité d’esthétique [Pseudo-
Treatise on Aesthetics], Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre [Baudelaire and the 
Experience of the Abyss] and Rimbaud le voyou [Rimbaud the Reprobate]. Insofar as 
the emphasis on art’s ‘tragic’ capacities can be made into an argument, it is perhaps 
put most directly in the 1939 essay L’Homme devant l’histoire: 
 
les pensées les plus audacieuses et les plus honnêtes ne se sont pas fait jour 
dans les ouvrages sérieux, mais dans les ouvrages frivoles, qui ont pour 
caractère distinctif celui de dispenser leurs auteurs d’assumer la 
responsabilité de leurs dires: ‘pourquoi vous refuserais-je la vérité, puisque 
je ne risque rien?’, semblent insinuer, de temps à autre, le romancier, le 
poète. (HDH, 442) 
 
[the most audacious and honest of thoughts do not come to light in serious 
works, but in frivolous ones, which hold the distinctive characteristic of 
dispensing with the author’s responsibility for what they are saying. “Why 
should I refuse you the truth, since I risk nothing?”, the poet or novelist 
seems to insinuate from time to time.] (Fondane 2011, 75) 
 
‘Serious’ and ‘frivolous’ can be thought of here as terms for, correspondingly, 
‘philosophical’ and ‘artistic’ works. The contradictory tensions of artistic 
responsibility will be developed in a later chapter, but for now note the similarity 
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with L’Exode’s Afterword as discussed earlier: ‘a dialogue wherein the one who 
speaks immediately refuses his identity’ (MF 207). 
 Fondane’s position on the possibilities of art point to a subversion of the 
consolations of philosophy. His work repeatedly engages with what is sometimes 
termed the ‘ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry’ (Griswold 2020).12 He 
has no intention of resolving the quarrel, and does not choose poetry ‘over’ 
philosophy; however subversive and anti-systemic his Shestovian approach, he finds 
himself a ‘prisoner of the earth’ as much as anyone, and driven to grasp at truth with 
the same tools of language and thought. What he contends is that the refusal of 
identity made possible in what might be called ‘imaginative’ writing allows the 
author to say what otherwise might be passed over as discomfiting. This does go right 
to the heart of the quarrel, or at least the parts where thinkers such as Plato or Plotinus 
argue that the representation of evil sympathetically reproduces it in reality. But the 
stakes are not simply those of art as a moral or amoral force. For Shestov and 
Fondane, art has the capacity to undermine the very processes of reasoned argument 
that bulwark confidence in human progress:  
 
Shakespeare peut bien oser, en cothurnes et sous masque, nous confesser ce 
qu’un Plotin, un Nietzsche ou un Kierkegaard, ayant eu la même pensée, 
n’eussent jamais pu avouer, le visage découvert… que ‘la vie est une histoire 
contée par un idiot, pleine de bruit et de fureur’ (HDH 442) 
 
[Shakespeare certainly dared, in buskins and through a mask, to confess to 
us what Plotinus, Nietzsche or Kierkegaard, having had the same thought, 
could never admit with their face uncovered… that ‘life is a tale told by an 
idiot, full of sound and fury’] (Fondane 2011, 75)13 
 
L’Exode, with its unanswerable questions and laments, certainly expresses the 
tragedy Fondane found himself plunged into: ‘L’Espoir est tombé en miettes, qui le 
rassasiera? [Hope has crumbled to bits; who will sate it?]’(MF 183).  
 
12 The inadequacy of this terminology is flagrant when we consider, say, Plato’s Symposium, which 
argues against rhetoric with wonderful rhetoric and even a dramatic structure (Griswold 2020). 
Fondane’s poetry and critical writing arguably direct us to the gaps in philosophy where it attempts to 
separate thought from lived experience and affect, and he makes a case for and a practice of art as 
occupying these gaps. 
13 In the full text Fondane also references William Faulkner, evidence of his engagement with 




 In L’Exode, however, Fondane articulates a broad interpenetration of existential 
philosophy and the special conditions of modernity. In her book Violence Without 
God: The Rhetorical Despair of twentieth-Century Writers, Joyce Wexler argues that 
with the ‘demise of axiomatic belief in transcendence… [t]he meaning of violence 
could no longer be grounded in a transcendent order’ (2017, 3). It must be noted that 
even before the secular age that Wexler, following Charles Taylor, identifies with 
modernity, violence and suffering had made existential doubt part of the work of 
Shakespeare or Villon, as well as of that of religious writers such as St John of the 
Cross and indeed of the Bible itself, both Old and New Testament. However, if 
modernity moves beyond these glimpses to a world where the centre no longer holds, 
where there is no ‘unifying force’ (Wexler 2017, 3), then L’Exode performs this 
existential uncertainty writ large in the chaos of modern war. Rather than soliloquized 
by a Macbeth or Lear who peel back the veil of worldly ideals and spiritual 
confidence at a moment of intensely personal crisis, L’Exode assails us with a 
plethora of voices and contexts which decentre Fondane himself from the narrative. 
There is a strange compassion in this work of association, an attempt to unite 
individual anguish through comparable experiences of suffering. For the destructive 
effect of catastrophe to be properly attested to, these cannot cohere into an answer, 
and yet in their poetic juxtaposition a kind of solidarity emerges.  
 This solidarity is, of course, disconsolate, a sharing but not a repairing. 
Fondane’s poetry also serves as a riposte to those who would seek to repair the hole 
exposed by ‘violence without God’, through Idealist philosophy or political utopias.14 
In its most hermetic, metaphysical utterances, L’Exode stages the tensions inherent in 





14 As Joseph Acquisto puts it, Fondane’s framing of catastrophe ‘has much in common with 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s dialectic of Enlightenment’ (Acquisto 2015, 70). While there will be 
insurmountable differences in their approaches, there is much scope for further research between 
Fondane and the Frankfurt school. Note the affinity in this statement from Negative Dialectics: ‘The 
need to let suffering speak is a condition of all truth’ (Adorno and Horkheimer 1966, 17–18). Fondane 
carried out his own critique of the Enlightenment directly across his philosophical prose, while the 
speech he wrote for the 1935 Antifascist writers’s congress (L’ecrivain devant la révolution) is his 
most direct address to utopianists, including the pithy line ‘Marx […] n’était pas le pape [Marx was 
not the pope]’ (EDR 112). 
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Ne puis-je obtenir une Joie 
où ne s’égoutte une rancoeur, 
et pas une seule Raison 
qui n’ait un viscère malade? 
Et ne puis-je toucher un marbre 
où ne dort une vierge défaite 
sans que la vie ne se hérisse  




Can I not obtain a Joy 
where rancour does not drip, 
and not a single Reason 
whose guts have not gone bad? 
And can I not touch a marble block 
where an unrealized virgin sleeps 
without life bristling with 
a thousand mortal disorders? 
 
(MF161–162; CO 161) 
 
 
The trio of Joy, Reason and art in this verse lay out the anguish of being a ‘prisoner 
of the earth’. There is no joy which is everlasting and transcends mortal context, no 
intellectual argument or framework which can legitimately distance itself from the 
fundamental chaos of existence, no aesthetic creation which truly represents an 
escape from its circumstances.15 As poetry, these lines allow Fondane to perform this 
very relation, a voice appearing out of nothing to pose the questions of its 
dissatisfaction before disappearing unanswered. Despite their abstraction, these are 
the words proffered by an engaged subjectivity rather than those of a detached 
philosophical argument. 
 It is important to emphasize that the lines spoken by the Ain, and many others 
in L’Exode , are also a cry against this irresolvable condition of mortality and its lack 
of answers.16 Fondane’s poetry does not condemn humanity for seeking answers. In 
the very fact and means of its expression, it resists the self-isolation of a 
Dostoevskian ‘underground man’. L’Exode’s multiple voices allow Fondane to 
dramatize anguish in its extremity while resisting an atmosphere of absolute 
bitterness. Its cries to the void (l’homme doit grimper | lentement, enfonçant ses 
 
15 The problem of the impossibility of the escape through art and the difficulties of living with this 
impossibility animates much of Fondane’s critical prose, especially his books on Rimbaud and 
Baudelaire and the Pseudo-treatise on Aesthetics. Across his essays Fondane ties together artists from 
various epochs, from medieval art’s claims to access to the divine to the surrealist’s privileged claims 
to interpreting the unconscious, as united in the denial of this problem.  
16 For example, in the questions of the Chorus as it keeps going determinedly (‘Il me faut avancer, 
marcher […] est-il encore de pays | où ne s’étale pas, moulé dans le sable | la plante de mes pieds? [I 
have to go on, to walk […]are there still countries | where there’s no trace, moulded in sand, | of my 
footprints?]’ MF 168; ‘Que me demeure-t-il a présent, si ce n’est | l’espérance? [What is left for me 
now, if not hope?] MF 170 ), in the musings of ‘a man’ (‘Angoisse, ô maman vénérable, | donne-nous 
de pouvoir brise cette vieille lumière [O Anguish, venerable mother | give us the power to break this 
old light]’ (MF 173) or in the Intermède (‘Assez crié! Assez vu! Assez de paroles mortelles! [‘Enough 




chaussures cloutées, | mordant les éboulis du vide [man must climb | slowly, pushing 
with hobnailed boots, | biting the scree of the void] MF 197) and to God (‘ce sont tes 
premiers-nés dont il t’a plu briser | contre le roc la tête tendre’ | — Jusques à quand, 
Seigneur? [these are the first-born whose tender heads it pleased you to dash | against 
the rock. | – For how long, O Lord?]’ MF 170), both in their metaphysical and 
mythopoeic masks, are juxtaposed, at certain points in the poem, with direct address 
to the other who is the reader.  
This aspect of poetry as interpellation makes the contrast with the Underground 
Man’s isolation more poignant, not least because Dostoevsky’s protagonist can also 
only define himself in relation to the other, from the ‘six-foot officer’ to his ‘old 
schoolfellow’, Simonov. When working on L’Exode in the 1940s, Fondane was 
genuinely underground, in hiding from the Nazis and their Vichy collaborators, yet 
continued to write and to publish his poetry in Resistance journals. Even in 
Auschwitz he is reported to have engaged his campmates by quoting Baudelaire from 
memory (Jutrin 2012). 
 Imaginative work thus had a twofold importance for Fondane. It was certainly a 
means to gesture towards the other. However, this means could not be separated from 
the disconsolation which was the condition of the need to perform that gesture. Thus 
in expressing this ‘reaching out’ the imaginative work could contain the shared 
anguish which, according to Fondane, philosophical or political projects could not 
admit to. In Man Faced with History, Fondane refers to the words of Plotinus, who 
posited a universal order using the metaphor of human beings as tortoises who must 
align themselves to the gigantic steps of divine dancers in order to avoid being 
crushed by a dance whose logic they had ignored. One who, firmly holding to a 
philosophy or indeed a ‘science’ of history, whether secular or theological, finds 
themselves caught up in a disaster, is like 
 
ce stoïcien dont parle Sénèque qui, surpris par l’orage en pleine mer, se met 
à trembler de tous ses membres. Croit-il encore qu’il suffise de se régler sur 
la cadence de l’ordre universel? Ou bien, en ce moment-là, s’aperçoit-il qu’il 
n’y a pas de sort privilégié pour la tortue ‘instruite’ et que c’est Dostoïevski 
qui avait raison, et Shakespeare, ou encore leur Maître commun: la Bible, 
qui avait dit, à sa façon, que la vie est une histoire contée par un idiot 
lorsqu’elle rappelle, et insiste, que le même soleil ici-bas luit sur le juste et 
l’injuste… Il semble au philosophe qu’affirmer cela, c’est porter atteinte à 
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Dieu et pourtant c’est Jérémie, après Job, qui s’écrie: ‘Maudit soit le jour où 
je suis né’ (20–14) (HDH 444) 
 
[that Stoic mentioned by Seneca, surprised by a storm in the middle of the 
sea, whose limbs begin to tremble. Does he still believe that it is enough to 
align himself with the cadence of universal order? Or really, in that moment, 
does he make out that there is no privileged fate for the ‘educated’ tortoise 
and that it is Dostoevsky who is right, and Shakespeare, or indeed their 
common Master, the Bible, which said, in its way, that life is a tale told by 
an idiot by its reminder, its insistence, that the same sun here below throws 
its light on the just and the unjust... It seems to the philosopher that to affirm 
that is to undermine God and yet it is Jeremiah, after Job, who cries ‘Cursed 
be the day of my birth!’] (Fondane 2011, 77) 
 
 
The poem’s imaginative features consolidate a sense of uncompassable tragedy, pre-
empting and resisting any logical attempts to fit the experiences it addresses into a 
framework of meaning.17  
 L’Exode uses imaginative tropes in order to break through the shock of self 
exposed by desolation and afford a confrontation of catastrophe that is not flattening, 
reductive or closing. ‘Man is not at home on this earth | a stranger wherever he goes’ 
(MF 170): these lines spoken by ‘the narrator’ participate in the extension of the 
condition of Jewish exile to all humanity. But as well as refusing the essential identity 
of people with place, they speak to a more personal relation – in Rimbaud’s words, je 
est un autre. Perhaps there are parallels with a child’s imaginative engagement with a 
stuffed toy to communicate distress or a patient’s therapeutic use of meditation or 
psychedelic drugs to confront trauma, in that Fondane’s mythic-artistic approach to 
the writing of disaster is mediating but not distancing.18  
 The mood of disconsolation that pervades the poem constitutes a paradox: a 
defeat that is not an ending. Proclaiming the insufficiency of knowledge and 
 
17 Plotinus’s tortoises may have been in Fondane’s mind when writing the Chorus lines in L’Exode 
mentioned earlier, as the captives address God in response to the hectoring of the guards, asking for 
their chains to be broken. ‘Que pose son pied déchaussé | sur nous, le Maitre de la vie […] et nous 
vous chanterons la chanson de Sion [Let him place his unshod foot | on us, the Master of life […] and 
we will sing you the song of Zion]’ (MF 192), they continue, the implication presumably being that 
even being crushed by God’s presence would at least be proof of a divine plan redeeming the chaos. 
18 See for example pyschology discussion of the ‘transitional object’ as bridge from ‘the psychic inner 
reality of wishes, desires, feelings, and ideas to the external world of intersubjectively verifiable 
things’ (Roig, Roig and Soth, 1987, 46; Nieuwenhuys 2011, passim) or ‘MDMA as a therapeutic 




language, L’Exode writes into the gaps to cry out what is absurd and unanswerable. 
This staging of anguish is part of a subversion of purported answers to catastrophe, 
but this subversion also depends upon the sense that a search remains open. 
Fondane’s unhappy consciousness is as fundamental to readings of his poetry as to all 
the rest of his work.19 Yet the mood of disconsolation created in L’Exode also 
depends upon a sense of courage – the courage of dissatisfaction. It is the refusal to 
bow to overwhelming circumstances – be they metaphysical or tangible – that 
differentiates disconsolation from mere cynicism, abnegation or simple despair. The 




19Not least because of the imperative to replace philosophy’s’ ‘problème du Savoir [problem of 
Knowledge]’ with a situation ‘où le Savoir devenait un problème [where Knowledge became a 
problem]’, as the Société Fondane website puts it (SEBF, n.d.), a situation where all claims to answers 




Colère de la vision: Irresignation in L’Exode 
 
D’autres […] ont confessé naïvement, comme ce fut le cas de Freud, 
que la science n’est que plus grande pour avoir eu le courage de nous 
enseigner la résignation à ‘l’univers hostile‘ […] Quel besoin a-t-elle 
donc, l’existence, d’être justifiée et légitimée?  
 
[Freud naively confessed that science is all the greater for having the 
courage to teach us resignation in the face of ‘the hostile universe’ […] 
What need does existence have of being justified and legitimated?] 
 
from ‘Preface for the Present Moment’ (EM 43) 
 
 
Fondane struck an ‘irresigned’ attitude to his disconsolate situation. Like the very 
notion of poetic tone, irresignation is both necessarily expressed in words and implies 
a resonance beyond their individual instances. If, against aestheticism, L’Exode 
confirms the presence of what is ‘terribly human’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2009) in poetry, it 
offers neither the rapturous efforts towards transcendence Fondane ascribed to 
Rimbaud nor the confidence of his avant-garde fellows such as Breton. Nonetheless, 
Fondane’s poetry does not make statements of misanthropy, aporetic nihilism or 
defeatism. L’Exode offers a revolt from within tragedy: as Meschonnic puts it in his 
introduction, ‘in his revolt […] he is closer to Dada and Artaud than to the surrealists, 
in living the poem [dans un vivre le poème]’ (Meschonnic 2006, 8, my translation). It 
is this unquantifiable ‘living-the-poem’ that I will survey in this chapter, with four 
short sections that draw together aspects of the linguistic and semantic difficulties of 
Fondane’s attempts to express irresignation, followed by a longer section that 








‘La chute des mondes’ : The Struggle to Speak 
 
One way in which L’Exode strikes a tone of irresignation is by setting up 
representational aporiae and then refusing them. Let us begin again au pied de la 
lettre, with the letters of the Hebrew alphabet which, in their multiple voices, appear 
at the beginning of what might be called the poem proper (though the 
‘supplementary’ preface is in fact essential to its reading) and immediately create an 
expectation of order. Instead, however, of acting as a kabbalistic worldly 
manifestation of the transcendent, these letters seem to float free in the abyss. What 
would be the essence of divine order figures only an empty chaos. Chaos, of course, 
is what theologically precedes creation.1  
 
Qui veut monter dans les  
                          ténèbres? 
Qui veut descendre en la  
                            lumière? 
Nulle figure n’est ici –  
L’Esprit ne flotte encore.  
Who wants to climb among the  
                                      shadows? 
Who wants to drop into the light? 
There is no figure here –  
The Spirit is not moving yet. 
 
(MF 154; CO 145) 
 
 
This is the voice of the ALEPH that begins the sequence. It is as if the shapes of 
reality – figure – await a transcendent driver (whether divine, Platonic or Hegelian) to 
direct their appearance. 
 Instead of a justification, the demiurgic urges of the poet come through in 
splinters, revealing themselves as the irrational thirsts and hungers of existence. 
There is a potentiality in these shards. KAPH warns that catastrophe is yet to come: 
 
Le temps n’est pas encor venu 
des cris, des signes, des mystères, 
l’homme n’est pas encor tout nu... 
Que ses villes se couvrent d’ortie et  
                                    de terre aride, 
qu’il craigne jusqu’à l’ombre qui au     
                                    soleil le ceint 
The time is not yet here 
for cries, signs and mysteries,  
man is not yet laid bare… 
Let his towns be covered by nettles and  
dry earth, 
let him fear even the shadow that haloes                
him in the sunlight, 
 
1 These voices from the darkness, subverting the uncertainty of their waiting with humour as well as 
anguish, foreshadow Beckett. I will come back to touch on this humour in chapters 7 and 8. 
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et si, dans son esprit, il sent mûrir le 
vide, qu’il en appelle au Saint!  
and if, in his spirit, he feels the void ripen, 
let him appeal to the Most High!  
 
(MF 155–156; CO 149) 
 
The warning prefigures the catastrophes attested to in the succeeding sequences, but 
it is also ambiguous. It not only prefatorily proclaims of what is to come in the poem, 
but also introduces a metaphysical anxiety: how bad do things have to get before we 
are really at the day of judgement? Immediately after the ALEPH, the BETH already 
undercuts the nothingness, introducing a ‘je’: 
 
Je cherche en un moi qui coule 
pendant le siècle qui coule 
avec un désir qui coule 
le dieu qui ne coule pas.  
 
I seek within a self that flows 
while the century flows 
with a desire that flows 
the god that flows not.  
 
(MF 145; CO 145) 
 
 
With the ‘je’ comes temporality, desire and the absence of God. Already, we have the 
suggestion of the existent and their dissatisfaction. With or without the guarantee of 
reason, being already is, even if only according to the phantom voice of an 
abstraction, even only as a trace. Thus, the concluding word of the ‘voice in the 
wilderness’ that comes right before the alphabet sequence at the end of the work is 
prefigured – ‘C’EST!’ (MF 203). 
 Desire is always temporal, always historical. The voices of the letters shimmer 
between the abstract and the concrete, as if the purity of the void were impossible, 
because to attempt to conceive of it presupposes existence. The holy letters cannot 
sing as David made them; they are themselves paradoxically profane. When HETH 
declares ‘Nous avons erré dans les rues | et sangloté dans les vitrines [We’ve 
wandered in the streets | and sobbed in the windows]’ (MF 155; CO 147), the 
groundlessness of the letters is tied to that of the emigrant, and to the Jew. Untethered 
from their rightful places – in Romanian synagogues, for example2 – the words go out 
into the world in the mouths of the persecuted and displaced. Their restoration would 
 




require a miracle, because what is shattered cannot be put back together. ‘Faudra-t-il 
la chute des mondes’, asks SAMEKH, ‘pour que jaillisse une parole? [Do worlds 
need to fall | for a word to spring forth?]’ (MF 156; CO 149).3 The form of the 
question underlines the scattering of letters. Already, we are in ruins. Fondane does 
not seek to erase poetic form in order to replace it with a newer, truer version. 
Instead, the very letters of creation (divine and artistic) continue to speak but 
contradict each other and pull apart in form. The quatrain set up by the ALEPH and 
BETH, already shaken by BETH’s hammering end ‘rhyme’ of a repeated ‘coule’ 
(which also undoes itself with that final ‘pas’), is troubled by GHIMEL’s six lines 
(although we could see eight if we count the blanks which frame the last ‘– mais où 
est-elle l’épaisseur? [but where is the density?]’ [MF 154, CO 145]). Not only 
between the letters but within them, there are silences, lacunae. 
 Words occupy a troubling space between nothingness and density. ‘Le vide peu 
à peu se peuple | d’étrange poissons transparents [The void peoples itself piecemeal | 
with strange transparent fish]’, begins GHIMEL, recollecting the ‘poissons irréels’ 
which the fragile self of the Préface mentions fishing for in the attempt to assert its 
own reality (MF 154, CO 145). Their ‘irreality’ is important. The Préface does not 
simply offer the pathos of details of the everyday life of a victim. It weaves together 
the absurdity and nobility, the transience and potentiality, of the affective and the 
imaginative.  
 
Le dimanche j’allais à la  
campagne 
pêcher, sous l’oeil de Dieu, des  
poissons irréels, 
je me baignais dans la rivière 
qui chantait dans les joncs et je  
mangeais des frites 
le soir. [...] 
 
On Sundays I went to the country 
to fish, under the eye of God, for  
                                    unreal fish, 
I bathed in the river 
that sang in the rushes and I ate chips 
in the evening. […]  
 
 
(MF 152; CO 141) 
 
 
3 The emigrant and the exile are major presences in Fondane’s poetry in part because, torn from their 
cultural and material apparatus of identity, they betray the reality that identity is in fact always being 
constituted by consciousness. As the dispossession of catastrophe exposes, memory and language are 
constitutive rather than conservative: in Julia Creet’s words, ‘memory is where we have arrived rather 
than where we have left’ (Creet 2010, 3). 
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There is a constant interplay here between figures of the mundane and the magic of 
the poetic, a simultaneous repulsion and attraction. Fondane cannot but love the 
beauty of art and artifice, yet strives against its complete enchantment.  
 ‘Play’ is the right word. An acknowledgement of the gravity of his context and 
the mood of disconsolation that pervades his work should never be allowed to efface 
the playfulness, both bright and sardonic by turns (though more often the former), 
that diverts its anguish. The way that words are more than one thing at once, that this 
is what poetry depends on, is essential to his use of it as a means to affirm even as he 
subverts meaning and form. Fishing (pêcher) on a Sunday is also sinning, a classic 
French homonym (and the juxtaposition of day and activity also reminds us of the 
Fisher of Men); l’oeil de Dieu is the sun as well as the watchful Lord (displeased or 
beneficent?); the singing flow of baignais/chantait is slowed by mangeais; the ‘frites 
le soir’ letting go of the melody and also, in their humble everydayness, 
counterpointing the ‘poissons irréels’: daydream fish, real fish whose own transience 
and beauty mark the bridge between reality and imagination, insubstantial ideas. 
When GHIMEL speaks of ‘poissons transparents’, the fish are words: what use are 
the insubstantial words of poetry, that claim to call a flower into being? 4 Where is 
density? 
 These inchoate voices, in their fragmentation and seeming crypticism and 
unanswerable questions (HE: ‘qu’est-ce que la soif | qu’est-ce que la faim – | le feu 
qui embrase, | les anges de glace? [What is thirst | what is hunger – | the fire that 
ignites, | the angels of ice?]’) sound dissonantly; they are dangerously close to an 
impossibility of utterance (MF 154, CO 147). Yet SAMEKH’s question is double-
edged. ‘Faudra-t-il la chute des mondes | pour que jaillisse une parole?’ Creation is 
predicated on instability; in the midst of catastrophe comes not ultimate silence, but a 
word. Amidst the ruination of langue comes a parole. Among the irreality of poetics 
and the cries of anguish, a word comes forth. Not the ‘true’ word, perhaps, the divine 
word of ‘in the beginning’, though we sense a longing for and accusation of this word 
 
4 Mallarmé, famously: ‘I say: a flower! and, out of the oblivion into which my voice consigns any real 
shape, as something other than petals known to man, there rises, harmoniously and gently, the ideal 
flower itself, the one that is absent from all earthly bouquets’ (poetryfoundation.org/poets/stephane-
mallarme). For more on the intricacies of Fondane’s self-extrication from Symbolism, see Salazar-
Ferrer 2004b. See Suleiman 1996, 651 for a connection between this Mallarméen naming and 




(must creation come from nothing, are mundane things meaningless except as pieces 
in a divine plan, to be discarded as necessary in the service of revelation?). But 
maybe, perhaps, a word that can be heard, a hesitant, unconcluding word that is not 
only an escape into beauty or abstract truth. Against the betrayals inherent in these 
options, irresignation is the struggle to speak.  
 SADHE, COPH and RESH speak across each other:  
 
TSADÉ 
Je vois une chose sans vue 
dans la ténèbre où je remue 
ma langue ne peut pas la parler 










Ténèbre! Voici ta victoire 
Je veux parler à ces oiseaux 
dans un langage d’innocent 
plus blanc que neige boréale.  
 
SADHE 
I see something without sight 
in the shadows where I flit 
my tongue cannot speak it 
my ear cannot make it quiet.  
 
QOPH 
To your appearing, 
lovely Unhearing, 





Shadow! Here is your victory 
I would speak to these birds 
in an innocent language 
whiter than boreal snow.  
 
(MF 157; CO 151–153) 
 
 
The impossibility of the tongue’s speaking is matched by the unquenchable desire to 
speak, to translate what is unsilenceably ‘heard’ yet unsayable. The desire for a pure 
language, which Fondane had previously felt promised in poetry, a promise distorted 
in the too-assonant, too-perfect rhymes of COPH, where abstraction and form create 
absurdity, is dashed by its own paradox: as Benjamin intimated, a pure language 
would be no language at all, the black bridges of words disappearing into 
omnipresent whiteness.5   
 
5 ‘In this pure language – which no longer means or expresses anything but is, as expressionless and 
creative Word, that which is meant in all languages – all information, all sense, and all intention finally 
encounter a stratum in which they are destined to be extinguished’ (Benjamin 2003ab, 22) 
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 Language cannot be innocent, and against the Adamic dream of aestheticism, 
poetry must blow man up with blasts of dynamite, must be an ‘axe on the frozen sea 
inside’.6 RESH is followed by SHIN: ‘Le cri que l’on pourrait crier | il n’est pas ici, 
pas encore | il rôde autour de quelque bouche | il sollicite une salive [The cry we 
could cry | is not here, not yet, | it roams around a mouth | it asks for saliva]’ (MF 
157, CO 153). The cry, as we have seen in the Préface, cannot be put into a poem. It 
is always waiting to be said. This avowal of SHIN foreshadows the attempts of the 
rest of L’Exode to say it, and this double move of repeatedly asserting the cry’s 
unsayability and attempting to say it is an irresigned one. The poet Joë Bousquet 
wrote of Fondane’s wartime poetry: ‘this spectacular poetry is so far from song it 
seems outside the human voice’ (Beray 2006, 206). Patrice Beray argues that 
Bousquet is right to consider it ‘spectacular’ (and note that the French is semiotically 
close to the noun spectacle, performance) and gesturing beyond itself (its ‘prophetic’ 
aspect; Beray 2006, 207). However, Fondane’s break beyond aesthetic tradition 
exposes the limits of human utterance not to leave it behind but to affirm it with 
humility. ‘Fondane’s poem [Le Mal des fantômes 1942–1943]’, claims Beray, ‘is 
animated by this prosodic, rhythmic orality, and not by an efficiency, a dramatic 
organization [un spectaculaire], drawn from a formulaic art refined by a poetic 
tradition’ (Beray 2006, 207). The question of form is never abandoned by Fondane, 
but the human voice missed by Bousquet in fact cannot be fully expressed in it. In 
L’Exode this tension, between aesthetic convention and the ‘roughness’ of the attempt 







6 Kafka, who had such a philosophical influence on Fondane, wrote these famous words in 1904 (in a 
letter to Oskar Pollok dated January 27), though they were not published until after Fondane’s death 
(Kafka 2013). 
7 Beray cites editor Jean Ballard’s description of Fondane’s poetry as âpre, arguing that his assessment 




 An Anti-Aesthetic Gesture 
 
The irresolvable contradictions of the Alphabet sequence are formed from a kind of 
‘mysticism-without-a-beyond’ repeatedly broken by the attempt to figure the real. 
The cry is crucial to this counterpoint, and disrupts the integrity of the poem itself. 
The letters speak, like a fragmented chorus, from beyond the action of the drama and 
yet as part of it: the drama of the work and the drama of history. TSADÉ’s 
description of being unable to stop witnessing and unable to respond are reminiscent 
of Benjamin’s angel of history, with a focus on hearing and language instead of 
seeing and action. Gisèle Vanhese (2012, 181) draws attention to the parallels 
between Fondane’s poetic vision and the angelus novus, using Michel de Certeau and 
Carlo Ginzburg’s work on history to argue that his poetry has a ‘heterological’ 
perspective, seeking to speak the unsayability of the lives that sweep through history 
only as statistics or absent voices. Poetry as a kind of salvage.   
 In the last chapter we saw how QOPH, speaking for a second time, stages both 
the creation of the poem and the search for rational answers to the absurdity of 
suffering, placing the unhappy consciousness behind the unending drive to create. 
The poem is ‘un monde plein [a full world]’ that nonetheless turns ‘autour du cri d’un 
homme seul! [on the cry of a solitary man!]’ (MF 162, CO163). QOPH hovers on the 
line between metaphysical and worldly relationships: ‘Écoute mon cri dans la nuit | et 
ouvre ton oreille avare [Hear my cry in the night | and open your miserly ear]’ (MF 
162, CO 163). Avare, cognate of avaricious, could be translated by greedy as well as 
miserly. If miserly implicates a God who never gives any sign of hearing, in the first 
instance (although the secondary implication is also of humanity’s inattention to its 
own cries), greedy would be a posing of the possible reader as sharing the same thirst 
for interlocution. If this voice knows anything of a potential listener, it is that their ear 
too must have a desperation, an unending search for answers. RESH brings us into 
history: ‘Les temps sont venus, je l’annonce | des fusillades, des émeutes [The times 
are at hand, I proclaim | of shootings, of riots]’ (MF 162, CO 163). The horrors of 
pogroms and war are also an attempt to block this ear, ‘immense échafaudages 
[massive scaffolds]’ built ‘contre la mort [against death]’ (MF 162, CO 163), seeking 
through the reification and instrumentalization of the other a rejection of vulnerability 
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and fundamental powerlessness in front of the meaninglessness of death. Against this 
process, L’Exode, as Fondane explicitly writes in the afterword, ‘cherche des amis [is 
looking for friends]’, both among the underground of its time of composition, where 
‘le lecteur, qui est un confident [the reader, who is a confidant]’ (MF 208) is exhorted 
to circulate their own clandestine versions, and in the ‘ears’ of all who come to it in 
the future. 
 If Fondane saw aesthetics as another form of the denial of vulnerability, the cry 
operates as its antagonist, ‘une attestation existentielle dans l’impuissance de la 
parole [an existential attestation in the powerlessness of the word]’ in Salazar-
Ferrer’s words (2007, 84). L’Exode takes up Fondane’s critique of aesthetics and 
performs a kind of anti-aesthetic gesture between the cri and the chante: not an 
obliteration of aesthetics, but a poetic writing that foregrounds its own 
insufficiencies, subverting itself even as it affirms. Indeed, this subversion is critical 
for the affirmation – a beauty which is precious for the pathos of its insufficiency, a 
going-on given force by the difficulty of its conditions. Thus the tone of irresignation 
contains contradictory overtones, combining defiance with uncertainty. There is 
ambiguity not only in the poem’s polyvocality, but clearly within its voices, in 
moments of hesitancy, polysemy and self-contradiction.   
 The status of the lyric ‘je’ is constantly under pressure. Fondane fully mobilizes 
the awareness that ‘je est un autre’ in its manifold and contradictory aspects – the 
desire for a true self which transcends earthly existence, the a priori unified self as an 
illusion, the correspondences between self and other. Many of the different voices 
speak from a ‘je’ position, including the Chorus. The confusion of identities is 
exemplified in an unusual sequence of tercets near the end of the work, which, with 
its eight stanzas followed by a lone end line coda, could also carry the trace of a 
double sonnet: the idea of the lyric underlies much of L’Exode, as if the poetic ‘I’ has 
lost its confidence but retained its appeal.8  
 It is unclear who is speaking in the tercets. They begin with a subjectless 
description: ‘Disséminés parmi les hommes [Broadcast among men ]’, ‘baignés de 
 
8 Patrice Beray carries out a sustained reading of Fondane’s subversive use of traditional forms in his 
book Au temps du poème (Beray 2006, 193–224), the way he ‘does something new with the old-
fashioned’ (200) so that internal conflict in the rhythmic structure becomes ‘le foyer d’incandescence 




solitude [bathed in solitude ]’, ‘oubliés sur la carte immense du vivant [marooned on 
life’s huge mappemonde]’; we are unclear who is being referred to. The grammatical 
absence of a subject turns the referents into phantoms, who are then addressed in the 
second person ‘quelle langue parlerez-vous, quelles paroles primitives [what 
language will you speak, what primitive words]’ (MF 201). There is no adequate 
language for disconsolation, and the irresigned response entails constantly seeking 
new words. In the third tercet, a dash introduces the voice of ‘the Lord’, whereafter 
second person plural and singular injunctions intermingle, until the penultimate 
tercet. Here, the aba rhyme scheme is broken, and the rhythm disrupted with an 
ellipsis ending the first line of the stanza: 
 
Il y a trop longtemps que vous aimez  
                       la paix... 
– La Paix vous abêtit, dit le Seigneur. 
Je préfère l’erreur qui chante à la  
vérité dévorante.  
You have been in love with peace  
                               for too long… 
– Peace is debasing you, sayeth the  
                                                Lord. 





These lines are deeply ambiguous and refuse to settle. Particularly the last. Is the ‘Je’ 
a continuation of the Lord’s voice? We could construe it as a privileging of beauty 
over reality. Alternatively, we could read the voice of the poet, asserting the value of 
their song in defiance of the exigency of ‘ideal’ truths.  
 Poetry is thereby aligned not with the co-expression of truth and beauty, but 
with the irrational and its right to exist, to disrupt the peace of the mind. This reading 
is supported by the two sections before the tercets. On page 198, the Narrator rages 
against man’s inhumanity to man, and against the lies of ‘false prophets’. 
Significantly, the insult he casts against those who have ‘assez tué pour des fantômes 
[...] vautrés au lit des idéals, | assez joué les saints, les héros, les martyrs [killed 
enough, you ghosts […] sprawled on the bed of ideals, | played enough at being 
saints, heroes, martyrs],’ is ‘Porcs! [Swine!]’ This Circean epithet is highly charged 
in its use in Rimbaud le voyou, separating the base, credulous part of the self from the 
esprit critique: Fondane essentially reads Rimbaud as seeking a means of 
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transcending the baseness of life while still satisfying his rational mind’s demands for 
proof. 9 
 According to Fondane (influenced by Kierkegaard), it is fear of being thought a 
porc that prevents Rimbaud from truly experiencing faith, whether the Catholic faith 
contemporaries10 aspired to claim for him or faith in poetry. In the tercets, the 
response to the question of language is ‘Il est temps de confondre la Beauté assise! 
[It’s time to confound settled Beauty!]’ (MF 201). This draws upon the exclamation 
of Rimbaud’s that Fondane considers a key expression of his break with the ideal of 
poetry: ‘Un soir, j’ai assis la Beauté sur mes genoux. Et je l’ai trouvée amère. Et je 
l’ai injuriée [One evening I sat Beauty on my knees. And I found her bitter. And I 
cursed her]’ (from A Season in Hell, translation Louise Varèse, 1961, p.3 [adapted]). 
For Fondane, this break that eventually led Rimbaud to abandon poetry for its 
illusions and insufficiencies is the same as the one he himself experienced, as set out 
in ‘Mots Sauvages’. Rimbaud’s accusation of poetry’s denial of reality demands a 
confusion of beauty: ‘sous l’impulsion première donnée par Rimbaud […] le poète en 
arrive à se mépriser et à mépriser l’opération qui rend son travail spécifique et lui 
confère un sens [by that first kick given by Rimbaud […] poets ends up holding in 
contempt both themselves and the operation that makes their work specific and 
confers meaning upon it]’ (RV 237).  
 However, unlike those who abandon poetry or seek to find a place for it by 
other logics, in Fondane’s words ‘une sorte d’expérience, une sorte de connaissance 
[…] quelque chose de valable, de rigoureux, de scientifique et qui n’a de la poésie 
que le nom [a sort of experience, a sort of knowledge […] something valid, rigorous, 
and scientific and which is poetry in name only]’ (RV 237), Fondane sees in poetry 
alone a means of staying with this representational trouble. As Kristin Ross puts it, 
Rimbaud’s ‘decanonization of beauty […] is a transformation in the relation of the 
narrator to the object […] a relation to beauty that is no longer timeless or immortal, 
but transitory, acknowledging change and death’ (Ross 2008, 40). Against the 
 
9 For more on the problem of not being a naive believer and Fondane’s irresignation, see his discussion 
of Nietzsche in Preface for the Present Moment (EM 42–43). It would be interesting to see further 
research in this regard comparing Fondane and his Cahiers du Sud collaborator Simone Weil, who did 
claim faith, in its Kierkegaardian absurdity. 
10 In this regard Fondane was writing against Roland de Renéville and Paul Claudel in particular. See 




imperatives on poetry to be either transcendentally beautiful or useful, Fondane, 
writing his last revisions to Rimbaud le Voyou around the same time as L’Exode, 
asserted  
 
Que l’on ne sache pas pourquoi on écrive, n’épuise pas la question […] il y 
aura toujours des poètes de par le monde, même si on leur coupait la tête 
pour de bon […] je consens que ceci ne soit pas […] une réponse sensée; 
mais peut-être que cette question ne comporte pas une réponse sensée; il 
n’est pas question de réponse sensée. 
 
[That we don’t know why we write does not exhaust the question […] there 
will always be poets somewhere in the world, even if they really are getting 
their heads cut off […] I accept that this is not […] a reasonable answer; 
but perhaps this question does not entail a reasonable answer; it is not a 
question of reasonable answers] (RV 238) 
 
The act of poetry is therefore a revolt against the very pressure on poetry to be 
reasonable, and is given extra weight in Fondane’s case as a simultaneous revolt 
against persecution. Where suffering seems to demand an escape but the faculties of 
reason cannot accept aesthetics as sufficient, L’Exode contains the injunction to 
refuse the lure of beauty’s enchantment even while actively putting poetry forward as 
an indication of and necessary means for the continuing need to speak, indeed as a 
performance meeting that need, though it cannot be fully satisfied.  
 
Strange Singing in a Strange Land 
 
Between the rant of the narrator and the semantically whirling tercets, the Chorus 
speaks. Picking up from where SAMEKH started, the final stanza it utters in the 




Mais laisserai-je choir le monde 
et pourrai-je jouer au cerceau dans un  
monde 
qui me demandera comme un  
aveugle-né 
de l’aider un instant à traverser la rue 
– la grande rue du Jugement? 
 
But shall I let the world fall 
and shall I play at push-pin in a  
                                               world 
which will ask of me, like one born  
                                                blind, 
for a moment’s help to cross the  
                                                 road 




Here the poet is not claiming a special status, but rather poetry is exposing the 
dilemma of all disconsolate subjects. We are in the territory of Simone Weil, 
discussed in chapter 1 (‘“Other” Criticism’): faced with the knowledge of suffering, 
how can we do anything other than maximize our efforts to eliminate it? What use is 
‘playing at push-pin’, the child’s game of poetry?11 Yet the poet’s shameful 
conscience has already been unpacked; there has already been a refusal to put faith in 
answers. The world is not just aveugle but aveugle-né: there has never been a 
convincing vision of a final resolution. The drama of history is stuck in catastrophe 
and cannot reach culmination. The Chorus shows an awareness of there being risk not 
only in action (‘oserons-nous baigner au sang de la justice [Dare we bathe in the 
blood of justice]’) but in words: ‘sur notre langue [s’appuieront] les serpents [from 
our tongue snakes will rise]?’ (MF 200). Unspeakability shadows the catastrophe.12  
 Is the only alternative to ‘let the world fall’? The line captures Fondane’s 
skilful simultaneous use of pathos and burlesque, the uselessness of the poet holding 
the whole world in their imagination. But refusing to ‘let the world fall’ could be a 
gesture not so much of holding it up as of refusing to abandon it. The tercets conclude 
‘Je serai avec vous, dans la boue et la poisse – | mais je serai en vous Celui qu’on ne 
voit point [I will be with you, in the mud and bad luck – | but I will be in you the One 
who is unseen].’ (MF 202). While there is a theological edge to this proclamation (see 
Nicorescu 2006, 180–181), we can read its ‘je’ as the voice of a poet. Not simply of 
Fondane, but of the trace of the singular which remains, going along with the people 
of the future who must keep walking with ‘reins d’angoisse [anguish in the gut]’ (MF 
 
11 Le cerceau is literally hoop-and-stick, but push-pin is used for prosodic effect. 
12 In this regard Fondane’s quasi-drama foreshadows Beckett’s ‘dramaticule’ titled Catastrophe, which 




202). Irresignation does not represent an overcoming of the problems of 
representation, but a resistance to them. Avoiding the desire to elevate life out of 
itself and into a transcendent ideal, the poet can offer a trace of their experience 
which connects to the lonely suffering of others.13 
 The Chorus has been asking the ageless question of how to sing in exile from 
the beginning of the poem, the impossibility of doing so in plenitude and satisfaction. 
Yet on page 195 it reminds its persecutors of ‘cette secrète angoisse | qui nous lie à la 
Joie créée aux jours anciens [this secret anguish | that links us to Joy created in 
ancient times]’. The cry of anguish and the joy of singing are intimately linked. 
Neither is sufficient to establish permanence or truth, yet together, in irresignation, 
they unite a refusal to dismiss suffering with a refusal to be overwhelmed by it. 
Against their own shameful conscience, the poet finds the bravery to cry out with a 
hope against hope, to use poetry’s sustaining of contradictions to affirm existence 
without imposing a judgement upon it: 
 
– C’est dans ce point 
que j’ai douté enfin de ma lucidité 
en me voyant moi-même, mais   
                                  détaché de moi. 
Ce n’était pas la peur mais une autre  
                                                    joie, 
ce n’était pas le bonheur mais une  
                                 autre amertume, 
et je criais, honteux de m’entendre  
                                                   crier: 
C’est dense!  
 
– It’s at this point 
that I finally came to doubt my reason, 
seeing myself, yet detached from myself. 
It was not fear but a different joy, 
it was not happiness but a different gall, 
and I cried, ashamed to hear myself cry: 
it’s solid! 
(MF 203) 
The voice that speaks these lines is the ‘voice in the wilderness’, the barest 
expression of affective life. In them we see that the end of the poem is only the 
beginning, as underlined by the reappearance after it of the Alphabet whose letters 
speak once more, bookending the work. In full awareness of the impossibility of 
speaking sufficiently, poetry becomes the means of an assertion of the need to speak. 
 L’Exode’s irresignation involves repeated attempts to push words beyond 
rationality, to use language to gesture towards what is beyond it. The notion of tone 
here becomes somewhat paradoxical – like the silences between chimes of a bell, 
 
13 This point will be developed further in chapter 8. 
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intentional absence contributes to the tone as much as what is positively perceived. 
Fondane uses a variety of paralinguistic strategies: punctuation such as ellipses, 
dashes and exclamation marks that disrupt syntactic flow; spaces, breaks and 
discontinuities within and between poems; contradictions that imply a missing 
presence as well as a lack of semantic stability; and various mentions of and 
paradoxical efforts to express extra-verbal vocalizations, such as vocative hailings 
(Ô), sobs and cries. Alexander Dickow gives an excellent reading of these strategies 
in Fondane’s poetry, arguing for their capacity to create the effect of an ‘emotional 
outburst’ and ‘disillusioned tonality’ (Dickow 2017, 206).  
 Out of the inchoate cacophony of the initial Alphabet sequence, the next 
speaking voice coalesces around an age-old formula: ‘Sur les fleuves de Babylone 
nous nous sommes assis et pleurâmes [by the rivers of Babylon we sat down and 
wept]’. Yet the poem’s disillusion precludes the notion of the comforting of present 
sorrow by recuperation into tradition. Immediately breaking with form, the next lines 
link with the past and future only to emphasize the way present sorrow is increased 
by the temporal perspective of the unhappy consciousness, one in which there is no 
diegetic justification: ‘que de fleuves déjà coulaient dans notre chair | que de fleuves 
futurs où nous allions pleurer [so many rivers have already flowed through our flesh | 
so many future rivers where we were going to weep]’ (MF 163). It is not clear who is 
speaking here. It seems similar to the Chorus, which continually mixes fragments of 
the Biblical refrain with mentions of other temporalities throughout the work, yet it is 
not titled as such. It is indeed a ghostly voice, one whose suffering is haunting.  
 Ghosts too are associated with crying or wailing. Fondane’s ghosts, denied 
even the attachment of a haunting ground, address the waterways that mirror their 
shifting reflections, asking: ‘Chantiez-vous de la harpe | en sanglotant – Abba! [Did 
you sing with the harp, | sobbing – Abba!]’ (MF 164). This is an exemplary instance 
of the paralinguistic bridge between the word and the unfigurable. The dash and 
exclamation mark parenthesize ‘Abba’, underlining its status as a sob. Instead of a 
ritualistic invocation of God14 that reassures past and present, the letters come close 
to losing their status as a linguistic sign, expressing anguish and desperation. As with 
other paralinguistic instances in the text, the juxtaposition of poetic and incantatory 
 




forms of language with non-verbal gestures highlights the signifying absence of what 





The Human Song 
 
A disconsolate mood entwines anguish at unspeakable suffering with a thirst to find 
and express unsayable joy. I will return to the cry later in this chapter, when I will 
discuss the Intermède that is the clearest expression of revolt in the work and the 
clearest statement of its actuality. For now I want to look at the way irresignation can 
also be brought out with softness and tenderness. In the last chapter, I discussed the 
retelling of the Song of Songs. This section of L’Exode is subtly startling. In its form, 
in its message and in its quiet appearance in the clamour of the work, it presents an 
unexpected will to live (or will to life), just as it does in the Bible: with a spontaneity, 
fertility and irrationality that confounds the narratives of suffering and searching for 
moral guidance that surround it. The return to Babylon, after the Intermède has 
pushed the France of 1940 directly into our imagination, finds the quiet of the night, 
in which the Jews had each been soliloquizing their metaphysical lassitude, broken by 
the drunken songs of the guards. Without falling into what Adorno calls ‘the abstract 
conception of universal wrong’ in which ‘all concrete responsibility vanishes’ 
(Adorno 2020, 27), the text remains committed to the humanity of the guards, 
themselves caught in the horrible logic of force. The bleak, Villonesque humour of 
their song, in its litany of corruption, is their attempt to reconcile themselves with 
horror: 
 
Où sont les mariniers des soutes?  
Sont balayés par l’océan. 
Les vieux copains? Ils ont la goutte.  
Les amoureuses plus de dents. 
 
Where are the sailors from amidships? 
All swept away into the mere. 
Old mates? Their feet now give them gyp. 





 Its refrain seems to oppose the Jews’ search for ‘la chanson de Sion’ (MF 169): ‘il 
n’y a de chanson que l’humaine [there is no song but the human one]’ (MF 188).  
 However, in the strange ‘ENVOI’ which follows – is it simply the conclusion 
to the guards’ song, or are other voices joining or responding, sending their message 
out beyond the bounds of the longer poem? – the refrain is picked up: 
 
Que l’on nous brûle ou qu’on nous  
                        cloute 
et que ce soit chance ou déveine, 
que voulez-vous que ça nous foute? 
Il n’est de chanson que l’humaine. 
 
Whether they burn us or they whip, 
whether we had good luck or none, 
what makes you think we give a  
                         shit? 




This would seem to be a statement of pure resignation: abandonment of the search for 
salvation, the human song as one of bitterness only. Yet singing in the dark times, 
about the dark times, can be a gesture of revolt as well as despair.  
 The Song of Songs is also, in Fondane’s emphasis, a song of abandonment and 
lack. However, the ‘mais’ that introduces it on the heels of the ‘ENVOI’ immediately 
distinguishes it from the numbing humour that preceded. If the messianic resolution 
is absent, the longing for it can still be sung, and as a different key of the human 
song: one that absurdly sings the value of what lives in the ruins, of the presence of 
love in the sensible despite the absence of the beloved, of a faint (weak?) promise 
beyond reason. Everywhere and nowhere, like the fragile ‘duvet de pissenlit 
[dandelion seeds]’ which could be scattered by a breath. 
 
– Mais comment donc lui ouvrirais-je, 
pas encore lavée du songe, 
mêlée à moitié de nuit? 
 
– But how could I open to him, 
not yet washed of the dream 




Caught between dream and the night, Fondane’s poetry utters, and in the Song of 
Songs finds a distillation of its own absurd gesture. Through bitterness and irony, 




Here is a combination of the unspeakability of absence and violence with the 
unsayability of longing and absurd hope. 
  In the same years that Adorno was reaching the conclusion that ‘even the 
blossoming tree lies the moment its bloom is seen without the shadow of terror’,  
Fondane was ‘withstanding horror’ (Adorno 2020, 28) by nonetheless singing ‘un 
panier de rosée [a basket of dew]’, in a voice ‘plus tremblante qu’un cil [trembling 
more than an eyelash]’(MF 189). This brings us to a paradox at the heart of 
irresignation that defines it as an activity. Where negative philosophy diagnoses and 
warns, Fondane’s poetry remains a gesture even when it expresses despair. This is a 
‘hope against hope’, a gesture towards a reader that by the fact of its occurrence is a 
resistance to silence or suicide. The imagery of nakedness and fruit that characterizes 
the Song of Songs does not only signify a celebration of sensuality and sensual 
hunger, but the dignity of subjective life even when dispossessed, and a hunger that 
refuses to be resigned, a hunger that propels the search for restitution even against all 
evidence of failure.  
 After being rendered desolate (‘– Les gardes de nuit m’ont trouvée | (que ma 
chair, que ma chair est blessée) [– The city watchmen found me | (how my flesh, how 
my flesh is wounded)]’; MF 189), the speaker concludes with these lines: 
 
Si vous voyez Celui que j’aime 
ne lui dites pas 
– ou dites-lui à peine – 
que l’on a vu saigner une fraise des  
bois… 
 
Should you see Him I love, 
do not tell him 
– or barely tell him – 
you have seen a wild strawberry  
bleed… 
Fondane’s reprisal of the Song of Songs is filled with quotation, and the novelty of 
the last line is startling.The poem, for all its sorrow and beauty, concludes with the 
passing on of a message, if ‘barely’. It is absurd: ‘He’ is not to be found, and the 
effort to keep active the life that exceeds the recognition and acceptance of the law – 
indeed of logic, as emphasised by the concluding metaphor, that lapses into 
wordlessness – occurs in the face of violence. Yet it is not ridiculous: it is the 
renewed attempt to keep what is beyond the sayable live. Although it is addressed to 
the ‘filles de Jérusalem!’, we cannot help feeling implicated by its ‘vous’. 
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 The affecting sincerity of the Song of Songs section, which is paradoxically 
created through its status as a placeless whisper, layered in metaphor and mythos, is 
underlined by the irony of the next voice following it. Another ‘mais’ throws us back 
to the guards: ‘Mais les gardes ont dit: “Assez de bavardages! | Chante-nous une 
chanson de Sion! | Chante. Juif!” [But the guards said: “Enough chatter! | Sing us a 
song of Zion! | Sing. Jew!”]’ (MF 190). The guards have just missed the song they 
demand like a trophy, one which could offer a ‘human song’ better than their bitter 
one. Between the hardness of accepting the logic of force and the vulnerability of 
resisting it is an unintelligibility, a myopia of the powerful, what we could call, in 
Lyotardian terms, a differend. ‘Comment voulez-vous que je chante sur une terre 
étrangère? [How shall I sing in a strange land?]’, responds the Chorus. Once again, 
the words of tradition are not simply repeated as a lament, but given new significance 
in the singular context of the poem. ‘Le malheur n’a-t-il plus de visage? [does 
suffering no longer have a face?]’ (MF 190), the Chorus asks, against the abstraction 
of suffering inherent in the reification of victimhood.  
 In singing a ‘human song’ despite the resounding silence that answers the 
Chorus’s question ‘Est-elle donc venue la Justice [?] [Has Justice come, then?]’ (MF 
190), L’Exode resists the logic of revenge demanded by the Weilian logic of force, 
and indeed expressed in Psalm 137 (‘blessed is he who repays you as you have done 
to us’). In this sense Fondane’s irresignation, though far from speaking in optimism 
or anticipation, preempts the liberation theology of Paulo Freire, who wrote that ‘the 
great humanistic and historical task of the oppressed [is] to liberate themselves and 
their oppressors as well’ (Freire 1996, 26). The understated register of Fondane’s 
version of the Song of Songs offers itself, simple as a strawberry, to any who will 
hear it. It contains a different expression of the hunger and thirst that burns 
throughout L’Exode, as in WAW’s lines: ‘Si la faim vous brûle | qu’allez-vous prier? 
| Si la soif vous brûle – dites-moi, dites-moi qu’allez-vous devenir? [If hunger burns 
you | what will you pray? | If thirst burns you – | tell me, tell me what will become of 
you?]’ (MF 155; CO 147). The ‘torrent de faim, de soif et de désordre [torrent of 
hunger, thirst and disorder]’ (MF 184), that lead to a refusal to stop looking for 
respite in the face of impossibility, is becalmed here, in a manner foreshadowed 
earlier by a nameless speaker: ‘la soif elle-même fond comme un fruit très mûr | et 




175). Like these lines, the Song of Songs trails off into wordlessness through an 
ellipsis. But the hunger that connects to the unsayable (‘dites-lui à peine’) therein 
concludes with the passing of a message: not so much the relaying of information as 
an injunction to keep the unsayable alive, apophatically, between those who continue 
to seek the words for it. 
 Mentions of hunger and thirst in L’Exode are never far away from mentions of 
le cri, an extra-rational, para-linguistic, interpellating expression of anguish which 
Fondane tries, absurdly, to force into words (the Préface, remember, states, full of 
contradictions, that the poem ‘n’est qu’un cri, qu’on ne peut pas mettre dans un 
poème parfait [only a cry, which cannot be put into a perfect poem]’, MF 153; 
CO143). This brings us to an important clarification: that the hunger is not only 
metaphysical, but also related to Rimbaldian motifs of affective independence: ‘Faim, 
soif, cris, danse, danse, danse, danse!’ (A Season in Hell). In her reading of Rimbaud, 
Kristin Ross points out how this line is counterpointed by the pacified, subjugated 
voice in the next scene of A Season in Hell: ‘La raison m’est né [I am reborn in 
reason]’ (Ross 2008, 68). While Rimbaud’s positive appropriation of ‘the primitive’ 
to oppose Western ‘civilization’ is still problematic,15 this juxtaposition perfectly 
highlights the radical dissection of affect in post-Enlightenment projects claiming to 
be guided by reason. Language itself is made complicit: plus de mots, Rimbaud’s 
speaker ejaculates. The body’s affirmations of its own existence – thirst, hunger, 
shouts, dances – are in every instance a revolt against the discourse which excludes 
them. Fondane’s poetry becomes an irruption of this revolt in language itself, and the 
cry, the hole of the open mouth, as gestured to by absences, italics, ellipses and 
exclamation marks, the insistence on the reality of what exceeds discourse. 
 
 
15 As is Fondane’s, although his discussion of ‘primitive’ thought is far from creating a ‘noble savage’ 
Other. Dominique Guedj (2003b, my translation): ‘For Fondane the dividing line between prelogical 
and logical thought does not separate so-called ‘primitive thought’– Fondane would almost certainly 
have said affective thought, or mythical, or analogue thought – from our own […] If there is a ‘rift’ 
between different modes of thought, it is internal to the human psyche, regardless of its ethnic, cultural 
or intellectual attachments. It is not so much a separation of the ‘civilized’ from the ‘primitive’ as it is 
the centre of the ‘tragic duality of the self’ [FT 25] discussed by Pascal.’ While any conception of the 
primitive is compromised by assumptions, Fondane’s use of the term does not function as a simple 
opposition to ‘civilized’ values but as a means to consider the inevitable failure of speculative 











From the Disconsolation of Philosophy to the Irresignation of Poetry 
 
The disaster is unknown; it is the unknown name for that in thought 
itself which dissuades us from thinking of it […] Alone, and thus 
exposed to the thought of disaster which disrupts solitude and 
overflows every variety of thought, as the intense, silent and 




Fondane’s frustrations with language are a frustration with the limits of thought. The 
cry reminds us that these frustrations are not only epistemological but affective. 
Kierkegaard wrote that ‘All existential problems are passionate problems, for when 
existence is interpenetrated with reflection it generates passion’(Kierkegaard 1941, 
313). The inevitability of passionate thought, which seems a paradox from a 
Cartesian perspective, is attested to in Fondane’s gloss on Kierkegaard: ‘Voici un 
homme vivant dont la pensée n’est pas une reflexion sur l’existence, mais le 
mouvement même de cette existence vers le VIVRE [Here is a living man whose 
thought is not a reflection on existence, but the very movement of that existence 
towards LIVING]’ (CM 203). And if the highest passion of thought, as he put it, is to 
discover something it cannot think, Fondane’s poetry represents a step beyond this 
movement, being an actual engagement with ‘le vivre’ itself. A revolt against the 
limits of the thinkable, tied to the actual experience of being. 
 The Intermède [Interlude] in L’Exode is as clear an articulation of revolt as 
anything in Fondane’s poetry. His return to poetry after his loss of faith in language 
marked an attempt to use words extra-rationally as a means to make a positive 




perpetuating exclusions and reductions.16 The voices and tropes wrought in the first 
part of the work, from the first Alphabet sequence to the Chorus and the ‘Voice of the 
Spirit’ by way of an intermingling of nameless ‘jes’, evidence the philsophical and 
theological complications of this step, with free-floating abstractions and sollipsistic 
preoccupations: ‘Le chair a beau crier: l’Angoisse est lourde. | Et l’Ange a beau 
gémir: il est lié [In vain the flesh cries: Anguish is heavy. | And the Angel moans in 
vain: he lies bounden]’ (MF 165); ‘A quoi te sert de fuir? L’Angoisse est prête. | – Je 
veux dormir. Qui crie? Est-ce moi? [What good will fleeing do you? Anguish is 
waiting. | – I want to sleep. Who’s crying? Is it me?]’ (MF 167); ‘quelquefois le 
gouffre prenait la voix d’un homme | il criait au secours: | “ PLUS HAUT, PLUS 
HAUT QUE L’HOMME!” | et cette solitude me donnait la nausée [but sometimes the 
abyss took the voice of a man | crying for help: | ‘HIGHER, HIGHER THAN MAN!’ 
| and this solitude made me sick]’ (MF 174). Such utterances are not as esoteric as 
they seem, when considered in light of the traditions engaged throughout the poem 
and their status, not as individual voices but as speakings that are juxtaposed and 
contrasted with many others across the work, with tropes that are both intertextual 
and semantically expansive. Nonetheless, the historicity that the Intermède injects 
into the work helps to mark the necessity for irresignation to be expressed through 
singularity and specificity, beyond the universalizing tendencies of philosophy, 
affectively tying together the linguistic and the social: 
 
[‘]si les cris des humains tombent  
                    comme châtaignes 
à terre, au gré du vent, 
sans altérer la paix des Anges, 
qu’est-ce que donc l’Exode? 
Si ce n’est pas vraiment une chose  
                                       éternelle 
– qu’est-ce donc?’ 
Et brusquement je fus jeté dans la  
                      campagne de France. 
  
 
[‘]if human cries fall to the ground 
like chestnuts, as the wind wills, 
without disturbing the peace of Angels, 
what then is Exodus? 
If there is really no eternal thing 
– what is it then?’ 
And I was abruptly thrown into the  




(MF 176; CO 167) 
 
16 For more on the broader intellectual context of Fondane’s negative philosophy and the 
background of this move to poetry as ‘a way of knowledge and a modality of expression that 
confronts – and constantly maintains the conflict with the rational and conscientious [… that] 





The Intermède is subtitled ‘Colère de la vision’: not just an angry vision that speaks 
in fury, but the poet’s anger at their own vision, at the limits of what can be seen and 
depicted, at the limits of the value of poetic vision. The interruption of the ‘drama’ is 
not simply the poet wearing the mask of themselves and speaking across the fourth 
wall: here too the text is broken into disparate sections, numbered this time, switching 
between singular and plural first person, mixed with third-person narration and 
second-person addresses to God. Again the status of the lyric voice is confused, 
gesturing towards an attempted ‘collective agency of enunciation’(Ross 2008 129). 
Following in the footsteps of Rimbaud, Fondane’s ‘ambivalence to figuration’ is also 
‘culturally and historically determined’(Ross 2008 130). The redployment of Jewish 
tropes and forms, already brave in the anti-Semitic climate of the 1930s, took on 
renewed significance during the Nazi invasion of France in 1940. Under the 
occupation, Fondane wrote, ‘la poésie cherche des amis, non du public [Poetry is 
looking for friends, not an audience]’ (MF 208): just by existing, his work is a 
resistance to authoritarian mass culture. 
 The variegated poetic forms of L’Exode give an impression of voices fighting 
to articulate a different kind of collectivity, trying out the flotsam of tradition among 
the interruptions of war’s dadaistic cries and lamentations, which prevent the 
realization of that collectivity. There is, appropriately, a kind of mise en abyme effect 
from the use of Jewish tropes, concerned as they are with the absence of and desire 
for covenant. Unlike philosophy in its conceptual constructions, poetry has the 
capacity to lay its own uncertainties bare. Even as l’Exode seeks the best 
‘éclate[ment] [eruption]’ of the ‘manière d’être [manner of being]’ (MF 208) of each 
of its voices through the masks of different times, places, myths and forms, the poem 
draws them together to unite the singular with the expansive: ‘Nous laissons derrière 
nous Paris. Ah! Si jamais | je t’oublie, Jérusalem... [We were leaving Paris behind us. 
Ah! If ever | I forget you, Jerusalem... ]’ (MF 179). The interplay of the unutterable 
between its utterances and the words themselves creates an affective tone. The 
potential for Fondane’s revolt to find resonance is inseparable from its singularity. In 
the Intermède, the pressing actuality of 1940 bursts through the entwinement of the 




groundlessness of modernity without subsuming them. Instead of analogy, all three 
aspects are expressed through and next to each other, reactivating their affective 
connection by way of the reader’s own engagement.  
 In reading, the reader has an opportunity to participate in the performance of a 
resistance to the obliteration of the existent through the poem’s assertion of the value 
of what is transient and intrinsically affective.17 Fondane synchronically connects 
Judaeo-Christian tropes to all those fleeing the invasion, opening up space to 
implicate all colonized peoples with this experience of colonization, offering 
solidarity with Jewish experiences of dispossession. At the same time as this, he 
diachronically reactivates French history, energizing the still-latent universality of 
revolutionary and communard ideals through the fact of their articulation, 
prioritizing the real over the ideal, and casting this situation forward to the living 
reader. Consider Intermède V: 
 
Je vous ai tous comptés 
civils d’hier, comptables,  
                        boutiquiers, paysans 
et ouvriers d’usine et clochards  
                                       dont le nid 
est sous les ponts de Notre-Dame 
et bedeaux de sacristie et fils  
                               de l’Assistance 
publique, tous Français de France,  
                          aux yeux limpides, 
ou du Congo, du bled algérien,  
                                        d’Annam 
avec des palmiers flottant dans le  
                                           regard 
et des Français venus des îles  
                                       Caraïbes, 
Français selon les droits de  
                                       l’homme, 
fils de la barricade et de la  
                                      guillotine, 
sans-culottes, le front  
                      incorruptible, libres, 
et des Tchèques, et des Polonais,  
                               des Slovaques 
et des Juifs de tous les ghettos de  
I have counted you all 
yesterday’s civilians, accountants,  
                            shopkeepers, peasants 
and factory workers and tramps whose  
                                                      nests 
are under the bridges of Notre-Dame 
and sacristy beadles and dependents  
of the State, all Frenchmen from  
                  France, with clear eyes, 
or from Congo, from deepest  
                     Algeria, from Annam 
with palm-trees floating in their  
                                              gaze 
and Frenchmen come from  
                          Caribbean islands, 
French according to the rights of  
                                              man, 
sons of the barricade and of the  
                                      guillotine, 
sans-culottes, incorruptible  
                              foreheads, free, 
and Czechs, and Poles, and  
                                          Slovaks 
and Jews from all the ghettos of  
 
17 For more on the philosophical background to notions of participation in Fondane’s thought and his 
troubling of genres of writing, see Jutrin 2003. 
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                                     ce monde, 
qui aimaient cette terre et ses  
                    ombres et ses fleuves, 
qui ont ensemencé de leur mort  
                                       cette terre 
et qui sont devenus français, selon  
                                           la mort. 
 
                                       the world, 
who loved this earth and its  
                   shadows and its rivers, 
who have sown this earth with  
                                      their death 
and who have become French, by  
                                 right of death. 
 
(MF 178; CO 171) 
 
Elsewhere, the poem uses shadows to stand in for those who are allowed no reality in 
the history books, and rivers to express their homelessness: still the poem can affirm 
love for them and their situation.  
 The poem contains a weak messianic hope held in the expression of the 
specific. Poetry is where one is most likely to, in Anne Carson’s words, ‘encounter a 
fragment of unexhausted time. Who can name its transactions, the sense that fell 
through us of untouchable wind, unknown effort – one black mane?’ (Carson 2002a, 
viii). Having described the refugees on the road ‘dormant sur les chevaux [sleeping 
on horses]’ (MF 177) in Intermède II, in XVII Fondane poignantly addresses an 
abandoned horse: ‘Cheval, ayant perdu ton cavalier, quel long | regard amer, le tien. 
Tes croupes sont usés | comme une vielle chaise [Horse, now you’ve lost your rider, 
what a long | bitter look you have. Your haunches are worn | like an old chair.’(MF 
185). One has the sense that this is a real horse. If, like Rimbaud, Fondane uses 
language that ‘threatens to move beyond language’(Ross 2008, 133), it is primarily in 
relationship with the real, le vivant. This urge acts as a sort of anti-tradition to 
Symbolism and the pure linguistic creation of which Mallarmé is the paragon.18  
 The irresigned tone of L’Exode, then, is something to do with the tension 
between three modes of time: a transtemporal vision that seeks affective affinity, 
historical specificity and an affirmation of the intrinsic value of the present moment, 
latent with ‘unexhausted time’, a trace which is reactivated in reading.19 In Intermède 
 
18 The paradox of this anti-Symbolist interpenetration of the poetic and the historic is nicely captured 
by Kristin Ross’s assertion that in Rimbaud ‘the lyric – that unique, evanescent, exception moment – 
tells a story’(Ross 2008, 76). We may think also of the contrast amongst the Romantics, notably the 
distinction between John Keats’s idealized use of nature and its foreshadowing of Symbolism, and 
John Clare’s ‘transactions’, with the sense ‘falling through’ actual, specific birds and trees. See for 
example Erchinger 2018, Parshley 2013 and McAlpine 2011. 
19 This picks up from Fondane’s interest in a paradoxically non-universal philosophy, which runs 
throughout his philosophical writing, his fascination for ‘la fulguration d’un moment unique [the 




XVII the thirsty, restless horse wanders round the well in the deserted farm. A 
wounded, brutalized soldier wanders into the yard, takes water and closes the well 
without attending to the horse, before collapsing from his wounds. Sandwiched 
between XVI and XVIII, which are written in verse (although XVIII ends the 
Intermède by emphasizing the paradoxical co-existence of unspeakable horror and 
singing in the dark times by reproducing sing-song quatrains that subvert themselves 
by not rhyming: ‘et la nuit est tombée brusquement. | Mais les rossignols ont chanté | 
tout de même! [and suddenly night has fallen. | But the nightingales have sung | all 
the same!]’; MF 186), the prose poetry of XVII is elegiacally modern. While firmly 
contextualized by the Intermède’s opening sections which speak unequivocally of the 
1940 invasion, the scene – horse, soldier, farm, well, desecration, thirst – ties in 
previous catastrophes: the First World War, pogroms, countless aftermaths of 
massacres in rural Europe going back to Homer.20 A subversion of linear time is 
operative: the historicity of the moment is confronted without being subsumed into 
either a progressive narrative or broken into untouchable atomization.  
 The presence of the horse also reiterates the apophatic actions of the poem. 
Intermède XVII (MF 185-185) stages the leap involved between affect and 
communication, and also the act of intersubjective recognition that is fundamental to 
a shared experience of unsayability, as well as the pain of its absence.  
 
Il va au puits,  
boit au seau et recouvre le puits d’un 
mouvement  
mécanique. Cheval, je te vois  
                                            approcher  
et regarder cette eau. Tu as été aussi 
de la bataille, du massacre. 
He goes to the well, 
drinks from the bucket and shuts 
the well with a mechanical 
movement. Horse, I see you 
approach 
and stare at that water. You too 
were at the battle, the massacre. 
 
20 The entirety of L’Exode is contextualized by its epigraph from Homer: ‘Les dieux ont ordonné la 
mort de ces hommes afin d’être sujets de chants pour les générations à venir’, which is given by 
Samuel Butler as ‘The gods arranged all this, and sent them their misfortunes in order that future 
generations might have something to sing about’. With these words, King Alcinous enjoins Odysseus 
to tell his story (in book VIII of the Odyssey). Fondane follows the epigraph with an ironic ‘ET VOILÀ!’, 
undermining the implication that human lives could simpy be grist to the mill of art. The irony is 
tempered, though, by the notion that suffering is worth telling. L’Exode displays an anguish at all 
human suffering, for all the nuances of oppression and persecution. This far-seeing, compassionate 
perspective is mirrored and emphasized in Simone Weil’s response to the invasion of France and 
occupation of Paris, published alongside Fondane’s contributions in Les Cahiers du Sud. In The Iliad 
or the Poem of Force (1940/1941) she highlights Homer’s lamenting loss of life irrespective of 
affiliation: ‘The entire Iliad is overclouded by the worst of human calamities, the destruction of a city. 
This calamity could not seem more heartrending if the poet had been born at Troy’ (Weil 2006, 65).  
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Tu ne sais pas parler, tu danse autour  
                                              du puits, 
tu danses autour de l’homme, 
mais le soldat fourbu s’est allongé  
                                            par terre, 
les yeux ouverts. Tu danses de plus  
                               en plus. Le jour 
monte son ombre autour du puits.  
                                Silence. L’eau. 
 
You are speechless, you dance 
round the well, 
you dance round the man, 
but the knackered soldier is 
stretched out on the ground, 
eyes open. You dance on and on. 
The day 
raises its shadow around the well. 
Silence. Water. 
The discourse of war has dehumanized, left in the ruins it has engendered a soldier 
who is ‘mécanique’, and the dance and thirst of a horse represent an unquenchable 
affectivity, written tenderly where Rimbaud’s ‘primitive’ is written in anger and 
sarcasm (although both, importantly, are present elsewhere in L’Exode, offering an 
energy beyond mourning without refusing it).21 Fondane uses cinematic thinking, 
already proffered by the description in XVII, which recalls his film scripts and 
cinépoems, to weave together the pathos of the scene with a wider philosophical 
resonance: 
 
Dans tes grands yeux ouverts de  
           l’homme, ton image 
s’est écroulée, immense. Elle est  
              sortie du champ. 
Pardon, cheval! 
 
In the man’s wide-open eyes, your  
                        image 
has collapsed, that loomed so large.  
              It has left the field. 
Forgive him, horse! 
(MF 186) 
 
War’s field of vision has no place for the bucolic field. The tes in the Verdier edition 
may well be a misprint for les. Yet the strange syntax helps to reinforce the sense that 
 
21 Anger is woven with sorrow in the Intermède, e.g. XI: ‘Colère, je t’ai appelée aux heures de soufre 
et de feu | quand toute terre tremble! [Anger, I called on you in the hour of brimstone and fire 
when the whole world shakes!]’ (MF 182). Sarcasm is apparent in the speech of the Babylonians, but 
also in the voice of the narrator who grows weary of his catastrophic perspective of the follies of 
mankind (MF 198): 
 
J’ai vu les faux prophètes au travail:  
ils étaient à cheval sur l’homme 
ils tranchaient de la vie, de la mort 
et la vie coulait entre leurs dents 
la mort passait entre leurs jambes.  
 
I’ve seen false prophets at work: 
they were sat astride mankind  
they were carving up life and death 
life flowed between their teeth 






‘man’s’ eyes, the gaze of human priorities, the hegemonic visions that order society, 
wreak havoc by their certainties and exclusions.  
 The terminal gaze is in contrast to the soldier’s eyes when he first appears:  
 
              les yeux hagards, emplis 
de visions, en vain cherche dans les  
                                           armoires 
fiévreusement des choses secrètes.  
 
 
                                   his wild eyes filled 
with visions, searches in vain through the  
                                                 cupboards, 




The desperation of the soldier, seeking some image in his memory to take him away 
from his present suffering, is, not allegorically but analogically, akin to the 
desperation of the poet, who seeks fantastical visions to save himself from the 
knowledge of suffering. On the face of it, Intermède XVII, especially read in 
isolation, seems to leave a taste of helplessness, if not outright despair. It is the work 
of a poet who has despaired indeed of being rescued by visions. Yet one who 
nonetheless writes poetry. Despair in the transcendent potential of poetry has been 
met with the courage to engage with reality, despite the fact that this can never be 
done adequately, never be done completely. The water that all through L’Exode 
communicates groundlessness and instability is also a sign that life is all around, 
though, as for the thirsty horse, in many ways denied to many.   
 Irresignation sounds as a refusal to abandon reality, even by the expression of 
its insufficiencies and the desire to soothe them. The pathos of XVII, in context with 
the rest of the Intermède, contains an injunction to the present, a resistance to the 
exclusion of lived reality. It is also an injunction both to be careful with language and 
to take risks with it. For Fondane, poetry is an attempt at language as pure means, in a 
Benjaminian sense, free of external criteria of ends, or from being ‘reduced to 
impulses from beyond the sphere of mediacy’ (Hamacher 1994, 116). It cannot 
succeed, because the presence of the word is always also an exclusion: it always 
relates to an instance, and always fails to resolve it. But, in Levinasian terms, it can 
trouble the notion of ‘pure ethical saying’ (Critchley 2009), disrupting the comfort of 
194 
 
the ‘Said of politics and law’ by sustaining contradictions, affirming affectivity and 
foregrounding its own inadequacy.22  
I want to argue, as Kristin Ross does of Rimbaud and A Season in Hell, that 
L’Exode ‘bears a distinctly different relation to the event than one of cataloguing or 
understanding; it materializes as a thought taken up with, vitally engaged with 
exterior forces, a problem-thought rather than a narrated, completed thought’ (Ross 
2008, 49). The tensions, subversions and contradictions sustained across the work 
prevent it from being closed into a reading, as either merely the trace of an individual 
consciousness or as a descriptive record of an event. L’Exode’s irresignation in the 
face of disaster keeps its meaning open and propels interpretation into the future. 
Where Benjamin reads the source of weak messianic power back into history 
implicitly, it is as if Rimbaud or Fondane’s poetry actively resists the definition of an 
event’s significance in order to consciously implicate those who are yet to come. In 
Fondane’s case at least, with the Préface’s address to the ‘men of the antipodes’, this 
opening is made explicit. 
 The vitality of irresignation is set aflame by the circumstances of catastrophe – 
as Salazar-Ferrer puts it, ‘an exposing of the poet to extreme mental states, when they 
have broken past logic, cognitive rationality and the mental barriers of ethics’ 
(Salazar-Ferrer 2005, 61, my translation). The very unspeakability of catastrophe 
leads Fondane to a sense of artistic duty, of art as resistance. This resistance is not 
necessarily ethical and is independent of political projects. As singing in the dark 
times it is proto-political: an affirmation of human life when its value can no longer 
be taken for granted. It is primarily a resistance to the domination of a particular 
relationship to the real, what Louis Janover calls ‘the affirmation […] of the 
unassailable rights of the poetic experience’ to ‘explore every domain supposed to be 
unproductive, the domain of thought, of psychological analysis, of solitude’ (Janover 
1997, 11, my translation). If, in Blanchotian terms, ‘desiring the ruin of language 
ends up making it live’ (Vanborre 2005, 211, my translation), L’Exode is written by a 
poet who is fully cognizant – connaissant – of this, who, in fact, has gone beyond the 
 
22 The primacy of the actual and the subversion of the Law as ideal are constant drivers of Fondane’s 
philosophical writing. They are most succinctly addressed in Le Lundi Existenitel’s appropriation of 





desire to transcend the real through the medium of language and has committed to 
living with it in that medium, while at the same time being aware of the medium’s 
insufficiencies. Fondane insists upon the poet’s duty to subvert thought and open up 
new linguistic possibilities while knowing there is no achievable final knowledge or 
‘correct’ representation. 
 L’Exode is Fondane’s poetry in action as ‘courage for anguish in the face of 
death,’ (CM 192) a rejection of false hinterlands in a living for what is. It is an act of 
irresignation in the face of the irredeemability of human subjectivity, which desires 
mastery and eternity but is faced with the evidence of failure and mortality. These 
affective dimensions betray the fact that there is in fact no objective certainty in 
rational thought, no absolute delineating standard of truth that separates knowledge 
and folly. The limitations and fallibility of knowledge collide with a fundamental 
condition of ineffability: ‘le réel en sa totalité[...] ne se laisse pas penser [the real in 
its totality [...] does not let itself be thought]’ (CM 193). 
 If Mallarméan poetics represented a desire to overcome this impasse by 
substituting a perfect imaginary for an imperfect reality, L’Exode is not just a critical 
refusal of this sterile escape but a commitment to reality along with all its suppressed 
affective dimensions. As maker, the poet does not simply frame reality, but 
intervenes in our relationship to it. Lamenting the world’s horror while refusing to 
run from it into a brittle palace of truth or beauty, L’Exode demonstrates poetry’s 
extra-rational power to affirm, revolting against the limits of language and its 
dangerous potential to reify by turning it into an intersubjective artistic performance 
of affective power. The present seems irredeemable, yet here it is: 
 
 
Non, ce n’est pas fini! 
Le cœur est haletant, ce viscère de  
paix, 
l’estomac ne digère que  
                         mollement l’angoisse 
l’œil ne repose plus sur lui-même et  
                                                le sang 
éprouve que c’est lui l’élément  
                                            angulaire, 
le fleuve originel, le cri premier, la  
                                                   voix, 
No, it is not finished! 
The heart, that organ of peace, is panting, 
the stomach struggles to digest anguish, 
the eye no longer settles itself and the  
                            blood 
finds it is the foundational element 
the originary river, the primordial cry, the  
                              voice, 
the paradise whence man, having emerged 
at dawn 
wet from his trespass 
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le paradis d’où l’homme étant sorti à  
                                                 l’aube 
humide de l’offense 
s’avança dans la lourde puanteur des       
chevaux. 
 








As Acquisto puts it, ‘he affirms the need [...] to generate a full picture of human 
subjectivity in a way that resists reason’s potential for reductionism’ (Acquisto 2015, 
70). That task is endless, and requires the irrationality of poetry in order to move 
beyond the confines of philosophy’s exclusions and negativity.  
 
The Unending Road 
 
Fondane refuses to turn away from reality to any kind of certainty, be it theological, 
meta-historical or aesthetic. Indeed, we might say, analogously, that he rejects the 
certainty of truth, goodness or beauty. L’Exode exemplifies Fondane’s holistic, anti-
systematic approach, taking his assertion that ‘nous sommes à la fois, en tant que 
citoyens du malheur social, des êtres politiques, et en tant que citoyens du malheur 
humain, des êtres métaphysiques [We are, as citizens of social discontent, political 
beings, and as citizens of human unhappiness, metaphysical beings]’ (CM x, 
translation Acquisto) and offering a combined, irresigned response, ‘dût cette 
irrésignation être–ou paraître–absurdité et folie [even if that irresignation must be – or 
seem – an absurdity or madness]’ (CM xvii).23 Salazar-Ferrer shows how L’Exode 
ties all of these aspects together:  
 
As with the poem titled ‘Refusal of the Poem’, in which the poet expresses 
the impossibility of lyricism in war, the poem’s formal beauty gives way to a 
historical real which violently irrupts into its field of meaning. Exile 
becomes a metaphysical theme: man is exiled from his original plenitude, 
and all the suffering of the outsider in historical exile [i.e. in an actual 
 
23 Fondane’s holistic view bolsters his consideration of himself a ‘petit frère’ of Rimbaud (Orlandini 
2014) in the light of Ross’s argument that the latter’s poetry ‘gives the lie to readings that would 
construct the poetic and the sociolect as contradictory or warring terms’ (Ross 129), always a 




material instance of exile] reactivates this existential sense of exile. (Salazar-
Ferrer 2005, 57) 
 
Salazar-Ferrer thus argues that L’Exode is an attempt to deal with the unhappy 
consciousness, the loss of the childlike unity of mind and reality.24 But as a poem it 
goes, absurdly, beyond a mere rational attempt at understanding: it is a response to 
suffering and death, staging their ineffable reality while affirming life in the 
incomplete presence of its words.  
 Fondane’s poetry speaks a pessimism that in its speaking signifies an absurd 
hope, acknowledging the presence and power of the ineffable but refusing to 
surrender to silence. Anne Carson argues that such speaking in despair is a 
‘contrafactual condition’: 
 
a poet’s despair is not just personal; he despairs of the word and that 
implicates all our hopes. Every time a poet writes a poem he is asking the 
question, Do the words hold good? And the answer has to be yes: it is the 
contrafactual condition upon which a poet’s life depends. (Carson 2002a, 
121) 
 
L’Exode stages gestures of hopeless hope, performing a going-on against the 
impossible, a starting-again in the face of the inconceivability of happy endings. Here 
are linguistic affirmations in the midst of the fallibility of language, affirmations that 
do not save the poet in and of themselves but which do call the reader into question. 
 In this chapter I have built up a sense of the tone of irresignation in L’Exode 
through means themselves somewhat apophatic. I have written through the absences 
and contradictions of the work, which as poetry makes something extra-rational 
happen in writing, in what Blanchot calls ‘the disastrous ruin of thought’ (Blanchot 
1995, 41). I am doubly aware, then, of ‘the difficulty of a commentary’ and have 
 
24 It is irrelevant whether Fondane held this post-lapsarian conception literally, the point is that the 
longing for an accord between existent and universe was real. Fondane’s concern was not so much 
how to overcome the unhappy consciousness as to live with it. Acquisto: ‘It is important to specify 
that, like Baudelaire’s Fondane’s reference to the religious or theological has nothing of an orthodox 
affirmation of faith in a God and certainly not of the redemptive God […] Fondane adopts the 
vocabulary and structures of religious thought in ways that bracket questions of belief or practice but 
retain the full force of theology as a mode of thought […] in a conceptul framework that has much in 
common with Horkheimer and Adorno’s dialectic of Enlightenment, the catastrophe of the mid-
twentieth century that Fondane lived and which he attempted to theorize in its full metaphysical force’ 
(Acquisto 2015, 70). 
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aimed to make apparent the inevitability of producing supplementary signification, 
‘unable to sustain an absent meaning’ (Blanchot 1995, 41). Fondane’s tone of 
irresignation is to be found in the collectivity of the work, akin to what Ross calls a 
swarm effect (Ross 2008, 103). The tension between the lyric and other poetic forms 
allow the singular and the collective to provisionally, incompletely co-exist, 
amounting to a pluralistic affirmation that, in sustaining contradiction and 
incompleteness, proclaims its revolt against exclusion and finitude without instituting 
a new exclusionary unity. Patrice Beray’s summary of the operations of these formal 
tensions in Le Mal des fantômes is worth quoting at length here: 
 
in those years of the Occupation where his very existence was constantly 
threatened by his Jewish status, it is remarkable that the poet upturns and 
exceeds metricality’s logics of identity and ideology […] our collective 
History in full is framed by the poem through an excessive, personal practice 
of versification, a style of writing both historical and collective. Overflowing 
the old mould, the metre’s speaking becomes the moving, unending subject 
of the poem: the speech of a witness sung at the top of his lungs, full of the 
voice that resounds under the feet of the emigrant: ‘The road walks and 
never ends’ [Ulysse; MF 38]. (Beray 2006, 224, my translation) 
 
 Temporally, L’Exode is elegiac without permitting itself to be read as a 
monument, which would reify as it remembered. Instead it implicates the reader in its 
experience of exile, asserting its own singularity and historicity while confronting us 
with an affective affinity that cannot be denied without existential and 
epistemological self-harm or dismembering. Let us return to a most naïve sense of 
poetic tone as representing an attitude. Taken together, the contrasting voices and 
forms of L’Exode form ‘the embracing of a posture in the world’ (Ross 2008, 152), 
one that encompasses the refusal of both final solutions and silence. A tone of 
irresignation. 
 In the next chapter, I will expand this discussion of L’Exode into an analysis of 
Fondane’s ‘living-the-poem’ as an intervention, suggesting a framework of poetic 
testimony as a means of understanding the specificities of his work and of connecting 







Towards Poetic Testimony 
 
The Artist and The Eyewitness 
 
In her book Violence Without God: The Rhetorical Despair of Twentieth-Century 
Writers, Joyce Wexler frames an opposition between eyewitness testimony and 
artistic responses to the catastrophic effects of violence in the modern era, including 
its effects within the domains of signification and discourse themselves. Focusing on 
literature, she writes that  
 
common strategies in twentieth-century texts reflect the continuing need to 
represent unimaginable violence in the absence of communal belief – religious or 
secular [...] Explanations, justifications and condemnations were inadequate. The 
challenge of representing these events was to convey their gravity without 
presuming to define their significance.’ (Wexler 2017, 149) 
  
The language-defying scope of this challenge is communicated even in the attempt to 
state it: how can violence be represented if it is ‘unimaginable’? And the choice of 
how to begin immediately throws the writer upon the twin horns of a dilemma: 
‘realist narratives imply that the unfathomable horror of events is knowable and 
describable, and antirealist accounts bury the specificity of events in a “discourse of 
unrepresentability and unknowability”’ (Wexler 2017, 151–152).  
 In keeping with the interpretations of modernist attitudes towards 
representation I set out in the earlier chapters of this thesis, Wexler covers the turn 
away from the perceived insufficiencies and obfuscations of realism to the ‘extremity, 
excess and irony [that] push readers beyond the empirical referent towards multiple 
symbolic meanings’ (Wexler 2017, 19). The binary she sets up is essentially between 
the eyewitness’s singular (usually legal or reportive) statement that fails to stand in 
for the whole and in using ‘realist’ language betrays the ‘unimaginability’ of the 
event, and the artist’s ‘radical narrative irony that does not depend on a speaker’s 
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intentions [...] the range of scenes and social discourses [...] prevents readers from 
discerning any consistent narrative tone or point of view’ (Wexler 2017, 99).  
 L’Exode certainly employs strategies of extremity, excess and irony, as well as 
‘parallels between similar events [that] preserve their specificity’ (Wexler 2017, 19). 
Yet Wexler argues that with their proliferation of irony modernist writers ultimately 
failed in their duty to address violence, signifying little, to recall Emma Bell’s phrase, 
beyond a ‘reluctance to signify’ (Bell 2010, 5). Her contention is that an assertion of 
the essential incommunicability of individual experience is sterile, with ‘no basis for 
a wider consensus’ (Wexler 2017, 187). This is a defensible view, if a pessimistic and 
limited one. However, she then leaps to an astonishing, and in my view deeply 
problematic, claim: that for a brief period after 11 September 2001, sincerity became 
possible, as evidenced in the poem When the Towers Fell by Galway Kinell, because 
it is an ‘elegy [that] mourns a communal loss and speaks for all victims’ (Wexler 
2017, 186).  
 Although When The Towers Fell is a prose poem, it has significant formal and 
thematic parallels to L’Exode. Like L’Exode’s Intermède, it was written in response 
to the author’s direct experience of a catastrophic event. It too employs multiple 
characters and voices, and incorporates fragments from other works (with even more 
overt direct quotation). It is heavily influenced by Eliot’s The Waste Land, as the title 
indicates, which means that it shares L’Exode’s mythical Biblical resonances of 
disaster and lack of earthly succour.1 Quotations from Aleksander Wat’s story ‘Songs 
of a Wanderer’ and Paul Celan’s ‘Death Fugue’ bring it degrees closer to Fondane. 
Like Fondane, Kinnell questions the relationship between imagination and reality: 
‘At the high window, where I’ve often stood to escape a nightmare, I meet the single, 
unblinking eye lighting the all-night’ (Kinnell 2002).  
 Both poems act commemoratively. Kinnell’s final lines are particularly 
poignant:  
 
As each tower goes down, it concentrates into itself, transforms itself 
infinitely slowly into a black hole 
 
 
1 While the tower of Babel is not central in Fondane’s work, its joining of physical and linguistic 
catastrophe is a context so ubiquitous it barely needs stated: ‘Babylone, que ta langue est mauvaise! 




infinitesimally small: mass without space, where each light, each life, put 
out, lies down within us. (Kinell 2002) 
 
This equation of the (inverted) infinity of immanent space with the imaginative 
remembering that links people to one another mirrors the performance of this 
intersubjectivity in L’Exode. However, while both poems deal with absence, 
Kinnell’s poem is about the absence of the dead, whereas Fondane’s is everywhere 
concerned with the living. L’Exode deals with the conundrum of affirming the lives 
still being lived as it pre-empts the absence of the present context of voices once they 
reach the reader, ‘étonnés de si peu comprendre – | avez-vous mieux compris que 
moi? [astonished to understand so little – | have you understood better than I?]’ (MF 
152; CO 141).  
 Kinnell’s poem shares the compassion of L’Exode, and I agree with Wexler 
that it is not an admission of failure in the task of representation. There are some 
elements which are perhaps contentious. L’Exode gives human voice to perpetrators 
(for example, in the characters of the Babylonian guards and priest) and engages with 
the reasons, however preposterous, that motivate them: Jews are ‘accusés d’un délit 
que vous n’avez pas fait | d’un meurtre dont il manque encore le cadavre [accused of 
a crime you did not commit | of murder where there isn’t a body]’ (MF 153; CO 143). 
These lines succinctly tie together Nazi political scapegoating and ancient traditions 
of blood libel and the murder of Christ. On the other hand, When The Towers Fell 
risks reducing Islamist terrorism to an abstract evil. Even the pairing of ‘New York 
and Kabul’ is more likely to connote the global nature of a threat of senseless 
violence by Muslim ‘barbarians’ than it is drone strikes.  
 Significantly, as Wexler notes, Kinnell’s poem stresses a certain sense of 
unreality which it shares with The Waste Land (which was arguably signalling the 
devaluing of worldy things to point towards a higher Christian reality [Freer 2015, 
77]). When The Towers Fell and Fondane’s Intermède both communicate a sense of 
shock through a collage of allusion, questioning and fragmentation. However, where 
for Kinnell a ‘sheet of mock reality’is ‘cast over our world’ and the fatal plane is 
reminiscent of a ‘cartoon plane’ (Kinnell 2002), for Fondane the catastrophe 
actualizes an existential maelstrom already present in his poetics. For Fondane, myth 
is the carrier of an existential real which dovetails with the catastrophic present. Such 
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an existential signification is, however, also implicit in Kinnell’s quotations of 
individual poets, which layer into the encounter with the terrible event.  
 My quarrel is not with Kinnell’s poem, but with Wexler’s conclusion. In 
Wexler’s view ‘Kinnell’s beautiful images of a terrible event condemn the terrorists 
and commemorate the victims. This is not a hopeful message, but it is a meaning’ 
(Wexler 2017, 186). Elegy may indeed be an important and valid part of responding 
to catastrophe. We may even allow that ‘beautiful images of a terrible event’ could be 
appropriate, if handled carefully, though we are on dangerous ground: aesthetically 
ennobling victims can also be dehumanizing, and aestheticizing the physical 
particulars of violent events is risky (as Weil points out in her treatment of the 
Illiad).2 But Wexler’s claim that the representational impasse can be overcome by 
defeating irony with a new sincerity that ‘speaks for a new community’ (Wexler 
2017, 186) bypasses many of the stakes she has set out elsewhere in her book. It 
flattens not just the imperative to mourn without claiming to have fully realized that 
mourning because the loss is too great, but also the fact that catastrophe does not 
simply create a disruption of meaning but exposes a fundamental instability. Wexler’s 
implication that the disruption can be repaired with ‘a new global fusion’ is not 
merely glib, it also perpetrates the epistemological violence modernist writers strove 
to avoid.  
 ‘Condemning the terrorists and commemorating the victims’ is inadequate, and 
it severely limits the context of the commemoration. Wexler argues that for the period 
of commemoration, the ‘Age of Irony’ came to an end: ‘suddenly, feelings seemed 
real’ (Wexler 2017, 184). She quotes journalist Roger Rosenblatt: the anger is ‘real’, 
the pain is ‘too real’. But one item on Rosenblatt’s list is revealing: ‘the greatness of 
the country: real’ (Wexler 2017, 184). Wexler talks about a post-9/11 ‘sense of 
community’ as if it were a universal. Let us be blunt: in her schema, the unstated 
implication is that these feelings only become real when experienced by Americans 
 
2 Weil’s argument that the Iliad word-paints its moments of value, such as the depiction of dreams, 
desires and love, while rendering its violence in the starkest of terms, is key to her assertion that 
‘the misery of all is revealed without dissimulation or condescension; no man is set above or below the 
common human condition; all that is destroyed is regretted. Victors and victims are equally close to us, 




(although Kinnell’s poem gestures beyond them, with multi-lingual quotations and 
references to other terrible events).3  
 Her reading of Kinnell’s poem also seems to make a virtue out of ahistoricity: 
despite the poet’s use of parallel, alluding to twentieth-century violence and 
referencing, as Fondane does, Villon and Whitman, which would seem to give us a 
similar perspective to the Benjaminian Angel of History, Wexler seems to see some 
kind of restitution, ‘a new consensus’ (Wexler 2017, 186).4 The terrorists are reduced 
to an abstract evil without context, akin to the attitude Fondane criticized in all who 
saw Hitler as a monstrous, barbaric, essentialized evil rather than a historical and all-
too-human phenomenon (EM 56–59). The modernist crisis of representation is not 
only one of how to represent unspeakable horror, it is also inherently an engagement 
with the intractable problems of the history and politics in which a given event in 
enmeshed, with the contexts the writer already finds themselves in. In The Waste 
Land Eliot poeticized the chaos and barrenness of modernity in order to point the way 
to the necessity of Christian faith. Wexler’s humanist version does not even have a 
supernatural guarantor for its claim of unity renewed. 
 I want to use L’Exode to argue that there is another trend in twentieth-century 
writing: one that, while not claiming to overcome the impasse, seeks to find ways of 
living with it and gesturing beyond it, through a juxtaposition of irony and sincerity. 
It is significant that the fragile return to unity Wexler envisages in Kinnell’s poem is 
grounded in his use of the first person ‘unifying the different elements of the poem’ 
(Wexler 2017, 184). For Wexler, polyvocality means bitter irony only (Eliot is her 
prototype) and its cure seems to be a return to the ‘je’ problematized by Rimbaud 
 
3 Kinnell’s poem also gestures to New York multiculturalism with a mention of ‘Humberto’ who is 
‘delivering breakfast sandwiches’. This gesture, however, is more uneasy, suggesting that difference is 
subordinate to the aegis of Americanization. Further, Humberto is the only personage in the poem 
given a proper name, which instead of humanizing in this instance risks being othering: it is easy 
enough to imagine the office where the ‘sandwich boy’ is known by his first name while the ‘banker’ 
and ‘trader’ are addressed more formally (and implicitly associated with whiteness).  
4 Kinnell’s excerption of verse XXXIX of Villon’s Grant Testament is highly Fondanian, its ‘povres et 
riches . . . poor and rich Sages et folz, prestres et laiz Wise and foolish, priests and laymen Nobles, 
villains, larges et chiches Noblemen, serfs, generous and mean Petiz et grans et beaulx et laiz Short 
and tall and handsome and homely’ emphasizing a shared humanity much as Fondane’s pastiche does 
(MF 187), though less humorously. Anguish and perhaps irresignation are latent in his citations of 
Whitman’s When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloom’d. Along with Villon, Whitman was a major 
influence for Fondane (Salazar-Ferrer 2007, 142), including during the occupation (see Dumas 2005). 
When Lilacs contains the lines ‘Song of the bleeding throat, | Death’s outlet song of life, (for well dear 
brother I know, | If thou wast not granted to sing thou would’st surely die’ (Whitman 1865), which 
marries the cry of anguish with the poem as Fondane would later strive to do.  
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decades before the twentieth century. As we have seen in the previous two chapters, 
Fondane counterposes a moving sincerity of lyric (as in the Préface and the Song of 
Songs passage) with other voices, lyric and otherwise, that do not erase the value of 
the former but which prevent ‘beautiful images’ from leading to a settled comfort. 
His ‘anti-modern’ modernism is of a different sort. Instead of attempting to impose a 
new unity of meaning or merely lamenting the unity that has been lost, his is an 
attempt to go on without it. 
 Fondane is both eyewitness and artist, ‘a very dear ghost, whose powerful irony 
is invigorating’ (Darras 2006, my translation). L’Exode combines glints of sincere 
statement with an explicit subversion of language’s powers of representation, 
affirming without claiming authority. Although they do not map perfectly, it may be 
worth associating irony in his work with disconsolation, polyvocality and mood, 
while thinking sincerity by way of irresignation, the lyric voice and tone. While the 
tone, in Wexler’s sense, may not be consistent, this does not mean the different 
voices simply cancel each other out. L’Exode is an ‘indeterminate text’ and yet it 
‘bears witness to specific acts’ (Wexler 2017, 19).  
 Part of the problematic is the question that haunts Wexler’s book: why is there a 
responsibility to attempt to represent catastrophic acts (or events, or processes) of 
violence? Is it simply to gain a knowledge of them, which could inspire a Weilian 
empathetic response? Catastrophe is unspeakable, but also exposes a more 
fundamental inadequacy in language. Meaning-making in response to it could be an 
attempt to live with this inadequacy rather than overcome it, and poetry can make 
affirmations at the same time as demanding we attend to the provisionality of 
meaning. Irresignation becomes an injunction to participate, rather than simply to 
know. The poem becomes an act of resistance to reification for poet and reader. For 
literal and for what, for a lack of a better word, I am going to side with Fondane and 
call metaphysical survival, resistance to dehumanization may not be sufficient, but is 
is necessary.  
Anamnesis 
 
A major reason that Fondane succeeds in marrying irony and sincerity is that he does 




moment that the unspeakable becomes overwhelming that he reaffirms the 
importance of the unsayable. To live with the catastrophe is not to comprehend it. Art 
has the potential to wrest back some of the space victorious or systematizing 
narratives attempt to dominate in an effort to justify power and consolidate it. This is 
true even when – perhaps especially when – the testimony is one of defeat and 
disconsolation. The struggle between irony and sincerity is also the struggle Fondane 
sets out in his works on Baudelaire and Rimbaud: between the inner ‘monster’ or 
‘saint’ (iterations of the same thing) that sincerely wants to affirm life and the esprit 
critique that despairs of the attempt to do so reasonably. There is no replacement for 
the pre-modern cultural unity symbolised by God.5 ‘Je danserais comme une 
flamme’, sings the Chorus: 
 
L’Exode manages to stage the disconsolation of meaning’s groundlessness while 
simultaneously affirming the value of the singular. 
 So L’Exode is an inspiring response to catastrophe because it shows that 
catastrophe is not just ‘about’ itself as an event, that it is not only negation, that it 
touches life and life touches it. Where, however, does this poetic resistance take us? 
The attestations of poets, their defiance of the cruelty of the world, their refusal to 
allow suffering to be subsumed by a narrative of victory or necessity, to accept the 
crushing of ‘human tortoises... under the feet of the Laws’ (HDH 443) placidly, must 
not be mistaken for compensation or restitution. Otherwise we are back with an 
aesthetic justification for the world, a retreat into poetic idealism. And we are still left 
with the unspeakability of violence and the why and how of addressing it. This is 
 
5The theological resonance of Fondane’s work lies precisely in the refusal to turn away from this 
problem, though I would contend that Fondane is no more or less religious than Rimbaud, though he 
mobilizes Jewish myth, on the side of the oppressed, towards solidarity where Rimbaud attacks 
bourgeois christianity for the same ends. 
– Mais puis-je danser sur Son  
corps? 
L’Homme dont Dieu est l’ennemi 
peut-il chanter? Est-ce qu’on  
chante 
dans la tempête, dans le sable 
dans la gorge du desert? 
I would dance like a flame 
– but can I dance upon His body? 
Can the man with God for his enemy 
sing? Who can sing 
in the storm, in the sand 





where I want to link Fondane’s poetic testimony to Jean-Francois Lyotard, who has a 
different take on modernist irony and fragmentary form than Wexler: ‘Lyotard still 
has praise for the modernist avant-garde’s work of anamnesis, the failure to forget 
that does not allow itself the solace of representation’ (Readings 1991, xxviii). 
 Fondane seeks a kind of anamnesis, a way of not forgetting, ‘même au milieu 
de la victoire, les morts, les blessés et les gosses mourant de faim [even in the middle 
of victory, the dead, the injured and the children dying of hunger]’. He continues: 
‘encore moins les puis-je oublier au milieu de l’échec, et me contenter de plastronner 
sur la ‘valeur de l’exemple’, sur les ‘revanches’ de l’avenir [still less can I forget 
them in the middle of defeat, and be contented with flattering myself with the ‘value 
of example’, with the ‘revenges’ of the future]’ (HDH 136–137; EM 79). The 
question of remembering, of refusing to forget the unspeakable, is tied by Weil’s 
question – I know, so what is the difference? – to the existential question of why and 
how to go on living (‘since it concerns the possibility of any affirmation of life, this 
question cannot be evaded’ [Adorno 2001, 110]). Adorno stands in Fondane’s 
shadow. His meditations on survivor guilt recasts the Dadaist problematic of rejecting 
the bourgeois culture that made mechanized slaughter possible in existential terms: 
 
Perennial suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to 
scream; hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could 
no longer write poems. But it is not wrong to raise the less cultural question 
whether after Auschwitz you can go on living. (Adorno 2007, 362) 
 
In his own poetry and in his relationship to poetry, Fondane had already responded to 
this question, not after the fact but in it. Poetry could be a means of going on, a 
gesture towards the unsayable, at the same time as being the means of refusing to turn 
away from the unspeakable.  
 This irresigned resistance of Fondane’s poetry is actually very close to 
Adorno’s own ethics of resistance. Fondane argues:  
 
Un humanisme qui n’aurait pas sur-estimé la raison […] nous [n’] eût [pas] 
évité les guerres, les révolutions, les cataclysmes […] mais il nous eût évité 
certainement les guerres à l’échelle de la nation, les révolutions à l’échelle 
du monde, et la barbarie machiniste, et la guerre des gaz et des microbes – et 





A humanism that had not overestimated reason […] would [not] have saved 
us from war, revolutions, and cataclysms […] but it would certainly have 
saved us from wars on a national scale, revolutions on a world scale, from 
mechanized barbarism, from gas and germ warfare – and from racism. (EM 
57)  
 
Adorno says simply: ‘there ought to be no concentration camps’ (Adorno 2007, 281). 
If the barest wishes of an anti-Humanist humanism flow, in James Finlayson’s words, 
‘from a kind of pre-theoretical involuntary protest at the actuality of human suffering’ 
(Finlayson 2012 29), art can function as its extra-theoretical articulation. Finlayson’s 
wording is important: not only as a record, but as a protest. He continues: 
 
Adorno is no mystic: He holds that discursive thought can be abandoned in 
favour of non-discursive modes of thinking: faith, feeling, visionary 
experience, poetry, aesthetic intuition or mimesis [...] it is not incoherent to 
attempt to show what cannot be said by whatever means possible, even by 
means of self-subverting rhetorical utterances. Nor is it incoherent to attempt 
to articulate, from sideways on, the experience of being shown something 
that cannot be known or put into words [...] the ethics of resistance is the 
counterpart to his critique of representational thinking in Negative 
Dialectics, and the ethics of resistance is nothing less than a way of being 
and a way of living. (Finlayson 2012, 31–32) 
 
This apophatic injunction to live and resist ties the work of anamnesis to the 
affirmation of the singular. The words of one victim do not metonymically ‘speak 
for’ all who have been silenced, but they are a resistance to the entwined 
epistemological violences of catastrophe and realist representation, an affirmation 
that ‘there is something else, something that history does not record: namely, 
the life as such, as subjectively lived, of the existant; that which Levinas calls 
the interior life’ (Dickow 2017).  
 Anamnesis sustains several paradoxes. It is a failure to forget that refuses 
representation. Poetry can work ‘sideways on’, yet it can only fulfil its role as 
testimony to the unspeakable by refusing to be defined by it. Fondane’s defence of 
the autonomy of art is a resistance to the enclosure in meaning of any one human life, 
a resistance to the reification of thought itself. Lyotard’s anamnesis reverberates 
unexpectedly with Fondane’s interest in Socratic daemonic inspiration as a means of 
considering the artist’s activity, the ‘nécessité profonde, irrationnelle, qui fait que 
l’art ne peut être autre qu’il n’est, comme s’il était porteur d’une mission dont le sens 
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doit nécessairement nous échapper et, en premier lieu, à l’artiste lui-même [deep, 
irrational necessity which means that art cannot be anything other than what it is, as if 
it were the bearer of a mission whose meaning must necessarily escape us, and escape 
the artist in the first instance]’ (EDR 81).6  
 Bill Readings succinctly frames the doors opened by these considerations: 
As Lyotard remarks in Heidegger et ‘les Juifs’, Adorno’s greatness is to 
have recognized that, after Auschwitz, art can only be historically 
responsible as event, rather than representation (HJ: 79). Art must not 
exchange the affect of the Holocaust, the emotion which moves us out of 
representation, for a representation that claims to give a cognitive 
signification to the Holocaust. (Readings 1991, 17) 
 
Readings continues with a gloss on deconstruction: ‘in its displacement of 
representation, deconstruction does not return us to a pure being or truth that might 
precede representation: deconstruction is the aesthetics, ethics and politics of the 
incommensurable’ (Readings 1991, 17). The catastrophe exposes 
incommensurability, but the great value of L’Exode is that Fondane responds not only 
by gesturing towards the horror but also the incommensurability of all that is 
cherished by the existent. This awareness and the brave attempt at expressing it 
dovetails with Lyotard’s argument that ‘an aesthetics of pathos is required, an 
aesthetics responsive to the limits of representation, to the sense that something is 
trying to be said which cannot be said’ (Readings 1991, 17). 
 In the work of anamnesis, the cry may be a starting point. In his Levinasian 
reading of Fondane, Alexander Dickow comments, in a move that parallels Adorno’s 
‘pre-theoretical impulse’, that ‘any attempt to establish an ethical relation 
discursively is ensnared: an ethical relation has or has not been established already as 
the Saying occurs, and before anything at all has been Said intervenes’ (Dickow 
2018a, 161). For art to be an event, however, something more than horror in a cry 
must be present. The aesthetics of pathos aligns closely with what Fondane scholars 
have called an aesthetics of participation (Jutrin 2003). For all the insufficiencies of 
language, when it is ‘responsive to the limits of representation’, as it is surely the 
 
6 Fondane’s use of Socrates’s daemon to describe artistic inspiration disrupts the function of the figure 
of speech. Although he does not literally believe in the daemon according to the terms of ancient 
Greek cosmology, neither is he simply using it as metaphor or analogy to say artistic inspiration is 




duty of poetry to be, it has the capacity to act as an event in the particular 
interpellation of the reader. As Dickow puts it, ‘in writing [...] the Saying does not 
become a Said until a reader actualizes the written discourse through the act of 
reading’ (Dickow 2018a, 162). The poetry of testimony is different from other forms 
of testimony because of the way it addresses the reader specifically, as Fondane 
demonstrates to know in the afterword to L’Exode and throughout. The possibility of 
affectively extending the singularly valued humanity held by the work to the audience 
is mediated by the work’s imaginative devices, which forestall the crystallisation of 
an authority which could overwhelm the ultimately ungraspable historical reality 
(Tranter 2009)7 and allow the reader to approach the event ‘sideways on’. 
 I will return to this interpellation in the next chapter. First, however, I 
want to probe certain aspects of this tentative notion of poetic testimony a 
little further, including its caveats and pitfalls. For all its positive, though 
anti-positivist, resonances, the context of anamnesis makes it crucial to 
foreground the necessarily subversive qualities enmeshed in it, the centrality 
of ‘self-subverting rhetorical utterances’. I am worried that in seeing 
Kinnell’s poem as successfully meaning-making Wexler is risking bypassing 
Adorno’s (and Fondane’s – ‘no! I was not like you’) warnings of complicity 
and allowing that meaning to settle.8 As I stated in chapter 2, I would like to 
follow the example of John Roth in his book Holocaust Politics: ‘I think 
there is no closure, at least none that I can or should attempt to provide [...] 
full expression requires not only a giving of testimony but a receiving of it as 




7 Aestheticisation creates, or relies on, distance, and it is exactly this distance which Fondane is 
anxiously aware of in poems such as Tristan et Yseut VII, as he undermines the poetic act in the 
moment of its performance, throwing his voice away from himself even as he brings it into existence: 
‘je suis trop acteur au ballet qu’on joue de sang et d’horreur, pour chanter, ce thème! [I am stepped so 
far in this ballet, staged in blood and horror, to sing this theme!]’(MF 235) 
8 Reading Wexler’s example another way, we could instead see Kinnell’s work as participating in the 
opening towards the reader I develop in this chapter. I would like to emphasize, however, my 
contention that Fondane’s poetry demonstrates that the interpenetration of ethical and representational 
concerns cannot be resolved. 
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The gesture towards the reader in Fondane’s poetry takes place in the expectation of a 
living response – an expectation that is imperatively fragile: the words both do and do 
not speak for themselves, and they make this vibration evident. 
Subversion: I. Language 
 
Poetic testimony, as I am arguing for it as a handle for reading Fondane’s poetry, is 
subversive in three principal ways. It is extra-rational, at the very least gesturing 
towards what cannot be thought logically. It makes space for tragedy: it cannot be 
separated from actual existence, forcing the undeniable, irreducible affective 
condition of living into acknowledgement, through and beyond other discourses 
which seek, for better or worse, to suppress or instrumentalize it. Finally, it 
foregrounds its own paradox of ineffability, apophatically insisting on its own 
inadequacy, enjoining the reader to participate in the work of thinking towards the 
unthinkable.9 
 It is in its own powers of self-subversion that poetic testimony has the capacity 
to radically differ from other kinds. By drawing attention, in various ways ranging 
from irony to palinodes (Dickow 2018b, 16) extra-lingual gestures such as ellipses, 
contradictory questions and other discontinuities, to its representational 
insufficiencies, it can make its existence a performance of the ‘attestation’ laid out by 
Salazar-Ferrer even as – indeed because –it calls its own status as a statement of 
knowledge into question. Maurice Blanchot argues: 
 
If, in order to deny, it is necessary to speak, and speaking, to affirm; if, 
consequently, language seems not to be able to free itself from a first 
affirmation, so that, once you speak, you are already the prisoner, always 
belatedly struggling against it, of an enunciation that affirms itself in speech, 
one would still have to know what this affirmation, enunciation, means. 
(Blanchot 1992, 48) 
 
L’Exode, written in the same epochal crisis of representation that contextualizes 
Blanchot’s approach to ineffability, works by bringing this tension in language to the 
 
9 Given that Fondane’s poetic practice evolved in antagonism to the traditions of philosophy, we could 
see this triad as a subversion of the transcendentals. Extra-rationality confounds the notion of 
transcendental truth. The acceptance of tragedy complicates the estimation of the good. Finally, 




surface. It foregrounds its status as parole: as a specific utterance linked to an actual 
existant, and by extension to their circumstances, which are shared by others. 
 Unlike even negative philosophy, poetry is able to explicitly suspend the 
principle of non-contradiction. For Patrice Beray, Fondane seeks to be a kind of 
troubled conscience to history, reinserting the suppressed affect that discomfits the 
neatness of historical narrative: ‘si on n’échappe pas à la logique du “signe”, on peut 
entrer en conflit avec elle [if we cannot escape the logic of the ‘sign’, we can engage 
in conflict with it]’ (Beray 2009, 23). This conflict becomes open in Fondane’s 
poetry, which as an irresigned act can be considered, borrowing from Lyotard, first 
and foremost a ‘disruption of conceptual reduction’ (Readings 1991, xxix). Fondane 
pre-empts postmodern philosophy in the ways that ‘his works attempt to testify to 
that which escapes language, though we never stop attempting to articulate this 
excess’, as Peter Gratton says of Lyotard (Gratton 2018). For Fondane, however, this 
unending attempt – édition sans fin – can only have a positive aspect in poetry, where 
the extra-rational and singular can be granted some kind of fragile presence.  
 In his reflections on discourse in Sade, Fourier, Loyola, Roland Barthes draws 
together the historical concerns shared also by Fondane (and by his Cahiers du Sud 
collaborator Walter Benjamin) with a consideration of writing as excess in a way 
which accords nicely with Fondane’s warning of logic’s limits and his poetic 
resistance to it: 
 
A text’s social intervention (which is not necessarily effected in the period 
when the text appears) cannot be measured with regard to the readership it 
reaches. Nor can it be measured with regard to the faithfulness of the socio-
economic reflection it inscribes, or projects towards some sociologist eager 
to extract it. A text’s social intervention is rather in the violence which 
allows it to exceed the laws that a society, an ideology or a philosophy create 
to harmonize themselves as a noble movement of historical intelligibility. 
This excess has a name: writing. (Barthes 1971, 14, my translation) 
 
This is the excess Fondane clings to and defends against the urge to harness writing 
to a programme, a practical use-value. His poetic texts foreground this 
epistemological violence. They demand recognition of their ambiguity, their games 
and contorsions of language force attention to the silence beyond them, necessitating 
readings of their excesses. They ask us to take the frivolity of poetry seriously. 
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 The urge to exceed comes from a place of disconsolation. Lyotard writes that 
‘To question requires that something happen that reason has not yet known. In 
thinking, one accepts the occurrence for what it is: “not yet” determined’ (Lyotard 
2006, 278). Poetry has the capacity to make this process evident and vital. L’Exode 
does so, but it does not stop there: if the gap between reality and knowledge is 
exposed, the existant’s ‘thirst’ for reality is also affirmed. In his paper on Fondane’s 
poetic response to the problems of reason, Dickow addresses the problematic thus: ‘if 
words cannot capture the world, they leave us without knowledge of the world [...] 
this places existence as such beyond the ken of language as a tool of knowledge (but 
not of language as expression beyond knowledge, such as poetic language in 
particular)’ (Dickow 2018b, 2). This strange relationship of poetic testimony to 
reality that uses words to attest to what is failed by words, can be thought of as 
asserting ‘power to figure and not merely to signify’ (Lyotard 1971, 62). To do so, it 
must relinquish rationalist discursive postures of objectivity. Irresignation requires 
specific, personal gestures, which are necessarily repressed in the logical 
argumentation of philosophy. Fondane’s poems are performances rather than 
arguments. Through simply being, they call for engagement, rather than imposing a 
logic. 
  Poetry has the great capacity to be ‘breathable’, as Barthes or Berardi might 
say. Its linguistic operations necessarily heed the silence from which it irrupts and 
which it carries within it, its inspirations, the blank spaces which surround its traces. 
Poetry is writing which refuses objectification, which insists that language cannot be 
total. Barthes argues that ‘There is nothing more depressing than imagining the Text 
as an intellectual object (of meditation, analysis, comparison, reflection, etc.). The 
Text is an object of pleasure (Barthes 1971, 11, my translation).’ This statement of 
pleasure may seem out of place in a discussion of testifying to the unspeakable. Yet 
this is precisely where irresignation irrupts, where the poetic testimony resists being 
merely a catalogue of horror. The poetic trace is a sign of life. Its pleasure may be 
absurd: an affirmation of life in language in the midst of catastrophe, of suffering, of 




the poem despite itself, despite the anguish of the author, is part of the poem’s 
excess.10  
Subversion: II. Presence 
 
Where presence has been denied or marginalized, it may resurface in poetry. Olivier 
Salazar-Ferrer writes that ‘the Fondanian poem is born from the fracture of the good, 
the true and the beautiful at the contact of suffering’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2005, 60, my 
translation). Poetic testimony starts from an extra-rational impulse; a desire to affirm 
existence – even in its terrible or terrified aspects – which is ‘pre-theoretical’. 
Catastrophe is not necessary to inflame this impulse, but it can dramatically release it 
(the energy of the Intermède in L’Exode demonstrates the effect of direct contact with 
catastrophe in Fondane’s own work, acting as a counterpoint to more contemplative 
sections).  
 Fondane discusses the extra-rational impulse to creation in essays like the Faux 
Traité and Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre, as well as more broadly in his work 
(he does so with particular humour in his essay on Brancusi). More recently, Chinua 
Achebe, in a lecture at the South Bank centre, paralleled that impulse with the Igbo 
practice of Mbari, where the goddess Ana calls upon an individual to commemorate 
an event or experience with sculpture (Achebe 1990). Poets may have their own Ana 
calling them to attest to what has been passed over. In her essay ‘War, Poetry and the 
Child’, the poet U.A. Fanthorpe states that ‘the distress I encountered [...] seemed to 
liberate my vocation’ (Fanthorpe 2000, 210). The impulse to create and its relation to 
testimony are very close together in an anecdote she relates of one of Fondane’s 
contemporaries: 
 
you will be summoned, as the great Russian poet Anna Akhmatova was. 
During the Stalinist terror, she was waiting in line outside the Leningrad 
prison where her son was detained. 
 
A woman with blue lips standing behind me... suddenly woke out of the 
benumbed condition in which we all found ourselves at that time and 
whispered in my ear (in those days we all spoke in a whisper): 
 
10 It is important to re-emphasize the difference between Fondane’s affirmation and an aesthetic 
escape from suffering. Salazar-Ferrer argues that ‘Titanic (1938)’s aesthetic of disaster radically 
opposes the contemplative aesthetic of Cimitière marin’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2005, my translation). 
214 
 
– Can you put this into words? 
And I said: 
– I can. 
(Fanthorpe 2000, 210) 
 
In Akhmatova’s case, the call was incarnated. Often it is internal. The figure of the 
muse-taught poet, of course, with divine, unstoppable inspiration, Valéry’s force 
chantante, has been romanticized beyond cliché, though the poet’s subversive extra-
rationality troubles the totality of the state as surely as it did in Stalin or Plato’s time. 
For Fondane the impulse to poetry is more ambiguous. Like the Rimbaud of Rimbaud 
le voyou, he struggles with his esprit critique: his defences of the frivolity of poetry, 
its lack of teleology, are addressed as much to his own reason as to André Breton, 
Roland de Renéville or Paul Nizan. He writes poetry despite himself, tells us at the 
start of L’Exode to forget his poem and retains only a ‘cri humain’. And yet this cry 
has to attempt to express itself through poetry. Poetic testimony seeks not simply to 
record but to be dynamite, a Kafkan axe to the frozen sea, an explosion to wake us 
out of any benumbed condition. 
 Fondane’s poetry defends against the triumph of one particular set of interests 
as hegemonic, or in other words as self-authorized to define what is ‘universal’. 
Beyond the negations of existential philosophy, though, it makes a statement of the 
singular. Poetic testimony affords ways of moving forwards, releasing the bonds of 
traumatic and oppressive silences, if not filling them or compensating for them. ‘The 
artist’, says Achebe, ‘is always ready – he welcomes that aspect of our humanity – 
that man (including woman) will surprise [...] an artist makes room for [...] things that 
make the story untidy’ (Achebe 1990). Against the ‘grand programmes’ that seek to 
tidy the world, in their nightmare forms such as fascism but also in their brightest 
clothing, such as socialism or liberal humanitarian discourses, poetry unshutters the 
untidy corners where, as Auden puts it, tragedy takes place, where ‘things don’t take 
place according to the manifestos’ (Achebe 1990). Poetic testimony such as 
Fondane’s or Akhmatova’s is not only a revolt against the effacing of actual lives but 
also the affirmation of life as a whole against forces of neutralization and obliteration. 
Irresignation is a move beyond silence that paradoxically begins from the 
acknowledgement of silence. In Fanthorpe’s words, ‘we all have to be ready for the 




century of war and dispossession, many people in the future may find their mouths 
blocked as mine was. I’d like them to know that they can retrieve and use their 
silence’ (Fanthorpe 2000, 210).  
 In its affirmations, L’Exode is at the antithesis of the Nazi project, which 
valued triumph through and after death over life’s transience (see Kolocotroni 2019, 
231–233). Where the Nazis fetishized the triumph of ruination, L’Exode speaks from 
within it, gesturing beyond it. Fondane’s return to poetry is very much in the 
existential paradigm critic Yann Frémy sees for Rimbaud – ‘vivre sa vie, et pas la 
sauver [living his life instead of redeeming it]’ (Frémy 2018). To speak from the 
ruins, to salvage, is to give consideration to the value of the evanescent rather than to 
give it ‘an inferior status’ as only worthy when driven towards ‘the construction of 
the whole’. These are Adorno’s words from a commentary on Hegel. Poetic 
testimony acts in defence of the singular. It is a resistance to the ‘serene indifference 
[with which Hegel] opts [...] for [the] liquidation of the particular’(Adorno 2020, 
17).11 
 In La Conscience Malheureuse, Fondane defines existence negatively, in 
opposition to philosophical thought with its liquidations of the particular: 
 
C’est définir l’Existence […] que de la considérer dans son opposition au 
mécanique: lois, necessité, logique, ressouvenir, esprit, et de la situer dans 
un CONFLIT IMMANENT qui ne peut avoir d’autre issue, ici-bas, que dans 
un ECHEC PERPETUEL.C’est définir la pensée que de dire qu’elle est 
OBLIGEE à l’échec, et non pensée DE l’échec.  
 
[We can define Existence […] by considering it in opposition to the 
mechanistic: laws, necessity, logic, remembering12 and spirit, and by 
situating it in an IMMANENT CONFLICT which cannot have any other 
result, in the material world, than PERPETUAL FAILURE. We can define 
thought by saying that it is COMPELLED to failure, and not the thought OF 
failure.] (CM 212, emphasis in the original) 
 
 
11 Adorno arrives at similar conclusions to Fondane, adding ‘social analysis can learn incomparably 
more from individual experience than Hegel conceded, while conversely the large historical categories, 
after all that has been perpetrated with their help, are no longer above suspicion of fraud’ (Adorno 
2020, 18).  
12 I believe Fondane is referring here to the idealist Platonic conception of anamnesis, quite different 
from the Lyotardian sense. 
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This failure of thought is an opening for life. The poem, still having to live with 
language but resisting it, becomes the site of an extra-rational affirmation of the 
singular.  
 A going-on despite not being a victory, this paradoxical extra-rational 
affirmation in a struggle with the negativity of thought aligns Fondane’s modernism 
with that of Samuel Beckett in ways that would bear much further exploration. I will 
merely bring Shira Wolosky’s apophaticism-focussed Beckett analysis to bear on this 
discussion of the active, searching function of Fondane’s poetic testimony: 
 
Beckett I think does not reject the world, although he does reject 
explanations that try to justify its suffering [...] he rejects transcendent 
solutions to immanent problems, rejects a totality of Being removed from the 
transient world and above it as a source of value and compensation. For 
Beckett, as far as I can see, suffering defies justification. And while there 
may be, nonetheless, ways for living in a world where so much suffering 
remains inexplicable, these will not point beyond the world to some other 
world as redemptive [...] figured [...] by silence. Language, conversely, may 
provide no final answer, but represents ongoing life – in protest, in hope, in 
despair, in tenacity. (Wolosky 1995, 122–123) 
 
This passage from Wolosky brings together a non-transcendent apophatic 
understanding of representation in modernity; a certain poetic way of using language 
irresignedly; and affirmation of and compassion for the singularity of existence in a 
way that encapsulates much of the energies of Fondane’s move to poetry. 
 In the expression of defeat that is a performance of resistance, irony can play an 
important role. It is not hard to find artistic and intellectual comparisons for this 
element of Fondane’s work. Beckett also manifests a paradoxical use of irony to 
sincerely express this revolt, staging the humour of despair and hopelessness to send 
a meta-message of defiance and love, as critics have variously argued over (see 
Tereszewski 2013, 1 and 79–81).13 Through the poetic act comes a performance of 
going-on that actualizes itself. This notion of performance, of what Salazar-Ferrer 
calls the ‘illocutionary’ form of this ‘existential attestation’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2005), has 
parallels with other existential responses to catastrophe, notably Victor Frankl’s 
 
13 Alain Badiou, who in a quasi-existential reading of Beckett offers a strong case for the importance 
of love, also makes the less contentious claim that in his work the approach to the Other ‘oscillates 
between realisations of failure and flashes of victory’ (Badiou 2003, 17), underscoring this tension 




logotherapy or Primo Levi’s analogous discussion of resisting dehumanization in If 
This Is A Man. Humour and irony can actually be ways of resisting the disaster, not 
merely proclaiming its ineffability. This is evident, for example, in the astonishing 
life and work of Sachsenhausen survivor Aleksander Kulisiewicz, whose resistance to 
concentration camp life involved not only songs, poetry and memory but also 
clowning. This powerful, though still uneasy, mobilization of clowning as a defence 
against becoming what Primo Levi (2014) called a muselmann is well explored in the 
2019 BBC Radio documentary Songs from the Depths of Hell, in a treatment that 
respects these practices without glossing over their troubling aspects. The clowning 
of Fondane’s poetic inspiration Charlie Chaplin was informed by his experiences of 
the Great Depression. ‘It is paradoxical that tragedy stimulates the spirit of ridicule’, 
he commented. ‘Ridicule, I suppose, is an attitude of defiance; we must laugh in the 
face of our helplessness against the forces of nature – or go insane’ (Robinson 1992, 
335). 
Defiance of absurdity is an unending process, and must acknowledge absurdity 
in its testimony. In L’Ecrivain devant la révolution, Fondane argued 
 
Alors que l’éthique parle le langage de la raison discursive, l’artiste travaille 
sur un plan d’irrationalité lyrique qui fait qu’alors même qu’il tend à mettre 
en valeur le bien, la santé, la joie, le courage, la liberté, l’amour des 
hommes, il le fait sous la forme apparente du mal, de la maladie, du 
désespoir, de la lâcheté ou – ce qui accroît le malentendu – sous la forme de 
l’humour qui brouille ce qui reste encore de valeurs claires dans notre 
sentiment éthique de l’art. Qu’humour, ironie, lyrisme sont des catégories de 
l’art et que l’art est impuissant à parler le langage de tout le monde: celui de 
l’éthique, il importe que l’artiste le fasse valoir au plus tôt.  
 
[While ethics uses the language of discursive reason, the artist works in the 
domain of lyrical irrationality, which means that even though he tends to 
prize goodness, health, joy, courage, freedom and loving others, he does so 
in the seeming form of evil, illness, despair, cowardice or – in a way which 
further increases the misunderstanding – in the form of humour which blurs 
what there still is left of clear values in our ethical feeling for art. The artist 
must point out as quickly as possible that humour, irony and lyricism are 
categories of art and art is incapable of speaking everyone’s common 
language, that of ethics.] (EDR 84) 
 
 The singing of the dark times can be not only lament but irresignation. 
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 The statement that ‘positive affirmation must inevitably establish an exclusivity 
against that not included in its definition’ (Vericat 2002, 188) is subverted in poetic 
testimony, which, rather than only affirming in the cataphatic, positivist sense, also 
gestures through language, making an affirmation of existence out of the very failure 
to positively confirm its definition. Faced with the suspicions of rationality towards 
language, the poet’s ‘conscience honteuse’ can easily lead to a work of ‘purifying’ 
language against ambiguity, a fruitless quest, in Fondane’s eyes, that turns them away 
from ‘the existent and from the savoir-faire they invent with their art’ (Beray 2006, 
148, my translation), qualities which poetry in fact has a unique capacity to defend. In 
order to do so, it must accept and even embrace language’s insufficiencies in order to 
subvert misleading claims to certainty and universality. Poetic testimony includes the 
affirmation that any language act ‘is made by someone’ (BEG 298) and has 
something specific and singular to say. If poetry can affirm that existence is more 
than ‘an object of knowledge’ (EM 8), it does so performatively. 
 Here is an extensive comment on L’Exode by Alexander Dickow that 
emphasizes the performativity inherent in this poetic presence:  
 
one might claim Fondane’s poem resembles ethical speech because of its 
performativity, as Jill Robbins hypothesizes when she writes that ethical 
speech might resemble ‘what J. L. Austin described as the performative 
dimension of language’. Fondane’s poems in general are eminently 
performative, which is precisely what gives them their flavour of oratory or 
theatre. Fondane ceaselessly warns, cajoles, accuses, forgives, promises, 
greets, invites, dismisses, begs, demands. The ‘Preface in Prose’ is no 
exception, as the poet’s accusations demonstrate. And the poet’s self-
affirmation, his pretension to existence and his insistence that his humanity 
be recognized, does become a speech act (or the written equivalent) in the 
‘Preface in Prose.’ The aporetic oscillation between identification and 
difference [...] can be viewed as performative in its own right, a performance 
of self-contradiction that encourages the reader’s interpretive engagement. 
(Dickow 2018a) 
 
L’Exode, with its explicitly dramatic structure, exemplifies the performative aspect of 
Fondane’s poetic subversions.  
  There is no doubt that the revolt Salazar-Ferrer and others have read in 
Fondane’s philosophical stance is performed in Fondane’s poetry. But that is not to 




The existential affirmation only comes to be as this performance. The revolt against 
the negation of existence can only have a positive dimension when understood as 
inextricable from a revolt against the limits of representation, through a 
simultaneously subversive and affirmative poetic practice. Elsewhere, Dickow writes 
that ‘like the inarticulate cry, poetry constantly shifts and eludes the reader with 
regard to all three of these categories, speaker, topic, and addressee’ (Dickow 2018b, 
12). Even as it employs the masks which would seem to offer some orientation, 
L’Exode qualifies their solidity. Only through the poet’s ‘declining his identity’ with 
the othered je of the poem can the existential revolt make a gesture of affirmation, a 
gesture towards the real presence of the singular. Similarly, this affirmation must be 
understood as a proto-ethical revolt against the isolation of the individual. Perhaps the 
most important of Fondane’s poetic subversions is the paradoxical subversion of 
solipsism that makes L’Exode a performance towards the other and introduces a move 
towards justice. 
 
Subversion: III. Justice 
 
‘The Igbo insist’, says Achebe, ‘that any presence which is ignored, denigrated, 
denied acknowledgment and celebration, can become a focus for anxiety and 
disruption’ (Achebe 1990). Poetry irrupts through the places where language denies 
and omits. Honouring a presence does not necessarily mean normalizing it, but it 
does mean trying to do justice to it. At the places where justice is impossible to 
realize, art can nonetheless gesture towards it. Subalternity involves both the 
repression of a voice and the implicit rationalization of that repression. Poetry can 
similarly make a double move, at once bringing our attention to a wider silence and 
refusing its domestication. The testimony of L’ Exode is not simply the record of an 
event, it is a subversion of silence and the activation of a relation. It is a political or 
proto-political act, not just an intangible object of heritage. As Beray puts it, ‘the 
present is in the time of the poem, of this poem to which the poet finds himself 
returning. And this historicity of the poem, which is valuable as specific testimony, is 
more important than the reading of historical events.’ (Beray 2009, 21, my 
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translation) As a reader we do not simply receive a mimetic reproduction of events, 
but are implicated in ‘the tragic nature of his poetic universe’ (Beray 2009, 22, my 
translation). 
 Poetry lives with silence by challenging our relationship with it. Poetic 
testimony is a disruption of discourse: not only a counter-discourse but a challenge to 
the limits of discourse itself. A Lyotardian framing brings out certain ethical 
implications of this intervention, as Peter Gratton explains: 
 
in postmodernity, there is no metanarrative, no onto-theology, as Martin 
Heidegger (1889–1976) would call it, that can ground prescriptive 
statements. Yet, leaving behind any foundation for prescriptive statements 
does not leave us unable to speak to what is just and unjust. […] What is 
unjust is the violent silencing of those raising claims to justice and 
disallowing them from making prescriptive claims, such as those colonized 
and left unheard by hegemonic powers […] If it were just a matter of having 
a sure knowledge or absolute set of laws to follow, then politics would be 
pre-programmed and there would be no judgment worthy of the name. 
(Gratton 2018) 
 
Poetic testimony operates like samizdat (literally in Akhmatova’s case; see Puchner 
2017). Yet its value is not only in opposing a counter-narrative to the hegemonic one: 
it is also the process and actuality of its doing so, the attestation that there is 
something else to say. There is a greater silence that exceeds oppressive attempts to 
control speaking but also, often, liberatory projects which oppose them. Poetry is able 
to embrace that silence, to honour it and make it part of its reading even as it speaks. 
The dictator does not only seek to eradicate dissent, but also ‘toute contradiction 
logique [any contradiction of his logic]’, a dynamic typified for Fondane by the case 
of Mayakovsky (RV 102). 
 Fondane himself, writing to the ‘hommes des antipodes’, recognized the 
processes of silencing at work even as he felt the urgency of pushing back. His 
attention to the ‘muffling’ (Fanthorpe 2000, 210) effects of the various crises he lived 
through, spurred him to stay with the difficulty of writing through them. Poetry 
allows a balancing of the impossibility of doing justice to the traumatic event – the 
impossibility which imposes a wounded or shamed silence – with the necessity of 
trying. Where a rational explanation cannot be afforded, poetry can create a space of 




Fondane’s poetics work in tandem with his insistence on subverting any kind of law 
in texts like L’Homme devant l’histoire, and thereby align with Simon Critchley’s 
reflections on violence. Critchley, following Benjamin and Agamben, seeks ‘to open 
a space between law and life. The name of this space is politics’ (Critchley 2009). 
Fondane’s concern as an artist is not to articulate the actual negotiation of politics but 
hold open this space and affirm ‘a praxis of life’s sanctity’ (Critchley 2009). 
 It is crucial to distinguish this subversive work of poetry from the idea of art as 
a moral force. Fondane was only too aware of what Slavoj Žižek has called the 
‘poetic-military complex’ (Žižek 2009a), the harnessing of poetry in the service of a 
nationalistic project, and he was similarly critical of any instrumentalization of 
poetry, including socialist realism. Fondane’s relation to the political importance of 
poetic testimony is contradictory. With typical provocation, he placed himself at the 
antithesis of the majority opinion at the 1935 anti-fascist writers’ congress, absolutely 
opposing the sublimation of art to political oversight. He went so far as to practically 
declare the writer’s work irrelevant, that it was time to stop writing and act only ‘as 
men’, stating that there was really only a place for writing in a peaceful society: 
 
Éthiquement, à moins d’être un laquais ou un fou, il [l’écrivain] ne saurait 
que combattre le fascisme et souhaiter l’avènement d’une société socialiste, 
d’une société qui, résorbant les contradictions de l’économique, promet à la 
fois un peu plus de justice et un peu plus de durée. (Fondane 1997, 82) 
 
[Ethically, unless he is a lackey or is crazy, he [the writer] can only fight 
fascism and desire the arrival of a socialist society, a society which, negating 
economic contradictions, promises at once a bit more justice and a bit more 
duration. (Fondane 2011, 61)]  
 
However, during the occupation, it was with poetry that he resisted, his poems 
appearing in Europe, Fontaine and later Eluard’s collection L’Honneur des Poètes 
(SEBF 2003). Not as a call to arms or even as satire, but as testimony, as an 
affirmation of the value of everything fascism threatened not only to defeat, but to 
unmake, to reduce to an absolute non-presence.14 
 
14Vassiliki Kolocotroni points out that among ruins may ‘remain signs of a salutary witnessing, 
fragments of the past that may be defunct, but also ripe for strategic reconstitution […] mythical 




 Poetic testimony refuses objectification, insists that language cannot be total, 
and is written with an implicit awareness of this statement by Barthes: ‘Acting as 
though an innocent discourse can be opposed to ideology means continuing to believe 
that language can be simply the neutral instrument of a triumphant content’ (Barthes 
1971, 14, my translation). Let us not forget that the same autonomy that allows art to 
be the site of resistance to authoritarian oppression also allows it to be framed into an 
aestheticist detachment which can render it useless or even complicit in the face of 
atrocity (Auschwitz guards instructing inmates to play Mozart for them is only the 
most flagrant counter-example to the idea of art as a moralizing force; there are 
countless instances running at least from Nero’s tears to Saddam Hussein’s poetry). 
Art’s ambiguities are often latent and always under contextual pressure, liable to 
enforced sentimentalization, distraction and even attempted weaponization.  
 In his philosophical and literary critiques, Fondane subverts Humanist 
assumptions about the virtues of art, assumptions which occur across political 
spectra. It is sometimes forgotten that it was not street thug brownshirts who carried 
out most of the Bücherverbrennung but university students, or that Savonarola 
himself was not simply an opportunistic rabble-rouser but highly educated. The 
capacity of poetry to perform an anti-Humanist humanism depends, in part, on a 
recognition of its failures: its failure to comprehend, to ‘grasp all’, even as it reveals, 
in its own writing ‘between the lines’ of rational thought, in its blank spaces and 
ambiguities, a thirst for plenitude. Poetry can say something new while foregrounding 
its own insufficiency in speaking. It is a gesture, but not a strategy. Poetry can be 
written in service to a cause (as a means to an end), but if it is not, it is difficult to 
instrumentalize it the way video evidence or juridical testimony can be 
instrumentalized, because it addresses itself to us, it speaks insufficiently and 
affectively, it calls upon us to interpret its story and not simply accept it. Any 
coming-to-terms it offers must not be taken as a just reconciliation with the traumatic 
event. It is a gesture towards a way of living, despite it. 
 
Brecht’s writings on the past point towards a resistance of hegemony with ‘an incomplete, ongoing 
process of radical awakening. To the phantasmagoria of the fascist dream and its beautiful ruins-to-be 
[i.e., the Nazi obsession with monument-building], they issue a warning and a memory flash from the 




 Fondane offers a refusal of the poet’s shameful conscience, a commitment to 
poetry that resists external logics of function. Daring to be ‘frivolous’ and subversive 
when the stakes of witnessing are so high is imbued with its own bravery, an 
assertion of what existentially has value but cannot be codified. Few poets have 
simultaneously theorized this struggle at the same time as fighting to bear witness to 
the extent that Fondane found himself doing, but the value of poetic testimony he 
prototypes is echoed in the words of many post-war poets. The 2000 essay ‘Poetry 
makes nothing happen’ by Sarah Maguire is so pertinent it is worth citing at length. 
She couples poetry’s subversive autonomy with its unique testifying qualities (‘poetry 
occupies the real places we inhabit’ [Maguire 2000, 249] much as I am trying to do in 
reference to Fondane. I have already discussed how Adorno’s famous quote about 
poetry has been taken out of context and de-nuanced. Maguire offers a similar 
analysis to Auden’s: ‘having told us that ‘poetry makes nothing happen’, Auden says 
that poetry, instead, survives as a way of happening, a mouth [...] we’re 
fundamentally wrong if we expect poetry to have a function’ (Maguire 2000, 250). If 
poetry is subordinate to politics, Maguire argues, it is reduced to propaganda, but 
arguing for ‘a hermetically-sealed aesthetic world of its own’, art for art’s sake, 
‘stems from the same philosophical misapprehension, the same paradigm’ (Maguire 
2000, 250). Historical and symbolic oppression and exclusion are inseparable from 
linguistic failure. In one sentence, Maguire grazes an apprehension of all the 
contradictions I am trying to bring together in reading L’Exode: demonstrating the 
inseparability of an affirmation of the value of the existent from resistance to semiotic 
breakdown, poetry is ‘a way of being in the world, of speaking in silence’ (Maguire 
2000, 250). 
 Against Joyce Wexler’s dream of a simply sincere poetic statement, the poetry 
of witnessing that can overcome the eyewitness/artist binary must take into account 
the complexity and aporiae of representation even as it fights against them. 
Combining irony and sincerity, and singular affirmation qualified by multiplicity, is 
the only way to do justice to the fact that, as Jacqueline Rose puts it, ‘there is no 
history outside its subjective realisation... just as there is no subjectivity uncoloured 
by the history to which it belongs’ (Rose 1991, 8). Poetic testimony’s overt 
subjectivity, qualified by the awareness that je ‘est un autre’, gives it a unique 
strength in this regard. Like Rimbaud, Fondane castigates the individual, rational 
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Enlightenment subject even as he defends subjectivity from modernity’s historical 
philosophies of sublimation to the ‘objective’ whole. 
 Maguire turns her focus to Wilfred Owen. I discussed earlier in the thesis the 
fact that for Fondane the symbolic damage of the Second World War was not 
essentially different from that of the First, that the vacuity of Humanism had already 
been revealed, and registered by Dada. An anti-Humanist humanist poetics cannot fill 
that vacuum. At best it can operate akin to a Benjaminian ‘plumb line’, in the manner 
Simon Critchley frames a philosophy of non-violence, that is to say as a never-settled 
means of going on rather than as a draft of an ethical blueprint. Here is what Maguire 
writes of Owen: 
 
It’s precisely because the poem can render the most intimate and elusive of 
subjective experiences in language that it’s able to bear witness to what’s 
excluded in dominant discourses [...] it’s the sheer stubborn memorability of 
Owen’s language, the way he draws on so many disparate discourses (from 
polemical anger to ‘unspeakable’ pain) in such a small space, which allows 
him to articulate experience which is at once profoundly subjective and 
politically resonant in all its gravid, lived reality. (Maguire 2000, 250–251) 
 
In trying to set out L’Exode’s poetic witnessing, its anamnesis and the ‘gravid’ 
potential of its affirmations, I could not put it more appositely than this.  
 L’Exode is not simply about an event, even though the catastrophe which is its 
context is so overwhelming. It sketches all kinds of modern voices and aspects, from 
the minutiae of everyday life to the anguish of God’s absence, not defined by the 
catastrophe but made sharper by it. Even as it makes an existential affirmation in the 
midst of the disaster, one which – as I am about to discuss further – offers a tentative 
beginning of existential solidarity, it subverts any potential comfort this could offer. 
In order to make its witnessing count, poetry must unsettle. 
 Maguire argues that 
 
although Owen’s war poems are responding to a major historical event, thus 
embuing his work with a particular urgency [...] the smallest and most 
seemingly ‘personal’ lyrics can also be capable of unsettling the given order 






It is the same uncontrollable, subversive, extra-rationality of poetry (when not 
reduced to function), that Fondane defends against Plato, that is fundamental for 
Maguire, who writes that the poet ignores ‘the logic of separation’, the separation that 
occurs through logic. ‘Poetry’s labour’, she writes, is ‘to bring together, carry, 
transfer, pieces of language that have been torn apart, decontextualized and placed in 
different categories (subjective/objective; personal/political). And it does this through 
the figure of the intimate self’ (Maguire 2000, 251). This work is unending. In an 
essay in which he expands on Mbari, Achebe points out that Ana is also the goddess 
of justice (Achebe 1992). Her image in the Mbari house holds a sword. The testimony 
of the people sits before her, but there is no pronouncement, no judgement, only the 
possibility of justice given presence in the attestations of art.  
Celebration 
 
As a vessel formed by the creative forces which it preserves, 
the work of art keeps alive and enhances every urge to come to 
terms with the world. 
 
Max Raphael, from The Demands of Art (cited in Berger 2018, 52) 
 
I want to use Achebe’s notion of artistic testimony’s worthiness of being presented 
before the demands of justice, without claiming that this validity, this ‘metasophic’ 
(Finkenthal 2013, 121) affirmation, comprises a satisfaction of those demands. 
Achebe’s conception of celebration is key here. His use of celebration differs sharply 
from the common, joyous sense. It does not exclude joy, but entails an unveiling of 
all the states and experiences of existence that are inadequately served by reason. 
Although this unveiling is never complete (even if its representation could be 
adequate, the continous flux of existence means that it would always require 
renewal), it is crucial. Celebration in this sense is a reclaiming of art from the 
conscience honteuse that would render it secondary or even inconsequential, by 
giving it an unending, not-fully-definable purpose that exceeds rational ends.  
 I have had it put to me that Achebe is an unusual thinker to bring to bear upon a 
discussion of Fondane. This seems to me problematic in terms of Fondane’s 
untimely, history-resistant engagement with the extra-rational, as well as Eurocentric. 
But even if we acknowledge the importance of historical contexts, as Fondane 
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himself simultaneously did, we find unexpected affinities. Achebe himself, 
antagonised by supposedly universal and actually racist characterization in the 
Western canon, developed his own literary response in part through his connection 
with Ulli Beier, co-founder of the Mbari Artists and Writers club and a Jewish 
survivor of the Nazi regime. A drawing of parallels facilitates an experience of 
solidarity.  
 Poetry is exemplary in juxtaposing different figures whose presences overlap 
while retaining the forms of their specificities. Fondane’s valuing of its existential 
communication through and beyond its own time is close in spirit to the importance 
of ‘non-contemporaenity’ and resistance to classification that Kolocotroni (2019) 
emphasizes in Benjamin’s philosophy in her essay on modernity and ruin. L’Exode’s 
Jewish tropes mobilize to make new, concrete experiences of exile and desire for 
community meaningful. The response of the Chorus to the Babylonian priest takes a 
context of Jewish cultural and theological tradition and within it raises the question of 
the valuing of the concrete, and the shared predicament of modernity: 
 
Quel insensé qui n’ait voulu sauver  
fût-ce 
qu’un peu de crépuscule, une  
poignée d’odeur, 
quelque absurde soulier d’une  
ombre 




Which madman has not wished  
                                       to save 
even a little of this twilight, a   
                        handful of scent, 
or merely the absurd boot-sole  
                               of a shadow 
and can laugh, laugh at the fact  





Poetic recognition across time and culture is exemplified in recent connections 
between Africa and Fondane, such as the award in 2016 of the Prix Benjamin 
Fondane to the Congolese poet Gabriel Okundji, or the special Fondane edition of the 
journal La Plume Vivante in 2017, edited by Fiston Loombe Iwoku. 
 Through the analogy of Mbari, Achebe redefines the meaning of celebration, 





extends the view, opens it out to meanings beyond the mere remembering of 
blessings or happy events. It deliberately sets out to include other 
experiences, indeed all significant encounters which man makes on his 
journey through life, especially new, unaccustomed and thus potentially 
threatening encounters. (Achebe 1990) 
 
He tunes the word beyond its customary uses and into much wider resonance, not 
simply a confirmation of joy but ‘an acknowledgement of presence, the courtesy of 
giving to everybody his due [...] art as celebration of my reality’ (Achebe 1990). Thus 
celebration comes to mean a testifying to reality which can encompass suffering as 
well as success, an affirmation of life even if that life is experiencing sorrow.  
 In the sense of experience given witness by art, celebration is reminded of its 
Latin root meaning a large assembly, a coming together. If nothing else, in its 
attention to language poetry has the capacity to decry and resist experiences of the 
world defined by what Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi calls ‘a fundamental lack of friendship, 
where solidarity has been replaced by verbal negotiation and convention’ (Berardi 
2018, 83). Anne Carson refers to the myth of Eve and the apple as a ‘gesture of rage’ 
against Adam’s imposition of the order of naming, ‘our answer to chaos’, the 
tendency which implies that ‘something without a name is commonly thought not to 
exist’ (2008). Poetic celebration means a coming-together in language which does not 
merely fill in the places discourse had hitherto excluded, but honours and holds open 
space for that beyond its limits. 
 The parallel Achebe draws between Mbari and the practice of art is, in my 
opinion, the same as that drawn by Fondane between the ‘pensée primitive’ and the 
aims of art. It is a ‘non-Aristotelean’ approach, as Serge Nicolas and Dominique 
Guedj put it in their edition of Fondane’s Lévy-Bruhl, ou le métaphysicien malgré lui 
(Fondane 2019). ‘Primitive’ in Fondane’s sense is not intended as meaning 
undeveloped, nor, conversely, noble and innocent. It is simply taken from the study 
of peoples termed primitive in the jargon of the 1920s to argue for a heterogenity of 
human thought against the domination of the Western ideal of reason as a good in and 
of itself. It refers to an experience of life in which creative acts are understood to 
directly intervene in the world, just as in Mbari.  
This use of primitive would include medieval culture, as evidenced by the way 
Fondane references Villon and Shakespeare in his work. Indeed, the likes of 
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Baudelaire, Lautréamont and Huysmans, key influences for Fondane as for the 
surrealists, parsed the modern, positivist cultural changes which ended the unity of 
such a worldview by reflecting on the medieval in their work. Art only came to exist 
as a concept when the primacy of rational thought, free even of the pagan faith of the 
Greeks, severed it from its holistic functions. For Fondane as for Achebe, the artist 
must seek to restore to art its status as event instead of merely being object, despite 
the artist’s own rationality – their conscience honteuse – working against them. In 
freeing and honouring – celebrating – the extra-rational in art, they must defy even 
their own mind. 
 Celebration through art may be understood as resistance to the subjugation to 
bare life. Fondane’s poetry resists a total Nazi victory, resists its hegemonic drive to 
make itself not only victorious but acceptable. This is akin to Achebe’s vision of 
African writing subverting the a posteriori justification of colonial appropriation by 
force through an idealized narrative of race and history. He received a letter from a 
group of Korean students who wanted to know why he let such failure fall upon 
Okonkwo, protagonist of Things Fall Apart. ‘The fact that we are talking about that 
man’, says Achebe, ‘is in fact his success’ (1990). These Koreans stand at the 
antipodes of Achebe’s geography as we stand at the antipodes of Fondane’s time. 
Such messages across the waters affirm a strange hope exactly in the moment of their 
own despair. They cannot promise a victory or justice in full, but their reading is 
some kind of success nonetheless. 
 The poetic urge to testify is a celebration of presence. Poetic acts of attention 
afford value to everyday experiences. This is true even at the simplest, smallest 
junctures and even when the presence is an absence, a space. This urge may also arise 
in the poet who is unwilling, crushed by the pain of their experience and the limits of 
its comprehensibility, yet who finds the pain of silence greater still, and finds 
themselves, in the words of Paul Celan, attempting to ‘give your saying also 
meaning: | give it its shadow’ (Celan 2005, 54). Through poetry, it is even possible to 
affirm that disaster can be part of the everyday. This does not mean normalizing or 
approving disaster and trauma. But poetry can help reclaim a way of speaking them 
from grand narratives which would situate them as exceptionally distant and either 




 In his Faux Traité, Fondane unpacks Plato’s prescriptions for poets in the 
Republic. ‘Qu’importe’, he glosses with irony, ‘s’ils ont empiriquement raison? Il 
n’en reste pas moins vrai qu’ils ont, philosophiquement et moralement, tort [what 
does it matter if they are empirically correct? It remains no less true that they are 
philosophically and morally wrong]’(FT 77). He notes that Plato reserves the moral 
authority to lie for the administrators of the city for the ‘good’ of the state, 
commenting with more understated irony that ‘on a largement usé, depuis le temps, 
de cette tolérance-là [since Plato’s time that allowance has been amply indulged]’ (FT 
77). Against the claims of states and ideology to dictate truth according to their 
interpretation of idealized ethics, for Fondane the poet provides evidence that ‘la vie, 
la mort, et la souffrance, et la misère, l’amour, la colère, l’ennui, la lâcheté, le 
sacrifice, la solitude, l’inconnu, le mystère, la fatalité, la chance, la liberté – existent 
[life, death, and suffering, and misery, love, anger, boredom, cowardice, sacrifice, 
solitude, the unknown, mystery, fate, luck and freedom – exist]’ (FT 78). Poets ‘ont 
dit l’homme enchaîné par la nécessité inexorable, mais aussi éveillé à l’absurde, à la 
joie, à la liberté [have spoken man bound by inexorable necessity, but also awoken to 
the absurd, to joy, to freedom]’ (FT 78). 
 By giving presence, poetic testimony opens up the possibility of coming to 
terms with an experience for all who read it. It cannot confidently be said that the 
experience is shared, but something of its presence can be heard. Poetry is a gesture 
towards community, community gathered by listening, by reading. Perhaps this is 
what Fondane means when he talks of an ‘aristocratic poetry’, when he claims in the 
midst of war that ‘la poésie cherche des amis et non un public [poetry is looking for 
friends, not an audience]’ (MF 208). Against the instrumentalization of poetry as 
propaganda, or its enforced popularization as a public good, he contends that it is 
only valuable as its own presence. The process of listening to testimony is active, the 
reader’s participation in the celebration must be granted willingly. This door to a 
fuller human presence is potentially open even to the perpetrator of oppressive 
violence and the enforcer of silence who mutilate their own humanity in 
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dehumanizing others. At the least, poetry can stand against the ‘total peace of mind’ 
(Fanon 2004, 199) the perpetrator may have to consciously work to maintain.15 
 Celebrating the specific affirms the value of the multiple. The counterpoint of 
‘like you’ / ‘not like you’ in the Préface attests to a specificity of experience while 
extending that experience – in this case a certain experience of Jewishness – into a 
public presence. In the agora of artistic culture tellings of private affective 
experiences become knowable without being subsumed into an organised whole. 
Thus Fondane is able to use Jewishness as a generous metaphor for human 
experience in the face of loss and exile even at the same time as he actually attests to 
the literal Jewish experience of persecution. Here is potential grounds for an anti-
Humanist universality, based not upon the supposedly inevitable progress of a 
narrative of rights and freedoms extended to all but a celebration of the experience of 
life in joy and suffering. 
Once again, Fondane shades close to Benjamin, for whom, in Irving 
Wohlfarth’s reading, ‘the universal could only be reached […] in and through the 
particular, not by abstracting from it’ (Wohlfarth 1997, 25). Susan Buck-Morss 
argues that for Benjamin ‘the best thing about his Jewishness is that it is not limited 
to Judaism’ (Buck-Morss 2014, 47:00).16 Roland Boer (2007, 5–6) has cautioned 
 
15 My idea of poetic testimony tends to be at odds with the poetic perpetrator testimony (already a 
much more marginal phenomenon). The sense in which I am using the term ‘poetic’ implies the 
assertion of contradiction and resistance of straightforward conclusions, whereas perpetrator testimony 
as such tends to be characterized by ‘mendacity and attempts at self-exculpation’ (Rowland 2011, 
368), or at least simplified narratives which glorify one’s own side. There are also many instances 
which blur moral boundaries, as Antony Rowland points out in his work on the British Oasis war 
poets, who were contemporaneous with Fondane: ‘The “myth” of the “just war” […] a simplified 
narrative in which soldiers cleanly dispose of Germans and then return unaffected to civilian life – 
gives way in the context of the archive to a series of texts engaging with victim and perpetrator 
behavior, and sometimes (as in “Ubique”) within the confines of a single text’ (Rowland 2011, 380). 
Poetic testimony in the sense I am using it must relate in some way to what Shoshana Felman and Dori 
Laub call the ‘human condition of exposure and vulnerability’ (Felman and Laub 1992, 5), whether 
that is in the weak sense of attending to ‘l’inessentiel et à l’inimportant [the unessential and 
unimportant]’, as Fondane puts it in the Faux Traité –  ‘le jaunissement d’une feuille, l’écoulement 
d’une durée, la première ride entrevue dans la glace [the yellowing of a leaf, the emptying of a span, 
the first wrinkle seen in the mirror]’ (FT 79) – or in the radical context of brutality and violence. 
16 Wohlfarth invokes the ghostly aspects of Freud’s malaise in modernity which resonate so strongly 
with Fondane’s ‘mal des fantômes’: ‘In Freudian terms, a ghostly “return of the repressed” – an 
intrusion from “the other scene” – prevents the ego from ever really being the “master in its own 
house”, thereby provoking a “malaise” endemic to “civilization” itself. The inalienable alien thus 
emerges from Simmel’s and Freud’s respective analyses as a key figure within both the psychic and 
the social economy. In this sense, we are all “strangers to ourselves” (in Julia Kristeva’s phrase), all 
foreign bodies, all (as Daniel Cohn-Bendit had it) “German Jews”. And the Jew is, conversely, easily 





against overly strong readings of Benjamin’s Jewishness. However if anything this 
reinforces the point, made by Hannah Arendt, that the best Jewish thinkers of 
modernity ‘transcend the bounds of nationality and […] weave the strands of their 
Jewish genius into the general texture of European life’ (Arendt 1978, 67). This is an 
achievement I am claiming for Fondane, even beyond a European context, and it is 
significant that for Benjamin the ability to maintain these contradictions of identity is 
the preserve of the artist (Wohlfarth 1997, 3).  
  Unlike other forms of testimony, whose primary function is to fix the present 
and turn it into a record of the past, poetic testimony necessarily looks forward. Art is 
a living alternative to history. This is how Ursula Le Guin voices it in her novella 
Paradises Lost: 
 
History tells us who we are, how we have behaved, therefore how we will 
behave.  
Does it? [...] that appalling record of injustice, cruelty, enslavement, hatred, 
murder – that record, justified and glorified by every government and 
institution, of waste and misuse of human life, animal life, plant life, the air, 
the water, the planet? If that is who we are, what hope for us? History must 
be what we have escaped from[...]  
To learn who we are, look not at history but the arts, the record of our best, 
our genius. The elderly, sorrowful, Dutch faces gaze out of the darkness of a 
lost century. The mother’s beautiful grave head is bowed above the dead son 
who lies across her lap [...] ‘Sleep, sleep’, say the cradle songs, and ‘set me 
free’ cry the yearning slave-songs [...] and the poets, the crazy poets cry out, 
‘A terrible beauty is born.’ But they’re all crazy [...] all their beauty is 
terrible. (Le Guin 2016, 706–707). 
 
The greatest of all the contradictions that Fondane sustains in his poetry is 
simultaneously singing and crying out, communicating both loving attention and 
disconsolate, excessive, irresigned yearning. 
 Poetic testimony must embrace poetic madness, as Fondane does: it cannot be 
only record-keeping and interpreting, it must give presence to the extra-rational and 
expose the limitations of discourse. This is also what turns it to the future, what lets it 
 
disturbing otherness that we prefer, all-too-humanly, to project onto others, but which belongs to the 
very definition of the human.’ (Wohlfarth 1997, 22) 
Ronald Boer (2007) also emphasizes the centrality of questions around language in this nexus of myth, 
religion and modernity. 
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hold a promise of life across time. In his introduction to a selection of Paul Celan’s 
work, Pierre Joris writes, in the context of the Holocaust, that 
 
all poetry, after that date, will have to be, at some level, a poetry of 
witnessing. But it cannot stop there if it wants to be of essential use [...] it 
cannot simply bear witness to the past but must at the same time be 
resolutely turned towards the future: it has to be open, it has to be 
imaginatively engaged in the construction of a new world, it has to look 
forward. (Joris 2005, 6) 
 
Untimely possibilities vitalize Fondane’s poetry. Its urgency is to the present of its 
reading. Again, this corresponds with the thought of Benjamin, who ‘wanted the art 
of the past to realize itself in the choices men [sic] made today in deciding their own 
historical role’ (Berger 2018, 58). 
 Celebration, as a figuring, stands in opposition to resignation. The combination 
of an affirmation of the extra-rational with an untimely awareness means Fondane’s 
subversive testimony is a refusal to be resigned, to be consigned to history’s dustbin. 
In performing its own radical signing in full view of the limits of language, the 
artistic act as an event, as celebration, functions as a return of the repressed, haunting 
history. In L’Ecrivain devant la révolution he argued: 
 
le rôle de l’éthique se borne […] à interdire […] les instincts antisociaux, 
l’homme dût-il souffrir cruellement de cette interdiction […] L’art, par 
contre […] libère. 
 
[ethics limits its role to prohibiting antisocial instincts, even if man suffers 




Addressing a crowd of writers whom he viewed as mostly complicit in subordinating 
art to ethical guidelines, Fondane harnessed this point to a social argument, claiming 
that the release of sadistic impulses through the creation and consumption of works of 
art guarded against their realization in reality. Whether or not we agree with this 
likely unmeasurable contention, akin to notions of catharsis in Aristotle or Freud, the 





 Fondane’s simultaneous critique of subject positions and defence of the 
existent’s subjectivity is fundamental to the subversive, celebratory testimony 
performed by his poetry. His desire to break through the sterility of aesthetics as a 
pure condition for a pure art and connect the poem to reality relies on a different kind 
of aesthetics: of pathos, of participation. Salazar-Ferrer argues that ‘The imperfect 
poem is not an end in itself, but the means of reaching another face which, by reading 
the poem, restitutes or saves the humanity of its vanished author’ (Salazar-Ferrer 
2005, 62–63, my translation).  
The perfect correspondence between poem and reality can only ever be a dream, but 
the poem’s very imperfection becomes part of its attestation, part of its value. In re-
membering the humanity in its authors words through being read, it instantiates a 
subject relationship, between existent and existent. Shira Wolosky puts it that ‘pure 
selfhood’ (emphasis added) is ‘a fantasy of the unreal […] without linguistic 
expression, there is no self at all […] the self is not […] unitary, unmediated self-
identity’ (Wolosky 1995, 84). Fondane’s poetry evinces a relational understanding of 
the self, in a tension where the boundaries are blurred but selfhood is not erased. ‘If 
language moves the self outside itself’, Wolosky argues, ‘this is not finally a loss of 
self. If it moves the self towards the other, this is neither intrusive nor 
dissipating’(Wolosky 1995, 87). It is to the ‘illocutionary’, interpellative processes of 





Towards the Other 
 
The poem needs the Other, needs an interlocutor for 
whom it searches and to whom it is dedicated.  
 
(Rotiroti 2013, 103) 
 
Take this unique face that each person may offer to alterity: 
all of its dreamed representations come back into play in 
language. They are realized in the poem, as in life, only if 
others share not only the same desire, but also the ethical 
foundation.  
 





In L’Exode Fondane shows an awareness of the poetic possibility of tying a 
historically-situated specificity to an ahistorical field of affect. This awareness comes 
despite the impossibility of comprehensively defining this field, an impossibility that 
marks the limits of existential philosophy. The poem operates as an instance of an 
ineffable totality. Poetic testimony stands in contraposition to the premises of the 
post-war ‘Era of Witnessing’ based on the objectivity of facts.1 Fondane and Celan 
scholar Giovanni Rotiroti argues that poetry can attend to ‘the convergence of all 
things that constitute us and not necessarily [...] what our eyes perceive in 
competition with (or concomitantly with) high-fidelity equipment’ (Rotiroti 2013, 
103). Poetry that does not accede to a subordinate function refuses the 
 
1 The complexities around the historical value of eyewitness testimony are explored in depth in Anna 
Wieviorka’s field-defining book The Era of the Witness (2006). The emergence of forensic approaches 
to documenting and analysing atrocities, born in part out of an unachievable desire for ‘a stable and 
fixed alternative to human uncertainties, ambiguities, and anxieties’ is superbly unpacked in Thomas 




essentialization of any authority over the narration of an event at the same time as it 
liberates what has been suppressed.2 
 In his book The Singularity of Literature Derek Attridge claims that  
 
a literary work can speak powerfully and immediately to us from across 
centuries or across cultures. This [...] awaits a full theoretical explanation, 
but one outcome of taking it seriously as a basis for thinking about the 
specificity of the literary is a conception of singularity not as a matter of 
closure but as one of openness [...] it changes every time it is read; 
singularity means staying the same through being open to any possible new 
context. (Attridge 2017, xxii) 
  
L’Exode asks the very question of the openness of the singular: ‘chanterais-je ici la 
chanson de Sion | parmi des hommes étrangers? | Car nous sommes étrangers les uns 
parmi les autres | notre langue n’est pas pareille [And should I sing the song of Zion | 
among a strange race of men? | Because we are strangers amongst each other | our 
language is not the same]’ (MF 169). Space, historical time and mythic time are 
drawn into the search for interlocution. In the words of Paul Celan in his Bremen 
speech, ‘the poem does not stand outside time. True, it claims the infinite and tries to 
reach across time – but across, not above.’ (Celan 2003, 34).  
 This reaching activates a renewed and renewable contemporary relevance 
because it ‘calls upon the reader’s sense of ethical responsibility’ (Dickow 2018a, 
149). Along with his 1960 ‘Meridian’ speech (Celan 2003, 37–55), Celan’s 1958 
speech is one of the most important post-war statements by a poet on poetry. 
According to Rotiroti, they were written at a time when Celan was preoccupied by 
Fondane’s life and by ‘Mots Sauvages’ (Rotiroti 2018, 169). Thus it seems 
appropriate to repeat Celan’s argument that ‘a poem, being an instance of language, 
hence essentially dialogue, may be a letter in a bottle thrown out to sea’ (Celan 2003, 
34–35) as a way of understanding L’Exode. In Alexander Dickow’s Levinasian terms, 
this dialogue ‘founded on a constitutive absence’ calls upon us ‘to respond through 
 
2 Drawing on Blanchot, Kristin Ross argues that Une Saison en enfer ‘bears a distinctly different 
relation to the event than one of cataloguing or understanding; it materializes as a thought taken up 
with, vitally engaged with exterior forces, a problem-thought rather than a narrated, completed 
thought’ (Ross 2008, 49). Rimbaud’s problematizing was crucial for Fondane’s own practice of poetry 
as extrospective and participatory. 
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commemoration to a perpetual, signifying absence’ in the act of reading (Dickow 
2018a, 149–150). 
 I believe that for its singular openness this particular dialogue depends upon 
poetry’s extra-rational, non-transcendentally apophatic, liminal status. Its ghostly 
promise of reanimation carries with it Fondane’s ‘aristocratic’ (MF 208) defence of 
poetry against instrumentalization. In resisting instrumentalization of all kinds, 
poetry’s subversion offers the space for life’s affirmation. This inherent subversion 
holds even as the poem seeks the ‘end’ of the other: this ‘end’ is purely 
‘subjectifying’. Fondane’s ‘témoignage spécifique [specific testimony]’ (Beray 2009, 
21) differs from ‘simply’ recording. Rather than simply mapping the present, material 
time is ‘transmuted’ into ‘the time of the poem’, ‘a non lieu that is the place of 
utopia’ (Beray 2006, 176, my translation).3 The poem cannot be reduced to its 
circumstances. There is a conscious irony and a productive tension in the relationship 
between the poet’s experience and what Baudelaire called ‘poetic force’ (Baudelaire 
1868, 23). Together, poet and reader ‘voyageons ensemble | dans un poème [travel 
together | in a poem]’ (MF 247, from an untitled poem cited by Beray). 
 When Fondane writes that ‘notre langue n’est pas pareille’ he continues ‘quand 
même il n’y aurait qu’une seule langue au monde, | qu’un seul mot dans le monde 
[our language is not the same | even if there were only one language in the world, | 
only a single word in the world]’ (MF 169). Fondane abandoned Romanian as his 
poetic tongue (in protest, in Rotiroti’s view, against rising anti-Semitism and 
military-poetic nationalism [Rotiroti 2018, 167]). Yet his ‘crossing’ into French was 
set by the compasses of Baudelaire and Rimbaud, and the linguistic instability 
signaled in L’Exode is always more fundamental than the specialized play of poetry. 
Fondane’s configurations of the remnants found in the ‘marché aux puces [flea 
market]’ (MF 34 and 42; see Vanhese 2012) of words prefigures the relationship to 
language explored by Derrida in The Monolingualism of the Other.4 Like Derrida, ‘it 
 
3 This productively tautological statement contains the non lieu that appears several times in Fondane’s 
work. Like utopia, the words literally mean no place. In French they also have judicial signification, 
‘case dropped’ or ‘case dismissed’. There is therefore an implication of justice missed or unfulfilled: 
‘accusés d’un délit que vous n’avez pas fait [accused of a crime you did not commit]’ (MF 153; CO 
143). It also carries a reminder of the no man’s lands of the First World War and of the Biblical 
wastes. 
4 Fondane’s image of the flea market, the importance of which is explored by Vanhese (2012), may be 
a deliberate riposte to Marinetti’s Futurist manifesto: ‘Italy has been a market for junk dealers for too 




is on the shores of the French language [...] on the unplaceable line of its coast’ that 
Fondane ‘wonder[s] if one can love, enjoy oneself [jouir], pray, die from pain, or just 
die, plain and simple, in another language or without telling anyone about it, without 
even speaking at all’ (Derrida 1998, 2). The poet works consistently at the places 
where language shifts and where its contradictions open gaps in logic. Fondane wrote 
that the poet must be a seismologist (AG 56). The shifting shores of language are also 
what Paul Celan called the ‘shoreline of the heart’ (Celan 2003, 35). 
 Fondane’s enacting of an ‘ethical writing’ (Dickow 2018a, 152) navigates an 
awareness of the poet’s fragile and liminal position. This position is figured in the 
rest of the poem I have been quoting across the past few paragraphs, which is 
‘spoken’ by the Chorus (MF 169–170), with its characteristic use of ‘je’ and 
Rimbaldian direct-speech dashes implying different individual voices. The final 
stanza draws together the chaos and darkness of abandonment with the crying out of 
one’s condition in the figure of the leper from Leviticus 13:45–46:  
 
Voici, mes vêtements ont été  
                décousus,
la ténèbre a noyé mon visage, 
ma tête est découverte, et je crie: 
Impur! Impur! 
Impur serai-je autant qu’il te fera  
                      plaisir
qu’on se moque de ton visage! 
Impur! Je suis impur! J’habite seul. 
 
Ma demeure est hors du camp.  
 
Look, my clothes are torn, 
shadow has overwhelmed my face, 
my head is uncovered, and I cry: 
Unclean! Unclean! 
I will be unclean as long as it pleases  
                                                       you 
for your face to be mocked! 
Unclean! I am unclean! I live alone. 
 





Just as the poet stands ‘neither inside nor outside’ (Derrida 1998, 2) language, his 
extra-rationality is a kind of sickness, his figuring of thought as failure and the 
anguish of desolate mortality a contamination of the hope of progress. One who 
dwells outside the camp is both part of and outside the community. 
 The special testimony of poetry depends upon its subversive contradictions. 
Fondane’s emphatic defense of the unqualifiable extra-rational element of poetry, 
‘ces ténèbres, ce silence, et ce mystère [these shadows, this silence and this mystery]’ 
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(FT 104) resonates with Michel Foucault’s approach to art through madness. Foucault 
argues: 
 
By the madness which interrupts it, a work of art opens a void, a moment of 
silence, a question without answer, provokes a breach without reconciliation 
where the world is forced to question itself. (Foucault 1988, 246) 
 
We can triangulate this destabilizing status of the poet with leprosy and with 
madness. Their interwoven social history is Foucault’s subject. The poet stands at the 
scission between figure and speech (Foucault 1988, 27), ceaselessly negotiating their 
contact. Fondane conflates the poet’s post-Rimbaud, post-Dada exile from, yet in, 
language, with exile that places humanity outside the boundary of the divine, Jews 
outside the polity, refugees outside the state and the existent outside of the meaning 
of history. Like the man in Kafka’s parable (Kafka 2015, 232–242) hesitating at the 
gates of the law, the poet troubles the threshold of the ‘castle of our conscience’ 
(Foucault 1988, 21). 
 In his book The Drowned and the Saved Primo Levi also troubles our collective 
conscience by arguing that eyewitness testimony of the catastrophe of genocide is 
literally impossible. Those who ‘touched the bottom’ were either dead or in a kind of 
living death, ‘muselmanner’ unable to communicate (Levi 2013, 89–90).5 Where 
Levi writes of speaking, inadequately, as a ‘delegate’ on their behalf (Levi 2013, 89–
90), Fondane further complicates the notion of the eyewitness and the possibilities of 
the artist, writing in a kind of visionary pre-meditation of his own death. It is the 
same madness of frivolity in the poem, which gives space to joy, that grants it its 
vision beyond time (and Fondane’s vision is explicitly ‘mad’ with anger, too: ‘colère 
de la vision’ [MF 176]).  
Fondane’s negotiation between the rationality and the irrationality in the word 
fundamentally occurs in what Rotiroti, following Agamben and Derrida, calls the 
‘power of the poem, which is ready to reignite the subject’s desire between the 
necessity of telling and the impossibility of speech’ (Rotiroti 2018, 162, my 
 
5 The living dead of the camps are also foreshadowed in the image of the ghost that runs through 
Fondane’s poetry. Gisèle Vanhese points out that the first of these ghosts is the young woman 
murdered in a pogrom he witnessed as a young boy. He invokes her memory with the figure of 
Shulamite (‘Sulamite, si jamais je t’oublie [Shulamite, if ever I forget you]’; MF 34), whom Celan 




translation). The apophatic elements of Fondane’s poetry, like those of Celan’s, 
trouble the notion of testimony at the same time as they strenuously work to testify. 
Derrida wrote of the ‘poetry of cinders’ (Derrida 1991, 31). In the ruins of the dream 
of a perfectly, mutually intelligible language, Fondane’s words become embers to be 
stoked by fresh reading. 
 The Chorus poem on pages 169 and 170 of the Mal des fantômes layers 
together the relationship between Fondane’s present and the ‘poetic force’ with which 
he transmutes and exceeds it. The mythic mask is evident; the section starts with the 
repetition of the psalm fragment. Yet the questions it asks of us build to an anguish 
which is both that of the essential isolation of the existent and a terrible acuity of the 
1930s: ‘qui est là pour m’entendre? || qui a pitié? [who is there to hear me? || who 
takes pity?]’ (MF 169). Then two troubling lines: ‘Bête qu’on mène à l’abattoir | ne 
fait pas l’innocente! [Animal led to the slaughterhouse, | don’t play innocent!]’ (MF 
169). Perhaps Fondane was not quite cognizant of the industrial mode of slaughter to 
follow, but he certainly had the pogroms of his lifetime in mind. Yet it is the victims 
who are warned not to play innocent: the guilt can only be the guilt of knowledge, 
implicating the reader in the same knowledge that struck Simone Weil (2002, 115; 
see chapter 1, ‘Fondane and ‘Other’ Criticism’), the knowledge that makes innocent 
poetry impossible. Even as Fondane displays a prescience of the coming catastrophe 
from which neither his contemporary reader nor today’s could claim distance, we are 
still with timeless imagery: ‘la fourmi avance jusqu’au bord de l’orage [the ant creeps 
up to the edge of the storm]’ (MF 169). 
 Suddenly, we are turned for a moment into a French context: ‘Ô Midi’ begins 
the lines on page 170. Sacred and profane, metaphysical and poetic, mythic and 
modern, the joys of life and the destruction of disaster are mixed: 
 
Ô Midi, recueilli dans la paume,  
                                         si frais 
la mort a fait des trous dans mes  
                             filets de pêche 
et les poissons se sont répandus  
                                         à terre 
éclatants comme une poignée de  
          monnaie de nickel... 
 
O Midi, gathered in the palm, so fresh, 
death has made holes in my fishing  
                                                     nets 
and the fish are spread on the ground 
flashing like a handful of nickel  








The silver of betrayal, unmistakeable in that ‘handful’, is also everyday coins (nickel 
money had come into circulation in France relatively recently). The fish, that central 
Christian image, are also, reflexively, the Rimbaldian fish of poetry, the golden fish 
sought by the drunken boat, already conflated with the dreamworld of childhood in 
Ulysse at the moment when death, in the form of a murdered Jewish woman, first cut 
the nets (MF 34).6 As the worldly goods of the French would soon be scattered by the 
Nazi invasion, Fondane’s poetic goods are betrayed, are the stuff of betrayal, and he 
goes on wounded. 
 What follows, then, is the cry pushing again through the imperfect poem. The 
Old Testament here functions as the Law; Leviticus 13 is a prescription for hygiene. 
Fondane’s leper gives imperfect voice to the experience silent between the lines of 
the commands. In destitution and darkness, he cries out his own inconvenient and 
disruptive condition (‘Impur!’) across the absence of justice, figured in God’s silence. 
The shadows swallow his face, paralleling the impotence of God’s image. Yet at the 
moment of catastrophe, when the speaker would be lost to the community, to history, 
without God to ‘offer another form of communion’ (Foucault 1998, 17), poetry 
allows us, the reader, to paradoxically witness his solitude. Who hears the cry if not 




L’Exode is performative in more than one sense. It is illocutionary (Salazar-Ferrer 
2005, 53) in its interpellation. Its cries, calls and questions function not simply 
rhetorically in and across the text but directly and indirectly addressing the reader and 
adjuring them to respond, or at least to complete this language act by reading and by 
carrying its questions on and into themselves. The performance of its existential 
affirmation depends upon the ‘immediacy’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2005, 55) of this address. 
Furthermore, this interpellation is necessarily effected in a poetic medium which also 
 
6 ‘Il a un monde en lui-même et rarement quitte le fond | pour respirer à la surface comme font les 
poissons | il ne comprend rien à ce meeting de fantômes || – Sulamite, je t’ai vue. Tu gisais sur la terre 
russe | ouverte comme un jeune melon [he has a world inside him whose depths he rarely leaves | to 
breathe at the surface as fishes do | he cannot understand this meeting of ghosts || – Shulamite, I saw 




performs an apophatic gesture, beyond its own sense limits and towards the ineffable 
which conditions its utterances.  
 Alexander Dickow has worked to examine the ‘structures of address, [the] 
linguistic configurations that in some way implicate the audience’ (Dickow 2018b, 3) 
that characterize lyric poetry in general and Fondane’s work in particular (even if, as 
I argued in the last chapter, Fondane simultaneously follows Rimbaud’s 
problematization of the lyric, for example in his Refus du poème).7 Salazar-Ferrer 
(2005) and Dickow both examine the productive tension between solipsism and 
‘yearning for collectivity’ (Lazarus 2011, 31; see chapter 3, ‘Disconsolation’) in 
Fondane’s work. For Dickow, this tension inherent in Fondane’s poetic act, the act 
that I am considering by way of Achebean celebration, is most usefully explored 
through the writing of Emmanuel Levinas: ‘where Levinas is concerned, the most 
convincing resonances begin, not between the philosophies of the two thinkers, 
but between Levinas’s philosophy and Fondane’s poetry’ (Dickow 2017, 202).8  
 Dickow argues that Fondane’s poetry is perfect for considering a Levinas-
inspired reading of the fragile paradox of relation between self and Other that extends 
into writing, able to reckon with the ‘constitutive absence’ of the author (Dickow 
2018a, 149). He argues: 
 
the past of commemorative writing is the past of the dead and the missing 
[...] a trou, or hole: an absence already inscribed in the present [...] the trou 
can and must be ‘recuperated by reminiscence’, since the act of 
commemoration lies at the heart of its ethical call. (Dickow 2018a, 163) 
 
Dickow rightly argues that this call occurs throughout Fondane’s poetry, though 
L’Exode’s Préface makes it most explicit. This ‘commemorative’ writing, in which 
‘while the poem cannot itself  preserve the  singularity  of  an individual  
existence, it  nonetheless bears witness to that existence, provoking an 
 
7 The image of poetry’s ‘fish’, as in the Drunken Boat, appears here most pointedly, as a sleazy 
distraction from reality: ‘Les molles putains de mon songe | me crient: – “Lâche pied et plonge, | que 
les poissons sont frais et muets!” | – Je songe aux forçats d’Allemagne | ils sont maigres sous le fouet... 
[The slack whores of my dream | cry to me: – “Let go and dive | the fish are fresh and quiet!”| – I 
dream of German convicts | they are thin beneath the whip...’(MF 237). 
8 Dickow’s analysis depends upon Levinas’s distinction between ‘the so-called thematic content that 
Levinas calls the ‘Said’ (le dit)’ and ‘the enactment of discourse prior to all content (the ‘Saying’, le 




awareness of the reader’s own fragile and transient inner life’ (Dickow 2017, 
202) aligns nicely with the broader notion of Achebean celebration.  
 The idea of writing as celebration is surely strongest when it comprehends the 
direct interpellative aspect upon which Dickow makes commemorative writing 
depend. Celebration carries an active, participative sense that bolsters the argument 
that ‘The commemorative text demands to be made present once more’ (Dickow 
2018a, 164). Fondane’s address to the reader in the Préface – ‘[Un jour viendra, sans 
doute, quand le poème lu | se trouvera devant vos yeux [A day will come, no doubt, 
when this poem | will find itself before your eyes]’ (MF 153; CO 143) – makes 
explicit the agency and actuality of remembering. There is no finality, but a ghostly 
interlocution reactivated at each reading. The many voices in L’Exode testify, 
admonish and question, but it is the Préface that directly ties them together in an 
interpellative rubric. 
 The Préface finishes with a call to remember that its author had ‘un visage 
d’homme, tout simplement [quite simply, a man’s face]’ (MF 153; CO 143, adapted). 
In engaging the reader’s participation, celebration not only commemorates the past 
but confronts the reader with the consitution of their own subjectivity through the 
intersubjective act of the poem. In this sense, Fondane’s poetry is not only an 
admonishment to the future, but also an ethical gift, as is fitting for a celebration. 
Though it may be through an experience of mourning and lament, an opportunity is 
created for the fruition of subjective value. Dickow argues that: 
 
the face of writing can only be the face of reminiscence and the face of the 
reader, the Same and the Self. In this sense, the ethical call of writing 
originates with the reading Self, not with the Other: the trou is not of the 
same order as the Other, even though its summons, paradoxical because it 
arises through an absence that still signifies, still might be said to be pre-
conceptual and therefore to precede the Said. (Dickow 2018a, 163) 
 
Across the ineffability of absence, across the absence which language yearns to fill, 
the poem depends upon the other in the expectation of the reader. However, the other 
– which is also the self – also depends, in a sense, upon the poem. The 
intersubjectivity instantiated by the poem paradoxically depends upon the apparent 




  Dickow examines various modes of address in Fondane’s poetry. He 
distinguishes it from Celan’s, in which the Said, according to Levinas, is abolished 
(although Marjorie Perloff [2006] questions this interpretation). While Fondane and 
Celan’s poetics differ significantly, the subversions I have argued for in Fondane’s 
poetry do constitute important qualifications of the Said, though without entirely 
abolishing it, for example by undermining the authority of any one voice. As Dickow 
points out, Fondane’s poetry directly states its call and directly stages the problem of 
interpellation.9 Nonetheless, the performance of this interpellation exceeds its Said. In 
Dickow’s words, ‘while the poem’s Said, its content and its precise mode of being, 
asks nothing of us, the reader is enjoined to respond to the summons of writing to 
remember’ (Dickow 2018a, 164).10  
 The interpellative aspects of Fondane resonate not only with Levinas, but also 
other authors he engaged with such as Shestov, Martin Buber and Gabriel Marcel. 
Rein Staal points out that  
 
Like Shestov’s friend, the great Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, Marcel 
came to believe that personal reality receives its clearest expression when 
one being addresses another in the vocative case, in the second person […] 
The condition of mutual presence, the second person, the Thou or the You, is 
the presupposition of every distinctively personal relation: love, friendship, 
brotherhood, citizenship, and worship. (Staal 2008)  
 
Even this use of the second person, however, is subversively nuanced in Fondane’s 
poetry. Dickow argues that ‘the accusatory posture also short-circuits the potential 
pathos and passivity of victimhood. While Fondane often evokes the Jew’s status as a 
victim, his representations always exceed and challenge this role’ (Dickow 2018a, 
158). Similarity is affirmed, but as a degree of difference. 
 
9 Celan’s ‘Conversation in the Mountains’ may be read as his most overt treatment of the same 
problematic: ‘Even now, when their tongues stumble dumbly against their teeth and their lips won’t 
round themselves, they have something to say to each other’ (Celan 2003, 19). 
10 Dickow’s Levinasian framing lends weight to similarities between Fondane and Kafka, Celan and 
Jabès. Beth Hawkins argues that in their work ‘poetic moments’which ‘capture the retreat of the 
divine’ also capture ‘the retreat of the confident, unified, autonomous subject […] as the subject or 
“self” loses autonomy, the text becomes the instance of, the arena for, the dissolution of the self in the 
other. At the same time, Kafka, Celan and Jabès remain conscious of the need between self and other 
[…] their projects reflect something of the paradoxical positioning that Levinas promotes […] we are 
ourselves only because of the other […] the difference that cannot be reduced to the same upholds the 
ethical relationship between self and other’(Hawkins 2003, xxv-xxvi). 
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 The going-on of Fondane’s poetry post-’Mots Sauvages’ represents an act of 
interpellation in order to affirm existence. However, this act also necessarily includes 
a gesture to what exceeds the literalness of communication, to what is beyond the 
Said and beyond the Saying itself. Fondane’s reflexivity in this regard is crucial. I 
have already mentioned its palanodic moves (see chapter 7 and Dickow 2018a and 
2018b) and its various articulations of the thirst for reality figured and unresolved in 
language. Fondane’s unending desire to affirm the singularity of the existent indicates 
that a gesture beyond the limits of Saying actually occurs through some kind of 
Said.11 Dickow argues that Fondane’s poetry, especially understood alongside his 
philosophy’s concern with the confrontation with reality, is exemplary for its 
demonstration that the inadequacies of words place ‘existence as such beyond the ken 
of language as a tool of knowledge (but not of language as expression beyond 
knowledge, such as poetic language in particular)’ (Dickow 2018b, 2).12  
 Despite the desperation of the cry that continually points in Fondane’s work to 
what lies beyond words, its status as interpellative performance reminds us that 
unsaying ‘performs its negations for the sake of the most positive relations possible’ 
(Keller 2014, 3; see chapter 2, ‘Writing Disaster). The apophatic gesture of 
Fondane’s poetry, which is inseparable from its affirmation of existence and its 
interpellative act, means that it is not only useful for re-reading contemporary 
philosophers such as Levinas, but is relevant for current debates on language and 
ethics. Amia Srinivasan, for example, in her article ‘The Ineffable and The Ethical’, 
has succinctly addressed the continuing tension between the desire to capture 
meaning and the impossibility of fully doing so, as well as examining the same 
performative potentiality of language that led Fondane to return to the extra-rational 
medium of poetry. As the title implies, she argues that the use of language ‘not only 
to represent, but also to gesture, enact, provoke’ is intimately bound up with the fact 
that ‘the ethical, properly understood, is grounded in the ineffable’ (Srinivasan 2018, 
216). 
 ‘Quand même il n’y aurait qu’une seule langue au monde, | qu’un seul mot 
dans le monde [even if there were only one language in the world, | only a single 
 
11 ‘One might put the rhetorical nature of discourse for Fondane in a different way, and say that for 
Fondane, all discourse, all linguistic signification, is driven by desire.’ (Dickow n..d, 8) 




word in the world]’ (MF 169): Fondane fully confronts what Judith Butler calls the 
‘paradoxical task of trying to write about what cannot be delivered in 
language’(Butler 2015). Butler shows that apophasis has always been central to 
existential philosophy: ‘Kierkegaard insists upon the necessity of indirect 
communication, a kind of communication that knows its own limitations and by 
enacting those limits indirectly points the way to what cannot be communicated’ 
(Butler 2015). If the negations of Fondane’s existential philosophy act in the service 
of ‘positive operations’ by resisting the previous negation of life by an overweening 
deployment of logic (Salazar-Ferrer 2005, 54) then it is in the singular address of 
poetry that the indirect gesture can fully realize its function of serving an affirmation 
that flourishes through an intersubjective relation. In Butler’s words, ‘self-affirmation 
means affirming the world without which the self would not be’ (Butler 2015) and 
L’Exode, in all its forms of exile, resists the absence of any true home in modernity 
through the performance – in the sense of both staging and actualization – of this 
dependent relation. 
 I will return to the ethical implications of L’Exode’s apophatic interpellation 
shortly. It is crucial to restate, however, that this performance depends upon art’s 
essential autonomy, the liberty from the demands of other ends that Fondane sets out 
in the Faux Traité. When Dickow writes that ‘Fondane’s poem allows us to extend 
Levinasian concepts into the domain of writing’ (2018, 150), he allows us to contend 
that it does this as poetry. This tautology helps place poetry as the furthest step, the 
one that takes language beyond itself. Simon Critchley writes that 
 
Levinas affirms that the very experience of welcoming the other is a 
violence for a mind committed to the ideal of autonomy [...] With the 
infinity of the ethical relation to the other, Levinas is suggesting that we are 
not and indeed should not be masters in our own house. To welcome the 
other is to unseat the archic assurance of our place in the world, our 
sovereignty[...] It is [...] an act [...] a shattering of my capacities, as what 
[Levinas] calls ‘a descent into the real’ beyond the realm of thought and 
knowledge. (Critchley 2009) 
 
It is poetry that can set the ‘coups de dynamite’ in writing, the ones that actually offer 
an affirmation of existence in the ‘welcoming of the other’. If Levinas is the 
philosopher of ethical speech, Dickow’s work confirms that poetry can extend 
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beyond the logical limits of language into ethical writing, adding another mode of 
response to the philosophical question of how ‘an exchange [can] take place or a 
debate unfold if we accept as a necessary risk the failure to address or respond to the 
other?’ (Voorsmit 2019, 6). 
 Like nothing else, poetry has a capacity to tackle what Derrida names the 
‘monolingualism of the other’ (Derrida 1998), language’s paradoxical double nature 
of being both more and less than owned by the self. Fondane wrote of poets 
performing ‘l’acte déloyal par excellence envers le langage, qui est de l’incliner à 
n’être plus que le langage d’un seul [the disloyal act par excellence towards language, 
which is to push it to into being the language of one alone]’ (FT 26, original 
emphasis). A language of one that we can nonetheless read. Beckett said that ‘to be 
an artist is to fail, as no other dare fail’ (Beckett 1949, 103). The exploration of the 
singular in poetry takes place in the most shared of media.  
 On the one hand, Fondane’s poetry starts from a desire to strike out, and affirm 
the unsayable: as with Rimbaud, ‘there is always that parting cry’ (Gros 2015, 47). 
Yet this move away from what flattens the self in a wider meaning takes place in 
language, though it subverts, opens, renews and refashions it. Thus the articulation of 
the singular experience moves toward the other. In the absence of a transcendent 
justice which would absorb self and other, this process always fails, and so must be 
renewed afresh. However, in the words of Claude Sernet, ‘through poetry’s power of 
transmutation,’ using ‘the shape of one alone’ Fondane finds ‘the power to embody 
the convulsions of a collective conscience and to pass from the single to the general’ 
(cited in Salazar-Ferrer 2005, 66, my translation). Thus, in Salazar-Ferrer’s reading of 
L’Exode, ‘The emergence of an intersubjective space [...] enriches, little by little, the 
meaning of the existential journey’ (OSF 2005, 66, my translation). The poem 
‘gestures towards the other’ even as it awaits the reader to bring its performance into 
being (Rebellato 2014, 4). 
 L’Exode certainly contains a Rimbaldian ‘furious joy’ (Gros 2015, 46) in its 
affirmation of existence, but the cry also reminds us of the haunting presence/absence 
of the unspeakable. The duality of joy and horror are part of poetry’s contradictions. 
To honour Fondane’s resistance to horror is to not let his death overwhelm our 
reading, without relegating it. Marjorie Perloff warns against the dangers of limiting 




place him ‘in a kind of solitary confinement, a private cell’ (Perloff 2006, 1) of 
almost scholiastic hermeneutics. While interpretations of Fondane’s poetry have not 
been steered to a philosophical-linguistic focus to the degree Perloff sees in Celan 
studies, the unspeakability of the Holocaust, a temptation to reduce Fondane to its 
prophet and emblematic victim, and a tendency to critique his work on theological 
and philosophical grounds, do risk creating a kind of ‘exceptionalism’ (Perloff 2006, 
2).  
 Fondane is perhaps less at risk than Celan, despite the temptation towards 
purely philosophical readings of his work,13 because it is more obvious that he writes 
‘out of a tradition, a culture, a history’ (Perloff 2006, 2). Or out of several. Or out of 
the ruins of several. Perloff usefully reminds scholars of the specificity of every 
poem, a status which is as necessary to Fondane’s irresignation as its simultaneous 
respect for the ineffable. The poem’s matter is always ‘quite specific’ (Perloff 2006, 
13). As is evident in Fondane’s multitudinous use of poetic forms, although ‘the 
difficulty of all speaking (to one another)’ counts, the ‘structure of that speaking’ 
counts just as much for the poet (Celan cited in Perloff 2006, 13).  
 Although Perloff does not mention it in her article, Celan too explicitly and 
intertextually references tradition, most famously in Todesfugue’s mention of 
Shulamite (Celan 2005, 46). Shulamite is an important reference for Fondane too, not 
only in the Song Of Songs passages of L’Exode but in Ulysse, where, as in 
Todesfugue, her name is given to a victim of a pogrom in a device that blurs the 
boundary between metaphor and repetition.14 As this connection to Celan through 
Shulamite shows, the forms and images of Fondane’s poetry connect in vital ways to 
other traditions, other moments of witnessing, of affirming the singular. The past is 
not restored to the present fully, but with difference, becoming a catalyst for the 
present’s communion in affirmation. ‘J’ai lu comme vous tous les journaux tous les 
bouquins [I read, as you do, all the newspapers, all the books]’ (MF 152; CO 142) 
 
13 Luca Orlandini warns ‘in general, I find that critics of Fondane are too philosophers [sic], 
philosophy prevails over everything else’ (Orlandini 2013). I am not sure I have avoided this trap. 
14 Shulamite is, understandably, a point of departure for much comparative scholarship on Fondane 
and Celan (see Rotiroti 2018 and Vanhese 2012). She is also an important third presence in the 
dialogue between Derrida and Levinas, paralleling Dickow’s emphasis on triangulation of address in 
Fondane’s poetry, which I will now draw upon. There is still ample scope for much more comparative 
work on Fondane and Celan. Perloff (2006)’s reading of Sprachgitter flags Celan’s relation to his 




writes Fondane in the Préface, certainly bringing knowledge into question (Dickow 
2018a, 156) but also simultaneously affirming a community of reading. Writing is 
shown to be an opportunity for connection and also insufficient, demanding our 
living participation, though not prescribing its form. 
 Poetic testimony calls upon us to participate in the work of testimony. We 
cannot answer but we can ‘respond’, in the sense given by Pierre Joris: ‘this necessity 
of witnessing imposes itself upon us as a responsibility, a word that Robert Duncan 
has usefully explained as meaning “the ability to respond,” i.e. not only to respond to, 
but also, and perhaps above all, to answer for’ (Joris 1995). To answer for Fondane 
and Celan is not to replace their words with ours, but to face their poetry and swear to 
it. We do not do this to grant them the legitimacy of truth – as if it were ours to grant 
– but to create an opening for them. ‘To reopen’, as Joris puts it, ‘these commissures 
stitched up by the SPRACHE’s word’ (Joris 1995, emphasis in the original). We 
grant their texts community and the texts grant community to us. We celebrate them, 
and in doing so defend the rights of existence. Fondane’s irresignation calls our own 
questions into being.  
 Art in general and poetry in particular, then, has a special role in what Foucault 
calls ‘the sovereign entreprise of unreason’ (Foucault 1998, 236). Fondane’s view of 
the role of the artist in works like the Faux Traité very much foreshadows Foucault’s 
argument that it is only in the ‘lightning-flash of works such as those of Hölderlin, of 
Nerval, of Nietzsche, or of Artaud’ that the ‘gigantic moral imprisonment’ (Foucault 
1998, 236) of reason sure of itself can be resisted, that is only through art’s autonomy 
can reason’s autonomy be undermined. It is here that Fondane finds the promise of 
re-enchantment, although Til R. Kunhle points out that poetry may in fact depend on 
the poet’s own rational separation from the world (Kuhnle 2007), an argument that 
aligns with Foucault’s own nuance that true madness is the ‘annihilation of the work 
of art’ (Foucault 1998, 244). The poet’s unhappy consciousness is, in this 
understanding, a necessary correlative of poetry’s stretch across language and time. 
Nonetheless, the utopian promise of connection between the real and the word held in 








Alexander Dickow has shown how enunciative theories of poetry are especially 
pertinent to Fondane’s work, and vice-versa (Dickow 2018b). He draws on Jonathan 
Culler’s notion of ‘triangulated address’ – the propensity for lyric poetry to indirectly 
interpellate the reader by addressing a third – together with Fondane’s direct 
interpellations to examine the ambiguity of address variously put to use by Fondane. 
While I agree with Dickow that L’Exode is not unique within Fondane’s poetry in 
enacting such techniques, I do think that it is exemplary, especially because of the 
way it not only deploys and subverts lyric but intersperses it with other modes. 
 In L’Exode Fondane invokes various well-worn poetic ‘thirds’ – death (Resch, 
MF 157), rivers (MF 164, Interlude IV 177), Spirit (MF 175), poetry itself (Interlude 
I, MF 176), humanity (in a very Whitmanian way; see Interlude V, MF 178), a horse 
(MF 185), the list goes on. However, as the work’s intertextual title implies, the 
primary point of triangulation between author and reader echoes the Old Testament. 
It is not so much God as the absence of God that is addressed. This absence torments 
the Israelites in their exile, and Fondane’s reason ultimately denies him full 
acquiescence to the ‘madness’ of faith that is a prerequisite for the restitution of the 
covenant: ‘lorsque tout se sera apaisé || nous T’aurons oublié [You know that when 
all is calm || we will have forgotten You]’ (MF 180). When the voice of God speaks 
in the poem, it is to declare that ‘Il vous faudra marcher avec des reins d’angoisse | 
jusqu’aux terres de la fatigue – et il se peut plus loin [You must go on, with anguish 
in your gut | to the lands of weariness – and further, it may be]’ (MF 202). God will 
be ‘Celui qu’on ne voit point [the One who is unseen]’ and it is at ‘ce point précis 
d’absence’ [this exact point of absence] (MF 202) that reality, ‘rugueuse à étreindre 
[rough to grasp]’ in Rimbaud’s words (Rimbaud 2009, 252, translation adapted), is 
admitted, despite the poet’s conscience somewhere in the background exhorting him 
to work towards transcendence: the next voice, named ‘La voix dans le désert’ is 
‘ashamed’ ‘de m’étendre crier || C’EST! [to hear myself cry || IT IS!]’ (MF 203).15  
 
15 This absence through which reality is encountered also fundamentally exposes the relationality and 
precarity of the self: ‘C’est dans ce point | que j’ai douté enfin de ma lucidité | en me voyant moi-
même, mais détaché de moi [– It’s at this point | that I finally came to doubt my reason, | seeing 
myself, yet detached from myself]’ (MF 203). 
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 ‘Pourquoi appelais-je au secours? [Why did I call out for aid?]’ THAV (MF 
207) asks in the very last stanza of the poem, and this reflexivity resounds with 
absurdity, in one sense: there is no response from God. Yet this constitutive absence 
is echoed by that absence that prefigures the relationship between writer and reader. It 
is the failure of communion between God and self that figures the fragile possibility 
of communion between selves through writing, the articulation of self through a 
shared experience of ‘la boue et la poisse [the mud and bad luck]’ (MF 202) of 
existence. The demolition of human community by the Nazis in the service of a 
totalizing historical project is resisted not by a pure language that would itself 
transcend difference, but by writing within and across the Babel of mundane life. 
Rotiroti argues that poetry offers the ‘possibility of reintegration of that which has 
been broken’ (Rotiroti 2019, 63). The breaking of absolute community cannot be 
undone, but it can be re-membered, recombined. Not fully restored, but salvaged. 
 The poem’s mediation of a participative relationship depends upon its 
affordance of indirect communication. The uniqueness of this affordance is well 
summarised by Dickow: 
 
Solipsistic isolation as a universal condition, subjective uniqueness 
channelled through a collective and conventional medium: these paradoxes 
share a self-contradictory quality that might be said to resist or contest the 
principle of non-contradiction. (Dickow 2018b, 16) 
 
Poetry is the linguistic medium that allows for contradiction, and L’Exode’s many 
dictions emphasize this. The indirectness of L’Exode’s address, whether in direct 
written interpellation from an absent author to an absent reader or through 
triangulation, is performed to establish a human relationship over and above 
imparting knowledge.    
 The indirect means of Fondane’s poetry can be seen as the antithesis of the 
utilitarian communications which Adorno, in Minima Moralia, sees as ubiquitous in 
capitalist modernity and attacks to an absolute degree: ‘Matter-of-factness between 
people, doing away with all ideological ornamentation between them, has already 
itself become an ideology for treating people as things’(Adorno 2020, 45). Statistics, 
for example, objectifiy, as is only too clear in the wave of numbers that washes over 




brought below an ‘acceptable’ level in order to ‘restart’ GDP. The Nazis’ 
historicizing project sought not only to exile their victims from the human 
community, but also from the community of signifiers. Against this terrible 
eschatological project, we can put Adorno’s statement that ‘tenderness between 
people is nothing other than awareness of the possibility of relations without purpose’ 
(Adorno 2020, 44). In L’Exode Fondane resisted reification even as it bore down 
upon him in absoluteness, in impending death.  
 L’Exode could only act as resistance to reification by gesturing to the 
unspeakable horror whose very existence is denied by other forms of discourse. This 
is the mediation I discussed in the ‘masks’ section of chapter 5. Poetic testimony uses 
triangulated address to mediate the reader’s engagement with its premises with a 
degree of psychic protection: ‘les pensées les plus audacieuses et les plus honnêtes 
[…] se sont […] fait jour […] dans les ouvrages frivoles [the most audacious and 
honest of thoughts come to light in frivolous works]’ (HDH 442; EM 49, adapted). 
The author’s responsibility is at once great, pointing out what is otherwise too terrible 
a subject, and ‘refused’, passed on to the mouth of the mask.   
Fondane argues in Baudelaire et l’expérience du gouffre that ‘l’expression 
artistique n’est ni l’objet de l’expérience affective, ni le langage, mais uniquement la 
relation entre les deux [artistic expression is not the object of affective experience, 
nor is it language, but only the relation between the two]’ (BEG 409). Poetry, 
evading the principle of non-contradiction through the thrown voice, responds to the 
rational knowledge of inexpressibility with an absurd attempt to express. The poem 
acts to make possible the relationship between selves, between author and reader, 
across the placeless place, the non-lieu of the unspeakable and the unsayable: ‘le 
besoin de poésie est un besoin de tout autre chose que de poésie [the need for poetry 
is the need for something quite different from poetry]’(BEG 517).  
 The ‘Song of Songs’ section of L’Exode is a drama-within-a-drama staging of 
the ways poetry’s indirectness leads it to being more than the sum of its parts. The 
Levinasian ‘trace of the feminine’, the affective remainder of philosophy highlighted, 
in their different ways by Shestov, Fondane or Barthes (see chapter 3), is given voice 
in the mask of the woman from the Song, Shulamite – the very same that Derrida 
uses in his ‘conversation’ with Levinas (Voorsmit 2019, 47–48). Through this mask 
an address from self to other happens through layers of triangulation. Fondane’s 
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poem in its boldness and humility is connected with the boldness and humility of the 
speaker and with uncountable, unnamed people whose existence is testified to by the 
poetic ‘remains’ that make up a written tradition.  
 The speaker addresses the people of Jerusalem (or specifically, the girls), but at 
the same time the words are being spoken by another mask, i.e. by a captive 
whispering to their comrades by a fire, and at another level still, its questions are 
addressed to a void, which could be the place of God or of Fondane’s reader: to 
whom exactly are lines like ‘Qui donc a frappé à mon coeur [Who was it knocked 
upon my heart]?’ (MF 188) addressed? The character triangulates her yearning for the 
other through the reader even as the relation between author and reader is triangulated 
through her; at the same time, the human yearning for God shared by author and 
reader is triangulated through her search and its narration at the campfire.  
 Fondane’s poetic forms may not be as wrenching to the Said as Celan’s. 
Nonetheless, by looking at a work as a whole we see the relevance of Wolosky’s 
contextualization of his compatriot’s work:  
 
Linguistic failure is the failure to realize meaningful experience. On the one 
hand, the ineffable makes possible positive utterance; on the other, it may 
engulf it. Language trauma is historical trauma. (Wolosky 1995, 7) 
 
Paradoxically once again, L’Exode affords a connection to the historical actuality of 
Fondane’s experience through an indirect and mythical mediation. This is his way of 
reckoning with linguistic failure, to fight to affirm existence despite its lack of 
rational meaning. In his work, too, ‘positive utterance is ever-threatened and 
vulnerable’ (Wolosky 1995, 7). This is how the Singer tails off: ‘Si vous voyez Celui 
que j’aime | ne lui dites pas | – ou dites-lui à peine – | que l’on a vu saigner une fraise 
de bois... [Should you see Him I love, | do not tell him – or barely tell him – | you 
have seen a wild strawberry bleed…]’ (MF 190). 
 Wolosky defends Celan against charges of creating ‘closed aesthetic worlds’ 
(Wolosky 1995, 7) and we have seen that ‘Mots Sauvages’ is a manifesto against 
such worlds (see chapter 2). L’Exode’s reckoning with reality’s traumas is also a 
refusal to ‘compromise’ with life (FT 35). Fondane refuses to recognize the triumph 
of reason and defined ends, and against Jaspers’s dismissal of myth (FT 36), he 




[render unto life what belongs to life]’ (FT 37). L’Exode’s many masks, which would 
seem to take us away from reality, analogous to the seeming hermeticism of Celan’s 
poetry, in actual fact are also invested with what Wolosky calls ‘all the risk of 
temporal process and historical engagement’ (Wolosky 1995, 7). Fondane’s 
philosophical negations are important, but his project of re-establishing ‘les fonctions 
abolies par le climat critique [the functions abolished by the critical climate]’ (FT 37) 
cannot be carried by his own critical work. It is in poetry that he can go ‘ever in the 
face of inexpressibility; but beyond inexpressibility there is a commitment to 
language as the articulation of meaning within our immediate historical condition’ 
(Wolosky 1995, 7). 
 Fondane’s use of myth and of masks, then, is another example of poetry’s 
indirectness performing functions unavailable (or at least obfuscated and 
downplayed) in other forms of writing. Poetry’s testimony subverts differences in 
status between locutor and interlocutor. It is predicated on affectively extending the 
condition of humanity to its audience, and seeking the humanity of its author in doing 
so. Claims to transcendent identities are subverted, and therefore the hierarchies 
which are based upon them. The othered ‘jes’ of L’Exode (what Salazar-Ferrer calls 
Fondane’s ‘je errant’; Salazar-Ferrer 2005, 54) undo transcendent authority in order 
to open to the contingent constitution of self and other in the fragile possibility of 
communication.16 Between philosophy’s constructions beyond reality and an 
aesthetic dream of escape, the participation invited by poetic testimony performs the 
endless negotiation between imagination and reality. 
 The operations of L’Exode belong to what Oscar Wilde referred to as ‘the truth 
of masks’ (O. Wilde 1913). Like his decadent predecessor, Fondane was highly 
aware of the importance of irony in this process, and as I have argued, against Wexler 
(see chapter 7), this irony does not nullify his truths but enhances them.17 There is 
humour in Fondane’s work, and the Interlude’s translation of disaster into comic 
chanson, personifying the rivers (MF 177):  
 
16 Fondane’s precarious yet tenacious subject positions pre-empt Beckett in this regard. Wolosky 
writes that Beckett ‘criticizes a unitary, self-identical self beyond time, and questions the Proustian 
ideal of one. For it is an ideal that imprisons the self in itself, making both love and communication 
impossible in any real sense’ (Wolosky 1995, 73). 
17 Robert Boyers counters a similar reading of the fiction of another reader of Shestov, George Steiner 




The lightness of the lines emphasize the absurd, unreal sense of suddenly being a 
refugee, while the ‘Mon Dieu!’ which interjects could be a stock refrain, but its 
seriousness is amplified by the uneasy sense that such an expostulation is only too 
appropriate.18 Fondane’s humour foreshadows the extreme example of Aleksander 
Kulisiewicz, mentioned in the last chapter, whose clowning in the concentration 
camp was not a means of escaping a terrible reality but of surviving with some 
semblance of humanity.19 At a moment when other forms of resistance appear futile, 
poetry’s frivolity disrupts absolute defeat with a hinging of self and other. 
 Fondane’s engagement of irony towards making poetry an event participating 
in reality fits with Koloctroni’s analysis of modernist historicity. While Wexler is 
right that there is a danger in modernist irony refusing the attempt at signification, 
Fondane constantly strives ‘towards the contradictions which are crying out to be put 
into words’ (Lefebvre 1995, 47–48, cited in Kolocotroni, forthcoming). In the words 
of Monique Jutrin, ‘[Fondane argues that] the poetic act can grasp the real only 
insofar as it refuses to conceive of itself as knowledge’ (Jutrin 2015, 6). Through 
irony, Fondane contextualizes various forms of discourse to tear open access to that 
cry, revealing the Sophist (and Nietzschean) position that ‘no dialectic can sidestep 
the affective dimension of language and its appeal to the passions’ (Dickow 2018b, 
17). As certain passages of L’Exode actually stage the conflict between the rational 
 
18 The Meuse was the trajectory of another famous flight, that of Rimbaud, here turned on its head as 
the river flees the poet. 
19 See Jude Polsky’s thesis Laughing Matters: The Holocaust Humour of Art Spiegelman, Tadeusz 
Borowski, and Aleksander Kulisiewicz (2002). 
‘La Meuse nous a fuis,la gueuse, 
et la Somme s’est fait enlever... 
Si tous les fleuves nous quittaient 
         qu’allons-nous faire? 
 
La Marne, ô rusée, ô jolie, 
pourquoi es-tu restée au lit? 
Ô Seine, c’est de la folie! 
 Mon Dieu!’ 
The Meuse gave us the slip, the  
                                           bitch, 
and the Somme's been carried  
                                            off... 
If all of the rivers should leave us 
  what will we do? 
 
Sweet Marne, so canny, so pretty, 
why did you stay in your bed? 
Oh Seine, this is insanity, 






imperative to eradicate contradiction and the inconvenient ‘thirst’ (MF 174) of the 
existent, a kind of meta-address comes in to play, such as in the ‘second man’s’ 
monologue (MF 173–174), where the exhortations of the ideal are related in a past-
tense narrative. Dickow writes that ‘as opposed to philosophy’s pretension to 
rhetorical mastery, poetry submits to the uncontrollable drift of affective life’ 
(Dickow 2018b, 19) and the staging of the rhetorical impulses of philosophy is 
followed, after the interlude, by the song of the Song of Songs (MF 188). 
 Fondane’s poetry cannot overcome the paradox of testimony set out by Primo 
Levi. Nonetheless, in its engagement with catastrophe L’Exode is a kind of artistic 
correlative to Blanchot’s philosophical attempt to confront the writing of disaster. 
Thierry Durand, commenting on Blanchot’s The Step Beyond, frames the context 
thus: 
 
at the moment where all is lost, where it is already too late, the face of the 
other – the deported other – calls for remorse, ‘as if it were necessary to 
respond’ writes Blanchot, ‘to a demand all the sharper for the fact that it 
demands nothing but this infinite response’. (Durand 1998, 51, my 
translation). 
 
The ‘moment when all is lost’ is also the moment of writing, when the author lets go 
of their authority and allows the text to stand for itself, indeed to travel for itself. 
Poetic testimony’s circumlocution, its circumnavigation – a message in a bottle cast 
upon the waves (Celan 2003, 35) – makes this demand possible in writing, across 
time, space and difference.  
 Salazar-Ferrer argues that L’Exode is primarily addressed to a ‘shared 
community’ (Salaza-Ferrer 2005, 63, my translation) implied in the ‘aristocratic’ 
view of poetry’s audience in the postface, but the irony is that membership of this 
community is open to all who choose it. With the message in the bottle, the unknown 
reader is intended more intimately for reception and connection than they ever could 
be by a straightforward address. Durand opposes Blanchot’s rhetorical conception of 
language to Hegel’s idea of philosophy as the flower which grows from the ruins of 
history, something pure and perfect distilled from the mash of human lives (Durand 
1998, note 2, 52). For Blanchot, against Hegel’s image, the flowers of rhetoric 
symbolize ‘the endless beginning again which ruins all dialectics’’ (cited in Durand 
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1998, note 2, 52, my translation). Durand argues that Blanchot thereby undermines 
the dominance of a conception of literature as subordinate to ideas. In using his own 
image of growth, Fondane humbly chooses nettles that survive in ruin (MF 153).20 
What survives in his poetry is not a glorious idea or a frozen beauty but a trace of life 
amidst ruins, presenting an ethical injunction.21 Neither simply a presentation of facts 
nor a command, its reading participates in that ‘beginning again’. The message is 
thrown into the ocean yet its address is the most precise possible. It subverts scrutiny 





In all discourse, at its heart and in its essence, 
someone is crying out.  
 
(Dickow 2018b, 19) 
 
Some of Fondane’s commentators have argued that he attacks or withdraws from 
politics. Michael Finkenthal describes him as ‘antipolitical’ (Finkenthal 2013, 83). I 
think this is a mischaracterisation. Just as Fondane’s philosophical work is best 
thought of not as anti-rational but as extra-rational, so his writing’s relationship to the 
social may be considered extra-political, not denying the reality of politics but 
subverting its certitudes and affirming the importance of what exceeds it (without 
being totally independent of it). In fact, his relationships to politics and to reason are 
intimately linked. Against contemporary Marxist attempts to triage literature in terms 
of revolutionary ‘purity’, Fondane defended writers such as Baudelaire and 
Lautréamont as ‘spiritually’ revolutionary while being socially conservative 
(EDR77). Ironically, this aligns him more closely than his opponents to Marx 
himself, who ‘always held that great writers have insights into social reality that 
transcend their personal prejudices’ (Wheen 2006, 5). Fondane’s position, 
 
20 The image is a Biblical one, too: the nettles in the temple (MF 192) is particularly reminiscent of 
Isaiah 34:13. 
21 Although the modern sense of injunction implies command, the etymological meaning of enjoin, ‘to 
fasten to, to bring upon’, is appropriate for the sense of an ethical presence in Fondane’s poetry as 




summarized by Finkenthal, that ‘Marxism itself should be liberated from the 
constraints of a narrow determinism and be presented with the challenge of 
confronting the irrational aspects of life and society’(Finkenthal 2013, 83) pre-empts 
later revisions. 
 Although Marx’s ‘insights’ could also be construed as a mandate for a 
hermeneutics of politically-correct knowledge extraction that Fondane would abhor, 
he never denied that the extra-rational activities of the artist were linked to the social. 
He only insisted that they not be made subordinate to it, at a time when various 
political idealists were demanding just that. While Fondane subverts the notion of an 
autonomous aesthetic realm à la Mallarmé, his defence of poetry’s power beyond 
political definition can be seen as having a political edge, in the sense that it resists 
projects which would banish it and the social consequences of this banishment. In 
1935 he wrote: 
 
Le rôle de la culture n’est pas de sanctionner une somme d’interdictions, ni 
de canoniser des moyens de contrainte; ce n’est pas à elle de faire le silence 
sur le suicide de Maïakovski; c’est à elle, au contraire, de délimiter dans un 
événement pareil la frontière du social de la frontière de l’individuel; c’est à 
elle de tirer les enseignements nécessaires et d’amener l’événement à sa plus 
haute expression éthique, métaphysique ou religieuse. 
 
[The role of culture is not to give official recognition to a collection of 
prohibitions, nor to canonise the methods of coercion; it is not its place to 
keep silent about Mayakovsky’s suicide; on the contrary, in such an event it 
is up to it to mark out the boundary between the social and the personal; it is 
up to it to take the necessary lessons from the event and to bring it to its 
highest ethical, metaphysical or religious expression.] (EDR 101–102) 
 
This is why I find the Achebean notion of celebration helpful: it ties together psychic 
liberation and the independence and ambiguity of art with a notion of community. 
There is an affinity between Adorno’s ‘ethics of resistance’ and Fondane’s poetics, in 
that a ‘pre-theoretical ethical impulse’ that demands a ‘way of being and living’ 
without ‘rational justifications’ (Finlayson 2012, 29) is surely expressed in Fondane’s 
poetry, beyond the limits of theorization. 
 Poetry’s affirmation of the existence of the singular takes place through the 
performance of contradictions. In Rotiroti’s words, poetry’s testimony ‘brings a 
multiplicity into itself, a constellation of light and shadow, a secret configuration of 
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places for memory’ (Rotiroti 2018, 152, my translation). Through its overt act of 
making the affirmation of the singular depend upon the expectation of the other in 
language, poetry holds together the singular and the multiple in a way which subverts 
the logical principle of identity. It does this even at the level of the word: a 
metaphoric word can be two things at once, as well as something else, subverting the 
principle of the excluded third, and that of non-contradiction. In the Préface Fondane 
subverts these principles in even simpler fashion: ‘je parle d’homme à homme || Et 
pourtant, non! | je n’étais pas un homme comme vous [I speak man to man || But no! | 
I was not a man like you.]’ (MF 151–152; CO 139–141). A difference that exceeds 
rationality is gestured towards in a comparison that puts forward similarity and then 
counters it without cancelling it. 
 Judith Butler makes a theoretical intervention that points up the importance of 
the limits of language in contextualizing the relation that is instigated by poetic 
testimony: 
 
None of us are captured by the categories by which we gain recognition. I 
am that name you give me, but I am also something else that cannot quite be 
named. The relation to the unnameable is perhaps a way of maintaining a 
relation to the other that exceeds any and all capture. That means that 
something about the other can be indexed by language, but not controlled or 
possessed, and that freedom, conceived as infinity, is crucial to any ethical 
relation. (Butler 2020) 
 
Through its contradictions, poetry draws attention to the fact of this unnameability. 
At the same time it draws attention to its specificity, ‘indexed by language, but not 
controlled or possessed’; poems are, in William Harmon’s words, ‘palpably physical 
objects inviting attention to their own visible and audible reality’ (Harmon 1992, 
926). Unlike the universalizing aims of philosophy, poetic testimony invites a plural 
relationship through the affirmation of singularity, connecting existents in an 
affirmation of existence that can never be captured as a transcendent object of 
knowledge.  
 Poetic testimony holds open a space for a non-absolute negotiation of values. 
Against programmatic politics that seek to comprehensively map social reality with 
logic, Fondane’s work is useful for an apophatic understanding of politics, which 




prevent them from happening and one has to cope with their consequences whether 
one finds meaning or not in their unfolding’ (Finkenthal 2013, 85). Catastrophe 
exposes the fundamentally uncontrollable nature of contingency. Celan, inspired by 
Shestov, argued that the indirectness of poetry is created ‘for the sake of an 
encounter’ (Celan 2003, 46). By phantomatically inviting a ‘shared humanity that 
demands recognition just as the face of the Other demands recognition according to 
Levinas’ (Dickow 2018a, 157) poetic testimony offers a starting-point that may help 
self and other to live with this uncontrollability. I would call this starting-point proto-
political: one to which politics can always return, ‘a word for living creatures’ (Celan 
2003, 48). 
 The beginning of a relation invited by poetic testimony is centred around the 
notion of address. Poetic testimony depends upon always implicitly addressing the 
reader in the second person, even when this address is in fact triangulated. ‘The 
condition of mutual presence, the second person, the Thou or the You, is the 
presupposition of every distinctively personal relation’ (Staal 2008). L’Exode 
presupposes this relation, though most of its passages are not directly addressed to the 
reader. The Préface emphasizes this by acting as a kind of overture, its direct address 
colouring and uniting all that follows.  
 Butler, of course, reckons the importance of pronouns in mediating the ethical 
relation. Paul Celan had already understood this. His Conversation in the Mountains 
indicates that the second person is the insufficient and necessary beginning of all 
social being. His ‘language of the earth’ consists of ‘nothing but He, nothing but It, 
you understand, and She, nothing but that’ (Celan 2003, 20). The language of the 
third person – the language of philosophy and ‘cataphatic’ politics – unspeakably 
objectifies the existent, but the unsayable language of nature is also impersonal. In 
Fondanian terms, we are banished from unity with it by our taste from the tree of 
knowledge – our esprit critique. Therefore we can only respond to and through the 
insufficiency of our human language with the necessity of using it, which always 
begins with a second-person address: ‘I had to talk, maybe, to myself or to you’ 
(Celan 2003, 20). The self itself is affirmed by making this address, which Fondane’s 
poetry performs. 
 Poetic testimony is ethically fragile. Its resistance to reification depends upon a 
refusal of instrumentalization: it should not be confused with an actual political act. 
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Nonetheless, the proto-ethical space which it holds open is that which must condition 
the ethical event. This is not to imply that poetry is necessary for the ethical event, 
only that it can perform such a pre-conditioning and make it evident. This fragility is 
clear in the tension maintained in L’Exode between the specificity of Jewish 
experience and its metonymic employment as exposing something essential in 
general human experience. As Dickow argues of the Préface, ‘although the poem’s 
conclusion at first seems to betray a preference for the notion of a shared humanity, 
the earlier section’s accusation persists as a troubling palinode, a wrench thrown into 
the poem’s otherwise smoothly working machine’ (Dickow 2018a, 158).  
 L’Exode’s fragile, absurd hope of shared humanity lies not in a political 
statement but in the relation it strives to engender, a relation which is necessarily 
provisional. It is in this sense that L’Exode can most importantly be ‘considered the 
great poem of Jewish poetic resistance under the Occupation’ (Salaza-Ferrer 2005, 
59, my translation). It does not simply dare make the riches of Jewish culture relevant 
to the present and attempt to safeguard them for the future. It actually uses the 
anguish of the Jewish experience of exile from God as a means for resisting the 
anguish of the exile of self from other and therefore of the objectification that 
‘justifies’ extermination. Fondane refuses revenge (MF 151; CO 139) not by 
accepting his fate but by looking to and attempting to instigate the subjectivity to 
come (see Buck-Morss 2014). 
 The guards’ song discussed in Chapter 5 (‘Voices’) is exemplary for examining 
the breadth of Fondane’ s vision as he articulates the meeting points of the existential 
and the social (as, with famous skill, did Villon, his formal model for this passage). 
Fondane imagines the brutalized humanity of the perpetrators of catastrophe singing a 
collective song with a lonely refrain. With Biblical force, the soldiers are stunned by 
looking on those stunned by violence: ‘Les statues de sel des routes, | avec leur regard 
étonnant [The statues by the road we traipse | astonish with their saline stares]’ (MF 
187). Their own individual anguishes and confusions are channelled into their unison: 
‘Êtes-vous morts, tous et toutes? | Sous quelles neiges sont les ans? [Are you dead, 
each and all | What snows have covered up the years?]’ (MF 187). Fondane subverts 
the border of individual and group, of victim and perpetrator: ‘Il n’est de chanson que 
l’humaine [there is no song but the human one]’ (MF 187). Henri Meschonnic argues 




continu de la vie] by way of the poem and in that of the poem by way of life. In this 
way he is present’ (Meschonnic 2006, 13, my translation). This presence is only 
possible through an unflinching attempt to gesture to the totality of affective reality, 
and so Fondane refuses to objectify his persecutors in turn. 
 Fondane’s resistance of reification through his poetry is pre-political. His 
poetry makes apophasis evident, expressing the repressed and excluding and 
gesturing to the ineffable. Simply by existing it defends the independence of the 
imagination, and the political ramification of this is a reminder that politics is for 
people, not the other way around (Fondane made Mark 2:27 a mot d’ordre in this 
regard: ‘The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath’. See LE 12–13 
and HDH). This kind of apophasis is a Celanian living-with the need to speak despite 
the abyss, as opposed to what might be called the apophasis of Fascism (Miéville 
2019, 14): the obscurantism of a doctrine that demands acceptance of the authority of 
an ineffable truth held in blood and soil, the silence in the service of a cause that 
induced Fondane to abandon Romania and eventually killed him. 
 Fondane’s dream of ‘primitive’ re-enchantment through poetry, as he himself 
sometimes admitted, would never be realized, ‘its restoration’, in Mircea Martin’s 
words, ‘always under threat from omnipresent and omnipotent reason’ (Martin 2007, 
my translation), including in the poet’s own mind. Poetry was nonetheless crucial in 
this endless attempt because it brought reality and imagination together in a resistance 
of what Fondane saw as philosophy’s intrinsic hatred of reality. If this resistance to 
alienation has a political parallel, perhaps it is in the Marxian social project of re-
enchantment of Silvia Federici, if only in its agreement that ‘the root of oppression is 
loss of memory’ (Paula Gunn Allen cited in Federici 2019, introduction), or in ‘anti-
blueprint’ social anarchism, found in twenty-first-century primers such as Cindy 
Milstein’s Anarchism and Its Aspirations but probably best (and somewhat 
apophatically) gestured towards in the fiction of Ursula Le Guin. Both share 
Fondane’s critique of any politics that would impose ‘a unitary model of social and 
cultural life’ (Federici 2019, introduction). 
 Fondane’s resistance to alienation operates at an existential level, not a political 
one, even though the act of affirmation in his poetry depends upon the possibility of a 
relationship. His notion of the poet’s shameful conscience is like an inversion of the 
common understanding of existential ‘bad faith’, ‘the human being’s anxiety in front 
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of the responsibility entailed by the realization of its radical freedom’ (Burnham and 
Papandreopoulos 2020). Fondane may have seen an ‘escape’ into aesthetics as a 
denial of that responsibility, but, in opposition to existential philosophies which 
depend upon a rational confrontation with the absurd, his own poetry represents the 
pushback of the irrational against the proclamation of other ethical responsibilities. 
Poetry can break all the rules, demanding even the freedom to be absurd, to escape 
the shackles of ethical thought without actually negating ethics. What Dickow has 
shown in his Levinasian reading of Fondane is that the act of assuming one’s 
subjectivity, an act performed by Fondane in his poetry, depends upon the attempt to 
instigate a relationship with the other, even if only through writing. Thus the reader is 
the most distant and the most intimate, the most general and the most specific of 
interlocutors. 
 Fondane’s poetry functions as a resistance to reification to the furthest degree, 
including the reification of death. In contrast to ruins which proclaim greatness past – 
the necrophilic Nazi conception – it speaks from the ruins with the promise of a 
living relation. It is impossible to consider his work without taking into account the 
specific catastrophe that surrounds it, and in thinking his writing as resistance his 
context is comparable to that of contemporary writers such as Edith Stein, Simone 
Weil, Anne Frank, and Etty Hillesum, the subjects of Rachel Feldhay Brenner’s book 
Writing as Resistance: Four Women Confronting the Holocaust (1998). There is 
something specific, though, about poetic resistance, poetic testimony: its embrace of 
irrational elements, the absurdity of its revolt as part of its revolt against absurdity.  
 Fondane is one of the ‘drowned’ discussed by Primo Levi (2017) and by 
Giorgio Agamben (2008). He cannot testify from death – yet he comes close. In his 
desire to give testimony to existence, through his own existence but, by the alchemy 
of poetry, not reduced to mere autobiographical witnessing, he defeats the 
significance of his death in advance. In his absurd choice to stay by his sister Line, in 
the aburd revolt of his poetry, his life gives itself meaning, rather than being given 
meaning by his death. That is to say, its meaning is opened by the participation of the 
reader. In his essays he argued for the revolt of art against domination in the 
philosophical sphere, and his poetry revolts against all domination. 
 In opening his book on the negotiation of identity and community with 




Humanism is understood as a rationalizing, normative and exclusionary project, 
Glissant’s characterization of the work of undoing hegemony as ‘anti-humanism’ 
(Derrida 1998) neatly shows that Fondane’s desire to affirm existence and subvert all 
definitions in the endless desire for relation is inseparable from the confrontation with 
language. It is poetry that can undertake this without fear or favour. As a poet, 
Fondane precedes Celan, but he anticipates him. In ‘Mots Sauvages’ he argued for 
poetry as dynamite. Rotiroti sees the ‘cinders’ of the poetry of catastrophe in terms of 
‘the power of the poem ready to reignite the subject’s desire, between the necessity of 
speech and the impossibility of the word’ (Rotiroti 2018, 163, my translation). In 
Fondane’s poetry, the fuse is always lit. 
 The necessity of saying something, against the impossibility of the word, brings 
us back once again to the importance of the cry in Fondane’s poetry, which expresses 
that necessity in a way which is proto-linguistic as well as proto-ethical. The cry 
communicates a longing for understanding that stands at the edges of language’s 
imperfections. To draw on William Franke, Fondane’s cry is also ‘the cry or scream 
(cri) that wells up from writing, “é-cri-ture” ’ because writing entails the ‘splitting 
apart of the whole into unbound, boundless fragments’ (Franke 2014, 109–110). The 
cry that responds to the impossibility of adequately speaking occurs in the utterance 
itself.  
 Although he may not seem to rend language at the level of the word to the 
degree seen in Celan (or, as I shall examine in the next chapter, Edmond Jabès), in his 
poetry Fondane does stand at the boundaries of sense, aware that ‘The significance of 
the whole–significance as a whole–is at stake in writing’ (Franke 2014, 110). 22 This 
liminality, this awareness of language as fragmentary – as essentially ruined – goes 
hand in hand in Fondane’s poetry with a social liminality. All too aware of the 
fragmentary status of identity, Fondane negotiates his complicated relationship with 
Judaism into an existential crying out that is nuanced by social contexts.  
 
22Furthermore, I agree with Perloff (2006, 9) that there is always a referential content and context to 
Celan’s poetry (Rotiroti also argues that Celan’s poetry owes much to the ‘tradition of Romanian 
folklore as a mythical, historical and creative [creaturale] background’; Rotiroti 2018, 157, my 
translation). We could say that the singularity of poetic testimony, its affirmation of existence, depends 
upon the presence of the Said, even though it necessarily displays the incompleteness of that Said. This 
is a major part of what places Fondane’s poetry in opposition to aestheticism. 
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 In the Interlude, which is like a cry, acting as an affective outburst that disrupts 
the flow of the ‘dramatic’ poem, a cry erupts in the form of a Hebrew imprecation to 
God: ‘Adonaï Elochenu, Adonaï Echod!’23 Fondane/the speaker cries out in a 
language which is not his own, whose function strains the division between 
signification and performance (of an act). The cry bursts through reason’s defences, 
as France lies ‘le ventre ouvert au centre immaculé de l’ode [stomach open in the 
immaculate centre of the ode]’ (MF 180): 
 
– Adonaï Elochenu, Adonaï Echod! 
Tu sais que lorsque tout se sera apaisé 
sur la terre et dans les cieux 
nous T’aurons oublié. Tu sais, dès à présent, 
que seul le souvenir secret de ma prière 
me remplira de honte.   
 
– Adonaï Elochenu, Adonaï Echod! 
You know that when all is calm 
on earth and in the heavens 
we will have forgotten You. Now   
                                     You know,  
that merely the secret memory of  
                                     my prayer 
will fill me with shame. 
 
 
It is at the moment of catastrophe that the esprit critique can no longer keep the 
irrational at bay, though the plunge into full faith is not possible either.  
 The boundaries straddled by the poet, between signification and silence, 
irrationality and logic, are made intensely relevant by his uncertain social status and 
identitarian persecution. As he has already made clear in L’Exode with his 
assumption of the status of the leper from Leviticus, Fondane writes from the 
boundary between member of the human community and homo sacer. The context of 
the Holocaust, of course, is integral to Agamben’s development of homo sacer as a 
way of theorizing exile from human relation and significance into bare life. 
Fondane’s poetry, however, resonates directly with its classical sense of one who 
relies only on the gods for protection. This is the exilic state of Odysseus, whose 
name he took for his first poetic sequence in French. It is also amplified here, as he 
cries out by the road, angry at himself for doing so, but without other recourse: 
 
 
23 The end of the sentence quoted from Franke in the previous paragraph emphasizes the way writing 
and God act together as a wrangling of the desire for totality: ‘The significance of the whole–
significance as a whole–is at stake in writing, and just this is what God is and always was about’ 




J’ai, Tu le sais, d’autres dieux  
que Toi, secrets, perfides! 
Mais ici, sur la route, dans le désastre  
et dans 
le chaos, il n’est pas d’autre Dieu. Tu  
es seul! 
 
I have, as You well know, other  
                      gods 
than You, secret, perfidious gods! 
But here, on the road, in disaster  
                      and in 
chaos, there is no other God. You  




Fondane’s cry is a sign of intent; it is a refusal to give up though rejected by society, 
literally on its boundary, in desolation on the road. Even in the most abject cry of 
distress which terribly subverts the ‘perfection’ of poetry, the status of homo sacer – 
the looming threat of being reified into a ‘muselmann’ – is resisted. 
 Shakespeare’s characterization of life as a ‘tale told by an idiot, full of sound 
and fury, signifying nothing’ (Macbeth, act V, scene V) was a touchstone for 
Fondane’s existential philosophizing (HDH 444). It is significant that Macbeth’s 
speech is in fact prompted by hearing a terrible cry (the ‘cry of women’; the keening 
of his wife’s attendants and, possibly, her own suicidal shriek). Macbeth’s lack of 
compassion turns him towards an existential soliloquoy, but it is also the completion 
of brutalization: ‘bear-like I must fight the course’ (act V, scene VII). Macbeth 
wearies of his own ambition, wishing ‘th’ estate o’ th’ world were now undone’ (act 
V, scene V), yet ‘will try the last’ (act V, scene VIII). Fondane’s own revolt turns on 
the enactment of the cry itself. In his poetry, it is not Macbeth but Lear that he 
echoes, and to some extent he also anticipates later poets such as Ginsberg: 
 
Howl, howl, howl, howl! – O, you are men of stones 
Had I your tongues and eyes I’d use them so 
That heaven’s vault should crack... (King Lear, act V, scene III)24 
 
The anguished, absurd desire to ‘crack heaven’s vault’ moves Fondane in the 
Interlude. The cry is the zero point of his poetry’s ‘pure resistance which survives his 
own extermination’ (Rotiroti 2018, 157, my translation). Crying out on the road is 
 
24 The expression ‘men of stones’ is worth noting, indicating a reification inherent in the assumption of 
pitilessness, as well as muteness. In L’Exode Fondane plays extensively on stones to explore 
boundaries between subjective and objective, human and divine and speech and silence: ‘Le jour de 
Colère est venu et chaque pierre est une bouche’ [The day of Anger is here and each stone is a mouth] 
(MF 182). So too does Celan, and there would be ample scope for further comparison: ‘the stones – to 
whom do they talk?’ (Celan 2003, 20). 
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also continuing down the road; the poem is ‘en route’, in Celan’s terms (Celan 2003, 
49). It is by going towards the reader that the poem can ‘signify in the après-coup of 
the catastrophic event’ (Rotiroti 2018, 157, my translation). 
 The resistance to reification which begins with the cry shows that the cry in 
L’Exode is, always, not only a symbol, but an act of revolt. In the first place, it is a 
revolt against the ‘philosophizing’ of history, against the pressure to give meaning to 
human suffering by explaining it, or worse, justifying it. If the twentieth century is 
the ‘shipwreck’ of the Enlightenment, it is fitting that the significance of this revolt is 
betrayed in Robespierre, paladin of reason, who, in a debate on military strategy, 
asked: ‘who will guarantee that your attack, for no plausible reason, will not irritate 
the people to whom you are bringing the war, however philosophical the motivations 
of this action?’ (Robespierre 1954, 137, my translation). The cry is an endlessly 
renewed starting point for resisting philosophy’s tendency to seek (and to seek to 
impose) laws. Blanchot points out that ‘there has always been an ambiguity in what 
goes by the name of law’ (Blanchot 1995, 143) and the proto-political effect of 
Fondane’s work is the attention it draws to the endless work of negotiating this 
ambiguity. He has a Blanchotian understanding of the importance of literature’s 
refusal ‘to be dependent upon, or symbolized by, any other order at all (such as pure 
intelligibility)’ (Blanchot 1995, 145). 
 Again and again, this extra-rational stance must be differentiated from the 
complete abandonment of reason: through poetry Fondane seeks to negotiate the 
boundary between the two. Like Rimbaud he cannot convince himself into faith; the 
cry which is repressed by the ideal cannot be constantly lived with (at the edge of 
reason, ‘Il nous faut défendre de Rimbaud, plus qu’il ne nous faut défendre Rimbaud 
lui-même [I must defend myself from Rimbaud more than I must defend him]’, he 
wrote in Rimbaud le voyou; RV 141). But his work also resists the capture of the 
irrational by reason, whether by Breton’s psychoanalytic domination of the 
unconscious by the social or by apophatic Fascism. L’Exode contributes to the 
difficult but essential task of defending space for the extra-rational against the logics 
of the Holocaust. In its pre-emptive poetic testimony, Fondane’s ‘drowned’ voice 
aligns with Levi’s ‘saved’ witnessing: ‘Perpetrators were “rationally” mean, putting 




 The cry staged in L’Exode is that implied with the question ‘Do you hear me?’ 
in Celan’s Conversation in the Mountains: 
 
 who speaks does not talk to anyone, cousin, he speaks because nobody 
 hears him, nobody and Nobody, and then he says himself, not his mouth 
 or his tongue, he, and only he, says: Do you hear me? (Celan 2003, 20) 
 
In L’Exode the triangulation of this address between poet and reader, the place of the 
capital-n Nobody, is taken by God. Given gestured presence in the salvage-work of 
the poem, cry is the affective start of the effort ‘against collapsing into nothingness in 
the throes of the crisis to preserve the question’ (Hawkins xxiii; see chapter 2, 
‘Writing Disaster’). In reading this problematic in Celan, Kafka and Jabès, Beth 
Hawkins sees an upholding of the bond between man and God. But ‘preserving the 
question’ could simply be holding open the space of the ethical, figuring a pre-
political relationship through the poem. The affirmation of existence through the 
poem’s question exceeds the ghost of the author that haunts it. At a time when many 
of his milieu were still defending Stalin, Fondane considered Mayakovsky 
emblematic of this power of poetry (FT 83), and its primary, unqualifiable need, 
stated by Celan in his translations of Mandelstam, for ‘the chance simply to exist’ 
(Celan 2003, 64). 
 It is crucial that the fight for this chance to exist that Fondane ardently enacts in 
his poetry (and attempts to contextualize in his philosophy) be set against a political 
co-option. Nonetheless, I contend that considering it in terms of the proto-political is 
worthwhile. While Fondane diverged from his contemporary Camus – with whom he 
was friendly (Salazar-Ferrer 2004, 217–218) – on the issue of political commitment 
as elsewhere, there is still something of a grounds of affinity to be found with 
Camus’s analyses in The Rebel [L’Homme révolté], even if Fondane would reject his 
political conclusions. Douglas Burnham and George Papandreopoulos make the point 
that 
 
Camus suggests that it is the making-absolute of the values of the revolution 
that necessarily lead to their negation. On the contrary a relative conception 
of these values will be able to sustain a community of free individuals who 
have not forgotten that every historical rebellion has begun by affirming a 
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proto-value (that of human solidarity) upon which every other value can be 
based. (Burnham and Papandreopoulos 2020) 
 
While Fondane would reject the rational political moves of Camus, or, on the other 
hand, the faith-directed politics of Simone Weil, this notion of the revolt against 
alienation as proto-political animates their shared problematic.25  
 For Fondane poetry is not a solution, but a going-on. The undirected apophasis 
of his irresigned revolt is also untimely, pre-empting current philosophical 
approaches to the logic of history, the critique of which is ‘bound up with the 
experience of language and the realm of the subjective’ (Critchley 2009). Fondane’s 
‘metaphysical anarchism’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2008, 86) finds resonance with Levnisas’s 
‘anarchic’ ‘unbinding [of] the subject by binding me to another’ (Critchley 2009). 
The negative political theology of Benjamin’s ‘On Violence’ (Benjamin 2002, 236) 
continues to animate ethical debate. Critchley argues that ‘“God” is not the super-
juridical source of the moral law [...] [but is] calling us into a struggle with the mythic 
violence of law, the state and politics by allowing us to glimpse the possibility of 
something that stands apart, an infinite demand that cannot be fulfilled’ (Critchley 
2009). There is a strong parallel here with Fondane’s discussion of Christ’s despair 
and his reminder that the Sabbath was made for men, and not the other way round, in 
L’Homme devant l’histoire. In Critchley’s view, ethics is an endless process of 
responding to such a demand, which exposes ‘our imperfection and failure and we 
wrestle with the demand and the facts of the situation’ (Critchley 2009). He argues 
that ‘ethics is all about the experience of failure, but in failing we learn something. As 
Beckett writes, “Fail again, fail better” ’ (Critchley 2009).  
 Fondane is not so much concerned with learning from failure in order to build 
an ethically-improved society (though neither is he dismissive of this work, as texts 
like L’Ecrivain devant la révolution and L’Homme devant l’histoire make clear) but 
more, in his poetry, with the actual experience of failure and the going-on from it. 
Rather than mapping the lines of the ethical, his poetry may be seen in strongly 
Blanchotian terms, ‘a disastrous passion, a perpetual exile’ (Durand 1998, 36, my 
translation). Its ethical aspect, its proto-political aspect, inheres in an assumption of 
 
25 For Salazar-Ferrer, Fondane’s’ ‘metaphysical revolt thirsting for the infinite’ and Camus’s 




the writer’s responsibility: ‘an ethic turned towards the other which comprehends 
(without being comprehensive) a practice of expiation’ (Durand 1998, 37, my 
translation).26 The poet’s attempt to ‘do justice’ to experience is inseparable from the 
movement towards justice through the interpellation of the other. ‘Y a-t-il donc 
encore | un être libre dans le monde | – et qui chante? Comment s’y est-il pris? [Then 
is there still | a free being in the world | – one who sings? How did he manage it?]’ 
(MF 183) L’Exode’s mood of disconsolation is underlain by an unflinching clarity 
towards the impossible task of writing, and its irresignation by its necessity as a step 
towards the absurd possibility of justice. 
 Let us return once more to the notion of celebration. For Fondane, in my view, 
the failures of Humanism, exposed by multifarious catastrophes, revealed a 
woundedness in existing that was paralleled in language. Franke puts it that ‘the 
unsayable is found within language, a language that wounds and bloodies itself by 
fragmenting into letters’ (Franke 2014, 109), a thought that is mirrored in the mise en 
abyme of the alphabet sections of L’Exode. I have already argued, in Chapter 7, that 
Achebe’s concept of celebration is wider than the everyday use, that mourning, for 
example, is a form of celebration (see also Dickow 2017). But even joyous 
celebrations may paradoxically contain an element of wounding. This is particularly 
true of ceremonies that mark the passage into a new stage of awareness and 
responsibility in life (circumcision is perhaps the last one widely practiced in the 
minority world) (Eliade 1998), that is to say which are explicitly existential. The 
double, wounded nature of poetic testimony is eloquently described by Rotiroti, who 
argues that the poem 
 
is not only the unsayable, ineffable, unavowable secret of the unheard-of, 
catastrophic event of extermination, but also the other order of the secret, 
that of the search for love, of the call towards the other, in the gift of the 
poem. (Rotiroti 2018, 165, my translation) 
 
The celebration of existence in L’Exode’s utterances amid the ruins, ‘even a little of 
this twilight’ (MF 197), remains a provisional and unquenchable thirst, ever open for 
partaking by the reader. 
 




 Fondane scholars have for the most part touched on his relationship to politics 
only in terms of the negative critique of his philosophy, which pre-empts later 
thinkers as various as Zygmunt Bauman (for whom the Holocaust, in Sheila 
Fitzpatrick’s words, was ‘an outcome of modernity, with its technological and 
bureaucratic capacities and processes of rationalisation’; Fitzpatrick 2020), John Gray 
(‘We have been reared on religions and philosophies that deny the experience of 
tragedy’; 2015, chapter 6) and Benjamin Labatut (2020). Although Fondane’s work 
resists political readings not at all in the sense of political contexts, it does so quite 
strongly in the sense of political directions. However, without denying the personal 
and spiritual foci which have been centred in Fondane studies (see the Cahiers 
Fondane), I believe it is worth examining how the ethical demands of his 
‘commemorative writing’ (Dickow 2018a, 163) graze the political. Fondane’s 
philosophy defends the non-determinability of existence outwith the realm of ideas. 
Yet unlike the work of Gray, say, which at points runs dangerously close to 
misanthropy,27 Fondane exceeds the aporiae behind the failures of reason by finding 
an affirmative approach in his poetry. 
 In untimely fashion, against the apotheosis of action of grand modern projects, 
from state communism to fascism, and the seduction of politics as the highest end for 
artistic avant-gardes, his ‘celebrations’ do not necessarily negate projects for a better 
society so much as acting as a corrective by, in effect, reminding that dancing is as 
important as revolution.28 In L’Homme devant l’histoire, Fondane centres his anti-
Humanist anti-fascism around that statement of Jesus’ that ‘the Sabbath was made for 
man, and not man for the Sabbath’. L’Exode’s performance of human solidarity is 
both a pre-political ethical demand upon the reader and a caution for politics that the 
better society is made for man, and not man for the better society.  
 
27 E.g. in chapter 1, section 3 of Straw Dogs: ‘Homo rapiens [sic] has become too numerous’ (Gray 
2015). 
28 It is worth cautioning here that Fondane’s work does not only resist ‘authoritarian’ regimes. It 
cannot be co-opted in favour of a simplistic project of liberal-democratic ‘neutrality’. His critique of 
modern rationalizing ideologies very much includes those of Western democracies. Again, this 
inconvenient view on the relationship between individual and society pre-empts more recent critiques 
of Western progress, and not only by post-modernist bête noires. To cite just one with an especially 
apt title, Enda Delaney’s 2012 study of British government policy and the 1845–1852 Irish Famine is 
called The Curse of Reason: ‘Universal systems of thought derived from Enlightenment concern with 
reason were translated in Ireland into rigid adherence to the ideologies of free trade and the protection 
of the rights of property over and above that of human life [...] Reason exacted an apocalyptic toll’ 




The legal scholar Luke Herrin argues that ‘constant renegotiation [is] an 
inherent feature of social relationships: any given arrangement can only exist because 
of a background of social solidarity that can never be captured by any rigorous logic’ 
(Herrin 2020). For Fondane, poetry’s subversion of the ‘three laws of thought’29 is 
key to affirming this proto-political relation that can neither be completed nor 
destroyed by reason. Its paradoxical testimony moves through what Salazar-Ferrer 
calls ‘factors of uncertainty [facteurs d’incertitudes]’, the ‘fragmentary appearances, 
ignorance, dissimulation, uncertainties and distortions’ (Salazar-Ferrer 2005, 53, my 
translation), which prevent the singular from becoming universal, yet render its 
affirmation ‘pertinent’.  
 If Fondane extends the possibility of community to all, there is nothing to 
demand the acceptance of his offer. Poetic testimony may act as a political gesture (as 
well as an extrapolitical one) primarily as subversion, in the opening of spaces – 
untidy corners – that political projects often occlude through the reductive modes of 
thinking they tend to employ in formulating their goals (as well as actively through 
prejudice and domination). Fondane’s poetic practice and statements about poetry 
point to the value of testimony being not so much the vehicle of a counter-narrative 
as an affirmation of presence that subverts the consolidation of hegemony, the 
capacity of propaganda or law to dictate what presences may be acknowledged. Such 
a reading offers very little comfort. In fact, it is discomfiting. Yet surely poetry’s 
greatest capacity is in discomfiting our relationship to reality, correcting our instinct 
to mistake language for the world it moves us through, simultaneously resisting both 
the occlusion of experience and the instrumentalization of language which abets the 
performance of such occlusion, whether consciously directed or through its own 
evolutive processes. 
 The irresignation performed in Fondane’s poetic testimony is a kind of revolt 
which constitutes itself through an expectation towards the other. To consider this 
revolt as proto-political is not to direct Fondane’s poetry towards politics, for the 
performance of this irresignation depends upon an understanding of art as ethically 
autonomous. The apophasis of Fondane’s poetry in his modernist and existential 
confrontation with language is fundamental to the performance of its affirmations and 
 
29 I.e., identity, non-contradiction and the excluded third or excluded middle. 
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its expectation towards the other, because it enjoins the reader to work across 
language’s insufficiencies themselves, in an existential engagement rather than a 
consumption of knowledge. The suspicions engendered by the logic of Plato’s 
Republic are that poetry neither touches the truth of things, nor provides a model for 
goodness, but only distracts with beauty. In Fondane’s lifetime, even many poets 
attempted to address this problem by harnessing poetry to the yoke of morality, for 
instance in the guise of socialist realism. In defiance of his own ‘shameful 
conscience’, Fondane rejects the whole schema, including the gilded cage of beauty 
as poetry’s domain. L’Exode is part of the expression of his conviction that poetry 
can stand up for its own truths, with images that, as the poet Philippe Jaccottet wrote 
a decade after Fondane’s death, ‘try to tell the truth, not about the world or about 
myself, but perhaps about our relations’ (Jaccottet 2009, 57, my translation). 
 Poetic testimony is subversive and singular. Poetry rejoices in the paradoxes 
which are ordinarily occluded in language. These paradoxes allow it to affirm extra-
rational aspects of life. This affirmation enjoins the reader to look through the gaps in 
the words: it gestures towards what is ineffable in a way that invokes the reader’s 
participation. Thus its special testimony of the singular inherently connects it to the 
multiple, by way of its manipulation of a medium which is at once individual and 
shared: language. Its logical subversions make the space of relation it creates across 
time, ineffability and the very boundaries of the self into a space which is not over-
determined, and therefore one in which the reader is called to engage and interpret 
themselves. Henri Meschonnic argues that Fondane wrote ‘on philosophy, and its 
conflicts with poetry, but it is above all because he is the poet that he is, in his revolt, 
that he is closer to Dada and to Artaud than to the surrealists, in a living-of-the-poem’ 
(Meschonnic 2006, 8, my translation). His poetry’s resistance of instrumentalization 
is crucial to the creation of this space across which an ethical relation is possible. 
Poetic testimony is not political of itself, but it performs a fragile, apophatic, ethical 
act which can be considered an expression of that which precedes politics. 
 In chapters 7 and 8 I have articulated a notion of poetic testimony in relation to 
Fondane, and through the fulcrum of his irresigned revolt I have hinged this notion on 
a context of relationality. In a sense this brings us full circle to the interconnection 
between social, existential and linguistic concerns in the initial discussion of 




a struggle in any one domain, be it political, religious, or otherwise, but must be 
considered holistically. Shira Wolosky takes such a holistic view in her treatment of 
the stakes of modern poetry, and is worth quoting at length here (note her use of the 
word celebration): 
 
The inexpressibility topos [...] has broad cultural implications. The same 
impulse that demotes language as unequal to unitary truth finds expression in 
other systems that demote materiality, difference, and mutability [...] 
Conversely, an orientation towards history as the scene of language points 
towards a series of translocations of value to the immanent world of human 
experience [...] at issue is the whole philosophy of the One that has reigned 
more or less uncontested from the inception of Western culture [...] A 
commitment to language would assert, in place of this ideal of unity, the 
positive value of multiplicity, mundane conditions, and history as the 
authentic realm of experience. Transcendence would in turn act as an Other 
at the absolute border of language, an irreducible limitation that also marks 
respect, relationship and ultimately celebration of the multiplicity it makes 
possible and regulates [...] a positive valuation of language would join with a 
negative sense of the limits of language [...] it takes shape as the acceptance 
of a negative boundary that leaves open and respects the world beyond 
ourselves as one we never fully possess. The negative boundaries of 
language then remind us of our own limitations, while its positive embrace 
calls us toward full responsibility within the realms of our action and of our 
utterance. (Wolosky 1995, 269–271). 
 
I believe the context set out by Wolosky is the same which Fondane navigated, 
through the subversions of existential philosophy and towards the ‘positive embrace’ 
of a new poetic practice. Patrice Beray argues that from the tension between 
Fondane’s use of poetic form and his ‘contestation’ of it ‘a living word springs’ 
(Beray 2006, 208, my translation). Meschonnic puts it that it is as a poet, with his 
‘caprices and fantasies of language’, against philosophy’s binaries, that ‘he is present’ 
(Meschonnic 2006, 13, my translation). L’Exode figures God as a means to relate to 
the ‘absolute border of language’, and thereby triangulates its address to the reader. 
As a coda to chapters 7 and 8, the next chapter will examine the paradox of negative 
theology’s influence as a way of dealing with immanence through language, by 
comparing Fondane’s poetry with the work of another poet better known for 





Chapter 9 (Coda) 
Fondane and Edmond Jabès: Absence and Possibility 
 
What can a writer do whose subject matter is the impossible, 
the emptiness of transcendence, the unsayable? 
 
 (Waldrop 2002, 142) 
 
Entretenir une angoisse en nous, un état de discontinu et de 
provisoire, où force nous est de penser hors des catégories, 
sentir dans l’absurde, juger dans l’arbitraire – n’est-ce pas là 
la volonté qui perce dans les livres de Chestov? 
 
[to hold open an anxiety in us, a state of discontinuity and 
provisionality, where we are obliged to think outside of 
categories, to perceive from within absurdity, to discern 
from within arbitrariness – is that not Shestov’s resolve, 
throughout his books?] 
 
from ‘Léon Chestov, témoin à charge’ (CM 281) 
 
There is no place for questions which is not also a question 
of place. Answers mean sleep, death. Waking means 
questioning […] I have, not without effort, preserved 
openness. 
 
from The Book of Margins by Edmond Jabès (1993) 
 
In this chapter, I will relate Fondane’s poetry more broadly to that of Edmond Jabès. 
Both are known for their treatment of God’s absence, and therefore that absence is a 
useful point of triangulation between them. This work of relation is not intended to 
bring the preceding chapters into the conclusion of a religious Fondane or a religious 
Jabès. Instead, since at the start of the thesis I set out apophasis as a useful tool for 
understanding the linguistic stakes implied in Fondane’s confrontation with 
catastrophe, I wish to bring Fondane’s irresignation and poetic testimony back to 
these stakes, by way of a reflection. 
 I have argued that poetic testimony depends upon poetry’s subversions of logic. 




enchantment’, for the complete overcoming of thought through poetry, is never 
satisfied. As Mircea Martin points out, ‘his own way of interpreting poems is itself 
conceptualizing’ (Martin 2007, my translation). It is, in fact, this tension that makes 
poetry possible. Martin asks ‘How could the poetic experience, as he himself 
understands and defines it, be possible without the anguish of separation, the anguish 
which his aspiration towards cosmic unity cannot soften, still less cancel out?’ 
(Martin 2007, my translation). Fondane is, in actuality, aware of this tension; the 
‘savoureuse angoisse [delectable anguish]’ (MF 157; CO 151) is the provocation to 
dare begin the poem: ‘Oser, veut dire entreprendre une tâche dangereuse […] 
trébucher, se relever et lutter sans arrêt contre soi-même [To dare means to undertake 
a dangerous tasks […] to stumble, to pick oneself up and to relentlessly struggle 
against oneself]’ (BEG 214). In both Fondane and Jabès’s work, this division in the 
poet, the difficulty of reasserting what Fondane would call a ‘primitive’ experience, 
combined with the extra-rationality of their attempt, can be considerd in parallel with 
the modern absence of God across which interpellation is sounded. For both, the 
absence is framed through the extensive resources of Jewish myth. 
 In his stated desire for poetry to attain enchantment, Fondane parallels a desire 
for faith, which, as Fabio Vericat argues, ‘is incompatible with self-consciousness, 
given that the critical awareness of faith already involves a distancing from the object 
of contemplation’ (Vericat 2002, 173). In effect, the poet cannot overcome their 
‘conscience honteuse’, only revolt against it. The struggle to succeed in this revolt is 
more or less the entire theme of Rimbaud le voyou. Unlike Rimbaud (at least his 
version of Rimbaud), Fondane does not rationally consider this success to be 
attainable. Nonetheless, the desire for it is crucial. Where philosophy left Fondane in 
a place of pure negation, a Kierkegaardian ‘crisis in thought’, poetry could 
affirmatively perform that absurd desire, ‘the advent of passion’ (Butler 2015). In the 
Faux Traité he asks ‘pour quelles raisons le poète essaie-t-il de spatialiser, de rendre 
solide et historique son expérience spirituelle, immatérielle et intemporelle? [for what 
reasons does the poet try to spatialise his spiritual, immaterial and intemporal 
experience, to make it solid and historical?]’, answering, provocatively but sincerely, 
‘nous l’ignorons, fort heureusement [we have no idea, thank goodness]’ (FT 27). 
 The lack in language was thought and performed by Jabès, too. Jabès wrote that 
after Auschwitz it was only possible to write with ‘wounded words’ (Jabès 1990a, 9). 
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Giovanni Rotiroti sets out the way that poetry, despite its failure to heal the wounds 
of language, still performs a valuable extra-rational function in its attempt: ‘even if 
the wounded word does not conquer death, it nonetheless seeks to survive it, 
revealing in the here and now of the poema the secret link that inextricably (and 
messianically) links the past to the future, hope to memory, the cry to the word 
(Rotiroti 2018, 176, my translation). Fondane came to an early understanding of 
language’s wounding (see Vanhese 2012), as he sets out – and defies – in ‘Mots 
Sauvages’ (‘nous sommes encore sous le règne des mots [we are still under the reign 
of words]’; Fondane 1996a, 22). Jabès’s poetic response to the Holocaust helps us to 
understand Fondane’s continuing relevance.  
 In Madness and Civilization, Foucault writes that ‘the language of delirium can 
be answered only by an absence of language, for delirium is not a fragment of 
dialogue with reason, it is not language at all; it refers, in an ultimately silent 
awareness, only to transgression’ (Foucault 1988, 224). For Fondane, poetry is a kind 
of reckoning with this absence in language. Perhaps ultimately for Fondane poetry is 
‘a fragment of dialogue with reason’: the poet is a kind of intermediary between the 
irrational and the rational. This is supported by a holistic approach to Fondane’s 
work, to what Patrice Beray calls ‘the essence of the questions freely distributed for 
twenty years by this writer across poetry, philosophy, cinema and literary criticism’ 
(Beray 1994, v, my translation).  
 The embracing of poetry’s fragmentary, subversive possibilities, against an 
overarching theory of aesthetics, is part of what Beray calls Fondane’s play at ‘the 
passionate seizing of expression on a bonfire of forms’(Beray 1994, v, my 
translation). Of course, Fondane’s piling up and enflaming of forms is not an erasure 
of them. As we have seen, his response to the ruining of form was not, in general to 
abandon it (even his cinépoems play with the form of the film script; Fondane 2007 
27–49 and CO 2–33). L’Exode is unusual both in relation to Fondane’s other poetry 
and to the poetry of his time and avant-garde milieu. Where Dada and surrealist texts 
often take fragmentation to extremes, enacting total breakdown or a chaos of novelty, 
in L’Exode fragments are married to forms that contextualize them without properly 
constraining them. As with the Song of Songs, at times they come close to allegory 





 The recognition of characters and modes by the reader simultaneously obliges a 
refashioning of their meaning. It is as if, interpreting Pound’s injunction to ‘make it 
new’, Fondane were insisting on the persistence of the ‘it’. This salvage-work cannot 
but take on a political dimension at a time when Jewish culture and literary culture in 
general were under grave threat, yet as an avant-gardiste Fondane recognized that 
their possible – if partial – integration, their translation, into the future required 
continuing renewal. This reworking of the fragments of the figures of the past might 
paradoxically be called a prefigurative poetics, endlessly creating the new poetry in 
the shell of the old. 
 Jabès is more commonly thought to drastically break open form (Franke 2005, 
629–630), but he too writes ‘out of a tradition, a culture, a history’, as Perloff says of 
Celan (Perloff 2006, 2), not least that of Rabbinic commentary and mystical or quasi-
mystical Jewish writing. And, whether with fractal expansiveness, as in the voices 
given to the letters in L’Exode, or with intense condensation, as in Jabès’s 
NUL/L’UN, both are deeply concerned with form in the strictest sense, with the form 
of language at the barest level. Patrice Beray reads Fondane as turned towards ‘a 
“something else” that seems to pull him outside of language’ (Beray 1994, vii-viii, 
my translation). Through reading Baudelaire, Beray argues, Fondane articulated the 
question of the meeting point between art and life: ‘If there were something in 
Baudelaire’s poetry other than the most beautiful verses, what could that be other 
than existence itself?’ (Beray 1994, viii, my translation). The question is not one of 
knowledge, but of relation. 
 The contradiction between Fondane’s desire for enchantment and the 
persistence of the esprit critique, astutely observed by Mircea Martin (‘the 
recuperation of the primitive mentality is never completed’; Martin 2007, my 
translation), strikes at the heart of Fondane’s endeavour to continue with poetry 
despite not having faith in it. I mean this in the sense that he did not believe it would 
provide a resolution to the problems of existence, but only a means of properly 
engaging with them. At another order, he did not believe that poetry could be the 
means for repairing language, for attaining a pure language. This approach to poetry 
is paralleled by, and mediated through, his approach to God. L’Exode reactivates the 
energies of theology, in its alternate sense as a ‘discourse to God’ (Finlayson 2012, 
12), as the Israelites seek their divine interlocutor, even though He may be absent. In 
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L’Expérience poétique, Fondane wrote ‘Que Dieu soit cru existant et parfois le poète 
le hait; mais le hait davantage de ne pas être [if God is believed to exist then the poet 
will sometimes hate him; but he hates him more for not existing] (Fondane 1935). 
The persistence of desire, for God, for linguistic satisfaction, is anguished. 
 Derrida’s famous text on negative theology, Sauf le nom, links the desire for 
God – the desire to understand the world through God – to the inevitability of poetry: 
 
inclining [to Godlessness], but not going beyond incline or inclination […] 
does not seem separable from a certain boldness of language [langue], from 
a poetic or metaphoric tongue […] apophatic boldness always consists in 
going further than is reasonably permitted’ (Derrida 1995, 36–37) 
 
Fondane’s irresignation is manifested precisely in this boldness of the poet. This is 
how it is able to simultaneously establish a relationship with the reader and 
undermine and challenge us. 
 Regarding Kafka, another key influence on Fondane (see BEG 348), as well as 
on Celan and Jabès, into whose orbit I have brought Fondane, Beth Hawkins puts it 
that 
 
He did inhabit a world of foreboding. Living in that world, Kafka developed 
a theology – rigorous and complex – that Celan and Jabès find sustainable, 
in many regards, after the Holocaust. His theology revolves around a God 
who has either retreated or who does not exist; at the same time, it 
encourages faith and demands individual responsibility despite and because 
of this absence. 
(Hawkins 2003, 3) 
 
Hawkins does much to illuminate the complex theological context of these writers. 
However, in Fondane’s case at least, I do not believe that Hawkins’s conclusions are 
sustainable. The encounter with an absent God certainly articulates a longing for 
faith, but it cannot encourage it: faith is irrational and therefore beyond the bounds of 
persuasion.  
 Faith in God acts as a kind of symbol for all the irrational aspects of life that 
are repressed by reason. Across the abyss of time, across the abyss of God's absence, 




comprehend eveything.30 It can only attest to its experience in desiring and in being. 
L’Exode represents and performs a struggle for human liberation: liberation from 
hegemonic historical definitions, liberation from reification, liberation from suffering 
in the name of progress. If it also bears upon individual responsibility, it does so not 
by proclaiming the power of the individual subject, but by placing all moral questions 
within a ‘pre-existing’ relationality. Derrida puts it that ‘To testify to the desire of 
God […] we do not determine ourselves before this desire, as no relation to self can 
be sure of preceding it, to wit, of preceding a relation to the other’ (Derrida 1995, 37). 
Testifying requires speaking, or writing, and poetry – at least Fondane’s poetry – 
makes manifest this relationality in its very articulation of the desire of God. 
 While Fondane’s poetry very much speaks in its own right, the existential 
commitment of his philosophical writings is always an available context. In order to 
properly understand this relationship of Fondane’s poetry to negative theology, it is 
also necessary to consider the major influence of that negator of theology, 
Nietzsche.31 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in particular, is a key intertext with L’Exode. 
Fondane’s irresignation is a rejection of the comfort of hinterlands or ‘worlds behind’ 
(Nietzsche 2005, book 1, chapter 3) even through the anguish of the continuing desire 
for such an escape. Nietzsche is a clear inspiration for much of Fondane’s overall 
struggle against the ‘teachings of weariness and renunciation’ (Nietzsche 2005, book 
1, chapter 9), and the Babylonian priest glorying in the desolation of the temple (MF 
192–195) embodies both the philosophical ‘preacher of death’ and the literal, 
genocidal one.  
 L’Exode cannot be reduced to a Nietzschean reading any more than it can be 
reduced to a religious reading: its voices are in active dialogue with these influences. 
Understanding Zarathustra as an intertext helps to clarify the speech of the ‘second 
man’ in the section that precedes the Intermède: ‘J’ai grimpé le plus haut que j’ai pu 
et je n’ai pas trouvé la hauteur | – Où est-elle donc l’altitude? [I climbed as high as I 
could and wasn’t up to it | – so where is the altitude?]’ (MF 173; see Nietzsche 2005, 
 
30 ‘  “Il n’y a pas assez de réel pour ma soif!” [“There is not enough real for my thirst!”]’ (MF 21; 
Fondane 2017, 15). 
31 ‘C’est en un monde sans Dieu, un monde où on a tué Dieu et où, selon la remarque de Nietzsche, on 
ne s’en est même pas aperçu, que la philosophie existentielle est née [It is into a world without God, a 
world where we have killed God and where, as Nietzsche remarks, we have not even noticed, that 
existential philosophy is born]’ (LE 59–60; EM 27). 
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book 1, chapter 8). The speech is laced with Zarathustran references, with its 
references to the cold of the void and the injunctions that come forth from it: ‘ “PLUS 
HAUT QUE L’HOMME!” [“Higher, higher than man!” ]’ (MF 174). Yet it is full of 
ambiguity, sharing Zarathustra’s elevation of freedom with a deep ambivalence 
towards the overman: ‘Le doute commença à ronger ma chair | qui donc avait voulu 
nous tromper de la sorte? || quelle était donc la chose | que l’on voulait nous voir 
quitter? [Doubt began to gnaw my flesh | so who had wished to trick us like this? || 
what was it | someone had wanted us to leave behind?]’ (MF 174). Like Zarathustra, 
for Fondane the poetic act is what helps us ‘bear to be human’ (Nietzsche 2005, book 
2, chapter 20), but he has no faith that this bearing is directed toward something 
higher, be it God or overman. This doubt is given immense poignancy by the time of 
its writing, as the Nazis exulted in their bastardizations of Nietzsche. 
 Zarathustra also illuminates the somewhat hermetic sonnets that appear earlier 
in L’Exode, which mention ‘solitudes grasses [fat solitudes]’ (MF 167) and ‘des tas 
de SEULS! [heaps of alones]’ (MF 165).32 The solitude that comes from seeking the 
heights is ironically, and with great pathos, paralleled in the scattering and crushing 
of ordinary people beneath the feet of history’s movers and shakers: ‘Pas même seul. 
Des tas! Des tas de SEULS! | Ont-elles droit, si maigres, aux linceuls, | ces pures 
ombres que l’histoire traque? [Not even alone: whole crowds! | Alones, in crowds! | 
Thin as they are, have they the right to shrouds, | these pure shadows with History on 
their tracks?]’ (MF 165). Extra-human solitude is acquired not by willing the 
overcoming of the human, but as a consequence of being treated as less than human. 
The poem testifies to the attachment to ‘base’ aspects of humanity – ‘la maison, la 
mère et […] la femme | dont la ventre était chaud [the house, my mother and my wife 
| whose belly was warm]’ (MF 173) – holding open a chink of space for their 
affirmation: philosophically, against the promise of edifying lightning that never 
arrives, and materially, against the persecution that is literally destroying them. 
 The tension between Nietzschean and theological impulses in Fondane’s work 
is productive. If his reason, like that of his Rimbaud, rejects hinterlands and hears the 
 
32 ‘One day you will see what is lofty in you no longer and what is base all-too-closely; even what is 
sublime in you will frighten you like a spectre. One day you will cry: ‘Everything is false!’ There are 
feelings that want to kill the solitary; if they do not succeed, well, then they themselves must die! But 




imperative to ‘create beyond himself’, if it leads him to the ‘desolate space […] the 
icy breath of being alone’ (Nietzsche 2005, book 1, chapter 17), his poetry responds, 
in all its anguish and desire, with an extra-rational affirmation of life that uses God as 
a placeholder for what stands outside of thought. It is in poetry that Fondane can keep 
asking the question: ‘free for what’? (Nietzsche 2005, book 1, chapter 17). 
Zarathustra itself is, of course, a poetic text that embraces contradiction. Chapter 14 
of the first book avows something of the key of relationality that sustains poetic 
testimony: ‘I and Me are always too zealous in conversation: how could it be endured 
if there were no friend?’ (Nietzsche 2005). For Zarathustra, this relationship is a 
means to reciprocate the ‘glance of eternity’. L’Exode does not deny a longing to the 
future: ‘… ô terres de futur! Puissants orteils! … [Lands of futurity! O powerful 
toes!]’ (MF 165),33 the first sonnet concludes, in fragmentary fashion. Yet the face of 
the Préface, in acting as a ‘rough and imperfect mirror’ (Nietzsche 2005, book 1, 
chapter 14), seeks not to provoke us to overcome its human image, but to accept it. 
 The terrible freedom birthed by the loss of God – whether dead or merely 
absent – is the obverse of the catastrophe of language and civilization, made manifest 
in world war, in which Fondane lived and died. Fondane’s irresigned poetry, its 
absurd affirmations sprouting in a collage of poetic forms, seem to place him at a 
tangent to the poets whose minimalizing styles are commonly associated with this 
relationship between poetry and negative theology (both in the sense of the 
ineffability behind God the signifier and in the sense of God as an absence) – Celan, 
Jabès, Beckett, Yves Bonnefoy. Yet despite their parings of words, they too share his 
embracing of the fragmentary, ruined material of existence that is all they have to 
work with, and he shares their subverting of language (Dickow 2018a; Riach 2011).34 
With the context of apophasis once again in mind, I now wish to compare Fondane 
and Jabès as another angle for examining the ruins of language as a necessary locus 
for the possibility of the constituting encounter between self and Other. 
 
33 The ambiguous toes here are a somewhat surreal eruption. They could figure a grasping of the earth, 
a rooting of the future in the past and present (this is supported if we read orteils as a pun on orties, the 
nettles of the preface). They could also figure the toes of the feet of Plotinus’s dancers, stamping on 
the victims of progress who haunt history from the outside. 
34As I have argued across this thesis, and as Dickow also shows in his work on Fondane and elegy. 
Bonnefoy explicitly acknowledges Fondane as a predecessor. Graham Riach has argued that 
Bonnefoy’s figuring of the desire for material affirmation made present in the word’s very lack of it 




‘Nous leur enseignerons à balbutier’35: Fragments of speech 
 
In Chapter 4, as a counter-point to Fondane’s dissatisfaction with language, I looked 
at (Riding) Jackson’s search for perfect utterance. It is not clear how such utterance 
would deal with paradox. For Fondane, and for his near-contemporary Edmond Jabès, 
however, poetry is a territory of expression which affords space to paradox and 
thrives upon it. Poetry is written out of a paradox: it both comes out of nothing and 
manifests in a preexisting medium. In Lavish Absence, her passionate engagement 
with reading, knowing and translating Edmond Jabès, Rosmarie Waldrop writes 
 
Jabès is no mystic. He is not even a religious writer in the narrow sense. In 
Jabès, the transcendence is empty. His “God” is a metaphor and does not 
exist… on the other hand, Jabès shares the mystics’ view that linear logic 
has its limits, and that beyond these, paradox becomes an epistemological 
tool. It takes an ambiguity in perception to make us conscious of perception. 
(Waldrop 2002, 127–128) 
 
It is just such ambiguities of perception that lead both Jabès and Fondane to non-
linear, questioning, reflexive modes of writing. This section will explore parallels 
between their poetry in order to illuminate, if only obliquely, something of the need 
for Fondane to turn to poetry in his wrestling with the contradictions he encountered 
in language, thought and ethics.  
 Despite magnetic similarities in their lives and works, and milieus (both 
connected, for example, to the surrealists, and both influencing later poets such as 
Yves Bonnefoy), Fondane and Jabès have been little studied together. The only 
article I have encountered which centres on them takes a very broad scope across a 
short text and does not offer much in the way of comparative reading (Chitrit 1998; 
Rotiroti 2018 also mentions them both). Like Fondane, Jabès was frustrated and 
intrigued by the aesthetic and semiotic limits of language, like Fondane, this process 
was given dizzying and terrifying new contexts by the war, though he was at a 
remove from it, and like Fondane, his personal experience of exile (forced out with 
 





the rest of Egypt’s Jews during the Suez Crisis) brought certain introspective and 
abstract concerns into collision with acute actuality. Like Fondane, he used the 
cultures of thought and mythic specificities of Judaism to address questions of 
existence and expression more broadly. It is impossible to state how mutually close 
their ‘understanding’ of unsayability may be and to what degree Jabès’s ‘empty’ 
transcendence complements or conflicts with Fondane’s own conceptions of the 
abyss or a religious horizon beyond it. What can be tentatively sketched out is an urge 
to communicate, a need to speak and a valuing of speaking despite the lack of an 
external guarantee for the value of that speech.  
 This hesitant speaking naturally forms itself by way of questions, and I will 
focus primarily here on Jabès’s Book of Questions. Waldrop’s own fragmented 
critical readings, grounded, like mine, in an experience of translation, provide 
particular inspiration. She quotes Derrida:  
 
The fragment is not a style or failure… without the interruption – between 
the letters, words, sentences, books – no meaning could awaken…Writing… 
proceeds only by leaps. (Derrida 1967, 108) 36 
 
Fondane and Jabès seek to lay bare such leaps, in their respective fashions. Although, 
like Apollinaire, Fondane offers something of a modernist take on the long Romantic 
poem, including or especially in the lyric sequences Ulysse and Titanic as well as 
L’Exode’s special dramatic structure, which is similar in some regards to Shelley’s 
Prometheus Unbound, sitting as it does between the written word and the theatre, his 
(meta)logics are still associative and appositional, operating through not only the 
spark of images colliding but also a willed tracing of the gaps between them. 
 In constructing argument around Fondane’s poetry I cannot but détourne him, 
and a structurally ambivalent approach opens itself to criticisms of evasiveness, bet-
hedging or even cowardice. Yet in treating Fondane, alongside Jabès, as an artist 
working in language, I aim to avoid Italian Fondane translator Luca Orlandini’s 
warning that ‘in general… critics of Fondane are too [much] philosophers… 
“généralisation” prevailing [over] the single… philosophy is undermining the 
 
36 Translated by Waldrop. 
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richness of [Fondane’s] complexity’ (Orlandini 2013, 1). A somewhat fragmentary 
and associative reading is at least a gesture to this end.  
 
Speech Conditioned by Absence 
 
For Fondane and Jabès both, the mark made upon the void of the page is at once an 
absolute point of origin, ex nihilo, and already inadequate. An inherent ontology and 
epistemology of writing. Rosmarie Waldrop, following Blanchot, writes of this 
haunting knowledge ‘there is no “original word”, no unbroken relation with the 
divine’ (Waldrop 2002, 19), quoting ‘Man come out of Nothing, unable even to claim 
a portion of this | Nothing.’ (from Jabès’s Adam, or the Birth of Anxiety cited in 
Waldrop 2002, 20). Yet despite the inadequacy of writing, of speech, they are 
nonetheless a gift, a necessity: ‘it is the absence of a divine word that allows us to 
speak’, Waldrop continues, introducing a quote from the Book of Questions:  
 
Eloquence is created by the absence of a divine word. It is at the beginning 
of speech. We are crushed by the deity. The echo dies as the voice weakens. 
The murmur is truly human. (Jabès 1991b, 85) 
 
Fondane, writing in the imminence of catastrophe, also approaches this point from the 
other side, so to speak: ‘Faudra-t-il la chute des mondes | pour que jaillisse une 
parole? [Do worlds need to fall | for a word to spring forth?]’ (MF 156, CO 148). It is 
perhaps unsurprising that the ‘truly human’ in his poetry is most often found in a cry 
or shout. Yet, cry or murmur, it is the beginning of speech that is nonetheless valued, 
though it begin in the midst of human anguish, though its author knows it to be 
inadequate. In Le mal des fantômes (1942–1943), the uncertain hopes of migrants 
setting out for America are a palimpsest upon all hopes of freedom and security in the 
absence of god. In their ‘tas de rêves [heap of dreams]’,  
 
quelqu’un remue, si pareil à moi –  
et néanmoins… Il rêve? Non; il parle…
 
someone stirs, so akin to me –  









Like Jabès, Fondane proceeds with fragmented questioning, the humility of the 
breaks and spaces honouring ‘l’innocence du cri’ (Jabès 1963, 13). 
 The very first lines of Fondane’s return to poetry (at least as published) are 
contradictory, fragmentary, and culminate in a question on the transience of all life’s 
arrivals: ‘est-ce arriver vraiment que d’arriver au port? [is it truly arriving, arriving 
in port?] (MF 17). They are also marked by death, in the form of the ‘ashes’ of his 
dear friend Armand Pascal which ‘pèse si lourd dans ma valise [weigh heavy in my 
case]’. Despite the weight of the abstractions which occupy them, Jabès and Fondane 
never fail to bridge these universal concerns with particular experience. As Ulysse is 
heavy with his brother-in-law Armand’s ashes, the Book of Questions is pregnant 
with the death of Jabès’s sister. Among the shadows of war and genocide which 
enfold their writings, the deep consideration for the value of one human life manages 
to assist in the mourning of those beyond named remembrance, rather than 
diminishing them. Ulysses’s narrative of wandering is also a narrative of encounters. 
Some Fondane scholars have focused on his Ulysse to sketch an ‘aesthetics of 
participation’ (e.g. Monique Jutrin or Michael Finkenthal in Jutrin and Vanhese, eds., 
2003, 25 and passim). In situating their meditations on death within or alongside 
specific experiences of grief, Fondane and Jabès alike make affect participate in 
enquiry, and open the poem to the participation of their interlocutors (from the 
mourned to the reader) according to categories which exceed the purely intellectual. 
 However noble her quest, perhaps this gesture towards the Other as specific 
other, rather than as part of a universal, is missing in (Riding) Jackson (see chapter 4). 
Yet she is surely spurred by the same question Jabès raises through ‘Reb Midrasch’: 
 
If we have been created to endure the same suffering, to be doomed to the 
same prearranged death, why give us lips, why eyes and voices, why souls 
and languages all different? (Jabès 1991b, 31) 
 
Is this a lament, or a gentle challenge? Each experience of les mêmes souffrances is 
unique, for all it is the same (another paradox). Despite and because of the 
individuality that divides us, each poem is an opportunity to celebrate the humanity of 
speaking, as well as lamenting its insufficiencies. We might say with Beth Hawkins, 
as she juxtaposes Jabès with Kafka and Celan, ‘the balance between particular and 
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universal is precarious and constantly shifting’ (2003, xi). The actual realization of 
participation is predicated upon originary difference. 
 In her book on Kafka, Celan and Jabès, Hawkins interprets Celan’s statement ‘I 
cannot see any basic difference between a handshake and a poem’ (Hawkins 2003, 
xiv) as an imperative: ‘art should be directed towards the other’. She cites Martin 
Buber, a formative thinker for Fondane (see Salazar-Ferrer 2017b and 2004, 18), who 
wrote: ‘the basic movement of the life of dialogue is the turning towards the other’ 
(Hawkins 2003, xiv, translation Ronald Gregor Smith) and foregrounds poetry as 
grounds for such turning, the Fondanian liminal non lieu where the border between 
internal and external space becomes open, or the two overlay each other. Whether or 
not we accept Hawkins’s emphasis on the Judaic covenant as framework for Jabès’s 
exploration of dialogue, her exposition is forceful:  
 
At the core of Jabès’s world, the question resides, a pulsing, dynamic entity 
that vehemently rejects conclusions, yet promises to foster a relation 
between the one who asks and the one of whom the question is asked. (2003, 
156) 
 
Le Mal des fantômes and the Book of Questions are both intensely dialogic. Various 
voices ask a multitude of questions – to each other, to themselves, to their authors, to 
their readers, to ‘God’. Speech is conditioned by absence: as Hawkins has it, ‘Jabès 
reaches out to the reader in the space of loss’ (2003, 162). Further, ‘reproach and 
misunderstanding are expected from the beginning’ (ibid). ‘Oubliez-le! [Forget it!]’, 
affords Fondane in the Préface en Prose (MF 153), carrying no certitude for the 
poem into its lines; ‘in order to punish me, you will deny the validity of these pages’, 
foresees Jabès (1991b, 63). What remains is a relationship. A recognition, though it 
be the recognition of suffering, though we see with different eyes and speak with 
different tongues. A presence: a faint promise of presence in the possibility of being 
read. Reading implies a reader, who becomes the medium for the resurgence of 
existence, the medium for the ghost of the existent. 
 A presence which affirms. Though it perhaps only affirms its thirst, the 
affirmation is dependent upon the other. Jean-Luc Nancy states that Jabès’s writing 
enacts a ‘pure pleasure of scrawling impatience across the impassive face of being. A 




childish as something close to simple, and certainly not as pejorative. Even in the 
impatience of being, of being in loss and absence, writing becomes being’s 
affirmation. Impatience connects this writing-into-silence into time, time which might 
be considered by way of the hermeneutic foothold of Benjaminian messianic time. If 
we extend Hawkins’s claim that her authors ‘reflect something of the paradoxical 
positioning between self and other that Levinas promotes’ (Hawkins 2003, xxv) to 
include Fondane, we can regard the gesture towards the future in Jabès’s and 
Fondane’s interpellations to their readers-to-come as a specific paradox. If ‘the 
perpetual alterity of the other, the difference that cannot be reduced to the same, 
upholds the ethical relationship between self and other’ (Hawkins 2003, xxvi) the 
address to the future reader is a special instance of the paradox of alterity from which 
‘we gain our humanity’ (Hawkins 2003, xxv).  
  If catastrophe is experienced as a confirmation of being’s situation in loss and 
absence, then Fondane and Jabès’s writing in anticpation of, during and in the 
aftermath of the Holocaust is generous and responsible in its human gesturing, 
because of the interpellating, questioning, fragmentation and respect for silence it 
performs in the holding up of a ‘man’s face’ – Fondane’s face, the face of Jabès’s 
character Yukel – to the future, though such modes have lead some, in Jabès’s case at 
least, to ‘deny [their] validity’.37 As we saw in chapter 7, Pierre Joris argues that post-
Holocaust poetry:  
 
cannot simply bear witness to the past but must at the same time be 
resolutely turned towards the future: it has to be open, it has to be 
imaginatively engaged in the construction of a new world, it has to look 
forward. (Celan 2006, 6) 
 
Jabès and Fondane’s poetic writings, for all their lacunae, for all their kaleidoscopic 
variety and shifting, hold their contradictions within an existential resonance of self 
dependent upon other.  
 At the threshold where the word begins, Jabès asserts the positive gesture of 
writing against logonormative criticisms: 
 
 







“Writing for the sake of writing does nothing but show contempt.” 
 
“Man is a written bond and place.” 
 
 (Jabès 1991b, 19)38 
 
Thus connection and place [lien et lieu] affirm being and create relation in and across 
absence. The very medium that negates existence, the logos that is desired as the 
vehicle of the ideal, can affirm it when it is shaped and understood as such a 
performance. ‘L’écriture’ here is sometimes translated as ‘Scripture’. The turn to the 
divine can be carried out as a turn away from wordly concerns, or it can be a fertile 
topos for the poet to explore the ‘spatialization’ (FT 27) of their experience, staging 
their extra-rational desire for affirmation and connection while recognizing the 
infinite horizon of absence.  
 For Fondane, poetry holds open a space – both abyss of terror and void of 
possibility – for the irrational to live, for a life to be allowed its irrationality. It is a 
space that is also a space of encounter. The relation that it instigates is both absurdly 
hopeful and predicated on strangeness. ‘L’homme n’est pas chez lui sur cette terre | 
étranger où qu’il aille [man is not at home on this earth | a stranger wherever he 
goes]’ (MF 170). Yet this strangeness is also the precondition for an act of expectant 








38 ‘– L’écriture qui aboutit à elle-même n’est qu’une manifestation du mépris 






Je hais le vide et voilà qu’il sonne en mon poème. 
 
[I hate the void and there it is resounding in my poem.] 
 
(Titanic XVII, MF 47) 
 
Absence and loss also inform and shape Fondane and Jabès’s texts in more concrete 
ways. According to Waldrop, ‘there are themes that a writer is not free to choose, 
themes that impose themselves in the manner of an illness of a wound’ (2002, 149). 
The theme she is specifically referencing is exile, one that imposed itself upon 
Fondane again and again – by force of the ‘arbitrary’ anti-semitism that intervened in 
his Romanian identity, by dint of the original and metaphysical exiles of Judaism, by 
(like Jabès, like Kafka, like Celan, like Benjamin) a displaced relationship to Jewish 
culture, by the artistic path which displaced him from groups and movements, by the 
German invasion of France which produced a shock akin to Jabès’s experience of 
being forced out of Egypt, by his final exile from France, another transient home (see 
Salazar-Ferrer 2004 & 2007).  
 One could not talk of Jabès and Fondane without talking of exile; it imposes 
itself. Waldrop says of Jabès that he is ‘the poet of the non-place’ (2002, 153). It is 
tempting to read this choice of words as a linguistic inevitablity. Fondane is literally 
the poet of the ‘non-place’, non lieu being the title of the fragment which precedes Le 
Mal des fantômes 1942–1943 (MF 77, CO 50). The French expression in fact has 
idiomatic resonance, shaded by the English no man’s land (and such martial 
desolation is apt as a context for Fondane’s poetry) but also used in a court of law to 
signify the dropping of a trial (hence the somewhat unsatisfactory translation of case 
dismissed).  
 The ‘authorial’ je as a voice is perhaps starker in Fondane’s poetry, with its 
oneiric lyrics and prefatory or apostrophic interpellations (the ‘prefaces’ to Ulysse 
and L’Exode as well as Non lieu) than in Jabès’s books. Yet both oeuvres, against a 
backdrop of exile, ‘translate [or let slip] that vocation of the poet, to voyage across 
the world’ (Cahen 2007, 19, my translation). In Non lieu Fondane apologizes for no 
longer being what might be called ‘at home’ in poetry. In order to be true to poetry, 
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he has to leave it behind: leave its limits and break through its conventions, not so as 
to renew them in a banal sense but to admit and afford a new condition of poet-as-
exile.  
 
Quelque chose de plus puissant que moi monte en moi… me force à 
exprimer à travers le bric-à-brac des structures lyriques les moins apparentes, 
les plus dépareillées, les plus décriées, la confusion d’un esprit que hantent, 
pêle-mêle, des vœux, des présages, des superstitions, des calembours, des 
ténèbres et des essences.  
 
[Something more powerful than me rises within me… compels me to use a 
medley of the most unrelated, and leftover, and disparaged lyric forms to 
express the confusion of a mind haunted by such a commotion of vows, 
superstitions, puns, shadows and pure essences.]  
 
(MF 77; CO 51) 
 
This haunting is surely of a kind with the phantomatic aspects of The Book of 
Questions. Like Jabès Fondane pre-empts criticisms addressed to his formal 
‘choices’, criticisms which are ethical as well as aesthetic: the duty to communicate 
clearly and directly, the primary duty of the poet to ‘reflect’ the spirit of reality, ‘de 
chair avec l’histoire [flesh joined with history]’ (MF 77). ‘Le ridicule m’apparaît 
d’une telle expédition’, he admits of his poetic projects, ‘I see the absurdity of such 
an expedition’ (MF77, CO 51 [adapted]). When reality is so clearly incommensurate 
with words, with poetry, Fondane and Jabès cannot in good faith assume their 
homeliness. They cannot remain silent, but voices of exile impose themselves as their 
means of expression. Voices which resist straightforward narrative, interrupted by 
absences and hauntings. 
 Perhaps we are close to the impulse behind Fondane’s resumed gravitation 
towards poetry despite his philosophical concerns: a necessity to linguistically 
perform the subversions of social and intellectual authority he drew from Shestov. 
Philosophical or ‘conventional’ prose could not in fact carry out these gestures even 
when directed towards them – a peculiar version of modernist insistences on the 
indivisibility of form and content. Waldrop writes that Jabès’s texts subvert ‘authority 
of statement, of closure and linearity, the confidence in a narrative thread, continuity 




as a form of quietism, equivalent to a refusal to speak (for example in Victor Serge’s 
rebuttal to Fondane; Serge 1933). Yet for Fondane or Jabès, putting an utterance 
under interrogation is an act quite different from refusing or cancelling it. Jabès 
wrote: 
 
I don’t presume to have any answers; I ask questions… [A]nswers embody a 
certain form of power. Whereas the question is a form of non-power. But a 
subversive kind of non-power, one that will be upsetting to power. (Jabès 
1979, 51) 
 
The exile is one who takes nothing for granted. Beth Hawkins wrote the following 
words on Jabès, and his name could seamlessly be exchanged for Fondane’s: 
 
exile characterizes the postwar trauma, the divisive split between the 
idealistic humanism of the Enlightenment and the atrocities that humanity 
found itself capable of committing. We have been exiled from our own 
source of humanity, that is. In positing this equation, Jabès relies on the 
historical situation of the Jew in exile and the mythical resonance of the 
wandering Jew… the voice of the margin is the human voice, the voice that 
we all share in a world so deeply betrayed by and cut off from its own sense 




Questioning the image still acknowledges its power. 
 
(Waldrop 2003, 143) 
 
Although their works represent two different poetic universes, is there something 
uncanny in Jabès’s mature poems first appearing in France at the very end of 
Fondane’s life? The Yukel who haunts the Book of Questions is also a ghost of 
Fondane, as well as a ghost of another Jabès who ‘could have been that man’: 
‘J’aurais pu être cet homme’ (Jabès 1963, 73). An astonishing aspect of both writers’ 
texts is the way in which the exilic experiences of Judaism comes to be extended to 
all of humanity. The metaphysical – and so often literal – experience of rootlessness, 
the anxiety of patrie, is a key facet of the phantasmatic effects of modernity. ‘Je n’ai 
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pas de pays. Je suis Yukel Serafi dont la vie est l’histoire’(Jabès 1963, 72).39 When 
individual lives are reduced to history, history is terribly inadequate in its 
representations. Fondane’s poetry not only saves something of him from history but 
also testifies to the absences, outlines them, refuses the narrative smoothness which 
would reduce or background them. 
 Such honouring of absence is practiced by Jabès, too, in The Book of Questions. 
But also in his earlier poetry. The lyric Chanson de l’étranger could be addressed to 
Fondane, as well as to the je which is un autre to the writer himself. I give it here 
with two translations, because I want to highlight a difference between them. 
 
Je suis à la recherche 
d'un homme que je ne connais 
pas, 
qui jamais ne fut tant moi-même 
que depuis que je le cherche. 
A-t-il mes yeux, mes mains 
et toutes ces pensées pareilles 
aux épaves de ce temps? 
Saison de mille naufrages, 
la mer cesse d’être la mer 
devenue l’eau glacée des tombes. 
Mais, plus loin, qui sait plus loin? 
Une fillette chante à reculons 
et règne la nuit sur les arbres, 
bergère au milieu des moutons. 
Arrachez la soif au grain de sel 
qu’aucune boisson ne désaltère. 
Avec les pierres, un monde se  
ronge 
d’être, comme moi, de nulle part. 
 
(Jabès 1990b, 46) 
 
I’m looking for 
a man I don’t know 
who's never been more myself 
than since I started to look for him. 
Does he have my eyes, my hands 
and all those thoughts like 
flotsam of time? 
Season of a thousand wrecks, 
the sea no longer a sea, 
but an icy watery grave. 
Yet farther on, who knows how it 
goes on? 
A little girl sings backward 
and nightly reigns over trees 
a shepherdess among her sheep. 
Let us wrench thirst from the grain  
of salt no drink can quench. 
Along with the stones, a whole world  
                                                      eats 
its heart out, being 
from nowhere, like me. 
 
(translated by Rosmarie 
Waldrop, Jabès 1991a, 71) 
 
I am seeking  
a man I do not know, 
who was never so much myself 
as now I look for him. 
 
39 Waldrop translates this statement as ‘I have no country. I am Yukel Serafi and my life is the story’ 
(Jabès 1991b, 68) but ‘whose life is history’ is also possible. Fondane’s philosophical understanding of 





Has he my eyes, my hands 
and all these thoughts that are 
like the wreckage of our time? 
Season of a thousand shipwrecks, 
the sea is no longer the sea, 
becomes the icy water of the graves. 
But, further, who knows further? 
A little girl sings 
and night reigns over the trees, 
shepherdess among the sheep. 
Tear thirst from the grain of salt 
no drink quenches. With the stones, 
a world eats its heart out 
from being, like myself, nowhere. 
 
(translated by Anthony Rudolf, Jabès 2013, 13) 
 
 
Not only could it have been addressed to Fondane, it is so similar in style and 
imagery to some of his lyrics that it could have been written by him. The je under 
exploration and interrogation, the juxtaposition of the simplest physical connections 
to the world – yeux, mains – with thought, the shipwrecks and icy waters, the 
irruption at once surreal and archaic of the bucolic, the thirst, the stones and the 
contradiction, primary among many, of being from nulle part (the non lieu), all of 
these are found at close quarters to each other throughout Le Mal des fantômes.  
 Both poets’ works are prickly, mixing the abstract and the everyday so as to 
draw the reader deeper while simultaneously evading them. With Jabès the simplicity 
of ‘my eyes, my hands’ unfolds into a sea ‘that is no longer a sea’; real seas and the 
seas of time and of the poem are confused. L’Exode contains similar juxtapositions of 
the intimacy of the body with the overwhelming vastness of seas. The ‘entrailles 
lâches [cowardly innards]’ of one of its nameless speakers is opposed by ‘le vent du 
large [the wind from the open]’ while ‘la soif elle-même fond [thirst itself melts]’ 
(MF 175). Fondane’s own Chanson de l’émigrant (MF 36–38) shares with Chanson 
de l’étranger a metre that teeters and bobs around the octosyllablic – tanguer, the 
French might say, pitching a little, like a boat, unable to have solid ground under its 
feet. The surreal images and rug-pulling abstractions in Fondane’s poetry prickled 
sharply in my experiences of translating it (see CO 137–175), and with Jabès, too, 
translation works as a kind of hermeneutics. Anthony Rudolf highlights the slightly 
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uncanny aspects (unheimlich, the home disturbed) – caught between traditional and 
modern – of both the metre and imagery in his decision to explicitly avoid translating 
the thorny à reculons in the twelfth line of Chanson de l’étranger, leaving a 
hemistich-sized gap which resonates with the poem’s images of absence.40  
 As well as paralleling each other in ocean imagery, Jabès and Fondane also 
draw extensively, of course, on their own Jewish heritage for their imagery of exile. 
Race, frère, pain, sel, the ‘vertigo’ of seeking God and self-knowledge (Waldrop 
2002, 129–130, MF e.g. 131, 174), the cri and the soif appear repeatedly, vibrate with 
such overtones that the two poets’ works seem almost to interpenetrate when read 
together. It is simply remarkable that Fondane should be writing so reflexively on the 
wave of catastrophe he was caught up in even as it broke, seeming to respond to 
Jabès despite preceding him. Jabès, writing in the aftermath of that wave and during 
his own literal exile, turned like Fondane to that most Jewish of motifs, the desert, the 
categorical non lieu, extended, as in his lost contemporary’s poetry, to encompass the 
exile of all humanity from God.41 ‘We walk along the fringe of the desert’, writes 
Jabès in the Book of Yukel, ‘along a solitude with the profile of a river where our 
thirst finds the strength to face the thirst to come’. (Jabès 1991b, 181). And Fondane, 
in Ulysse: 
 
seul le désert avait de quoi calmer  
                                           ma soif 
j’avais besoin d’un monde sans 
horizon ni fin  
 
only the desert could calm  
                            my thirst 
I needed a world without 




The desert appears again and again throughout Le Mal des fantômes. These lines, 
walking together with those of Jabès, encapsulate the paradoxes which the two 
writers were able to sustain: the desert which ‘calms’ thirst though it does not quench 
it; the tension between the anguish of exile and the desire for boundless freedom. 
 
 
40 Waldrop’s backward is justifiable but utterly different to the strong possibility of the idiomatic 
reluctantly. I do not have margin to further develop a comparative analysis of the two translations here 
but include both for the reader’s attention.  
41 Olivier Salazar-Ferrer points out that there may a resonance between this use of the desert and 





By Way of the Word 
 
For Fondane and Jabès, exile also takes place in and is conditioned by writing, which 
refers to that which is not present. Whereas (Riding) Jackson’s universalism contains 
an implicit rejection of Jewishness and seems to target a finality of utterance, 
incompleteness and particularity are honoured in their work to subversive effect. 
Hawkins reads Kafka, Celan and Jabès with reference to the Jewish Midrash, ‘a 
method that… privileges absence over presence… [it is] potentially subversive’ 
(2003, xiv-xv). The Midrash ‘encourages and promotes interpretation and digression 
from the written text’ and yet paradoxically affirms the value of the text in doing so: 
in ‘illuminat[ing] the gaps or spaces in the biblical text’ it ‘grants a certain primacy 
and legitimacy….this “enunciation”, in other words, has inspired further 
commentary’ (ibid.). A subversion that is also affirmatory in and of its own 
utterances. In the absence (Riding) Jackson seeks to fill with maximal meaning, 
Fondane and Jabès use God as a placeholder for the uncircumscribed possibilities of 
both human freedom and human responsibility. While Fondane strains against moral 
codification, there is a kind of responsibility entailed by the Levinasian, pre-
theoretical ethical relation proffered in the act of his poetry. 
 Between preexisting meaning and idiolectic indecipherability, Fondane and 
Jabès’s utterances take place in the ‘space of negation’ (Hawkins 2003, xv) where 
original creation negotiates with the sense beyond the self. Waldrop describes the 
paradox of the writer who is conscious of both the preexisting semiotic currency of 
their utterances and their (always insufficient) creative attempt to extend and renew 
it: ‘the “book”… is both read by the writer and is unavailable, absent, unknown’ 
(Waldrop 2002, 142). In this negotiation with reality through the useful and 
inadequate medium of language, the poem contains not so much revelations as hopes. 
Waldrop cites from Elya: 
 
Jamais le livre, dans son actualité, ne se livre.42 
 
 
42 Waldrop’s translation: ‘The book never actually surrenders.’ 
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What, then is this initial word? Maybe an unbearable absence of the word 
which the word will, unbeknownst to us, come to fill by exposing itself. 
(Waldrop 2002, 142) 
 
Jabès’s ‘book’ of life which never gives itself up, never confides what it has to 
confide in its full actuality, is paralleled by Fondane’s édition sans fin [endless 
editions (or versions)]. Fondane came to the position that the text is never finalized, 
never complete: ‘he never stopped reworking his texts, endlessly rewriting them’, 
Monique Jutrin reminds us (Jutrin 2014, my translation).43 Poetry seems to gain 
traction from its ability to actualize the lack of ‘actuality’, to subvert the apparent end 
of the text. ‘Only the poet’, argues Didier Cahen, 
 
knows how to approach the void by way of the word, only they know how to 
compromise with the impossibility of saying anything [or nothing]. In the 
game of questions, the writer does not interrogate in order to seize the 
incomprehensible and render it comprehensible, but to inscribe its 
impossible story between the lines of the book, to make it heard in the 
silences of creation. (Cahen 2007, 65, my translation) 
 
In continuing to write poetry without holding faith in it, at least as ‘un univers 
autonome [an autonomous universe]’, Fondane aligns with what Waldrop refers to as 
Jabès’s ‘passionate questioning’: ‘dans quelle mesure un poète ment-il, dans quelle 
mesure dit-il la vérité; dans quelle mesure imite-t-il, ou modifie-t-il la réalité [in what 
measure does the poet lie, in what measure does he tell the truth; in what measure 
does he imitate or modify reality]’(Fondane 1996a, 22). Anne Van Sevenant argues 
that ‘Fondane's aesthetics is one of finitude and failure; it makes us sensitive to 
artistic creation as being an irremediable shortcoming’; this is not nihilistic but 
‘underlines the fact that man [sic] finds himself each time again before new 
challenges’ (Van Sevenant 2007). 
 
43 She cites an unpublished 1944 letter Fondane wrote to the translator of Shestov, Boris de Shloezer: 
‘Mais le moyen d’avoir une pensée FINIE sur quoi que ce soit! J’ai écrit sur mon manuscrit d’Ulysse: 
Edition sans Fin, et cela est vrai de tous mes bouquins. J’ai envie de tout recommencer à l’infini; 
heureusement qu’il y a les revues, l’édition et la mort, en fin de compte, pour mettre un terme 
provisoire à ces travaux de Sisyphe.’ 
[But the way to have a FINISHED thought on anything at all! I wrote, on my manuscript of Ulysse, 
Endless edition, and that is true of all my books. I have an infinite wish to begin everything again; it’s 





 Fondane wrote in the ruins of language, without faith in the perfectibility of 
utterance, between the word and the cry. In ‘looking forward’, Jabès also carried out 
‘a passionate crying out […] against not communicating. A passionate questioning of 
language […] staking his whole life on the word, on his call for a little light out of the 
overwhelming darkness. Out of our great need. Out of our wounds’ (Waldrop 2002, 
155). This existential resonance cannot be reduced to a response to the Holocaust, 
though it is informed by it. Jabès’s struggle with language, combined with the 
bravery of the continued attempt at speaking, provides an excellent parallel with 







As a writer, Benjamin Fondane was concerned with truths beyond the grasp of 
syllogism. In his philosophical essays, as even some of his advocates have pointed 
out (Dickow 2017, 203 and Baugh 2003, 13) he was happy to read his sources in a 
very partial manner to suit the cut of his argument. Yet this does not undermine 
the intellectual depth of his work, for he was working according to his own 
criteria, which, in the case of his philosophy, sought to subvert the very criteria of 
the discipline and open gaps in it to attend to what necessarily escapes it, 
‘begin[ning] with disjointedness’, in Ann Van Sevenant’s words, with ‘the idea 
that thinking is equal to starting anew, leaving behind the illusion that one has 
found a philosophy without error for all times to come’ (Van Sevenant 2007). 
This creates a tension for the researcher: the very form of a doctoral thesis must, 
at least to some degree, enforce the limits which the totality of Fondane’s work 
fights against. It is not even a case of the academic standing outside a radical 
artistic work and analysing it in their own domain. The holistic aspect of 
Fondane’s oeuvre challenges any scholar, for Fondane has already preceded them 
in their own grounds and questioned their authority, that is, the authority of 
rational analysis.  
 To be true to Fondane, then, is to betray him: one can either contextualize 
and advocate his work using the very tools of reason whose constraints he 
consistently seeks to defy, or explicitly, committedly misrepresent him for one’s 
own purposes. It is likely that across this thesis I have done a bit of both. But I 
hope I have done so without sacrificing the analytical and intellectual depth he 
himself practiced. Against surrealists who claimed to have mastered 
contradictions by colonizing the irrational, Fondane’s ‘conscience honteuse’ 
epitomizes the unending condition of existing with reason despite its 
insufficiencies. Fondane’s ‘going on’ in these circumstances is absurd. On the one 
hand, it rejects messianism: no future salvation could ever justify the sufferings of 
the past and present. On the other, it depends on it: the limits of our reason mean 
that the impossible could always be possible.  
 Critical discourse is vital to the ongoing engagement with Fondane’s work. 
He himself continued to write philosophy as the Nazis came to their ascendancy. 
Yet his prose always points to what lies beyond it. This apophatic combination of 




deconstruction, which, as cited earlier, Bill Readings calls ‘the aesthetics, ethics 
and politics of the incommensurable’ (Readings 1991, 23). Without claiming any 
deconstructive ‘method’, in the arguments of this thesis I have aimed to work at 
the boundaries, or at least to acknowledge, such limitations and liminality. For 
Fondane discourse is ultimately better served by acknowledging its always 
already rhetorical purpose, against the idea of a transcendent realm of ideas 
superior to human existence, with language as its orderly intermediary. Ideas were 
made for man, and not man for ideas.  
 As I stated in Chapter 3, the tone of Fondane's irresignation is found not in 
technique but in affirming the necessity of speaking despite acknowledging its 
impossibility, of having something to attempt to say, 'as a singular object, not as 
an essence' (FT 29, emphasis in the original). Fondane came to perform his 
linguistic and existential irresignation in his poetry precisely because he could not 
conceptualize it in his philosophy. This is not to say that his poetry ‘transcends’ 
his philosophy — its subversions remain important, and contextualize his poetry. 
But it is in poetry that his affirmation can take place, in the address to the other 
that the self-affirmation depends upon. His Rimbaldian subversion of the self is 
nonetheless a defence of subjectivity against modernity’s idealisms, constituted in 
the relation to the other. This is at the heart of the subversive testimony performed 
by his poetry. 
 For Fondane, poetry can apophatically testify to existence and the 
experience of existing in ways philosophy cannot. This is fundamentally what led 
him to return to poetry after having lost hope in its aesthetic consolations. This 
testimony depends upon the fragile possibility of reception by a reader, who in the 
constitutive act of reading actively restitutes its origins, not comprehensively, but 
affirmatively. This address, triangulated through the irrational space — or non 
lieu — of the poem, can be thought of as a form of Achebean celebration: an 
apophatic, extra-rational affirmation of the whole of existence.1 This celebration 
does not imply a condoning of horrific aspects of existence, but does include a 
liberation of these from their suppression or instrumentalization by philosophies 
of history which claim totalizing authority.  
 
1 ‘As in Levinas’s paradoxical formulation, ‘the distance of proximity’, the relation of Self to 




The affirmation of existence in poetic celebration includes an act of absurd 
hope and commitment towards the unsayable possibility of justice, precisely in the 
act of the poem constituting itself in relation to the other. Beth Hawkins argues 
that  
 
in the vast turbulence of the first half of the twentieth century, all the 
values of Enlightenment humanism — faith in the dignity and nobility of 
the human subject, in the power of reason and rationality, in the progress 
of technology to improve the world — were shattered. Like Nietzsche’s 
madman, all three writers [Kafka, Celan and Jabès] place the burden of 
responsibility and accountability on us for the failure of these values, and 
sense that a God who can speak, who does act in history, who is 
personal, is a dangerous illusion that we have concocted in order to 
deflect such responsibility. (Hawkins 2003, xiii – xiv) 
 
L’Exode’s religious horizon may not contain any true faith in the covenant 
between God and humanity being renewed. Yet beyond the inadequacy of 
philosophy or religion when confronted with this shipwreck of values, its many 
voices stage and restage this disconsolate context with the tools of poetry: ‘si le 
Juif, seul dans l'antiquité, a témoigné de la présence effective de Dieu, du moins 
pourrait-il, dans le monde moderne, et contre le monde moderne, être seul à 
témoigner, avec la même angoisse, de l’absence de Dieu! [if the Jew, alone in 
antiquity, testified to the effective presence of God, he could at least, in the 
modern world, and against the modern world, be the one who, alone, and with the 
same anguish, testifies to the absence of God]’ (Fondane 1936 ). Hawkins’s 
statement lays out the essentially collective ramifications of this context, which 
Fondane’s anti-Humanist humanism implies and which his poetry enacts. 
 Fondane’s celebration of existence, necessarily performative and subversive 
and therefore enacted in poetry, is a kind of resistance to dehumanization, by way 
of an affirmation of what is singular through its very interconnection to what is 
plural – to the other. It acts as a kind of corrective to the inevitable, idealistic 
dream of universality, one that cannot but be dreamed, yet always contains the 
danger of imposing itself as the ‘final truth’ in one form or another. Fondane’s 
resistance is adjacent to politics: its ‘re-realization’ of existents turned into 
phantoms is not sufficient for solidarity or justice, but it is necessary. Fondane 
like everyone else can dream of a final justice, but he performs the proto-ethical 




justice. The poet does not speak for the silent, but his saying says their unsaying, 
to defend the worth of ordinary lives irrespective of the directions of history. 
 
Reading Fondane Today 
 
The continuity of the singular is born of the 
intersubjectivity that gives its substance to the 
future.  
 
(Mounic 2017, 105, note 16, my translation) 
 
This thesis offers a direct and evident contribution to Fondane studies, which are 
still in their infancy in terms of English-language publications. It traces and 
develops key areas of Fondane scholarship previously established by francophone 
and international researchers, particularly at the interstices of existential thought 
and poetry. More broadly, the research presented here intersects with a variety of 
ongoing concerns across various fields in and beyond French studies. The 
question of ‘the status of the work of art in desperate times’ (Allen 2020, 1) is one 
with traction, as William S. Allen’s recent work on Blanchot makes clear. My 
engagement with Fondane emphasizes the continuing relevance of the 
problematics he raises, promoting the status of his work in both its French context 
and its internationalism. Thus it offers fresh insights in regards to the nature of 
modernity and catastrophe, connecting to studies such as Carlos Fonseca’s The 
Literature of Catastrophe (2020) and Seth Moglen’s Mourning Modernity (2007). 
In the haunting of modernity, the question of the relationship between art and 
horror remains vital, and I have argued that Fondane’s work remains a live 
challenge to our attempts to answer it. As Holocaust studies continues to grow, 
the arguments of this thesis around the problems of expression offer relevance to 
everything from music in the camps (see Elise Pétit’s Des usages destructeurs de 
la musique dans le système concentrationnaire nazi, 2019) to cinema (see Alex J. 
Kay, 2019, on ‘speaking the unspeakable’ on film) to translation (Harris 2020; 
Munyard 2020; Harding and Nash, eds, 2019) to resistance to dehumanization 
(Cabral 2020) to the legacy of the Holocaust itself (Soulsby 2020). My treatment 
of groundlessness and exile in Fondane’s work also offers useful material for 
consideration of these eminently modern problems and their linguistic expression, 
going some way to restituting his importance alongside contemporaries such as 
Benjamin (Källgren) Beckett and Steiner (Rosell 2019) and of course Jabès and 
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other Jewish and/or Romanian émigrés (Kerr 2021; Gelber and Sjöberg, eds, 
2017; Taïeb 2012).  
Last year’s timely launch of the Journal of Avant-Garde Studies gathers 
many of the threads which run through such writing, and this thesis shows that 
Fondane’s oeuvre has much to offer considerations of both the history and future 
of the avant-garde. Gelber and Sjöberg’s centring of Jewishness in avant-garde 
studies has recently explicitly been picked up by way of Fondane in Iulia 
Dondorici’s chapter  ‘Redefining and Integrating Jewish Writers into the Study of 
Historical Avant-Garde(s)’ in the new book Disseminating Jewish Literatures 
(Zepp et al, eds, 2020) and this thesis offers groundwork for anyone siting 
Fondane in terms of ‘how Jewish studies and avantgarde studies may benefit 
reciprocally from each other’ (Gelber and Sjöberg, eds, 2017, 12). This thesis has 
also underlined Fondane’s role as interpreter and developer of an understanding of 
modernity as catastrophe generated by nineteenth-century French poets such as 
Baudelaire, Lautréamont and Rimbaud, an understanding which continues to be 
absorbed, in relation to everything from philosophy (Acquisto 2013) to the 
pandemic (Elhariry 2021). It also contributes to the work of coordinating the 
poetics of modernist avant-gardes, including in their French and transnational 
contexts (Gumbrecht 2012), in their trans-genre and multimedia aspects (see 
Ksenofontova 2020, who discusses Fondane’s filmic writing) and in terms of the 
interpenetration of art and politics (Nohendon 2020; Spiteri and Lacoss, eds, 
2003). 
 In 2013 Joseph Acquisto argued that ‘French poetry studies are at an 
important crossroads […] Recent years […] have seen a renewed interest in lyric 
poetry among literary critics whose work intersects with philosophy’ (Acquisto 
2013, 1). Acquisto’s own subsequent research highlights the significance of 
Fondane for this move (as well as for the boundary between modernism and 
theology: see Domestico 2017), and this thesis represents the first prolonged 
engagement of this kind with his work to appear in English. In its exploration of 
uses of form in modernism, it can bolster current work such as Jeff Barda’s 
Experimentation and the Lyric in Contemporary French Poetry (2019), as well as 
(to name a few) Benhaïm et al, eds, 2020; Thain 2019, Probstein 2017 and 
Hermans 2014. 
Who are we readers today, who may participate in the performance of 




its address to the hommes des antipodes. At one level, the men of the antipodes 
may be his friends in Argentina, receiving a message across space from one being 
swallowed by the wave of catastrophe, to the effect that there is still something to 
salvage, that it is never too late. At another level, they are people of a different 
time, figuring the hope of a better world to come: ‘en tant qu’homme […] il ne 
saurait que combattre le fascisme et souhaiter l’événement d’une société 
socialiste’ [as a man […] he can only fight fascism and desire the arrival of a 
socialist society’] (EDR 82; Rubens 2011, 61). We can hardly say that we live in 
the world with ‘un peu plus de justice [a bit more justice]’ (EDR 82; Rubens 
2011, 61). We too live in a time of catastrophe, not only because the undermining 
of Humanism remains unrepaired but due to the climate crisis, a catastrophe that 
leaves no space untouched.  
 Today, as in Fondane’s time, but probably with even less excuse than for 
his contemporaries, champions of faith in progress have disproportionately loud 
voices in both the political and spiritual (or imaginative) realms: discourse is 
dominated by ‘green capitalist’ technocratic solutions and a refusal to 
countenance the possibility of imminent catastrophe actually arriving. Against this 
tendency, there are theorists who attempt to think our current predicament while 
keeping in view the critiques of Enlightenment and modern values continued by 
many thinkers after Fondane. Pablo Servigne and Raphaël Stevens have initiated 
the field of ‘collapsology’, a transdisciplinary approach to acknowledging and 
preparing for societal collapse (Servigne and Stevens 2015). Amitav Ghosh, in his 
2016 book The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable, 
addresses the limits of rational thinking in reckoning with the climate catastrophe 
and centres on our collective failures of imagination. Donna Haraway (2016) 
enjoins us to ‘stay with the trouble’. Her conception of the ‘cthulucene’, with its 
emphasis on interconnectedness, makes it evident that epistemological and 
existential crises – I here intend the latter in the broadest and most literal sense – 
must be confronted together. Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing and her colleagues look at 
the possibilities for life amongst ruin (Tsing 2017). 
 These thinkers share Fondane’s territory: where are we in the midst of 
catastrophe? This territory is, in fact, the non lieu: how do we respond when the 
ground has been pulled from underneath our feet? Even if the shockwaves have 
not yet hit our personal patch, we can feel the trembling. In L’Homme devant 
l’histoire Fondane called for the humility to own our disconsolation: Eli, Eli, lema 
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sabachthani? (HDH 450). Even as we continue to seek reasoned responses to the 
calamity, an intellectual humility could temper our idealistic tendencies and 
bolster our courage in facing failure. What else could help us to go on when all 
our schemes come to naught, other than, as Jabès so neatly put it, ‘in the throes of 
the crisis, to preserve the question?’ (Hawkins 2003, xxiii). According to 
Haraway, inspired by Hannah Arendt, part of our task is to learn ‘how to practice 
curiosity without sadism’ (Haraway 2015), to engage with meaning without 
reducing that engagement to a domineering appropriation of knowledge. 
 Despite desperate searches for ways to undo our current environmental 
predicaments, it is not at all clear that updating Humanist values would be any 
kind of genuine solution. Significantly, many current theorists such as Haraway 
and Tsing lean towards an imaginative, rather than purely philosophical or 
scientific, practice of theory, which implicitly reaffirms the critique of Humanist 
modes of thought. In this thesis I have tied Fondane’s relationship to such critique 
to linguistic concerns. Poetry becomes crucial because it can live with the 
challenges: the unreliability of language, the tensions inherent in memory (such as 
forgetting, distorting, erasing), our subjective relationship with reality, the 
tendency of language to mask its own erasures and to devalue by omission. Poetry 
can do this because it can foreground its own ambiguities and omissions, 
unmasking them. In its novel uses of language it exposes the insufficiencies of 
language as we have been using it.  
 Against the idea of a ‘pure’ poetry that could overcome these insufficiencies 
once and for all, for Fondane these new directions ‘expand the shore of our 
ignorance’ (John Wheeler cited in Miéville 2019, 4). Poetry can say ‘look what I 
cannot say’, and in doing so in strange ways, becomes an attestation of the life 
that is beyond it, of the singular, the affective, the fleeting, everything in existence 
that cannot be captured by rational thought in the guise of language. Even the 
expression of deep sorrow which gestures towards a catastrophe, where the 
breakdown of meaning overwhelms even those directly caught up in it, 
paradoxically affirms the life of the one who performs it, and may hold the grain 
of compassion that connects that life to all others. Richter argues that ‘To write a 
pessimistic text is a thoroughly optimistic act’ (Richter 2016, 1206). 
 The role of the poet, for Fondane, is not to provide solutions. Although he 
ranges himself on the other side of the argument, he essentially agrees with Plato 




there; it can also affirm. Interconnectedness may be a problem here. For all that 
Fondane, as a philosopher, was influenced by Nietzsche, it would seem 
impossible for him, as a poet, to be ‘the eternal Yes’ (Nietzsche 2011): eternal 
recurrence, even as a philosophical motivation, is hard to sustain in the wake of 
World War and genocide. Yet poetic testimony can affirm the lives that lived 
catastrophe. If Fondane could not take on the ‘lightness’ of Nietzsche’s amor fati, 
through irresignation he could simultaneously object to the suffering of existence 
and face and live through it. Jabès wrote that ‘philosophy is incapable of taking on 
the wound’ of Auschwitz, and that ‘Jewish thought is turned towards the poetic, 
which does not mean seeking to circumscribe it — that would be futile — but 
seeking to open it’ (Jabès 1990a, 17). 
 Fondane’s philosophical writings may be guilty of Victor Serge’s charge 
that they do not prescribe a ‘gesture’ (Serge 2019). Yet his work taken as a whole, 
philosophical and artistic, is an existential reckoning with the unspoken remainder 
of philosophy (and, in many instances, of politics): the extra-rational, affective 
factors without which no act would have a motivation. Fondane’s irresignation is 
the poetic practice of carrying an absurd hope forward despite conditions of 
despair. The present of the poem is reactivated in the present of reading. For 
Fondane, poetry’s simultaneous performance of negation and affirmation resists 
abstraction. His poetics is involved in a remediation – poetry subverts our 
relationship to reality and causes us to cognitively work to rearrange it. L’Exode is 
an unsettling gift, one that ‘reaches us from outside ourselves and requires an 
acknowledgement of the other […] we are confronted with our own dependence 
on, and fundamental interrelatedness with, the other’ (Richter 2016, 1202). 
Derrida framed a meditation on the dialogic nature of language in the form of an 
imaginative dialogue: 
 
since you want to narrate your story, give testimony in your name, speak 
of what is ‘yours’ and what is not, it remains for me, one more time, to 
take your word for it. 
 
— Is that not what we always do when someone is speaking, and hence 
attesting? (Derrida 1998, 9) 
 
What is crucial about L’Exode, with its interpellations, its subversions, its 
polyphony and masks, is that it makes this context apparent. 
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 The catastrophic context of modernity, and in particular the contradictions 
which became harder to ignore post-Auschwitz, leads us to a position where, as 
Richter says in his reflections on Celan and Adorno, ‘the question of the right life 
would then have to be renegotiated and rearticulated with every new historical and 
personal situation and with every new way of feeling’ (Richter 2016, 1216). 
Fondane, following Nietzsche and Shestov, already confronted this difficult task 
in his philosophy, with its ‘metasophic’ aspirations (Finkenthal 2013, 121). But to 
do the work of that Richter calls ‘recognizing and affirming the survival of life 
itself, of life as life, of living as living on, precisely in the kind of restless and 
vigilant negotiation that living itself occasions’ (Richter 2016, 1216), Fondane 
returned to poetry. Where philosophy comments upon and critiques our 
relationship to the world, poetry hopes to mediate it: to undo ideas we may have 
come to rely upon, to open up gaps in our understanding through which we are 
called to shift our perspective.  
 Damaged life, to use Adorno’s term, is life in the ruins. Fondane defended a 
particular role for poetry in regards to this life, a role both unique and difficult to 
define. In her novella Paradises Lost, Le Guin mobilizes the ecological argument 
that ‘there is no away’ (Le Guin 2016, 707).2 This serves as an existential 
reminder as well as an ecological one: there are no worlds behind (Nietzsche 
2005, book 1, chapter 3). The importance of the immanent is doubly signified. 
The awkwardness of Fondane as something of an anti-modern modernist is 
reflected in the awkward relation between artistic modernism and ecology. This 
problem is excellently surveyed in Anne Raine’s essay ‘Modernism, Eco-anxiety, 
and the Climate Crisis’, which demonstrates that critically examining meaning 
and progress remains as urgent a task now as it was for Fondane (Raine 2019). 
 Fondane himself showed a kind of awareness which might be called 
ecological with his image of the nettle in the Préface of L’Exode. The 
interconnection of all existence is latent in this generally devalued weed, which 
also stands as a riposte to Hegel’s flower of philosophy, living only for itself and 
without justification or control. If modern poetry is often criticised for being 
without rhyme or reason, for Fondane these are the wrong criteria. For Fondane, 
irresignation only exists as poetic testimony: the act of affirming life, the 
interpellation of the other and the gesture towards the ineffable are inseparable. 
 




His writing for an afterlife turns such a project away from its usual anxiety for 
personal fame and towards an existential and cultural ecology that is attached, 
‘ever so lightly’, to material existence.3  
 As Fondane himself acknowledged in L’Homme devant l’histoire, 
catastrophe has us grasping for solid reasons to which we could cling. In his 
poetry, he instead enacts a different kind of affirmation. Poetry can affirm without 
undoing negation: because it takes the problems of representation into account in 
its saying, its making is also an unmaking, seeking to provoke us to re-mediate 
our own relation to reality, and through that process our relation to the subject of 
the poem. Fondane’s poetic testimony is analogous to Chinua Achebe’s artistic 
celebration: a celebration that is not exclusively joyful, that includes mourning, 
but that, in the absence of universal certitudes, refuses to turn away from the 
complexity of the plural plenitude of existence. Against thought’s refusal of 
contradiction, across past and future in the re-activation of the present, through an 
exploration of the back and forth between singular and multiple, self and other, 
Fondane’s speaking of ruin is a speaking from the ruins: a salvaging that reminds 
us that the unexpected may always grow anew. 
 
3 This function for poetry was greatly sharpened for Fondane by his awareness of Nazi book 
burnings and the persecution of artists in the USSR, and to my mind foreshadows the use of 
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